State Of Washington, Respondent V. Ronald Bianchi, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59268-1-II
Respondent,
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RONALD JAY BIANCHI,
Appellant.
MAXA, P.J. – Ronald Bianchi appeals his sentence imposed after a 2023 resentencing
hearing for multiple convictions related to a 1997 bank robbery and subsequent police chase
during which his accomplices fired multiple shots at pursuing officers. His convictions included
three counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of first degree robbery, second degree
possession of stolen property, second degree assault, and second degree malicious explosion.
Following a retrial, the trial court sentenced Bianchi to 1,131 months in confinement,
which represented the high end of the standard sentencing range for the three attempted murder
convictions plus a 60 month exceptional sentence. An appellate court vacated a second degree
possession of stolen property conviction and remanded for resentencing. At resentencing, a
different judge imposed the same 1,131 month sentence.
Bianchi argues that (1) the trial court failed to give meaningful consideration to his
request for an exceptional sentence below the standard range based on mitigating circumstances,
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
December 31, 2024

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(2) the court miscalculated his sentence by adding 60 months to the standard range sentence
without properly imposing an exceptional sentence, and (3) imposition of the exceptional
sentence was unconstitutional because it was based on impermissible judicial fact-finding. In his
statement of additional grounds (SAG), Bianchi also challenges the imposition of a 36 month
community custody term, arguing that the term exceeds the statutory limit of 24 months.
We hold that (1) the trial court adequately considered Bianchi’s request for an
exceptional sentence below the standard range; (2) the judgment and sentence was deficient
regarding the exceptional sentence, and we remand for the trial court to cure the deficiencies; (3)
imposition of the exceptional sentence was not unconstitutional; and (4) as the State concedes,
Bianchi’s community custody term must be reduced to 24 months.
Accordingly, we affirm Bianchi’s sentence, but we remand for the trial court to cure the
deficiencies in the judgment and sentence regarding the exceptional sentence and to reduce the
community custody term to 24 months.
FACTS
In October 1997, Bianchi along with two accomplices robbed a bank in Vancouver,
Washington. During the robbery, they held bank employees and customers at gunpoint and stole
several thousand dollars in cash before fleeing in stolen vehicles.
Law enforcement pursued the suspects in a high-speed chase through residential
neighborhoods. The suspects fired multiple bullets from a shotgun and an automatic weapon at
pursuing officers, striking patrol cars, houses, and other vehicles. Three officers came under
heavy gunfire during the chase. The pursuit ended when the suspects’ vehicle crashed into a
tree. Bianchi fled into a nearby ravine while his accomplices exchanged gunfire with officers,
resulting in the deaths of both accomplices. Bianchi was 25 years old at the time.

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In 1998, Bianchi pleaded guilty to multiple charges and was sentenced to 864 months in
confinement and 24 months of community custody placement. His convictions included three
counts of attempted first degree felony murder.
In 2008, the Supreme Court invalidated the crime of attempted felony murder, leading the
Court of Appeals to vacate the three attempted first degree felony murder convictions. The trial
court subsequently allowed Bianchi to withdraw his guilty plea.
In 2019, Bianchi was retried and again was convicted of multiple offenses, including
three counts of attempted first degree murder and two counts of second degree possession of
stolen property. The trial court imposed a sentence of 1,131 months, which was at the top of the
standard range for the three attempted murder convictions plus a 60 month exceptional sentence
for aggravating factors found by the jury. On direct appeal, Division One of this court vacated
one of Bianchi’s second degree possession of stolen property convictions and remanded for
resentencing. State v. Bianchi, No. 83338-3-I (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2022) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/833383.pdf. The holding only affected the offender
score on the other second degree possession of stolen property conviction, and did not affect the
offender scores for the attempted murder convictions.
At his June 2023 resentencing, Bianchi requested a mitigated sentence of 30.68 years,
emphasizing his traumatic upbringing and his significant rehabilitation during incarceration.
Evidence he presented included a score of 10 out of 10 on the Adverse Childhood Experiences
test, reflecting severe trauma throughout his youth. Bianchi’s upbringing was characterized by
learning disorders, illiteracy, chronic abuse, neglect, and exposure to criminality, including being
introduced to cocaine by his parents at the age of eight, and using methamphetamine by age 15.

