* State Of Washington, Resp. V. Michael T. Pigott, B.d. 06/12/94, App.

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
MICHAEL T. PIGOTT,
B.D. 06/12/94,
Appellant.
No. 69003-5-I
(consolidated with No. 69700-5-I)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO PUBLISH
The respondent, State of Washington, has filed a motion to publish herein. 	The
court has taken the matter under consideration and has determined that the motion
should be granted.
Now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the 	motion to publish the opinion filed 	in the above-entitled
matter on March 31, 2014, is granted. The opinion shall be published and printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports. 	It is further
ORDERED that appellant's request for use of initials in the opinion is denied.
Done this y | 	day of 	/7V}fol _ 	,2014.
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FOR THE COURT:
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COURT OF APPEALS DiVI
STATE OF WASHINGTON
201^ HAR 31 	AH 9=2 i
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL T. PIGOTT,
B.D. 06/12/94,
Appellant.
No. 69003-5-I
(consolidated with No. 69700-5-I)
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: March 31, 2014
Grosse, J. — A Frve1 	hearing 	is not required 	where there is no evidence
involving new 	methods 	of proof or 	new scientific principles. 	Here, 	the fingerprint
identification method 	used 	by the 	police 	is generally accepted within the scientific
community. 	The trial court did not err in not conducting a Frve hearing and admitting
the evidence. 	Affirmed.
Michael Pigott was charged and found guilty in juvenile court of two counts of
residential 	burglary. 	In both homes, detectives discovered 	latent fingerprints which
were identified as belonging to Pigott. 	Prior to trial, Pigott requested a Frve hearing,
arguing that fingerprint identification is no longer generally accepted in the scientific
community. 	The trial court denied the motion. 	After trial, the court found Pigott guilty
and imposed the standard range disposition on each count. 	Pigott appeals arguing that
the trial court improperly denied his motion for a Frve hearing.
1 Frve v. United States. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 69003-5-1 / 2 	w 	w
We review de novo a trial court's decision whether to hold a Frve hearing. 	In
determining the admissibility of evidence based on novel scientific theories or methods,
Washington courts employ the "general acceptance" standard set forth in Frve v. United
States.3 	Under Frve, novel scientific evidence is admissible if it is based on a theory or
principle which is generally accepted 	in the 	relevant scientific community, 	but not
admissible if qualified experts have significant disputes as to its validity.4 	Evidence not
involving new methods of proof or new scientific principles is not subject to examination
under Frve.5
Washington has a long history of admitting fingerprint identification evidence.6
Here, the fingerprint experts examined the latent prints, compared them to Pigott's
known print, and made an evaluation. 	The results were verified. 	The State's expert
witnesses 	did 	not rely on novel 	or unusual scientific techniques in 	reaching their
opinions. 	The evidence presented clearly demonstrated that this specific method is
commonly used and generally accepted by the fingerprint analysts. 	Once the scientific
community accepts a methodology, application of the methodology to a particular case
is a matter of weight and admissibility under ER 702, which allows a qualified expert
witness to testify if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact.7
2 State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 830, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006).
3293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244, 255, 922 P.2d
1304(1996).
4 State v. Havden. 90 Wn. App. 100, 103-04, 950 P.2d 1024 (1998).
5 State v. Baity, 140Wn.2d 1, 10,991 P.2d 1151 (2000).
6 See State v. Johnson, 194 Wash. 438, 442, 78 P.2d 562 (1938); State v. Witzell, 175
Wash. 146, 26 P.2d 1049 (1933).
7 Gregory, 158 Wn.2d at 829-30; State v. Russell. 125 Wn.2d 24, 41, 882 P.2d 747
(1994).
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 69003-5-1 / 3 	w 	w
Pigott argues that new evidence raises questions as to the continued general
acceptance of the ACE-V technique used here to analyze fingerprints. 	ACE-V is an
acronym 	for 	"analysis, 	comparison, 	evaluation, 	and 	verification."8 	The 	ACE-V
component was succinctly described by the Third Circuit in United States v. Mitchell:9
The 	basic steps taken 	by an examiner under this protocol are first to
winnow the field of candidate matching prints by using Level 1 detail to
classify the latent print. Next, the examiner will analyze the latent print to
identify Level 2 detail (i.e., Galton points and their spatial relationship to
one another), along with any Level 3 detail that can be gleaned from the
print. The examiner then compares this to the Level 2 and Level 3 detail of
a 	candidate 	full-rolled 	print 	(sometimes 	taken 	from 	a 	database 	of
fingerprints, sometimes taken from a suspect in custody), and evaluates
whether there is sufficient similarity to declare a match.
Once a second examiner confirms the conclusion of the first examiner, it is verified.
The 	expert 	witnesses 	used 	generally 	accepted 	methods 	in 	analyzing 	Pigott's
fingerprints. 	Thus, the methods were not "novel," and did not require a Frve hearing.
Because such methodology is generally accepted 	in the scientific community, 	the
evidence was properly admitted.
Pigott relies on a high profile misidentification of Brandon Mayfield made by the
Federal Bureau of Investigations in its investigation into the terrorist bombing of a train
in Madrid, Spain. As a result of this misidentification, the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) initiated an investigation of the Mayfield case. 	Citing to the OIG report, Lyn
Haber, Ph.D. and Ralph Haber, Ph.D. argue that fingerprinting is not an exact science.
In support of their theory, the Habers cite to a 2009 report by the National Research
Council of the National Academy of Sciences, which recommended additional testing to
8 United States v. Mitchell. 365 F.2d 215, 221 (3rd Cir. 2004).
9 365 F.2d 215, 221 (3rd Cir. 2004)
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 69003-5-1/4 	w 	^
determine 	the 	reliability 	of latent fingerprint 	analysis 	generally 	and 	of 	the ACE-V
methodology in particular.10
However, 	the 	reliability 	of 	fingerprint 	identification 	has 	been 	tested 	in 	our
adversarial system for over a century and routinely subjected to peer review.11 	The trial
court considered all of this in reaching 	its conclusion that a 	Frve hearing was not
needed. The trial court expressly found that the identification analysis is accepted in the
relevant 	scientific 	community.12 	Once the evidence 	is accepted as 	scientifically
acceptable, the 	question of admissibility turns on whether the witnesses qualify as
experts and whether the proffered testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact. 	Under
the circumstances here, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence under ER
702. 	Any objections that Pigott had to the fingerprint analysis addressed the weight of
the testimony, not its admissibility. 	The trial court did not err.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
J
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10 See National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, Strengthening
Forensic 	Science 	in 	the 	United 	States: 	A 	Path 	Forward, 	at 	143-44 	(2009),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf; see ajso United States v. 	Rose.
672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725-26 (fingerprint evidence sufficiently reliable to be admitted
under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and holding the Habers' criticism of the ACE-V methodology
insufficient to even warrant holding a hearing to determine whether fingerprint analysis
is admissible scientific evidence).
11 People v. Jennings, 252 III. 534, 549, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911); State v. Johnson. 194
Wash. 438, 442, 78 P.2d 562 (1938); United States v. John. 597 F.3d 263, 274-75 (5th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Plaza. 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (2002).
12 See also Havden, 90 Wn. App. 100 (digitally enhanced latent fingerprints and palm
prints found admissible under Frve).