Chesapeake Hospital v. Commonwealth

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CHESAPEAKE HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, D/B/A
CHESAPEAKE GENERAL HOSPITAL
v. 	Record No. 002813
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION
OPINION BY
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO
November 2, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION
v. Record No. 002820
CHESAPEAKE HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, D/B/A
CHESAPEAKE GENERAL HOSPITAL
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
Frederick H. Creekmore, Judge
On April 3, 1997, the Commonwealth of Virginia, Department
of Taxation (the Department) issued a notice of assessment to
Chesapeake Hospital Authority, d/b/a Chesapeake General Hospital
(the Hospital), for use tax on the cost of certain food prepared
and served by the Hospital during the assessment period
beginning December 1, 1993, and ending November 30, 1996. 	The
Hospital filed an administrative application for correction of
erroneous assessment with the Tax Commissioner pursuant to Code
§ 58.1-1821. 	On May 19, 1998, the Tax Commissioner issued a
determination letter upholding the assessment. 	The Hospital
paid the assessment under protest and filed an application in

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the trial court for correction of the assessment pursuant to
Code § 58.1-1825.
The trial court held the assessment was erroneous and, in a
final order entered August 30, 2000, awarded the Hospital
judgment for $28,487.98, representing the amount of the
erroneous tax plus interest collected for the assessment period.
We awarded the Department this appeal.
In Record No. 002820, the Department seeks reversal of the
trial court's award of judgment to the Hospital. 	In Record No.
002813, the Hospital seeks a ruling that the trial court erred
in refusing to hold that interest on the judgment should be
compounded daily. 	Finding that the trial court did not err in
either respect, we will affirm its judgment.
The record shows that the Hospital's dietary department
purchases raw food and ingredients, and the Department agrees
there is "no taxation" on these purchases. 	The dietary
department prepares meals and serves them to patients, and the
Department concedes the furnishing of meals to patients is
exempt from sales and use tax. 	The dietary department operates
a cafeteria and a catering service and collects sales tax on the
food sold to physicians, employees, and others.
The dietary department also prepares food and serves it
free of charge, without collecting sales tax, at meetings of
members of the medical staff, the Process Improvement Committee,
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and the Hospital Authority, as well as at annual banquets
recognizing volunteers. 	In these situations, the Hospital uses
an accounting entry called "dietary transfers" to record the
value of the food transferred to the different departments of
the hospital, and it was upon these dietary transfers that the
Department based its assessment of April 3, 1997.
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The assessment was imposed pursuant to Code § 58.1-604,
which provides in pertinent part that "[t]here is hereby levied
and imposed in addition to all other taxes and fees now imposed
by law, a tax upon the use or consumption of tangible personal
property in this Commonwealth." 	The use tax imposed by Code
§ 58.1-604 "applies to the use, consumption or storage of
tangible personal property in Virginia when the Virginia sales
or use tax is not paid at the time the property is purchased."
23 VAC 10-210-6030.
The Department and the Hospital join issue on whether the
latter's "claims derive from similar statutory language
exempting from taxation 'tangible personal property for use or
consumption by' a political subdivision (Va. Code § 58.1-
609.1(4)) or a nonprofit hospital (Va. Code § 58.1-609.7(4))."1
1 Classifying itself as a "food service operator," the
Hospital also claims it is entitled to an exemption for food
that restaurants and food service operators furnish to
employees. Code § 58.1-609.3(7); 23 VAC 10-210-930(C). 	However,
the Code section limits the exemption to "[m]eals furnished by
restaurants or food service operators to employees as a part of
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The Department agrees that food is tangible personal property
within the meaning of both the statute imposing the tax and the
statutes providing the exemptions. 	The Department also agrees
that the Authority is a political subdivision of the
Commonwealth, created by the General Assembly "to provide
improved medical care and related services" to "the residents of
the City of Chesapeake and such other persons who might be
served by the Authority." 	1966 Va. Acts ch. 271 as amended by
1987 Va. Acts ch. 396. 	Finally, the Department agrees that the
Hospital provides its services on a nonprofit basis and is
exempt from federal and state income tax.
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In its first assignment of error, the Department asserts
that "[t]he Circuit Court erred by failing to give the
Department's rulings and policy proper deference by ignoring the
Department's long-standing administrative interpretation."2 The
wages." 	(Emphasis added.) 	There is no showing that the food
the Hospital furnished free to its employees was a part of
wages.
