Juanita A. Whittaker v Roanoke Co. DSS

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
JUANITA A. WHITTAKER MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 1650-98-3 	PER CURIAM
DECEMBER 15, 1998
ROANOKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY
Diane McQ. Strickland, Judge
(Joseph F. Vannoy, on brief), for appellant.
Appellant submitting on brief.
(Joseph B. Obenshain, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 	Appellee
submitting on brief.
Juanita A. Whittaker (mother) appeals the decision of the
circuit court terminating her parental rights to her daughter.
Mother contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding that
Roanoke County Department of Social Services (DSS) presented
clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support terminating
her parental rights; and (2) finding that it was in the child's
best interests for mother's parental rights to be terminated. 	We
conclude that this appeal is without merit. 	Accordingly, we
affirm the decision of the trial court.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.

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consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development, 13 Va. App.
123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991).
"In matters of a child's welfare, trial
courts are vested with broad discretion in
making the decisions necessary to guard and
to foster a child's best interests." 	The
trial court's judgment, "when based on
evidence heard ore tenus, will not be
disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it."
Id. (citations omitted). 	"Code § 16.1-283 embodies 'the
statutory scheme for the . . . termination of residual parental
rights in this Commonwealth' [which] . . . 'provides detailed
procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents and
their child,' balancing their interests while seeking to preserve
the family." 	Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d
538, 540 (1995) (citations omitted).
Code § 16.1-283(B) provides that the residual parental
rights of a parent of a child found by the court to be neglected
or abused may be terminated if the court finds that it is in the
child's best interests, that the neglect or abuse presents a
serious and substantial threat to the child's life, health or
development, and that it is not reasonably likely that the
conditions resulting in the neglect or abuse can be substantially
corrected or eliminated to allow the child's safe return within a
reasonable period of time. 	See Code § 16.1-283(B)(1) and (2).
Proof that the parent, without good cause, failed to respond to
or follow through with "appropriate, available and reasonable

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rehabilitative efforts on the part of social . . . or other
rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce, eliminate or prevent
the neglect or abuse" is prima facie evidence that the underlying
conditions cannot be substantially corrected or eliminated. 	Code
§ 16.1-283(B)(2)(c).
The trial court found that the child was emotionally abused
and neglected by her parents and placed in foster care by court
commitment. 	The evidence proved that the child, who was ten
years old at the time of the hearing, suffered serious neglect
and emotional abuse at the hands of her parents. 	She was placed
in foster care three separate occasions between 1994 and 1997.
The 1997 placement followed an incident of domestic violence
which occurred while mother was intoxicated. 	The child was
diagnosed as suffering from severe depression and post-traumatic
stress disorder. 	She repeatedly engaged in self-destructive acts
and expressed thoughts of suicide. 	She also displayed
threatening and sexually inappropriate behaviors in her foster
homes. 	While the evidence suggested that the child had suffered
sexual abuse while in the parents' custody, the trial court found
insufficient evidence to prove that the parents were the
perpetrators of the sexual abuse. 	The child's severe emotional
problems and resulting behavior made it necessary to place her in
a residential treatment facility. 	Her prognosis was described as
highly guarded.
The trial court also found that DSS provided significant

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services to the parents. 	Those services included parenting skill
classes, family and individual counseling, anger management
classes, alcohol abuse treatment, and offers of assistance with
employment. 	The family had a history of domestic violence and
alcohol abuse. 	Mother declined specific offers of in-home
services and treatment for the child at a time when medical
professionals indicated it was necessary to provide those
services as soon as possible. 	Mother also declined alcohol abuse
treatment.
The record fully supports the trial court's finding that DSS
proved by clear and convincing evidence that the neglect and
emotional abuse suffered by the child presented a serious and
substantial threat to her life, health and development and that
it was not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted
in the neglect and abuse could be substantially corrected or
eliminated so as to allow the child's safe return to mother
within a reasonable period of time.
Best Interests of the Child
Mother contends that, because the child's likelihood of
adoption is poor, DSS failed to prove that termination of
mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests. 	We
disagree. 	The trial court noted that the medical evidence
indicated that the child's mental and emotional health would
deteriorate if she saw her biological parents again. 	The trial
court found that the child's best interests required the finality

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of termination. 	Substantial, credible evidence supports the
trial court's conclusion that it was in the child's best
interests to terminate mother's parental rights.
Mother also raises an issue concerning the trial court's
consideration of the recommendation of the guardian ad litem. 	We
note that the Court Appointed Special Advocate who had worked
with the child since March 1995 recommended termination of the
parents' parental rights. 	The substitute guardian ad litem,
appointed in January 1998, never met with the child following his
appointment, and admitted that he had "no pat answer." 	The trial
court indicated it considered the concerns expressed by the
guardian ad litem. 	We find no error in the trial court's
weighing of the guardian ad litem's recommendation.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.