Sara Macduff, Respondent V. John Darin Bowen, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SARA MACDUFF,
Respondent,
v.
JOHN DARIN BOWEN,
Appellant.
No. 87323-7-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HAZELRIGG, C.J. — John Darin Bowen appeals from the imposition of a
vulnerable adult protection order that prohibits his contact with Patricia Mayovsky.
Bowen avers that substantial evidence does not support the court’s order, the court
failed to review all the evidence before entering the order, and that certain terms
of the protection order exceeded the court’s statutory authority. We disagree and
affirm.
FACTS
In June 2024, Sara MacDuff petitioned for a vulnerable adult protection
order (VAPO) in her capacity as Patricia Mayovsky’s attorney. 	At that time,
Mayovsky was over 80 years old and suffering from dementia and other health
conditions. 	MacDuff’s petition sought to protect Mayovsky from Bowen and
asserted that he had “abandoned, abused, financially exploited, or neglected” her
pursuant to RCW 7.105.225(1)(d). The petition alleged several incidents, including
that Bowen had twice picked Mayovsky up from her retirement community and

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taken her to her former residence which caused her distress when she discovered
the residence had been rented. 	MacDuff further asserted in the petition that
Bowen had provided Mayovsky with alcohol on two occasions, despite Bowen’s
knowledge of her longstanding problems with alcohol abuse. 	The petition was
supported by declarations from MacDuff, Mayovsky’s brother Ronald Mayovsky,1
and Kelli Clopp, Mayovsky’s relative2 and agent pursuant to a durable power of
attorney. 	MacDuff’s declaration described Bowen as Mayovsky’s “longstanding
friend,” and Ronald’s declaration stated that Bowen had previously cared for
Mayovsky’s father.
Bowen 	defended 	against 	these 	allegations 	with 	his 	own 	declaration,
transcripts of his phone calls with Mayovsky, and two reference letters attesting to
his good character.
The trial court issued a temporary protection order at a hearing on July 8,
2024 and appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL). 	The trial court held a review
hearing in August but continued the proceedings for an additional five weeks
specifically to provide Bowen with time to obtain counsel. On September 19, the
parties appeared before a King County Superior Court Commissioner, who
expressly noted that he had read all of the materials filed by the parties and then
heard testimony from MacDuff, the GAL, Clopp, and Bowen.
1 Because Patricia and her brother, Ronald Mayovsky share the same last name and
Ronald submitted a declaration in this case, we refer to Patricia by her last name and Ronald by
his first name for the sake of precision and clarity. No disrespect is intended.
2 Clopp referred to Mayovsky as her aunt, and the record establishes that Clopp is the
daughter of Mayovsky’s first cousin.

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At the conclusion of the virtual hearing, the commissioner entered a VAPO
effective for four years. 	The order relied on the GAL’s report, the declarations
submitted by the parties, and testimony which showed that Mayovsky was “a
vulnerable adult—cognitively and physically.” 	The order also noted that “Bowen
has shown a remarkable lack of awareness of Ms. Mayovsky’s medical and
cognitive condition,” included a finding that Bowen posed a credible threat to
Mayovsky, and specifically that “Bowen’s actions have created unsafe conditions
for Ms. Mayovsky. 	The [c]ourt understands that Ms. Mayovsky would like the
freedom to decide with whom she can associate. The possible value added to Ms.
Mayovsky by choosing to associate with Mr. Bowen is outweighed by his harmful
conduct.” The VAPO imposed general restraints including no harm and no contact
provisions, 	a 	provision 	prohibiting 	Bowen 	from 	being 	within 	1,000 	feet 	of
Mayovsky’s residence, and explicitly disallowed attempts at contact through third
parties.
Bowen timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Burden of Proof in VAPO Proceeding
As a preliminary matter, relevant to Bowen’s first assignment of error
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the VAPO, the parties
dispute the burden of proof that applies in a contested VAPO proceeding. 	This
conflict appears to arise from the preprinted language in the King County Superior
Court protection order form, used for a variety of different types of protection