2 Under this assignment of error, the Department argues on
brief that the trial court erred in failing to give the actions
of the Tax Commissioner proper deference by ignoring a 1997
amendment to Code § 58.1-609.4(2), related to an exemption in
favor of colleges and other institutions of learning. 	As
amended, the Code section grants an exemption from sales or use
tax for "[t]angible personal property for use or consumption by
a college or other institution of learning, including food
purchased for free distribution at the facilities of the college
or other institution of learning." 	(Italics added to show new
language.) 	The Department argues that "without the inclusion of
similar language in the hundreds of other statutory exemptions
that exempt 'tangible personal property for use or consumption
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Department argues that, to provide the proper deference, the
trial court should have given "great weight" to the published
rulings of the Tax Commissioner on questions similar to the
issue presented here.
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3 Throughout its opening brief, the
Department repeatedly asserts that the actions of the Tax
Commissioner are entitled to a heightened level of deference,
resulting in judgment in the Department's favor.
by [an exempt entity]' the General Assembly has acquiesced in
the restrictive interpretation applied to them by the Tax
Commissioner." 	While it is doubtful the Department properly
preserved this argument below, there is no doubt the
Department's assignment of error is inadequate to encompass the
argument. 	"The purpose of assignments of error is to point out
the errors with reasonable certainty in order to direct this
court and opposing counsel to the points on which appellant
intends to ask a reversal of the judgment, and to limit
discussion to these points." 	Harlow v. Commonwealth, 195 Va.
269, 271, 77 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1953). 	No one reading the
Department's first assignment of error could possibly know to
respond to an argument related, not to the deference allegedly
due the actions of the Tax Commissioner, but to the non-action
of the General Assembly, requiring an examination of "hundreds
of other statutory exemptions." 	Rule 5:17(c).
3 The Department also argues that a long-standing and
consistent published interpretation of a tax statute by the Tax
Commissioner is "entitled to much greater weight because the
legislature is presumed to be cognizant of the interpretation
and to have acquiesced therein." 	The difficulty with this
argument is that the Tax Commissioner has not been consistent in
his rulings on questions similar to the issue presented here,
and the Department concedes as much. 	In response to the
Hospital's citation of the Tax Commissioner's inconsistencies,
the Department states that "[t]o the extent that these citations
are intended to show conflicting or confusing holdings, they
attack the persuasiveness of the published rulings, not the fact
that the Tax Commissioner has made a policy, published the
policy, and vigorously enforced that policy for many years."
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The Department emphasizes one of the Tax Commissioner's
published rulings, P.D. 95-70 (April 3, 1995).
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4 In this ruling,
the Tax Commissioner denied a hospital an exemption for
"[i]nternal accounting charges for catered meals provided by the
hospital's food service division to various hospital departments
for staff meetings, board meetings, [and] technical and
educational meetings . . . because the hospital exercises no
control over the consumption of such meals." 	Further, in P.D.
95-70 and in his determination letter upholding the assessment
in this case, the Tax Commissioner relied "heavily" on an
opinion of the Attorney General of Virginia which, according to
the determination letter, stated that "catered meals purchased
by the state with public funds and consumed by guests attending
a conference hosted by the state [did not] warrant exemption."
Citing 1969-1970 Att'y Gen.Ann.Rep. 291.5
Responding, the Hospital points out that "[o]n July 1,
1980, § 58.1-205 became effective and codified the effects of
regulations, rulings, and administrative interpretations of the
Tax Department." 	The Code section provides as follows:
4 Although P.D. 95-70 was not published until April 3, 1995,
the Department seeks to use it retroactively to uphold the
assessment against the Hospital for the 1993 use tax the
Hospital claims is erroneous.
5 The relevance of P.D. 95-70 and the Attorney General's
opinion is questionable. 	Both relate to "catered meals," which
are not involved in this case. 	Here, the Hospital purchases raw
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In any proceeding relating to the interpretation or
enforcement of the tax laws of this Commonwealth, the
following rules shall apply:
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1. Any assessment of a tax by the Department shall be
deemed prima facie correct.
