In Re The Detention Of A.p.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Detention of:
A.P.,
Appellant.
No. 86015-1-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FELDMAN, J. 	— 	A.P. 	appeals 	a 14-day commitment order under 	the
Involuntary Treatment Act (ITA), ch. 71.05 RCW. 	A.P. asserts (a) the trial court
erroneously concluded that she could be detained under the ITA for up to 14 days
of involuntary mental health treatment and (b) RCW 71.05.240(6), which prohibits
her from possessing firearms until a court restores that right under RCW 9.41.047,
violates her equal protection rights by treating her differently than someone who
agreed to voluntary mental health treatment. 	We disagree with both arguments
and affirm.
I
On October 23, 2023, A.P. was initially detained for up to 120 hours of
psychiatric evaluation and treatment at Valley Medical Center (Valley) after she
flew from Chicago to Seattle and was found rolling around on the ground outside
Boeing Field in Renton complaining that her ex-boyfriend and brother were trying
to kill her. 	While A.P. denied any suicidal ideation, she acknowledged that she

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had been thinking about jumping off the roof of her seven-story apartment building
to escape from her brother who she believed was stalking and seeking to harm
her. 	Later the same day, she was transferred to Fairfax Behavioral Hospital
(Fairfax). 	Fairfax determined that A.P. required further evaluation and treatment
beyond the initial 120-hour involuntary hold, and so it filed a petition for an
additional 14 days of involuntary treatment based on grave disability under prongs
(a) and (b) of RCW 71.05.020(25), which are quoted and discussed below.
Pursuant to RCW 71.05.240, a King County Superior Court commissioner
held a probable cause hearing on October 30, 2023. Three witnesses testified at
the hearing: (1) A.P.’s father, who testified regarding A.P.’s history of paranoid and
suicidal behavior and that A.P. was “definitely manic” when he last spoke with her
earlier that month; (2) Patrick Swann, a Mental Health Counselor at Fairfax, who
testified that he had evaluated A.P., that A.P. has a working diagnosis of bipolar
disorder with psychosis, and that A.P. presented a danger to herself and others in
the absence of continued in-patient treatment; and (3) A.P., who denied having
any suicidal thoughts in the past month and testified she would not harm herself
and would provide for her essential human needs, including her medical needs, if
permitted to return to her apartment. The court also heard closing argument from
both parties.
Following closing arguments, the court granted Fairfax’s petition. In its oral
ruling, the court meticulously described the evidence supporting its ruling. 	And
while the court expressly acknowledged A.P.’s testimony, it stated it was “not
persuaded by [her] testimony.” 	Instead, the court was largely persuaded by the

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testimony of A.P.’s father, who it noted was “a credible witness.” Lastly, the court
also ruled, “as a result of being involuntarily hospitalized, [A.P.] does lose her
constitutional right to possess a firearm. And that right can only be reinstated with
a court order.” 	The court subsequently entered a written ruling that both
supplemented and incorporated its oral findings and conclusions. 	This timely
appeal followed.
II
A. 	Involuntary Mental Health Treatment
A.P. asserts that the trial court erroneously concluded that she could be
detained under the ITA for up to 14 days of involuntary mental health treatment.
We disagree.
RCW 71.05.240(4)(a) states in relevant part as follows:
[I]f the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a person
detained for behavioral health treatment, as the result of a behavioral
health disorder, . . . is gravely disabled, and, after considering less
restrictive alternatives to involuntary detention and treatment, finds
that no such alternatives are in the best interests of such person or
others, the court shall order that such person be detained for
involuntary treatment not to exceed 14 days in a facility licensed or
certified to provide treatment by the department or under RCW
71.05.745.
As this statutory provision requires, the trial court here found that A.P. was “gravely
disabled” and could therefore be detained under the ITA for up to 14 days of
involuntary treatment.
On review, we must determine “whether substantial evidence supports the
[trial court’s] findings and, if so, whether the findings in turn support the trial court’s
conclusions of law and judgment.” In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 209, 728

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P.2d 138 (1986). 	“Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence sufficient to
persuade a fair-minded person” that the premise is true. 	In re Det. of H.N., 188
Wn. App. 744, 762, 355 P.3d 294 (2015). This is a deferential standard of review:
“we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Petitioner[],” which in
this case is Fairfax. 	In re Det. of A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d 321, 330, 487 P.3d 531
(2021) (citing In re Det. of B.M., 7 Wn. App. 2d 70, 85, 432 P.3d 459 (2019)).
The trial court found that A.P. was “gravely disabled” under both prong (a)
and 	prong 	(b) 	of 	RCW 	71.05.020(25). 	Starting 	with 	prong 	(a), 	RCW
71.05.020(25)(a) defines “gravely disabled” as “a condition in which a person, as
a result of a behavioral health disorder . . . [i]s in danger of serious physical harm
resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health or
safety.” 	To establish grave disability under this statutory provision, the petitioner
must prove both “recent, tangible evidence of failure or inability to provide for . . .
essential human needs” and that “the failure to meet these needs placed [the
person] ‘in danger of serious physical harm.’” A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d at 334 (quoting
LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 204-05; former RCW 71.05.020(22)(a) (2018)). 	Essential
human needs, in turn, include “food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment.”
LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 204-05.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that A.P. was “gravely
disabled” under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a). 	The trial court meticulously catalogued
the behaviors that support this finding, which includes inconsistent sleep, pacing
at night, failing to consistently take prescribed medication, removing her clothes in
public, defecating in the shower, ripping up her mattress, wrapping a shower