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orders, that was checked by the commissioner as applicable to the instant case,
which reads as follows:
Vulnerable Adult Objects. The petition was filed by someone other
than the vulnerable adult and the vulnerable adult objects to some or
all of the order. The court finds by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence the petitioner established that there is abandonment,
abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect of a vulnerable adult and the
vulnerable adult is unable, due to incapacity, undue influence, or
duress, to protect their person or estate in connection with the issues
raised in the petition or order based on the following evidence.
(Emphasis added) (boldface omitted.) 	Following this preprinted language, the
commissioner set out his various findings of fact.
Bowen contends that while the evidence was nonetheless insufficient to
support the findings, the commissioner properly applied the clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence standard. 	Bowen urges this court to follow In re Vulnerable
Adult Petition for Knight, 178 Wn. App. 929, 317 P.3d 1068 (2014). 	Knight held
that the standard of proof for a VAPO, under former RCW 74.34.110 (2007), in
circumstances 	where 	the 	protected 	person 	objects, 	is 	clear, 	cogent, 	and
convincing evidence. 	178 Wn. App. at 937-38. 	He contends that the legislature
did not explicitly abrogate Knight when it amended the relevant VAPO statutes and
“a heightened standard of proof is required” because “fundamental personal rights
are at stake.” 	MacDuff avers that the commissioner should have applied a
preponderance of the evidence standard to reflect the legislature’s revision to
RCW 7.105.225. 	MacDuff would have us follow the reasoning set out in the
unpublished opinion In re Vulnerable Adult Petition of Cox, which held that
subsequent 	revisions 	to 	RCW 	7.105.225 	necessitate 	the 	application 	of 	a

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preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence 	standard 	and 	thus 	Knight’s 	holding 	was
“overridden.”3
The parties agree that chapter 7.105 RCW controls here. 	In 2021, our
legislature passed a bill entitled “Civil Protection Orders” with the stated intent to
“improve the efficacy of, accessibility to, and understanding of, civil protection
orders.” L AWS OF 2021, ch. 215, § 1(7). To this end, it determined that the “the six
different civil protection orders in Washington state should be included in a single
chapter of the Revised Code of Washington.” 	Id. 	That single chapter is chapter
7.105 RCW. RCW 7.105.225(1) states, “The court shall issue a protection order if
it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner has proved the
required criteria specified in (a) through (f) of this subsection for obtaining a
protection order under this chapter.” (Emphasis added.)
“When a court interprets a statute, it does not construe an unambiguous
statute because plain words do not require construction.” 	Muckleshoot Indian
Tribe v. Dep’t of Ecology, 112 Wn. App. 712, 720, 50 P.3d 668 (2002). If the statute
is unambiguous its meaning is “‘derived from the language of the statute alone.’”
Food Servs. of Am. v. Royal Heights, Inc., 123 Wn.2d 779, 784, 871 P.2d 590
(1994) (quoting Cherry v. Mun. of Metro Seattle, 116 Wn.2d 794, 799, 808 P.2d
746 	(1991)). 	We 	presume 	that 	the 	legislature 	is 	“‘familiar 	with 	judicial
interpretations of statutes, and absent an indication it intended to overrule a
3 No. 39134-5-II, slip op. at 15 (Wash. Ct. App. July 9, 	2024) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/391345_unp.pdf.
Pursuant to GR 14.1, we may cite to unpublished opinions as necessary for a well-
reasoned opinion. We cite this unpublished opinion solely because of the respondent’s reliance
on it in support of her position on this issue.