2. Any regulation promulgated as provided by subsection B
of § 58.1-203 shall be sustained unless unreasonable or
plainly inconsistent with applicable provisions of law.[6]
3. Rulings issued in conformity with § 58.1-203 and
published as provided in § 58.1-204 shall be accorded
judicial notice.[7]
4. In any proceeding commenced under §§ 58.1-1821, 58.1-
1824 or 58.1-1825 before January 1, 1985, unpublished
rulings and other administrative interpretations which are
documented and established by competent evidence to have
been in effect prior to July 1, 1980, shall be accorded
judicial notice and shall be given such weight as the
reviewing authority deems appropriate. 	In all proceedings
commenced after such date, such rulings and interpretations
shall be subject to the provisions of subsection 5.[8]
5. Rulings and administrative interpretations other than
those described in subsections 2, 3 and 4 shall not be
admitted into evidence and shall be accorded no weight,
except that an assessment made pursuant to any such ruling
or interpretation shall be entitled to the presumption of
correctness specified in subsection 1.
food and ingredients and uses them in preparing and serving the
meals involved in the dietary transfers.
6 Subsection B of Code § 58.1-203 provides in pertinent part
that "notice of a proposed regulation shall appear at least
sixty days in advance of the date prescribed for submittals."
7 Code § 58.1-204(4) provides that the Department shall
publish "[a]ny written ruling or other interpretation of
Virginia law which the Tax Commissioner believes may be of
interest to taxpayers and practitioners."
8 Code § 58.1-1821 applies to "Application to Tax
Commissioner for correction," § 58.1-1824 applies to "Protective
claim for refund," and § 58.1-1825 applies to "Application to
court for correction of erroneous or improper assessment of
state taxes generally."
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2 	The Hospital says "[t]his statute does not afford the Tax
Commissioner's rulings great weight."	3
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The Department's reply brief consists of a set of confusing
statements of the Department's position concerning the effect of
the enactment of Code § 58.1-205. 	The Department says on the
one hand that Code § 58.1-205 "is silent about the weight to be
given published rulings" and that the "rulings are not cited as
persuasive authority." 	On the other hand, the Department states
that "[t]he Court must analyze the published rulings to
determine the appropriate weight in the same manner as before
the enactment of § 58.1-205," meaning, of course, to give the
rulings "great weight," as we did before 1980. 	See Virginia	13
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Dept. of Taxation v. Progressive Community Club, Inc., 215 Va.
732, 739, 213 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1975) (construction of statute by
state official charged with its administration entitled to great
weight).
Further, the Department says that the statute is also
silent "as to the weight to be given a policy published in
anything other than a regulation." 	Even so, the Department says
that "the court determines the appropriate weight based on
principles developed and applied over the years," meaning,
again, to give the policies pre-Code § 58.1-205 "great weight."
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Finally, the Department states that "an unpublished policy
is inadmissible and entitled to no weight." 	The Department
immediately turns around and says that upon the review of an
"assessment based on an unpublished policy . . . the views of
the Tax Commissioner are entitled to great weight."
It is true, as the Department points out, that since Code
§ 58.1-205 was adopted in 1980, this Court has in four cases
cited the "great weight" level of deference allegedly due the
actions of the Tax Commissioner. 	Virginia Dept. of Taxation v.	9
Blanks Oil Co., 255 Va. 242, 244, 498 S.E.2d 914, 915 (1998),
involved a regulation issued by the Tax Commissioner, and the
parties to this controversy agree such a regulation is entitled
to great weight.
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Carr v. Forst, 249 Va. 66, 69, 453 S.E.2d 274,
276 (1995), and
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Virginia Dept. of Taxation v. Delta Air Lines,	14
Inc., 257 Va. 419, 426, 513 S.E.2d 130, 133 (1999), involved
published rulings.
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City of Winchester v. American Woodmark	16
Corp., 250 Va. 451, 458, 464 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1995), merely
noted that the Tax Commissioner, "[s]ince 1950, . . . has
opined" a certain way concerning the meaning of the phrase
"machinery and tools."
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However, in none of these cases was the issue of the effect
of the enactment of Code § 58.1-205 raised, discussed, or
decided. 	Hence, the principles of stare decisis do not
foreclose inquiry into the issue of the Code section's effect
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upon the level of deference due the actions of the Tax
Commissioner; the question remains open.
