Scott Allen McNamara v. Carol Richter McNamara

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Frank, Clements and Haley
SCOTT ALLEN McNAMARA
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 0742-05-4 	PER CURIAM
FEBRUARY 14, 2006
CAROL RICHTER McNAMARA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Kathleen H. McKay, Judge
(Scott A. McNamara, pro se, on brief).
No brief for appellee.
Scott A. McNamara, husband, appeals the trial court’s award of spousal support to Carol R.
McNamara, wife. Husband argues on appeal the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
spousal support to wife for an undefined duration and the evidence did not support the award. Upon
reviewing the record and opening brief, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly,
we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
Background
On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
appellee as the party prevailing below. See McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 391 S.E.2d
344, 346 (1990).
Husband and wife were married on April 21, 1984. They separated in 2003 and were
divorced by final decree entered on February 23, 2005. They had three children during the
marriage.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

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At the December 18, 2004 hearing, the trial court made a number of factual findings and
addressed many of the factors of Code § 20-107.1(E) related to spousal support awards. Husband is
a plastic surgeon with an office in Washington, D.C. The trial court found that, during the marriage,
wife “devoted herself utterly to the family enterprise that was her husband’s practice.” The court
also found that wife contributed monetarily to the marriage, primarily at the beginning of the
marriage when husband was in training. Her contributions became more non-monetary when
husband began practicing medicine, although she remained “pivotal in the running of his business.”
The court noted that wife decorated husband’s office, managed office staff to promote his business,
“was instrumental in overseeing” husband’s accounts, and networked with organizations to promote
his interests.
Wife was the primary caretaker of the children during the marriage. Both parties are in their
mid-forties and presented no evidence of health issues. The parties had few marital assets. The trial
court found that the parties lived a “very extravagant lifestyle.” Wife presented evidence that she
spends $10,522 per month to maintain her household, and husband presented evidence that he
spends $8,678.19 per month to maintain his household. Wife intended to return to employment in
January 2005, earning $25,000 per year.
Husband presented evidence that his income had decreased from about $300,000 per year to
about $30,000 per year over the past ten years. However, based on the evidence presented, the trial
court imputed income of $150,000 per year to husband. The court awarded wife $40,000 of the
marital assets. The trial court also awarded wife spousal support of $3,000 per month, stating it was
wife’s “only way of any kind of security for the future at all.”

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Analysis
Code § 20-107.1(C) provides that “[t]he court, in its discretion, may decree that maintenance
and support of a spouse be made in periodic payments for a defined duration, or in periodic
payments for an undefined duration, or in a lump sum award, or in any combination thereof.”
In awarding spousal support, the chancellor must consider the
relative needs and abilities of the parties. He is guided by the . . .
factors that are set forth in Code § 20-107.1. When the chancellor
has given due consideration to these factors, his determination will
not be disturbed on appeal except for clear abuse of discretion.
Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 129, 341 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1986).
At the December 18, 2004 hearing, the trial court considered the factors of Code
§ 20-107.1(E) in making the spousal support award. The court particularly referenced the
obligations, needs, and financial resources of the parties; duration of the marriage; age and physical
condition of the parties; circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the
marriage; income and earning capacities of the parties; standard of living established during the
marriage; contributions, both monetary and non-monetary, of each party to the well-being of the
family; and the decisions regarding employment and career economics made by the parties during
the marriage and their effect on present and future earning potential. See Code § 20-107.1(E).
As we stated in Joynes v. Payne, 36 Va. App. 401, 551 S.E.2d 10 (2001), “[Code
§ 20-107.1] does not require the trial court to specify the date of termination of a spousal support
award. In fact, the language allows the trial court to order an award for an undefined duration.” Id.
at 423, 551 S.E.2d at 21. Given the economic circumstances of the parties and the improbability
that the disparity in the incomes of the parties will significantly change in the future, we cannot say
the trial court abused its discretion in its ruling. Finding no “clear abuse of discretion,” we will not
disturb the trial court’s decision.

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Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
Affirmed.