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curtain around her neck, rubbing a banana all over herself, and attempting to enter
other patients’ rooms. Based on this evidence, a fair-minded person could find, as
the trial court did, that A.P. was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a)
because she was exhibiting active symptoms of a behavioral health disorder and
was consequently unable to provide for her essential human needs.
Turning to prong (b), RCW 71.05.020(25)(b) defines “gravely disabled” as
“a condition in which a person, as a result of a behavioral health disorder . . .
manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and
escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and is not
receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety.” Here again, the
trial 	court 	meticulously 	catalogued 	the 	relevant 	evidence 	regarding 	this
determination, which includes A.P.’s repeated and escalating loss of cognitive and
volitional control over her actions such that she would not receive essential medical
care outside a hospital setting. 	As the trial court found, the record includes
evidence that A.P. was hyperactive and paranoid, was making nonsensical
statements, and believed her father was selling her to pedophiles, was trying to kill
her, and was selling drugs as a member of a cartel. Based on this evidence, a fair-
minded person could find, as the trial court did, that A.P. was gravely disabled
under RCW 71.05.020(25)(b) because, in the absence of involuntary mental health
treatment, she will continue to exhibit active symptoms of a behavioral health
disorder.
Against this weight of evidence, A.P. claims that Fairfax failed to establish
she was gravely disabled under prong (a) of RCW 71.05.020(25) because there is

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no evidence of “a recent overt act of self-harm.” While Washington law requires a
“recent overt act,” there is no requirement that it be an act of self-harm. Instead,
we have recognized, “‘This act may be one which has caused harm or creates a
reasonable apprehension of dangerousness.’” In re Det. of T.C., 11 Wn. App. 2d
51, 57, 450 P.3d 1230 (2019) (quoting In re Det. of Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 284-85,
654 P.2d 109 (1982)). The ITA defines “recent” as a “period of time not exceeding
three years prior to the current hearing.” 	RCW 71.05.245(3). 	The evidence
satisfies this requirement in two respects. 	First, when A.P. completed the
Columbia Suicide Risk Assessment while at Valley, she indicated she had suicidal
ideation within the past month, including thoughts of “wanting to die” and “want[ing]
it to be over.” Second, also while at Valley, A.P. pulled down a shower curtain and
wrapped it around her neck, which required immediate intervention by Valley
medical staff. Viewed in the light most favorable to Fairfax, this evidence satisfies
the recent overt act requirement.
A.P. next argues that Fairfax failed to establish she was gravely disabled
under prong (b) of RCW 71.05.020(25) because she “recognized she had a bipolar
diagnosis” when asked about this issue at the probable cause hearing and
“indicated she will take her medication, continue regular outpatient care, and rely
on her support system in times of crisis.” But A.P.’s father testified that A.P. is fine
until she starts smoking cannabis, which A.P. indicated she does “once in a while.”
The record also shows that A.P. failed to coordinate any outpatient services prior
to moving to Seattle. And while A.P. claimed that her emergency plan was “I would
call my aunt,” her aunt lives in Illinois and there is no evidence that A.P. contacted

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her aunt in mid-August 2023 when, according to her father, she was “definitely
manic.”
Lastly, A.P. cites LaBelle in support of her arguments, but that reliance is
misplaced. In one of the consolidated cases in LaBelle, the Supreme Court held
that the trial court erred in finding that Richardson (one of the appellants in LaBelle)
was gravely disabled based on evidence of untreated impetigo, failure to seek
dental care despite intermittent tooth pain, and inadequate nourishment prior to
hospitalization. 107 Wn.2d at 213-14. But LaBelle involved a 90-day commitment
hearing, which requires “clear, cogent and convincing evidence” of a “high
probability of serious physical harm within the near future unless adequate
treatment is afforded.” Id. at 205, 209. Additionally, the record in Labelle did not
show that Richardson was in any immediate risk of harm as a result of his medical
and nutritional needs. 	Here, in contrast, the burden of proof regarding’s Valley’s
14-day 	commitment 	petition 	is 	“preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence,” 	RCW
71.05.240(4)(a), and the risk of harm to A.P. and others was neither speculative
nor insubstantial, particularly given A.P.’s statement that she was considering
jumping off her seven-story apartment building and evidence that she had
previously jumped off a 60-foot parking garage and nearly died from her injuries.
In short, the trial court did not err when it determined A.P. was gravely
disabled under prongs (a) and (b) of RCW 71.05.020(25) and could therefore be
detained for up to 14 days of involuntary treatment.