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In addition, he suffered physical and sexual abuse from family members and peers and endured a
transient lifestyle marked by poverty and instability.
Despite these challenges, Bianchi achieved significant personal growth while
incarcerated. He obtained his GED, completed multiple vocational certifications, developed a
business plan, maintained long-term sobriety, established a meaningful relationship with his
daughter and mother, and was married. Psychological evaluations highlighted his remarkable
rehabilitation, with experts noting his transformation despite the profound disadvantages of his
upbringing.
The trial court stated that its typical practice was to “start with what has already been
sentenced by the sentencing court and to give a certain amount of deference to that, subject to the
legal standards and subject to the briefing and the arguments by the parties.” Rep. of Proc. (RP)
at 16.
The trial court reviewed materials submitted by both Bianchi and the State, heard
argument from counsel, heard statements from an expert who prepared a report on Bianchi’s
upbringing, and heard from Bianchi himself. The trial court noted Bianchi’s arguments
regarding his youthfulness and childhood trauma and his rehabilitation. The court stated, “I
consider all these things and I weigh them against the nature of the crime and the conviction.”
RP at 16. The court then highlighted the extensive planning and execution of the offenses and
their devastating impact on victims and law enforcement.
The court concluded,
I’ve given this case quite a bit of thought. And, again, my inclination and I think
it’s judicially appropriate and judicially conservative is to give significant
deference to the sentencing Court. I do appreciate the defendant’s arguments on all
of the grounds that I have recited and as briefed in defendant’s materials. I’m not
persuaded to change the sentence from the original sentencing court.

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RP at 17. The trial court judge imposed the same 1,131 month sentence that the prior judge had
imposed.
On June 16, 2023, the trial court entered an amended judgment and sentence. The court
sentenced Bianchi to 471 months on one of the attempted first degree murder convictions and
300 months each on the other two attempted first degree murder convictions. The sentences
were at the top of the standard range, including firearm enhancements. Those sentences ran
consecutively, with the other sentences running concurrently. However, the court stated that the
number of months in total confinement was 1,131 months, when the sentences that ran
consecutively only totaled 1,071 months (471 + 300 + 300).
The trial court found substantial and compelling reasons to impose an exceptional
sentence above the standard range for the three attempted first degree murder convictions, based
on aggravating factors found by the jury. However, the judgment and sentence did not expressly
refer to any sentence above the standard range other than stating that the total sentence was 60
months more than the total of the three sentences for attempted murder.
On September 21, 2023, the trial court entered an order correcting Bianchi’s judgment
and sentence. The order stated that the judgment and sentence “shall be amended to reflect that
to the sentence imposed is an additional 60 months of total confinement for the aggravator found
by the jury. The total confinement order is 1,131 months.” Clerk’s Papers at 315. Bianchi’s
defense counsel signed as approving the form of the order. Although the case had been
appealed, the trial court did not obtain permission from this court before entering the order.
Bianchi appeals his sentence and the duration of his community custody.

No. 59268-1-II
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ANALYSIS
A. CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST FOR EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE DOWNWARD
Bianchi argues that the trial court failed to meaningfully consider his request for an
exceptional sentence below the standard range based on mitigating circumstances when
imposing the 1,131 month sentence. We disagree.
1. Legal Principles
Under RCW 9.94A.535, the trial court “may impose a sentence outside the standard
sentence range for an offense if it finds . . . substantial and compelling reasons justifying an
exceptional sentence.” Under RCW 9.94A.535(1), the court must find that a preponderance of
the evidence establishes mitigating circumstances justifying a sentence below the standard range.
RCW 9.94A.535(1) contains an illustrative, but not exclusive, list of mitigating circumstances
that could justify an exceptional sentence downward.
Every defendant is entitled to ask the trial court to consider an exceptional sentence
below the standard range and to have the exceptional sentence actually considered. State v.
Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). But our review is limited to
circumstances where the trial court “ ‘refused to exercise discretion at all or has relied on an
impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range.’ ”
State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47, 56, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017) (quoting State v. McGill, 112 Wn.
App. 95, 100, 47 P.3d 173 (2002)). A trial court has exercised its discretion when it “has
considered the facts and has concluded that there is no basis for an exceptional sentence.” State
v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. 322, 330, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997).