We deal here with an assessment. 	Under any reading of Code
§ 58.1-205, an assessment is entitled to a presumption of
correctness, and nothing more. 	What the Department would have
us say is that an assessment, which under Code § 58.1-205 is
entitled to no weight other than a presumption of correctness,
gains great weight simply because it is based upon prior rulings
and policies that are, in the Tax Commissioner's view, entitled
to great weight. 	This is bootstrapping, indeed, and the
Department's attempt to have the elevated level of deference
applied to an assessment must fail in light of the fact that,
under Code § 58.1-205, the Tax Commissioner's prior rulings and
policies themselves are not entitled to great weight, unless
expressed in regulations.
In its second assignment of error, the Department states
that "[t]he Circuit Court erred by failing to strictly construe
the tax exemption for government use and for medical-related
use." 	In a letter opinion, the trial court did not state
whether it construed the exemptions strictly or liberally.
However, the Department is correct in stating that an exemption
from taxation must be strictly construed, Forst v. Rockingham	22
Poultry Mktg. Coop., 222 Va. 270, 276, 279 S.E.2d 400, 403	23
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(1981), and we shall strictly construe the "government use" and
"medical-related use" exemptions in deciding this case.
In its third assignment of error, the Department maintains
that "[t]he Circuit Court erred by failing to hold the
Assessment in this case to be prima facie correct and to place
the burden of proof of Assessment error upon the . . .
Hospital." 	This assignment of error is meritless; counsel for
the Department must not have read the trial court's letter
opinion.
In that opinion, the trial court stated as follows:
[T]he holdings of the Tax Commissioner are to be viewed as
"prima facie correct." 	Virginia Dept. of Taxation v.	12
Blanks Oil, 255 Va. 242 (1998). 	A presumption of validity
therefore attaches to the Commissioner's ruling, and the
burden is on the taxpayer to prove the ruling is contrary
to law or that the Commissioner abused his discretion and
acted unreasonably.
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Commonwealth v. Wellmore Coal, 228 Va.
149 (1984). 	Plainly, a Court should not overturn the
Commissioner's decision unless the assessment is contrary
to law, was a[n] abuse of discretion, or was the product of
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable behavior.
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Virginia	21
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Dept. of Taxation v. Lucky Stores, 217 Va. 121 (1976).
Naturally, we take the trial court at its word and hold that it
touched all the bases this assignment of error claims it missed.
Giving the assessment in question a presumption of
correctness and applying a rule of strict construction to the
exemptions the Hospital claims, we turn now to the question
whether the Hospital is entitled to the exemptions. 	The
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Department contends the Hospital is entitled to neither of the
exemptions.
The Department claims there is ambiguity created by the
interplay between the statute imposing the use tax, Code § 58.1-
604, and the statutes granting the exemptions, Code § 58.1-
609.1(4) (political subdivisions) and Code § 58.1-609.7(4)
(nonprofit hospitals). 	The Department points out that the tax
is imposed upon "the use or consumption of tangible personal
property in this Commonwealth" while the exemptions apply to the
"use or consumption [of tangible personal property] by [a
political subdivision or a nonprofit hospital]."
Use of the word "by" in the statute suggests alternative
meanings, the Department submits, including "in consequence of"
and "[t]hrough the means, act, agency or instrumentality of."
Black's Law Dictionary 201 (6th ed. 1990). 	This, in turn, the
Department says, "suggests that a use 'by' a hospital must not
only be through the act of an agent of the hospital but also in
consequence of the nature of a hospital." 	The Department then
opines that "[i]ncorporating a consequential meaning into the
word [']by['] leads to consideration of how the consumption [of
food] relates to the purpose of the hospital and the rendition
of medical services."
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These circumstances, the Department says, necessitate
resort to the Tax Commissioner's expertise to determine what
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meaning the General Assembly intended in its use of the word
"by." 	The Department points out that, in his determination
letter upholding the assessment in this case, the Tax
Commissioner stated a hospital is not entitled to exemption from
taxation on food unless that food is consumed "in connection
with the [provision of the] hospital's medical services [to its
patients]," a connection the Department asserts "is derived from
the statutory requirement that exempt tangible personal property
be used or consumed by the [Hospital]."
We disagree with the Department. 	We find no ambiguity in
the language of the statutes involved in this case. 	The General
Assembly obviously used the word "by" in the exemption statutes
rather than the word "in" as a matter of good grammar and common
sense. 	As the Hospital points out, for the General Assembly to
have used the word "in" rather than "by" in the exemption
statutes would have produced an absurdity: 	all the property
made subject to taxation under the imposition statute would have
been excluded immediately under the exemption statutes when the
plain intent was to exclude only property used or consumed by a
political subdivision or a nonprofit hospital.
