Cesar Hernandez Blake, Jr. v Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Moon, Judge Annunziata
and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
CESAR HERNANDEZ BLAKE, JR.
v. 	Record No. 1172-94-2 	MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 	AUGUST 1, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY
F. Ward Harkrader, Jr., Judge
Darwyn H. Lesh for appellant.
Thomas C. Daniel, Assistant Attorney General (James S.
Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for
appellee.
Upon his plea of guilty, appellant, Cesar Hernandez Blake,
was convicted of conspiracy to distribute more than five pounds
of marijuana. 	On appeal, he contends that the evidence presented
by the Commonwealth was insufficient to constitute an offense
under existing Virginia law. 	We affirm the conviction.
On November 8, 1993, appellant pled guilty to the charge of
conspiracy to distribute more than five pounds of marijuana. 	The
trial judge extensively and thoroughly questioned appellant to
ensure that his plea was being entered freely and knowingly. 	The
trial judge accepted appellant's guilty plea and the Commonwealth
presented evidence concerning the conspiracy charge. 	Appellant
agreed, "that would be the Commonwealth's evidence if it were
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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presented."
Appellant now argues that the Commonwealth's evidence "not
only does not support the plea of guilty, but has the opposite
effect by indicating that in fact no conspiracy . . . as charged
in the indictment, ever existed."
The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that the Commonwealth
is not required to present evidence to support a guilty plea.
[T]he introduction of evidence to sustain a
conviction upon a guilty plea is
. . . unnecessary in any criminal case. 	In
Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291,
296, 46 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1948), we said that
a "plea of guilty, accepted and entered by
the court, is a conviction or the equivalent
of a conviction of the offense to which it is
directed." 	And in Peyton v. King, 210 Va.
194, 196, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969), we held
that "a voluntary and intelligent plea of
guilty by an accused is, in reality, a
self-supplied conviction authorizing
imposition of the punishment fixed by law.
It is a waiver of all defenses other than
those jurisdictional."
If, as Crutchfield and King teach us, a
plea of guilty is a self-supplied conviction
of the offense to which it is directed, the
law would engage in superfluities to impose a
requirement that evidence is necessary to
sustain that which sustains itself. 	And if,
as King holds, a plea of guilty is a waiver
of all defenses save those jurisdictional,
included in the waiver is the potential
defense of lack of evidence or of
insufficiency of evidence.
In accepting a plea of guilty, any
Virginia trial judge is, of course, free to
hear the evidence he deems necessary to an
understanding of the case and to the fixing
of an appropriate sentence. 	This does not
mean, however, that evidence must be heard
upon a plea of guilty.

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Kibert v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 660, 664, 222 S.E.2d 790, 792
(1976). 	Accordingly, the appellant's plea of guilty was
sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding of guilt. 	The
Commonwealth was not required to present evidence to support
appellant's guilty plea.
Appellant's second and third issues are rendered moot by
virtue of this Court's ruling on the first issue.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.