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B. 	Equal Protection Claim
Next, A.P. claims that RCW 71.05.240(6) violates her equal protection rights
by treating her differently than someone who agreed to voluntary mental health
treatment. We disagree.
RCW 71.05.240(6) provides as follows:
The 	court 	shall 	notify 	the 	person 	orally 	and 	in 	writing 	that 	if
involuntary treatment is sought beyond the 14-day inpatient or 90-
day less restrictive treatment period, the person has the right to a full
hearing or jury trial under RCW 71.05.310. If the commitment is for
mental health treatment, the court shall notify the person orally and
in writing that the person is barred from the possession of firearms
and that the prohibition remains in effect until a court restores his or
her right to possess a firearm under RCW 9.41.047.
As A.P. notes, the effect of this statute is that a person who agrees to voluntary
mental health treatment would not thereby be barred from the possession of
firearms whereas someone who is involuntarily detained for such treatment is
barred from the possession of firearms until a court restores that right under RCW
9.41.047. This differing treatment, A.P. claims, violates equal protection principles.
“The Washington Constitution article I, section 12, and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution ensure that persons similarly
situated as to the legitimate purposes of a law receive equal treatment.” State v.
McClinton, 10 Wn. App. 2d 236, 242, 448 P.3d 101 (2019). We construe both our
state and the federal equal protection clause identically. 	Id. 	Critical here, “To
succeed with an equal protection challenge, [the proponent] must first establish
that [they are] similarly situated with other persons in a class who have received
different treatment under the same law.” Id. at 246. Whether persons are similarly
situated “is an inquiry that is determined by and relative to the purpose of the

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challenged law.” State v. Pedro, 148 Wn. App. 932, 946, 201 P.3d 398 (2009). If
“the two classes are not similarly situated . . . no equal protection analysis is
required and [the proponent’s] equal protection claim fails.” 	State v. S.D.H., 17
Wn. App. 2d 123, 141, 484 P.3d 538 (2021).
A.P. claims she is similarly situated with other persons who have received
disparate treatment under the challenged law. 	That is incorrect. The legislative
purpose of the ITA is “[t]o protect the health and safety of persons suffering from
behavioral health disorders and to protect public safety through use of the parens
patriae and police powers of the state.” RCW 71.05.010(1)(a). 	Unlike someone
who has recognized the utility of continued mental health treatment and has
therefore agreed to such treatment, A.P. was unwilling to receive such treatment
absent 	a 	court 	order 	committing 	her 	for 	involuntary 	treatment. 	These 	two
classes—persons who agree to voluntary mental health treatment and persons
who, like A.P., are involuntarily detained for such treatment—do not share the
same understanding of the necessity for further treatment and therefore do not
present the same risk of harm to self and others. As such, they are not similarly
situated relative to the purpose of the challenged law.
Additionally, it is axiomatic that “The State has an important interest in
restricting potentially dangerous persons from using firearms.” State v. Jorgenson,
179 Wn.2d 145, 162, 312 P.3d 960 (2013); accord United States v. Rahimi, 144 S.
Ct. 1889, 1891 (2024) (“When an individual poses a clear threat of physical
violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed.”). Thus, in Morris

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v. Blaker, 118 Wn.2d 133, 821 P.2d 482 (1992), our Supreme Court rejected a
similar equal protection argument upon noting:
The current statutory classification includes only those persons who
have been judicially determined to be gravely disabled or to present
a danger to themselves or others as a result of a mental disorder.
The State has a compelling interest in keeping weapons out of the
hands of persons who have been the subject of such a judicial
determination.
Id. at 151. Because A.P. is not similarly situated with persons who have not been
judicially determined to be gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.240(4)(a), no equal
protection analysis is required and her equal protection claim fails.
A.P.’s contrary argument is unpersuasive. Quoting State v. Sosa, 198 Wn.
App. 176, 184, 393 P.3d 796 (2017), A.P. claims that the two classes of persons
at issue here—those who are detained for up to 14 days of involuntary mental
health treatment and those who agree to voluntary treatment—are similarly
situated 	because 	they 	share 	“materially 	similar 	circumstances.” 	Those
circumstances, A.P. avers, are continued mental health treatment, continued
evaluation, and possible continued detainment at the expiration of the 14-day
period under RCW 71.05.285. In so arguing, A.P. overlooks important differences
between the two classes: one class has agreed to continued mental health
treatment while the other has not, one class has been judicially determined to be
gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.240(4)(a) while the other has not, and one
class is subject to a 14-day commitment order while the other is not. 	In these
respects, 	the 	two 	classes 	do 	not 	share 	materially 	similar 	circumstances,
particularly with regard to the risk of harm to self and others. 	As Sosa confirms,
“Without materially similar circumstances, there can be no complaint about

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disparate treatment.” 198 Wn. App. at 184. A.P.’s equal protection argument thus
fails without further analysis.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: