Inglewood Holdings Llc, Et Al., Appellants V. Jones Engineers, Inc., Et Al., Respondents

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
INGLEWOOD HOLDINGS, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company;
GOLDEN SUN, LLC, a Washington
limited liability company; SAGEWOOD
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; SEABELL, LLC, a
Washington limited liability company;
WOODLAKE ESTATES, LLC, a
Washington limited liability company;
PLANTATION HOLDINGS OF
WHATCOM LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; STEBNER REAL
ESTATE, INC., a Washington
corporation,
Appellants,
JONES ENGINEERS, INC., PS, a
Washington professional service
corporation; DARCY JONES and
JANE DOE JONES, husband and wife
and the marital community thereof;
and JONES LAW GROUP, PLLC, a
Washington professional limited liability
company,
Respondents.
No. 74566-2-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: January 30, 2017
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Trickey, A.C.J. — Inglewood 	Holdings, 	LLC and several other parties
(collectively, Inglewood) appeal the trial court's dismissal on summary judgment
of its quiet title and slander of title claims against Jones Engineers, Inc. and other
parties (collectively, Jones Engineers). 	Inglewood argues that the court erred by
holding that its quiet title claim was 	moot and that it had 	not raised material
questions of fact whether Jones Engineers's statements met all the elements of a
slander of title action. 	Because the trial court could still order effective relief to

No. 74566-2-1 / 2
Inglewood on the quiet title claim, we reverse the dismissal of that claim. 	But we
affirm the trial court's dismissal of Inglewood's slander of title claim because
Inglewood 	did 	not 	present 	competent 	evidence 	that 	Jones 	Engineers's
statements caused damages to Inglewood.
Inglewood sought a continuance from the trial court in order to uncover
evidence of Jones 	Engineers's 	malicious behavior. 	It argues that 	the 	court
abused 	its discretion 	by denying 	its 	motion 	for a 	continuance. 	Because
Inglewood did not demonstrate good cause for the delay in seeking depositions
from Jones Engineers, we affirm the trial court's denial of the request.
FACTS
In 2008, Jones Engineers, 	Inc., 	PS (JEI) filed a lawsuit against Derek
Stebner, several specific entities owned by Stebner, and "Stebner Entities" for
breach of contract.1 	Stebner had signed the contract with his name followed by
"Stebner Entities."2 	When asked about it at a deposition, Stebner said, "[W]hat
am I going to do, write Derek Stebner and list all 14 companies? 	No one is going
to do that. That's Stebner and all my entities."3
In 2013, the court awarded JEI a judgment of over $100,000 against
"Defendants 	Derek 	R. 	Stebner, 	Stebner 	Entities; 	Canyon 	Holdings, 	Inc., a
Washington 	corporation, 	and 	Plantation 	Builders, 	L.L.C., 	a 	Washington
company."4 	The trial court found that Stebner was the "owner and authorized
representative ofthe entity defendants" in the action and that he was "authorized
1 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 76.
2 CP at 118.
3 CP at 92.
4 CP at 88-89.

No. 74566-2-1 / 3
to bind the entity defendants."5 	It also found "Derek Stebner Entities" was a
"moniker" that Stebner used when entering into contracts but that there was "no
actual company named Derek Stebner Entities."6
Stebner appealed 	the judgment. 	While the appeal was pending, JEI
recorded the judgment against Stebner and the Stebner Entities. 	JEI included a
coversheet with the judgment that named many "Grantor[s]," including Inglewood
Holdings, 	LLC; 	Golden 	Sun, 	LLC; 	Sagewood 	Holdings, 	LLC; 	Seabell, 	LLC;
Woodlake Estates, LLC; Plantation Holdings of Whatcom, LLC; and Stebner Real
Estate, Inc. 	(collectively, 	Inglewood).7 	The coversheet listed 	real 	properties
belonging to Inglewood.
In July 2014, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 	But, concluding
that the reference in the judgment to "Stebner Entities" was an "inadvertent
error," the court remanded the case to the trial court to amend the judgment to
delete "Stebner Entities."8 	Neither JEI nor Stebner immediately sought to amend
the judgment.
In April 2015, 	Inglewood initiated the current action against JEI, 	Darcy
Jones and Jane Doe Jones, and 	Jones Law Office PLLC (collectively, Jones
Engineers) to quiet title, for slander of title, and for negligence. 	After this litigation
began, Jones Engineers successfully moved the trial court to amend the original
judgment to delete "Stebner Entities."9
Jones 	Engineers 	moved for 	summary judgment on all of Inglewood's
5 CP at 106.
6 CP at 107.
7CPat19.
8 CP at 125.
9CPat73, 127-28.

No. 74566-2-1 / 4
claims. 	Inglewood opposed summary judgment and moved for a continuance.
The trial court granted Jones Engineers's motion for summary judgment and
denied Inglewood's motion for a continuance.
Inglewood appeals.
ANALYSIS
Inglewood argues that the trial court erred by granting Jones Engineers
summary judgment on all of Inglewood's claims. 	Jones Engineers responds that
summary judgment was proper because the quiet title action was moot and
Inglewood did not raise genuine issues of material fact whether it could prove
every element of slander of title or negligence. 	We address each of Inglewood's
claims in turn.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." 	CR 56(c). 	"We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering
the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party." 	Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357
P.3d 1080 (2015).
Quiet Title
Inglewood argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed its quiet title
action as moot. 	Jones Engineers argues that Inglewood's quiet title claim is
moot because the judgment that allegedly encumbered Inglewood's titles has
been 	amended 	to remove the 	Stebner Entities. 	We agree 	with 	Inglewood
because the judgment and coversheet remain on the record title for Inglewood's

No. 74566-2-1 / 5
properties.
A case is moot when the court can 	no 	longer provide effective relief.
Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984).
Relief in a quiet title action may include an order removing any clouds
from the record title. 	Robinson v. Khan, 89 Wn. App. 418, 423, 948 P.2d 1347
(1998). A "cloud" on a title may be an encumbrance or a recorded document that
"has any tendency to impair the fee owner's ability to exercise the rights of
ownership." 	Robinson, 89 Wn. 	App. 	at 422-23. 	Even 	a contract, or other
document that does not actually encumber a party's title, may be a cloud if it
would create "an unnecessary complication that [would] have to be explained to
a buyer or title insurer." Robinson, 89 Wn. App. at 423.
Here, 	Jones 	Engineers recorded a judgment and coversheet against
Inglewood's 	properties. 	Inglewood 	moved 	to quiet 	title 	to 	numerous 	real
properties whose titles were clouded 	by Jones Engineers's 	recording 	of the
judgment 	and 	coversheet. 	As 	relief, 	it 	sought 	an 	order 	"removing 	the
encumbrances 	on each 	of [its] 	real properties and 	quieting 	title" 	or, 	in 	the
alternative, 	an 	order 	"declaring 	that 	[Jones 	Engineers] 	and 	the 	[Jones
Engineers's] judgment states no right, title or claim whatsoever to any part of
[Inglewood's] real properties."10
After Inglewood filed 	its complaint, Jones Engineers had the judgment
amended 	to 	remove 	"Stebner 	Entities."11 	It does 	not 	appear 	that 	Jones
Engineers argues that it currently has any right to encumber these properties.
10 CP at 10.
11 CP at 127-28.

No. 74566-2-1 / 6
But it also does not appear that either party has recorded the amended judgment
or taken any action to remove the earlier judgment from the record title for these
properties.
Jones Engineers argues that the coversheet is not a cloud on the title
because only the judgment, not the coversheet, "determine[s] the legal chain of
title." 	See RCW 65.04.047(1). 	The judgment itself does not list Inglewood and
the other entities or describe the properties, but the coversheet does. 	But, even
if the judgment did not actually encumber Inglewood's titles, the judgement and
coversheet together give potential buyers "notice" of an obligation that might
impact the property.12 	See 	RCW 65.04.070. 	Although 	there is no current
encumbrance, 	having to explain the existence of the recorded judgment and
coversheet creates unnecessary complications for Inglewood. 	Therefore, the
coversheet clouds Inglewood's titles.
Since Jones Engineers does not dispute that it has no right to Inglewood's
properties, Inglewood is entitled to an order removing both documents from the
record titles. 	Because the court could provide effective relief by entering that
order, this issue is not moot. 	We reverse the trial court's dismissal of the quiet
title action. 	On remand, the trial court is directed to enter an order removing the
judgment and coversheet from the record title of all the Inglewood properties.
Slander of Title
Inglewood argues that the trial court erred by granting Jones Engineers's
motion for summary judgment on its slander of title claim because it offered
12 Jones Engineers acknowledges that the purpose of recording the coversheet and
judgment is to give notice. 	Br. of Resp't at 9, 11-12.

No. 74566-2-1 / 7
evidence to support every element of that claim. 	Because Inglewood failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact whether it suffered damages, we affirm.
"A defendant moving 	for summary judgment may meet his 	burden by
showing 	an 	absence 	of evidence 	to 	support 	the 	nonmoving 	party's 	case."
Janaszak v. State, 	173 Wn. App. 703, 	711, 297 P.3d 723 (2013). 	Once the
"defendant makes this 	initial showing, the inquiry shifts to the party with the
burden of proof at trial, the plaintiff." 	Janaszak, 173 Wn. App. at 711. 	The trial
court should grant summary judgment if "the plaintiff fails to make a showing
sufficient 	to 	establish 	the 	existence 	of 	an 	element 	essential" 	of 	its 	case.
Janaszak, 173 Wn. App. at 711.
The court considers "supporting affidavits and other admissible evidence
that is based on the affiant's personal knowledge." 	Int'l Ultimate. Inc. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 122 Wn. App. 736, 744, 87 P.3d 774 (2004). The plaintiff
"may not rely on speculation or argumentative assertions that unresolved factual
issues remain." 	Little v. Countrvwood Homes, Inc., 132 Wn. App. 777, 780, 133
P.3d 944 (2006). "Unsupported conclus[ory] statements alone are insufficient to
prove the existence 	or nonexistence of issues of fact." 	Hash by Hash v.
Children's Orthopedic Hosp.. 49 Wn. App. 130, 133, 741 P.2d 584 (1987).
Here, 	Jones 	Engineers moved for summary judgment on 	Inglewood's
slander of title action, arguing that Inglewood had no evidence to support its
claim. 	Accordingly, Inglewood had to show that there were genuine issues of
material fact for each element of slander of title.
Slander 	of 	title 	has 	five 	essential 	elements: 	"(1) 	false 	words; 	(2)

No. 74566-2-1 / 8
maliciously published; (3) with reference to some pending sale or purchase of
property; 	(4) 	which 	go 	to 	defeat 	plaintiff's title; 	and 	(5) 	result 	in 	plaintiff's
pecuniary loss." 	Rorviq v. Douglas, 123 Wn.2d 854, 859, 873 P.2d 492 (1994).
Jones 	Engineers 	asserted 	in 	its 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	that
Inglewood 	had no evidence that recording the judgment and cover sheet had
damaged Inglewood. 	In response, Inglewood described several "pending sales"
and 	"other 	transactions" 	that 	had 	fallen 	through, 	allegedly 	because 	of the
recorded judgment.13 The only proof Inglewood offered to support these claims
was Stebner's declaration.
Stebner's declaration is full of assertions about the motives behind other
people's actions. 	It is too conclusory to establish that Jones Engineers's actions
caused Inglewood pecuniary loss. 	Describing various pending transactions and
foreclosures, Stebner alleged that "pending transactions are being hampered by
Defendants' wrongful liens"; "[t]he lender would not proceed without removal of
Defendants' bogus lien"; "we could not sell any other properties or satisfy the
lender that 	Defendants' 	lien was 	bogus 	or would be 	removed"; 	and 	that 	a
"transaction could not close due to Defendants' bogus lien and the property was
foreclosed on."14 	But neither Inglewood nor Stebner provided the names of any
of the other parties to these transactions or any affidavits or statements from
these lenders explaining why the transactions fell through. 	Stebner's declaration
alone, 	without any 	supporting 	evidence, 	is simply not sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact whether Jones Engineers's act of recording the
13 CP at 210-11.
14 CP at 222.
8

