George Woods v. Tina Heywood

VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 25-AP-028
109 State Street
Montpelier VT 05609-0801
802-828-4774
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-
appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

OCTOBER TERM, 2025

George Woods* v. Tina Heywood et al. } APPEALED FROM:
} Superior Court, Washington Unit,
} Civil Division
} CASE NO. 24-CV-03459
Trial Judge: Timothy B. Tomasi

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his civil complaint against defendants. We affirm.

In September 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint against the Commissioner of the
Department of Corrections (DOC), several DOC officials, and Superior Judges Thibault and
Richardson. He alleged that he was unlawfully incarcerated because his sentence was
miscalculated by the DOC, and that defendants were aware of the miscalculation and had not
corrected it. He sought damages and injunctive relief.

Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds of absolute immunity and issue preclusion.
The trial court held that because plaintiff sought to hold defendants Thibault and Richardson
liable for actions taken within the scope of their role as judges, they were entitled to absolute
immunity from plaintiff’s claims against them. Similarly, the court concluded that
Commissioner Deml was entitled to absolute immunity because plaintiff’s claim against him was
based on actions taken within the Commissioner’s general authority to calculate sentences of
prisoners. The court also held that plaintiff’s complaint was barred by issue preclusion because
he had litigated the sentence calculation issue in both his criminal case and in a post-conviction
relief action and the issue had been finally resolved against him in both cases. The court
therefore granted the motion to dismiss.
On appeal, plaintiff focuses primarily on his underlying claim that his sentence was
miscalculated. He does not appear to challenge the trial court’s conclusions that defendants
Thibault, Richardson, and Deml were entitled to absolute immunity or that his claims against all
defendants were barred by issue preclusion, but even if he did, we would affirm on both points.

Plaintiff’s claims against both Superior Judges were based on rulings they issued in
plaintiff’s post-conviction relief case and one of his criminal cases. Even if, as plaintiff argues,
the rulings were incorrect, they were plainly judicial acts that fell within defendants’ general
authority as judges. See Polidor v. Mahady, 130 Vt. 173, 174 (1972) (“So long as such an
officer is performing an act that may be categorized as judicial, and its performance is within his
general authority, his motive for acting is not subject to inquiry in a private suit.”). Similarly,
plaintiff’s claim against Commissioner Deml is based on his alleged failure to supervise the
DOC officials who calculate sentences. Because Commissioner Deml’s alleged acts or
omissions fall within his statutory authority to supervise the DOC, 28 V.S.A. § 102(b)(1), he is
entitled to absolute immunity from plaintiff’s civil suit. See LaShay v. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab.
Servs., 160 Vt. 60, 64 (1993) (“Absolute immunity applies to judges, legislators and the state’s
highest executive officers when they are acting within their respective authorities.”).

Plaintiff’s complaint is also barred because his claims are all based on the alleged
incorrectness of his sentence computation, which is an issue that has previously been litigated
and decided against plaintiff. Issue preclusion bars an issue from being relitigated when the
parties and issue are the same as in the prior action, the issue was resolved on the merits in a
final decision, the parties had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier
action,” and “applying preclusion in the later action is fair.” Trepanier v. Getting Organized,
Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265 (1990). These factors are satisfied here. The parties are the same:
plaintiff and the State. The same issue, the correctness of plaintiff’s sentence computation, was
litigated and finally decided against plaintiff in both his criminal case and his post-conviction
relief case. Plaintiff did not attempt to appeal the decision in the criminal docket and filed an
untimely notice of appeal from the decision in the civil docket. Thus, both decisions are final.
Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and it is fair to apply preclusion to
avoid burdening the parties and the courts with successive litigation. The trial court therefore
properly dismissed plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff appears to argue that the court erred in granting the motion to dismiss without
first holding a hearing. The Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure give the trial court discretion to
dispose of any motion without a hearing. See V.R.C.P. 7(b)(5) (stating court “may dispose of
the motion without argument”); Shaw v. Barnes, 166 Vt. 610, 610 (1997) (mem.) (noting trial
court’s “wide discretion” to decide whether to hold hearing on any motion). We therefore see no
error. To the extent plaintiff is arguing that he was not afforded a proper hearing in a separate
habeas case, that issue is outside the scope of this appeal.

Plaintiff also asserts that defendants supported their motion to dismiss with “fraudulent
documents.” He does not explain which documents he means or provide any support for this
assertion. We therefore do not address this argument. See Johnson v. Johnson, 158 Vt. 160, 164

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n.* (1992) (explaining that this Court will not address contentions so inadequately briefed as to
fail to minimally meet standards of V.R.A.P. 28(a)).

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice

William D. Cohen, Associate Justice

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