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room for interpretation. 	Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321,
330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). 	And since there is no room for
interpretation, there is no foundation for the requirement the
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Tax Commissioner added when he wrote in his determination letter
in this case that, to qualify for the political subdivision and
nonprofit hospital exemptions, food must be used or consumed by
a hospital
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in connection with the provision of its medical	4
services to its patients. 	Indeed, to add the requirement
constitutes amending the exemption statutes, and neither the Tax
Commissioner nor this Court may take that action.
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See Shelor	7
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Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 479, 544 S.E.2d 345, 349
(2001).
Furthermore, we think the Hospital satisfied the
requirement that the food be "used or consumed" by exempt
entities. 	It should be noted that this requirement is in the
disjunctive, used or consumed.9 Code § 58.1-602 states that
" '[u]se' means the exercise of any right or power over tangible
personal property incident to the ownership thereof." 	The
Hospital certainly owned the food in question; it purchased the
food with its own funds. 	And one of the rights or powers it
could exercise incident to its ownership was to decide what
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9 It should also be noted that the phrase "use or
consumption" appears in both the statute imposing the tax and
the statutes providing the exemptions. 	The Department states
that, viewed in isolation, this use of the same terms "might
suggest that the exemption is coextensive with the imposition."
We think the suggestion is a strong one, indeed, bearing in
mind, of course, that the exemptions do not exclude all use or
consumption of personal property, only, as in this case, use or
consumption by selected entities.
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disposition should be made of the food, i.e., to whom it should
be served and what, if any, charge would be made therefor.
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Unlike the situation involving the catered food denied
exemption by the Tax Commissioner in P.D. 95-70, the Hospital
here purchased the food raw and prepared it before serving it at
meetings of the medical staff, the Process Improvement
Committee, and the Hospital Authority, as well as at annual
banquets recognizing volunteers. 	The Hospital exercised the
necessary degree of control over the food until the very moment
it was consumed by the chosen recipients, thus using the food in
the sense contemplated by the exemption statutes.
But, even if it were necessary to determine whether the
Hospital had consumed the food in the sense contemplated by the
exemption statutes, the result would be the same, as published
rulings of the Tax Commissioner affirm. 	For example, in P.D.
85-202 (October 28, 1985), the taxpayer, a for-profit hospital,
contracted with an independent contractor for operation of its
food service facilities. 	The contractor procured the food and
supervised its preparation and serving to the Hospital's "staff,
employees, visitors, etc.," to some of whom the food was
furnished free and to others at a price set by the Hospital.
Title to the food vested in the hospital. 	The contractor was
reimbursed for the food it purchased and also was paid a weekly
management fee. 	The Tax Commissioner allowed the hospital a
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resale exemption for the food that was sold but denied such an
exemption for food furnished "for the Taxpayer's own use,"
including "meals served to patients, 'free' meals provided to
visitors, and food furnished to the Taxpayer for special
functions." 	In such instances, the Commissioner stated, the
hospital "as
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the ultimate consumer of the food must remit the
tax." (Emphasis added.)
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10 See also P.D. 85-216 (December 9,
1985) and P.D. 97-152 (March 28, 1997).
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But, the Department argues, the food ultimately was used or
consumed "by someone other than the Hospital, e.g., employees,
physicians with staff privileges, members of the Authority, and
volunteers," and this does not constitute use or consumption by
the Hospital. 	Accordingly, the Department concludes, the
ultimate use or consumption of the food was properly taxed.
Again, we disagree with the Department. 	It should not be
necessary to say that the Hospital, being an artificial entity,
cannot use or consume the food in the sense of eating it itself.
But the Hospital can act through natural persons and, in such
manner, use or consume the food in the sense contemplated by the
exemption statutes, i.e., "in the performance of its service as	20
10 In the Brief Amicus Curiae filed in the present case,
this comment is made: 	"What is most remarkable about this
ruling is that, when necessary to collect a tax from a for-
profit hospital, the Commissioner concluded that the hospital
was the user and consumer of food under the very circumstances
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a hospital [and] its service to patients," Virginia Dept. of	1
Taxation v. Bluefield Sanitarium, 216 Va. 686, 689, 222 S.E.2d
526, 528 (1976), or, as the Department itself puts the
proposition on brief, "in furtherance of the purpose for which
the General Assembly granted the exemption."