No. 74566-2-1 / 9
judgment and coversheet caused Inglewood pecuniary loss.
Inglewood's slander of title claim could not survive without establishing the
element of pecuniary loss. 	The trial court did not err 	by granting summary
judgment on this claim.
Negligence
Inglewood assigned error to the entire summary judgment order, including
the dismissal of its negligence claims. 	Inglewood waived that assignment of
error by failing to support it with argument or citation to authority. 	See Skagit
County Pub. 	Hosp. Dist. No. 1 v. State. Dep't of Revenue, 158 Wn. App. 426,
440, 242 P.3d 909 (2010).
CR 56ffl Continuance
Inglewood argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
Inglewood's request for a continuance. 	We hold that the trial court did not err
because Inglewood did not offer any reason for its delay.
When a party moves for summary judgment, the opposing 	party may
request a continuance if it needs additional time to obtain affidavits that will justify
its opposition to summary judgment. 	CR 56(f). 	But the court "may deny a motion
for a continuance when (1) the moving party does not offer a good reason for the
delay 	in 	obtaining 	the 	evidence; 	(2) 	the 	moving 	party does 	not state what
evidence 	would 	be 	established 	through the 	additional discovery; 	or (3) the
evidence sought will not raise a genuine issue of fact." 	Coogle v. Snow, 56 Wn.
App. 499, 507, 784 P.2d 554 (1990).
This court reviews a trial court's decision to deny a continuance for an

No. 74566-2-1/10
abuse of discretion. 	Coggle, 56 Wn. App. at 504. 	It is an abuse of discretion if
the court bases its decision on 	untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.
Coggle, 56 Wn. App. at 507.
Inglewood filed its complaint in April 2015, but had contemplated filing it
since at least February 2015. Jones Engineers moved for summary judgment in
November 2015. 	Although 	Inglewood 	conducted other discovery during 	the
seven months between the complaint and the motion for summary judgment, it
did 	not seek to depose any of the defendants until 	two weeks after Jones
Engineers's motion. 	Inglewood sought a continuance under CR 56(f) because it
would not have time to submit any depositions it took to the court before to the
summary judgment hearing. 	But it did not offer any justification for its delay in
seeking depositions.
The trial court's decision was reasonable, given that Inglewood offered no
explanation for the delay. 	The court did not err by refusing Inglewood's request
for a continuance.
Attorney Fees and Appellate Costs
Inglewood requests attorney fees under RAP 18.1 and Rorvia v. Douglas,
123 Wn.2d 854, 873 P.2d 492 (1994). 	Rorvig allows a plaintiff who is successful
in a slander of title action to recover attorney fees. 	123 Wn.2d at 856. 	Rorvig
permits attorney fees in slander of title actions because, in those cases, the
defendant, "by intentional and calculated action," leave the plaintiff no choice but
litigation. 	123 Wn.2d 	at 862. 	Inglewood 	has 	not established that 	Rorviq's
holding 	should 	apply 	to 	quiet title 	actions, 	which 	do 	not 	require 	intentional
10

No. 74566-2-1/11
conduct by the defendant.
While Inglewood's quiet title action was successful, 	its slander of title
action was not.15 We do not award Inglewood attorney fees on appeal.
Inglewood 	also 	requests 	appellate 	costs 	under 	RAP 	14.4. 	"A
commissioner or clerk of the appellate court will award costs to the party that
substantially prevails on review." 	RAP 14.2. Although prevailing on its quiet title
action, Inglewood did not prevail on its slander of title or negligence actions, or its
review of the trial court's denial of its request for a continuance. 	It is not a
substantially prevailing party on appeal.
We affirm the dismissal of Inglewood's slander of title and 	negligence
claims, but reverse the trial court's dismissal of the quiet title action. On remand,
the trial court is directed to enter an order consistent with this opinion.
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WE CONCUR:
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15 Moreover, Inglewood would not be entitled to attorney fees even if this court reversed
summary judgment on the slander of title claim. 	Successfully resisting 	summary
judgment on a slander of title action is not the same as ultimately succeeding on a
slander of title action. 	An award of attorney fees would be premature. 	See Landis &
Landis Const.. LLC v. Nation, 171 Wn. App. 157, 168, 286 P.3d 979 (2012).
11