R.m., Appellant V. King County, Respondent

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
R.M., individually,
Appellant,
v.
KING COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Washington,
Respondent.
No. 87143-9-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FELDMAN, J. — R.M. appeals the trial court’s summary judgment ruling
dismissing her negligence claim against King County. Finding no error, we affirm.
I
In our prior opinion in this case, we recounted the relevant facts and
procedural history as follows:
In 1993, when R.M. was 16 years old, she was introduced to Michael
Landry and Rochelle King. R.M. moved into their home in Bellevue
to work as a nanny for Landry and King’s children. During the same
timeframe, Landry and King were operating a prostitution ring. 	As
part of their enterprise, Landry and King operated a massage
parlor—The Golden Touch.
From 1992 to 1994, the King County Sheriff’s Office Vice Unit was
investigating Landry and King. 	In December 1993, King County
Detective Jon Holland was assigned to the investigation. Other law
enforcement agencies were investigating Landry and King’s various
prostitution enterprises.

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As early as December 1993, Detective Holland had information that
minors were involved in the operations. 	In February 1994, Holland
interviewed a witness forced to perform sex work by Landry at 14
years old.
Shortly after R.M. began nannying for Landry and King, Landry
began sexually assaulting R.M. R.M. was also forced to work in the
massage parlor and she was trafficked repeatedly through Landry
and King’s escort service.
While working in the massage parlor, R.M. recalled at least two
encounters with unidentified police officers. Once she was asked for
identification (ID). R.M. was not allowed to carry an ID and, at some
point, her ID was taken from her by King. 	R.M. recalled lying and
telling the officer she was 18. 	She was unable to ask for help. 	On
another occasion, R.M. recalled King telling her that a massage
customer was an undercover police officer. 	The customer was in
plainclothes. R.M. gave him a normal massage. He did not ask R.M.
her age or for other services, and R.M. did not ask for help.
Law enforcement learned the address of Landry and King’s home in
Bellevue as early as February 1993. 	While law enforcement did
receive a tip that a vulnerable victim, not R.M., might be living with
Landry, they did not receive information that a minor was being held
captive in the home.
Sometime in late winter or early spring 1994, R.M. escaped from
Landry and King’s home.
In July 1994, R.M. gave a written statement to Detective Holland and
disclosed 	working 	through 	Landry’s 	escort 	service 	and 	in 	the
massage parlor. 	Detective Holland’s contemporaneous follow-up
report on the investigation described the interaction as follows:
07-26-94 1845 – I took a written statement from [R.M.] She is
a juvenile who [says] that she went on about 300 dates while
being employed by Landry/King. 	The dates were escort call
outs and “servicing” clients which came into the massage
parlor. She said in her statement that Landry/King trained her
in the operation of escort services and massage parlors.
This is the first mention of R.M. in the investigation records.
The investigation was completed in 1994 and Landry and King
pleaded guilty to six counts of promoting prostitution. 	Landry and
King were charged with promoting the prostitution of R.M. from
October 1, 1993 through February 28, 1994.

No. 87143-9-I
3
In 2022, R.M. sued the County asserting claims of negligence and
outrage. 	The County moved for summary judgment and sought
dismissal of R.M.’s claims.
. . . .
The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment in
part and denied it in part. 	The trial court found that the negligence
claim failed as a matter of law and dismissed the claim. 	The trial
court explained:
There 	exists 	no 	claim 	for 	negligent 	investigation 	in
Washington. 	Under the Public Duty Doctrine, a government
entity, including law enforcement, is not liable for its negligent
conduct unless it has a specific duty that is owed to the injured
person in particular and separate from the general duty owed
to the public to enforce laws. 	The Court finds as a matter of
law that none of the four exceptions to the public duty doctrine
apply in this case. 	The Court further finds that there is no
evidence of any affirmative misfeasance that would create a
duty to act under § 302B of the Restatement of Torts.
Therefore, King County owed no duty.
But the trial court found “there remain issues of material fact that
make summary judgment improper as to the claim of outrage and the
statute of limitations.”
The County unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. The County
moved 	for 	discretionary 	review, 	which 	was 	granted 	by 	a
commissioner of this court. 	The trial court proceedings have been
stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.
R.M. v. King County, No. 84903-4-I, slip op. at 1-4 (Wash. Ct. App. July 8, 2024)
(unpublished), 	https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/849034.pdf 	(footnotes
omitted). Further addressing R.M.’s negligence claim, we added:
R.M. asks this court to review the dismissal of her negligence claim.
But R.M. did not file a motion for discretionary review under RAP
2.4(a) or seek cross review under RAP 5.1(d). 	We decline to
consider R.M.’s arguments on the negligence claim. 	This does not
preclude R.M. from appealing the dismissal once it becomes a final
order. RAP 2.2(a).