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On this point, the Department singles out the Hospital's
volunteers for special disparagement, arguing as follows: "[T]he
evidence clearly showed that the annual volunteer banquet was
not patient-care oriented, but given as a reward to encourage
volunteers. 	Volunteers do not provide medical services."
And, with respect to the dietary transfers as they related
to employees, physicians with staff privileges, and members of
the Hospital Authority, the Department has this to say: "No
medical services were provided at the meetings where the meals
were consumed. 	Some of the meetings were described as 'patient-
care oriented.' 	Under the concept of strict construction,
discussing patient care is not the equivalent of rendering
medical services."
However, the trial court made these specific factual
findings concerning employees, physicians with staff privileges,
members of the Hospital Authority, and volunteers:
The dietary transfers are provided to functions that are
essential to the Hospital's ability to carry out its
that he argues that Chesapeake General Hospital is not the user
and consumer."
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primary mission of providing quality health care. 	For
instance, . . . meals are provided to volunteers who are
actively donating their time in a function directly
involved with promoting health care. 	Feeding volunteers
who are working uncompensated to assist patients is an act
calculated to promote health care. 	Further example,
feeding Hospital Authority members, who are meeting to
discuss and conduct Hospital business, is further
calculated to promote health care.
The Court finds that indeed the dietary transfers at issue
are the type that are made directly related to the primary
issue of the Hospital's main purpose. 	The Court believes
the evidence and the record do indeed support that the
dietary transfers provided to entities such as physicians
on duty, volunteers at selected functions, and Hospital
Authority members are provided with the intent, and the
result, to promote the better efficiency of those groups
promoting health. 	The Court further finds that such groups
do indeed provide a significant function in providing
health care.
The Department has not assigned error to any of these
factual findings of the trial court. 	Accordingly, they are
binding upon this Court and conclusive of the issue whether the
Hospital's use or consumption of the food qualified the dietary
transfers for exemption from the use tax.
As noted previously, the trial court stated in its letter
opinion that "a Court should not overturn the [Tax]
Commissioner's decision unless the assessment is contrary to
law, was a[n] abuse of discretion, or was the product of
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable behavior." 	The trial
court found that the Hospital was exempt from use tax as a
matter of law, and we agree. 	Hence, the assessment in question
18

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
was "contrary to law" and properly overturned by the trial
court.
Remaining is the question raised by the Hospital concerning
the trial court's refusal to hold that interest on the judgment
awarded the Hospital should be compounded daily. 	In its final
order, the trial court awarded the Hospital interest "as
provided by Virginia Code § 58.1-15 and § 58.1-1833."
Code § 58.1-1833 provides that interest shall be allowed on
money improperly collected from and refunded to a taxpayer at a
rate equal to the rate established pursuant to Code § 58.1-15.
Code § 58.1-15 provides that interest on refunds shall be
computed at the
10
11
rate equal to the rate established pursuant to
§ 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code. 	Section 6621 of the
Internal Revenue Code provides the method for calculating the
actual interest
12
13
14
rate to be applied by taking the federal short-
term
15
rate plus percentage points. 	All these statutory
provisions deal with
16
rates of interest, not the compounding of
interest.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Section 6622 of the Internal Revenue Code does provide for
the compounding of interest daily, and the Hospital says that
since "the Virginia Code defers to the Internal Revenue Code for
the computation of interest, § 6622 necessarily applies and the
compounding of interest on a daily basis is required." 	We
disagree. 	Section 6622 of the Internal Revenue Code is not
19

referenced in Va. Code § 58.1-15, Va. Code § 58.1-1833, or
Internal Revenue Code § 6621. 	To adopt the Hospital's position
would require amending Va. Code § 58.1-15 with the addition of
the following italicized language, making it provide that
interest on refunds shall be computed at the rate equal to the
rate established pursuant to § 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code
1
2
3
4
5
6
and compounded daily pursuant to § 6622 of the Internal Revenue	7
Code. 	As indicated supra, this Court is not at liberty to amend
Code sections.
8
See Shelor Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. at 479,
544 S.E.2d at 349.
9
10
11
12
Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
13 	Affirmed.
20