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particular interpretation, amendments are presumed to be consistent with previous
judicial decisions.’” 	In re Est. of Bowers, 132 Wn. App. 334, 342, 131 P.3d 916
(2006) (quoting Pudmaroff v. Allen, 138 Wn.2d 55, 64-65, 977 P.2d 574 (1999)).
RCW 7.105.225 is straightforward and unambiguous. 	Accordingly, we
reject Bowen’s contentions regarding the burden of proof for a VAPO. 	Knight
addressed a statute that no longer governs VAPO proceedings and therefore, does
not 	control 	here. 	However, 	we 	take 	this 	opportunity 	to 	encourage 	those
responsible for maintaining standardized court forms to update the protection order
to reflect this statutory amendment that became effective in 2022.
II. 	Sufficiency of the Evidence
Bowen contends that “the trial court’s findings are unsupported by the
record.” We disagree.
A trial court’s decision to grant a protection order is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. 	Cox v. Fulmer, 31 Wn. App. 2d 485, 489, 555 P.3d 431 (2024). 	A
trial 	court 	abuses 	its 	discretion 	if 	the 	issuance 	of 	the 	order 	“is 	manifestly
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” 	Id. 	“We
review a trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence, generally deferring to
the trier of fact on questions of witness credibility, conflicting testimony, and
persuasiveness of the evidence.” In re Domestic Violence Prot. Ord. for Timaeus,
34 Wn. App. 2d 670, 679, 574 P.3d 127 (2025). 	“Evidence is substantial when
sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.” Id.
“Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal.” Id. at 677.

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Bowen fails to reference specific factual findings, instead focusing on the
more general finding of “abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect.”
He asserts there is no possibility of any of the statutory grounds premised on a
duty of care and, without conceding it truly applies, focuses his argument on the
abuse basis for a VAPO. Critically, Bowen does not challenge the court’s finding
that Mayovsky is “a vulnerable adult—cognitively and physically.” 	Nor does he
challenge the finding
that Mr. Bowen’s actions have created unsafe conditions for Ms.
Mayovsky. The [c]ourt understands that Ms. Mayovsky would like the
freedom to decide with whom she can associate. The possible value
added to Ms. Mayovsky by choosing to associate with Mr. Bowen is
outweighed by his harmful conduct.
His failure to do so means that these findings are verities on appeal, and we need
consider only whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
ultimate finding regarding abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect.
RCW 7.105.010(2) provides an expansive definition of qualifying behavior,
in relevant part, as follows:
“Abuse,” for the purposes of a vulnerable adult protection order,
means intentional, willful, or reckless action or inaction that inflicts
injury, unreasonable confinement, intimidation, or punishment on a
vulnerable adult. . . . “Abuse” includes sexual abuse, mental abuse,
physical abuse, personal exploitation, and improper use of restraint
against a vulnerable adult, which have the following meanings:
. . . .
(b) “Mental abuse” means an intentional, willful, or reckless
verbal or nonverbal action that threatens, humiliates, harasses,
coerces, intimidates, isolates, unreasonably confines, or punishes a
vulnerable adult. “Mental abuse” may include ridiculing, yelling,
swearing, or withholding or tampering with prescribed medications or
their dosage.
. . . .
(d) “Physical abuse” means the intentional, willful, or reckless
action of inflicting bodily injury or physical mistreatment. “Physical

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abuse” includes, but is not limited to, striking with or without an
object, 	slapping, 	pinching, 	strangulation, 	suffocation, 	kicking,
shoving, or prodding.
There was evidence before the trial court that Bowen’s actions amounted to mental
abuse in the form of isolation. 	MacDuff provided her own declaration as well as
those from Mayovsky’s relatives that stated Bowen’s action had stoked enmity
between Mayovsky and her family, isolating her from her existing support system.
The 	VAPO 	noted 	that 	Bowen 	had 	“interfered 	with 	her 	family 	and 	legal
relationships.” There was also evidence of physical abuse from Bowen’s decision
to provide Mayovsky with alcohol, or at least provide her access to it. 	MacDuff
testified that Mayovsky “has a history of alcohol abuse,” Clopp’s declaration stated
that Mayovsky had been found wandering the Seattle University campus at night,
and MacDuff’s declaration explained that Mayovsky was taken to the hospital with
alcohol poisoning after being found on the campus two days after Bowen had
visited. 	The VAPO noted this evidence and also expressly included a finding that
“Mr. Bowen has supplied alcohol.” There were two separate grounds, established
by substantial evidence, to support the finding of abandonment, abuse, financial
exploitation, or neglect. The commissioner’s ruling that granted the VAPO was not
an abuse of discretion.
III. 	Consideration of Evidence
Bowen next argues that the trial court failed to consider the evidence he
submitted because it is not explicitly mentioned in the written list included in the
VAPO and this failure amounts to an abuse of discretion that mandates reversal.
This contention is directly contradicted by the record.