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2. Analysis
First, Bianchi argues that the court erred in merely deferring to the prior judge’s 1,131
sentence rather than engaging in a de novo analysis. Bianchi relies on State v. Dunbar, in which
Division Three of this court held that any resentencing on remand is de novo. 27 Wn. App. 2d
238, 244, 532 P.3d 652 (2023). The court stated, “[t]he resentencing judge may not rely on a
previous court’s sentence determination and fail to conduct its own independent review.” Id. at
249. However, as long as the resentencing court exercises independent discretion, the court may
consider rulings by another judge at the earlier sentencing. Id. at 244. And “[d]uring
resentencing, the trial court may impose the identical sentence . . . within its discretion.” Id. at
249.
Assuming without deciding that a full, de novo resentencing was required here, we
conclude that the trial court did not err. The trial court did state that it would “give significant
deference to the sentencing Court.” RP at 17. However, earlier the court stated that this
deference was “subject to the legal standards and subject to the briefing and the arguments by the
parties.” RP at 16. And the court stated, “I do appreciate the defendant’s arguments on all of the
grounds that I have recited and as briefed in defendant’s materials.” RP at 17.
As noted above, even under Dunbar the trial court was allowed to consider the prior
sentence. 27 Wn. App. 2d at 244. Further, the court never stated that it was bound by the prior
judge’s sentence. Instead, the court considered the materials Bianchi submitted, heard argument
from counsel, and explained the reasoning behind the sentence imposed. The fact that the court
imposed the same sentence as before does not mean that the court failed to exercise discretion.
We reject Bianchi’s argument.

No. 59268-1-II
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Second, Bianchi argues that the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitation while in
prison. A trial court has discretion to consider post-conviction rehabilitation at resentencing.
Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 247. However, a court is not required to consider rehabilitation. The
Supreme Court stated, “While a resentencing court may certainly exercise its discretion to
consider evidence of subsequent rehabilitation where such evidence is relevant to the
circumstances of the crime or the offender’s culpability, we decline to hold that the court is
constitutionally required to consider such evidence in every case.” State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d
420, 449, 387 P.3d 650 (2017).
Here, the trial court did consider Bianchi’s rehabilitation argument. The court stated,
“The other gist of the argument is the passage of time and significant rehabilitation. And, there’s
extensive materials on that. That this is a life that is still redeemable, post custody and the
Department of Corrections.” RP at 16. However, the court decided that Bianchi’s rehabilitation
did not warrant an exceptional sentence downward. That decision was within the court’s
discretion. We reject Bianchi’s argument.
Third, Bianchi argues that the trial court failed to consider the mitigating qualities of his
youthfulness at the time of the crimes. Bianchi was 25 years old when he committed the
offenses that lead to his convictions. Youthfulness is a mitigating factor that may justify an
exceptional sentence below statutory guidelines, even when the defendant is a legal adult. State
v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 689, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). However, “age is not a per se mitigating
factor automatically entitling every youthful defendant to an exceptional sentence.” Id. at 695.
Here, the trial court did consider Bianchi’s youthfulness argument. The court
summarized Bianchi’s argument:
[H]e was young at the time, 25 years old. That is – that’s not the kind of youth that
I think I have in mind when you’re talking about an adolescent. I know there’s

No. 59268-1-II
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arguments about child – childhood trauma, etcetera and I appreciate those and
recognize those. But, I have to weigh those for the interest of the community. So,
youth of the defendant at the time of the crime would be one argument.
RP at 16. However, the court decided that Bianchi’s youthfulness did not warrant an exceptional
sentence downward. That decision was within the court’s discretion. We reject Bianchi’s
argument.
Fourth, Bianchi argues that the trial court should have found a mitigating factor under
RCW 9.94A.535(1)(g). RCW 9.94A.535(1)(g) states the following mitigating factor that can
support an exceptional sentence below the standard range: “The operation of the multiple offense
policy of RCW 9.94A.589 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly excessive in light of
the purpose of this chapter, as expressed in RCW 9.94A.010.” Whether or not to impose an
exceptional sentence downward based on RCW 9.94A.535(1)(g) is within the trial court’s
discretion. State v. McGill, 112 Wn. App. 95, 99, 47 P.3d 173 (2002).
Here, the trial court did not expressly address RCW 9.94A.535(1)(g) in its oral ruling.
However, the court noted that it had read all the materials submitted by the parties. And the
court stated, “I do appreciate the defendant’s arguments on all of the grounds that I have recited
and as briefed in defendant’s materials.” RP at 17. Bianchi argued in his materials that RCW
9.94A.535(1)(g) provided a basis for an exceptional sentence downward. There is no indication
in the record that the trial court failed to recognize that it had the authority to impose an
exceptional sentence downward on this basis. Instead, the trial court determined in the exercise
of its discretion that an exceptional sentence below the standard range was not appropriate. We
reject Bianchi’s argument.
We hold that the trial court adequately considered Bianchi’s request for an exceptional
sentence below the standard range based on mitigating circumstances.

No. 59268-1-II
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B. IMPOSITION OF EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE
Bianchi argues that the trial court did not properly impose the 60 month exceptional
sentence in the judgment and sentence. We agree.
Bianchi argues that the 60 month exceptional sentence must be vacated because (1) the
judgment and sentence did not reflect the imposition of such a sentence and (2) the 60 months
was not added to any specific conviction. We agree that the judgment and sentence was
deficient, but we conclude that the trial court made clerical errors that can be corrected on
remand.
1. Failure to Include Exceptional Sentence in List of Sentences
The trial court failed to expressly reflect in the judgment and sentence that it was
imposing a 60 month exceptional sentence for the attempted first degree murder convictions.
The court found substantial and compelling reasons to impose an exceptional sentence based on
the jury finding of aggravating factors. But the judgment and sentence only showed sentences at
the top of the standard range for the three attempted murder convictions, which totaled 1,071
months. On the other hand, the court stated in its oral ruling that it was imposing a sentence of
1,131 months. And the judgment and sentence showed a total confinement of 1,131 months – 60
months more than the three consecutive standard range sentences.
The State relies on the order correcting the judgment and sentence that was entered after
this appeal was filed. Under CrR 7.8(a), clerical mistakes in a judgment and errors arising from
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or upon the
motion of any party. But CrR 7.8(a) also states that if review has been accepted by an appellate
court, a clerical mistake can be corrected pursuant to RAP 7.2(e). Under RAP 7.2(e), regarding
the modification of a decision, “[i]f the trial court determination will change a decision then

No. 59268-1-II
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being reviewed by the appellate court, the permission of the appellate court must be obtained
prior to the formal entry of the trial court decision.”
Here, the “decision” we are reviewing is entry of the judgment and sentence. And the
trial court’s correction order changed the judgment and sentence. Therefore, the trial court was
required to obtain permission from this court before entering the correction order.
Because the State and the trial court did not comply with RAP 7.2(e), we will disregard
the order correcting the judgment and sentence. And without that order, we agree that the
judgment and sentence was deficient because it did not expressly impose the exceptional 60
months in the list of sentences for the three attempted first degree murder convictions.
2. Nonspecific Exceptional Sentence
Bianchi argues that the judgment and sentence also was deficient because the 60 month
exceptional sentence was not allocated to any specific conviction. Bianchi relies on RCW
9.94A.535, which states, “The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range
for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” (Emphasis added.) He claims that the
“for an offense” language allows the trial court to impose an exceptional sentence only for
specific offenses, not a group of offenses.
The State does not address this argument on the merits. Instead, in a footnote, the State
claims that Bianchi did not provide meaningful argument or authority on this issue. We
disagree. Bianchi cited authority – RCW 9.94A.535 – and provided an argument based on that
authority.
In the absence of any contrary argument from the State, we conclude that the trial court
erred in not allocating the 60 month exceptional sentence to a specific conviction or convictions.

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3. Correcting Clerical Mistakes
Bianchi argues that the remedy for the deficiencies in the judgment and sentence is
vacation of the exceptional sentence. We disagree.
We conclude that the trial court’s failure to show the 60 month exceptional sentence in
the judgment and sentence was a clerical mistake. The trial court’s clear intention – stated in the
judgment and sentence – was to impose an exceptional sentence, and the 1,131 month sentence
referenced in the judgment and sentence was 60 months more than the consecutive standard
ranges for the attempted murder convictions. Therefore, the trial court can correct this mistake
with our permission.
Similarly, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to allocate the exceptional sentence to
a specific conviction was a clerical mistake. The trial court’s clear intention was to impose a 60
month exceptional sentence, and the failure to allocate the 60 months to a specific conviction
was an oversight. Therefore, the trial court can correct this mistake with this court’s permission.
We remand for the trial court to amend the judgment and sentence provide for a 60 month
exceptional sentence and to allocate the 60 month exceptional sentence to a specific conviction
or to divide the 60 months among more than one conviction.
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE
Bianchi argues that the trial court’s imposition of an exceptional sentence based on
judicial fact-finding violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. We disagree.
1. Legal Principles
Under RCW 9.94A.535 and RCW 9.94A.537, a trial court may impose an exceptional
sentence if it finds there are “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional

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sentence,” provided that the aggravating factors have been found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. Specifically, RCW 9.94A.535(3)(v) permits an exceptional sentence if “[t]he offense was
committed against a law enforcement officer who was performing his or her official duties at the
time of the offense, the offender knew that the victim was a law enforcement officer, and the
victim’s status as a law enforcement officer is not an element of the offense.” The jury must
determine the existence of aggravating factors, but the trial court determines whether those
factors warrant an exceptional sentence. State v. Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d 280, 290-91, 143 P.3d
795 (2006).
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a defendant the right to a jury trial for
every fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum. Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). “ ‘Other than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id.
(quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000)).
However, Division One of this court in State v. Sage held that determinations that involve
applying the law to facts already found by the jury are legal conclusions, not factual findings,
and do not require additional jury consideration. 1 Wn. App. 2d 685, 708-10, 407 P.3d 359
(2017). The court stated,
Washington cases recognize that once the jury by special verdict makes the factual
determination whether aggravating circumstances have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, “[t]he trial judge [is] left only with the legal conclusion of
whether the facts alleged and found were sufficiently substantial and compelling to
warrant an exceptional sentence.”
Id. at 708 (alterations in original) (quoting Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d at 290-91).

No. 59268-1-II
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Washington courts have emphasized that the judicial role in determining whether a
sentence is justified under RCW 9.94A.535 involves applying the law to facts already found by
the jury. This approach does not violate constitutional protections. Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d at 290-
91; Sage, 1 Wn. App. 2d at 708-10.
2. Analysis
Bianchi challenges the trial court’s determination that the jury’s findings provided
“substantial and compelling reasons” for an exceptional sentence, arguing that this amounted to
impermissible judicial fact-finding in violation of his constitutional rights. He relies on Hurst v.
Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 97-99, 136 S. Ct. 616, 193 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2016), to argue that any
determination leading to an increased sentence should have been submitted to the jury. In Hurst,
the Supreme Court addressed Florida’s death penalty sentencing scheme for capital felonies, in
which the jury provided a recommendation of a life or death sentence without stating the factual
basis of its recommendation. Id. at 95-96. Although the trial court would consider the jury’s
recommendation, the court exercised independent judgment to determine whether a death
sentence was justified. Id. The Court held that Florida’s death penalty sentencing scheme was
unconstitutional because it allowed judges, rather than juries, to independently determine the
existence of aggravating circumstances necessary to impose a death sentence. Id. at 98-100.
However, Washington’s sentencing scheme is distinguishable. Unlike Florida’s law,
which required judges to find aggravating factors and weigh them against mitigation,
Washington requires a jury to find the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt before a court can consider whether those factors are substantial and compelling. RCW
9.94A.535; RCW 9.94A.537(6). The trial court has no role in the jury’s determination. Only

No. 59268-1-II
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once the jury has made its factual findings can the trial court determine as a matter of law that
those findings justify an exceptional sentence. See Sage, 1 Wn. App. 2d at 708-09.
Bianchi also argues that Sage was wrongly decided. We disagree. Sage relied on and
quoted from our Supreme Court’s decision in Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d at 290-91 & 291 n.3. Sage,
1 Wn. App. 2d at 708 & n.80. And our Supreme Court denied review in Sage. 191 Wn.2d 1007
(2018).
Here, the trial court complied with constitutional and statutory requirements. The jury
found the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically that the
offenses were committed against law enforcement officers performing official duties. RCW
9.94A.535(3)(v). The trial court then determined that these findings constituted “substantial and
compelling reasons” to impose an exceptional sentence, as required by RCW 9.94A.535 and
RCW 9.94A.537(6). This determination was a legal conclusion rather than a factual
determination and therefore was appropriately made by the court. Sage, 1 Wn. App. 2d at 708.
We hold that the trial court’s imposition of an exceptional sentence did not violate
Bianchi’s constitutional rights.
D. SAG CLAIM
Bianchi argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court improperly imposed a 36
month term of community custody, exceeding the statutory maximum of 24 months authorized
under RCW 9.94A.728 at the time of his crime in 1997 and original judgment and sentence in
1998. Former RCW 9.94A.150 (1981). We agree.
The trial court sentenced Bianchi to 36 months of community custody under RCW
9.94A.701(1), which mandates that term for a serious violent offense. However, RCW
9.94B.050(2)(b) states that the term of community custody is 24 months for “[a] serious violent

No. 59268-1-II
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offense other than a sex offense committed on or after July 1, 1990, but before July 1, 2000.”
RCW 9.94B.010(2) states that chapter 9.94B RCW supplements chapter 9.94A RCW.
Bianchi committed his offenses in 1997. Therefore, RCW 9.94B.050(2)(a) applied to his
sentence and the correct term of community custody was 24 months. We remand for the trial
court to correct the judgment and sentence.
CONCLUSION
We affirm Bianchi’s sentence, but we remand for the trial court to cure the deficiencies in
the judgment and sentence regarding the exceptional sentence and to reduce the community
custody term to 24 months.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MAXA, P.J.
We concur:
PRICE, J.
CHE, J.