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Id. at 4 n.3. 	We then proceeded to review—and reverse—the trial court’s ruling
regarding R.M.’s outrage claim, noting: “R.M. did not establish the existence of a
material question of fact concerning the County’s conduct. 	We conclude that
summary judgment should have been granted.” Id. at 10.
The court thereafter issued its mandate remanding the matter to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 	In accordance with the
mandate, the trial court entered an order granting the County’s motion for summary
judgment as to all claims and dismissed the case with prejudice. This timely appeal
followed.
II
R.M. argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
the County on her negligence claim. 	More specifically, she asks “that this Court
reinstate the negligence claim filed under RCW Chapter 26.44.” We decline to do
so for the reasons that follow.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Lybbert v. Grant
County, 	141 Wn.2d 	29, 	34, 	1 	P.3d 	1124 	(2000). 	“Summary 	judgment 	is
appropriate only ‘when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on
file demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, 185
Wn.2d 532, 547, 374 P.3d 121 (2016) (quoting Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d
658, 663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998)). 	“The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating there is no issue of material fact, and all facts and reasonable
inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Id. Also, whether a party owes a duty in tort to another party is a question

No. 87143-9-I
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of law. Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc’y, 124 Wn.2d 121, 128, 875 P.2d
621 (1994). 	We review questions of law, including duty, de novo. 	Michaels v.
CH2M Hill, Inc., 171 Wn.2d 587, 597, 257 P.3d 532 (2011). 	This court also
interprets statutes de novo. Yaron v. Conley, 17 Wn. App. 2d 815, 825, 488 P.3d
855 (2021).
The centerpiece of R.M.’s argument is RCW 26.44.050.1 At the time of the
County’s 	investigation 	of 	Landry 	and 	King’s 	prostitution 	enterprises, 	RCW
26.44.050 stated in relevant part as follows:
Upon 	the 	receipt 	of 	a 	report 	concerning 	the 	possible
occurrence of abuse or neglect, it shall be the duty of the law
enforcement agency or the department of social and health services
to investigate and provide the protective services section with a
report in accordance with the provision of chapter 74.13 RCW, and
where necessary to refer such report to the court.
A law enforcement officer may take, or cause to be taken, a
child into custody without a court order if there is probable cause to
believe that the child is abused or neglected and that the child would
be injured or could not be taken into custody if it were necessary to
first obtain a court order pursuant to RCW 13.34.050. 	The law
enforcement agency or the department of social and health services
investigating such a report is hereby authorized to photograph such
a child . . . for the purpose of providing documentary evidence of the
physical condition of the child . . . .
Former RCW 26.44.050 (1993). The same act defines "Child abuse or neglect" to
include both sexual abuse and exploitation. 	Former RCW 26.44.020(12) (1993).
According to R.M., “law enforcement officers have a duty to the subjects of child
1 R.M. also relies on RCW 26.44.030, but it does not support her argument. 	Currently, RCW
26.44.030(1)(a) requires law enforcement officers to report suspected child abuse or neglect when
there is reasonable cause to believe a child has suffered such abuse or neglect. 	But the prior
versions of this statute in effect during the events at issue in this case did not refer to or impose a
reporting duty on law enforcement officers. See Former RCW 26.44.030 (1993); Former RCW
26.44.030 (1991). 	Thus, RCW 26.44.030 cannot support a claim that the County owed and
breached a mandatory reporting duty to R.M.

No. 87143-9-I
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abuse investigations under RCW 26.44.050” and, relatedly, the “record supports a
clear negligence claim under RCW Chapter 26.44.”
In support of this argument, R.M. cites Lewis v. Whatcom County, 136 Wn.
App. 450, 149 P.3d 686 (2006). 	In Lewis, while the Whatcom County Sheriff’s
Office was investigating a report of child abuse against another alleged victim, the
sheriff’s office received information that Lewis was likely also being abused. Id. at
452-53. 	Despite that information, the sheriff’s office did not investigate the
additional allegations regarding Lewis. 	Id. at 453. 	The court held that because
Lewis was the subject of specific allegations of abuse, she was within the class of
persons for whose benefit RCW 26.44.050 was enacted, and the sheriff’s office
therefore owed her a duty to investigate the allegations of child abuse with
reasonable care. Id. at 460.
Though R.M. relies heavily on Lewis, she ignores Boone v. Dep’t of Soc. &
Health Servs., 200 Wn. App. 723, 403 P.3d 873 (2017), which distinguishes Lewis
and reaches a different conclusion on different facts. 	Specifically, the court in
Boone held as follows:
As it relates to the investigations done in 1992, 1997, and January
2006, the Boone children are not within the class of persons for
whose benefit RCW 26.44.050 was enacted. The Boones allege that
they are within the class of persons because RCW 26.44.050 was
enacted to protect all abused children. 	But, the Boone’s reading of
the class of persons for whose benefit RCW 26.44.050 was enacted
is too broad. 	Under RCW 26.44.050, the duty to investigate with
reasonable care is triggered by “a report concerning the possible
occurrence of abuse or neglect.” 	Therefore, the class of persons
protected by the duty to investigate are the children who are the
subjects of a report of possible abuse or neglect. 	Insofar as the
Boones rely on the investigations into the abuse of other children in
the day care in 1992, 1997, and January 2006, the Boones are not
within the class of persons for whose benefit RCW 26.44.050 was

No. 87143-9-I
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enacted because the Boone children were not the subjects of the
reports of alleged abuse that triggered those investigations.
200 Wn. App. at 734 (internal record citations omitted). The court therefore held
“the Department’s duty to investigate with reasonable care does not extend to the
Boones under their theory of the case.” Id. at 736.
Critical here, the plaintiffs in Boone also relied heavily on Lewis as well as
another case—Yonker v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 85 Wn. App. 71, 930 P.2d
958 (1997)—that similarly addressed the class of persons for whose benefit the
legislature enacted RCW 26.44.050. 	See 85 Wn. App. at 79-81. 	Distinguishing
these 	authorities, 	the 	court 	in 	Boone 	held 	that 	“neither 	case 	supports 	the
conclusion that children and families who were not the subject of the report
triggering the investigation are within the class of persons for whose benefit RCW
26.44.050 was enacted.” 	Boone, 200 Wn. App. at 734. 	The rule that emerges
from these authorities is clear: 	while law enforcement officers owe a duty to
investigate with reasonable care to a child who is being abused or neglected when
it receives a report concerning the possible occurrence of abuse or neglect of that
child, that duty is owed solely to that child and not to any other child who is not the
subject of the report of alleged abuse or neglect.
Boone is dispositive here. 	As recounted in this court’s prior opinion, law
enforcement received a tip in 1993 “that a vulnerable victim, not R.M., might be
living with Landry” and “did not receive information that a minor was being held
captive in the home.” R.M., slip op. at 2-3.2 Our prior opinion also notes: “While
2 While the law of the case doctrine does not apply to factual statements, see Pac. Coast Shredding,
LLC v. Port of Vancouver, USA, 14 Wn. App. 2d 484, 503, 471 P.3d 934 (2020), neither party has
asked that we revisit any portion of our prior opinion under RAP 2.5(c)(2).

No. 87143-9-I
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a parent provided the information to law enforcement, it is unclear from the record
if this victim was a minor or a vulnerable adult.” Id. at 3 n.1. This is analogous to
the situation in Boone, where someone other than the plaintiff was the subject of
a report concerning the possible occurrence of abuse or neglect. 200 Wn. App. at
734. 	Accordingly, as in Boone, the County’s duty to investigate with reasonable
care does not extend to R.M. under her theory of the case.
Nor does it matter here that R.M. eventually gave a written statement to law
enforcement regarding Landry and King’s prostitution enterprises. 	As our prior
opinion notes, R.M. gave that statement to Detective Holland in July 1994, and it
“is the first mention of R.M. in the investigation records.” R.M., slip op. at 3. But
in July 1994, when R.M. gave this statement, law enforcement could no longer
take her into custody under RCW 26.44.05 because, as our previous opinion also
notes, “Sometime in late winter or early spring 1994, R.M. escaped from Landry
and King’s home.” R.M., slip op. at 3. R.M.’s reliance on her previous statement
to Detective Holland is therefore unavailing.
Lastly, our holding here is also consistent with the public duty doctrine,
which the trial court relied on below. “The policy behind the public duty doctrine is
that legislation for the public benefit should not be discouraged by subjecting the
government to unlimited liability for individual damages.” 	Donohoe v. State, 135
Wn. App. 824, 834, 142 P.3d 654 (2006). Accordingly, if a statutory duty is owed
to the public, then “no claim for negligence may be supported as a matter of law.”
Blackwell v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 131 Wn. App. 372, 379, 127 P.3d 752
(2006). 	As the court explained in Boone, “a duty owed to all is a duty owed to
none.” 200 Wn. App. at 740 (quoting Munich v. Skagit Emergency Commc’n Ctr.,

No. 87143-9-I
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175 Wn.2d 871, 878, 288 P.3d 328 (2012)). Conversely, if a statutory duty is owed
to a particular individual, rather than the public as whole, the public duty doctrine
does not preclude liability Munich, 175 Wn.2d at 878.
Boone properly effectuates this distinction between a duty owed to the
public—where there is reason to believe someone is abusing or neglecting a minor
without a report identifying the alleged victim—and a duty owed to an individual—
where there is a report that a specific victim is being abused or neglected. Here,
the report at issue, at most, identified a victim other than R.M. Thus, at most, law
enforcement owed a duty to that victim. 	Because there is no evidence that law
enforcement received, prior to when R.M. escaped, a report that she was being
abused or neglected, the County’s duty to investigate with reasonable care does
not extend to her under her theory of the case. As such, the trial court did not err
in dismissing her claim on summary judgment.3
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
3 Because the trial court did not err in dismissing R.M.’s negligence claim against the County based
on the absence of any duty owed to her under RCW 26.44.050, we need not reach the County’s
other asserted bases for dismissal.