Joan C. Raymond v Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Baker, Bray and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
JOAN C. RAYMOND
v. 	Record No. 2422-93-4 	MEMORANDUM OPINION*
BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 	MAY 30, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Gerald Bruce Lee, Judge
Sammy S. Knight (Knight & Associates, on brief),
for appellant.
Robert B. Condon, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Joan C. Raymond (appellant) appeals her conviction for
driving under the influence of alcohol (3rd offense within five
years). 	She contends that the certificates of blood alcohol
analysis (certificate[s]) admitted into evidence were not
properly attested as required by statute and were, thus,
erroneously admitted. 	We disagree.
The certificates are divided by a line running the width of
the page. 	The upper portion of the certificate sent to the
Division of Forensic Science indicates, inter alia, that the vial
of blood was received by R. D. Cook on January 7, 1993, and
examined by the same person on January 21, 1993. 	The bottom part
of the certificate reports the analysis results and beside the
____________________
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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word "TESTE" is the signature of Paul F. Ferrara, Division
Director, someone other than R. D. Cook.
The upper portion of the certificate sent to an independent
laboratory indicates that the vial of blood was received by
Hyun C. Thomason on January 11, 1993, and examined by Ruth Zapka
on January 18, 1993. 	The bottom part of the certificate reports
the analysis results and beside the word "TESTE" is the signature
of Zenaida B. Barredo, Laboratory Supervisor, someone other than
Ruth Zapka.
At trial, appellant objected to the admission of the
certificates on the ground that the attestation requirements of
Code § 19.2-187 (for admission of "material" generally) were not
met because the person who performed the analysis did not provide
an attestation. 	Appellant appears to have abandoned this
argument on appeal. 	Assuming she has not, we hold that Code
§ 19.2-187 has no relevance here as Code § 18.2-268.7 controls
the admission of blood alcohol tests specifically. 	See Thurston
v. City of Lynchburg, 15 Va. App. 475, 478-79, 424 S.E.2d 701,
703 (1992). 	Appellant now asserts that the attestation
requirements of Code § 18.2-268.7 were not fulfilled. 	In
pertinent part, it requires that:
[T]he [Division of Forensic Science] Director
shall execute a certificate indicating the
name of the accused; the date, time and by
whom the blood sample was received and
examined; a statement that the seal on the
vial had not been broken or otherwise
tampered with; a statement that the container

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and vial were provided by the Division and
that the vial was one to which the completed
withdrawal certificate was attached; and a
statement of the sample's alcohol . . .
content. . . .
. . . [T]he certificate of analysis,
with the withdrawal certificate attached,
shall, when attested by the Director, be
admissible in any court . . . .
(Emphasis added). 	Appellant's sole argument rests upon her
conclusion that the dividing line running the width of the
certificates renders each certificate two separate documents.
Under such a rendering, the director would have attested to only
some of the requirements under Code § 18.2-268.7. 	This issue was
advanced for the first time in appellant's brief and is barred
from our review. 	Rule 5A:18. 	Otherwise, appellant finds no
fault with the admitted certificates. 	Nor do we. 	The
Commonwealth has met the attestation requirements of Code
§ 18.2-268.7.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Affirmed.