The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Joanne Walker Harris

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Frank, McClanahan and Petty
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
THE GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY AND
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 0882-09-3 	JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY
DECEMBER 8, 2009
JOANNE WALKER HARRIS
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
James A.L. Daniel (Martha White Medley; Daniel, Medley & Kirby,
P.C., on brief), for appellants.
Philip B. Baker (Sanzone & Baker, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
On March 25, 2009, the Workers’ Compensation Commission issued an opinion
reversing the deputy commissioner and holding that “[t]he [employee] failed to show, with clear
and convincing evidence, that her [carpal tunnel syndrome] arose out of and in the course of her
employment.” In addition, the commission further stated that Joanne Walker Harris reasonably
marketed her residual work capacity. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and Liberty
Insurance Corporation (collectively referred to as the “employer”) appealed and contend that the
commission erred when it determined that Harris reasonably marketed her residual work
capacity. Because the employer is not an aggrieved party, we do not have jurisdiction to address
this issue.1
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1 While we recognize that employee has also appealed the same final decision of the
commission, employer’s appeal is a separate and distinct appeal and it is not an additional
question presented under Rule 5A:21(b). As a result, employer’s appeal must meet our
jurisdictional requirements on it own and cannot rely on the employee’s appeal to supplement
jurisdiction.

- 2 -
Employer argues that the commission erred in determining that Harris had reasonably
marketed her residual work capacity. However, that determination was secondary to the
commission’s determination that Harris’ carpal tunnel syndrome was a noncompensable ordinary
disease of life as defined in Code § 65.2-401. The net effect of the commission’s determination
regarding Harris’ marketing efforts is nil. It had no effect on the outcome of the case, and the
employer prevailed because the commission decision concluded that the disease was
noncompensable.
“It is well established that the ‘Court of Appeals of Virginia is a court of limited
jurisdiction. Unless a statute confers jurisdiction in this Court, we are without power to review
an appeal.’” Randolph v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 166, 170, 609 S.E.2d 84, 86 (2005)
(quoting Canova Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. LMI Ins. Co., 22 Va. App. 595, 599, 471 S.E.2d 827,
829 (1996)). According to Code § 17.1-405, our appellate jurisdiction is limited to appeals
brought by an “aggrieved party . . . from [a]ny final decision of the Virginia Workers’
Compensation Commission.” (Emphasis added). ‘“The word “aggrieved” in a statute
contemplates a substantial grievance and means a denial of some personal or property right, legal
or equitable, or imposition of a burden or obligation upon the petitioner different from that
suffered by the public generally.’” Commonwealth v. Harley, 256 Va. 216, 218, 504 S.E.2d 852,
853 (1998) (quoting Virginia Beach Beautification Comm’n v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va.
415, 419-20, 344 S.E.2d 899, 902-03 (1986)). Here, employer lacks a substantial grievance and
has not been denied any legal or equitable personal right or property right. Further, the
commission did not impose any burden or obligation on the employer because of its
marketability determination. Therefore, we hold that employer is not an aggrieved party under
Code § 17.1-405 and we lack jurisdiction to decide the question presented. Thus, we dismiss.
Dismissed.