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While Bowen is correct that the evidence he submitted is not expressly set
out in the VAPO, the report of proceedings contains two separate express
statements by the commissioner that he had reviewed the all of the materials the
parties had provided. Early in the hearing, before any testimony was offered, the
commissioner stated, “If you’ll refer me to any declarations that you want to—I did
read it all, but if there’s information that you want me to look at, tell me the date of
filing and what page.” 	(Emphasis added.) 	Then, at the close of the proceeding,
the commissioner said, “I want to read the pleadings one more time. I’m going to
do that, and we’ll get the written ruling e[-]mailed out to everybody shortly after the
lunch hour.” (Emphasis added.) Further, the list of evidence set out in the VAPO
is clearly limited to that on which the commissioner relied for entry of the order.
The preprinted language on the form that precedes the portion added by the
commissioner states,
The 	court 	finds 	. 	. 	. 	the 	petitioner 	established 	that 	there 	is
abandonment, 	abuse, 	financial 	exploitation, 	or 	neglect 	of 	a
vulnerable adult and the vulnerable adult is unable, due to incapacity,
undue influence, or duress, to protect their person or estate in
connection with the issues raised in the petition or order based on
the following evidence.
(Emphasis added.) 	The omission of Bowen’s evidence from the list that follows
merely indicates that the commissioner did not credit Bowen’s testimony or the
documentary evidence that he had filed, not that he had failed to consider it.
IV. 	Scope of Order
Bowen’s final contention on appeal is that the limitations in the VAPO went
beyond the scope of the trial court’s statutory authority because it was not a

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“tailored, proportional response.” 	MacDuff responds that the broad scope of the
prohibition 	on 	contact was 	necessary based 	on 	the GAL’s 	conclusion that
Mayovksy’s “dementia and alcoholism, and Bowen’s failure to act in a manner
consistent with vulnerability” meant that “a total prohibition on contact between
Bowen and Mayovsky was the best solution.”
Again, as explained in Part II, supra, we review the trial court’s decision to
grant a protection order for an abuse of discretion and defer to the trial court as to
witness credibility, conflicting testimony, and the persuasiveness of the evidence.
The trial court enjoys a broad grant of discretion by the legislature and has the
authority to enter an order “as it deems necessary for the protection of the
vulnerable adult.” RCW 7.105.220(4).
The GAL submitted a written report at the conclusion of his court-ordered
investigation, and he testified at the hearing. He explicitly recommended that the
court prohibit Bowen from having any contact with Mayovsky and explained that
this was based on the following:
[Bowen’s] tendency to see this whole thing as a conspiracy to
prevent Ms. Mayovsky from having contact with her friend, he’s
lacking insight. He is either in denial or he really does not understand
the level of Ms. Mayovsky’s dementia. 	It’s quite advanced. 	Her
memory is very impaired, and her own insight is very impaired. And
coupled with her alcoholism, she’s making very poor judgments for
herself. 	And he either refuses to acknowledge that or he can’t
understand it. And either way, I think it’s best that he not have any
contact with her.
Further, Ronald’s written declaration stated that he had tried to talk with Bowen
“many times about [Mayovsky]’s vulnerability but he will not listen and becomes
mad at [him] and says nasty comments.” Clopp’s declaration noted that she had

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changed Mayovsky’s phone number and blocked Bowen’s number but he had
continued to use proxies to contact her. 	MacDuff testified about the lengths to
which Bowen went in order to contact Mayovsky after multiple new phone numbers
were obtained for her, including calling the reception desk of the facility where she
lived to connect him to her room and then asking Mayovsky to read her new phone
number to him.
This evidence established that Mayovsky’s attorney and family had already
tried to mediate contact with Bowen and that her overall condition improved when
they were able to do so, but it also showed that Bowen repeatedly sought to
circumvent those efforts. 	The trial court exercised its broad discretion, followed
the recommendation of the GAL, and entered a VAPO with conditions responsive
to the facts before it. The commissioner did not err.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: