* Miki & Michal Mullor, App's V. Renaissance Ridge Homeowners Assoc., Resps

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
MIKI M. MULLOR and MICHAL
MULLOR, a marital community,
Appellants,
v.
RENAISSANCE RIDGE
HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, a
Washington Non-Profit Corporation; and
SURESH ANNAMREDDY and DIVYA
KIRON ANNAMREDDY, a marital
community,
Respondents.
No. 83025-2-I
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO PUBLISH
The respondents, Renaissance Ridge Homeowners Association, having filed a
motion 	to 	publish 	opinion, 	and 	the 	hearing 	panel 	having 	reconsidered 	its 	prior
determination and finding that the opinion will be of precedential value; now, therefore it
is hereby:
ORDERED that the unpublished opinion filed August 1, 2022, shall be published
and printed in the Washington Appellate Reports.
For the Court:
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THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
MIKI M. MULLOR and MICHAL MULLOR,
a marital community,
Appellants,
v.
RENAISSANCE RIDGE HOMEOWNERS’
ASSOCIATION, a Washington Non-Profit
Corporation; and SURESH
ANNAMREDDY and DIVYA KIRON
ANNAMREDDY, a marital community,
Respondents.
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No. 83025-2-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
A NDRUS , C.J. — Miki and Michal Mullor appeal the summary judgment
dismissal of claims against neighbors Suresh and Divya Annamreddy, and the
Renaissance 	Ridge 	Homeowners 	Association 	(the 	Association), 	for 	alleged
violations of Association covenants relating to the style of cedar fence the
Annamreddys 	erected 	on 	the 	boundary 	of 	the 	two 	parcels. 	Because 	the
Association exercised its lawful authority under the covenants to grant a variance
to the Annamreddys for the cedar fence, we affirm. 	But because the trial court
failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its fee award to the
Annamreddys, we remand to the trial court to do so.
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No. 83025-2-I/2
2
FACTS
Miki and Michal Mullor own a home in a residential neighborhood known as
the 	Renaissance 	Ridge 	in 	Sammamish, 	Washington. 	Suresh 	and 	Divya
Annamreddy own a home adjacent to the Mullors’ property, also in Renaissance
Ridge. 	The Mullors’ property is northwest of the Annamreddys’ property, and a
portion of the Mullors’ property sits 10 feet below the Annamreddy backyard, with
the two properties separated by a retaining wall and fencing.
Homeowners living in Renaissance Ridge are members of the Association
and subject to a set of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). 	The
CC&Rs set out land use restrictions for all lots within the development, including
the style of fencing permitted in various locations on a lot or within the residential
neighborhood. 	Article XV of the CC&Rs established an Architectural Control
Committee (the Committee), appointed by the board of directors, to review plans
and specifications for fences that residents propose to place on their properties.
Currently, the Association’s three board members act as the Committee.
Article XII, section 4 of the CC&Rs identifies the type of fences that
homeowners may use in Renaissance Ridge:
Fences, walls or shrubs are permitted on side and rear property lines,
. 	. 	. 	subject 	to 	(1) 	the 	approval 	of 	the 	Committee 	and 	(2)
determination whether such fences, walls or shrubs would interfere
with utility easements reflected on the face of the Plat and other
easements elsewhere recorded. . . . 	No barbed wire, chain link, or
corrugated fiberglass fences shall be erected on any Lot, except that
vinyl coated chain link fencing for sports [facility] or galvanized or
vinyl coated chain link dog kennel enclosures (providing dog kennel
is fully screened from view of adjacent lots or public right-of-way) or
county owned facilities may be considered for approval by the
Committee upon request. All fences, open and solid, are to meet the
standards set by the Committee and must be approved by the
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No. 83025-2-I/3
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Committee prior to construction. . . . All [fencing] must be of the style
shown on the attached Exhibit “C,” and location approved by the
Architectural Control Committee.
(Emphasis added.) 	Exhibit “C,” referenced in article XII, section 4, is a “Wildlife
Network 	Management 	Plan” 	(Plan), 	approved 	by 	King 	County 	to 	provide
“guidelines and ongoing restrictions to preserve and protect the wildlife habitats
located within” the Renaissance Ridge plat. 	The plan notes that the residential
development contains a 150’ wide wildlife network at the two entries into the plat
and near a stormwater detention facility needed for the development. The county
approved encroachments into this wildlife network conditioned on approval of the
plan. The relevant provision of the plan provided:
Preservation of wildlife habitat will be accomplished by limiting the
disturbed area for development. . ..
Protection of the non-disturbed areas will be accomplished in several
ways. Fencing along wetlands and wildlife networks will be provided
as shown in Figure One. Back yards of all lots adjacent to the wildlife
network will be fenced with a solid type 5’ – 6’ fence per Exhibit “A.”
The wildlife network adjacent to SE 8th St. will be fenced with a
combination of a low open fence as shown in Exhibit “B” and our
standard 3’ split rail fence as shown in Exhibit “C.” 	Fencing will be
provided as shown in Exhibit “D” (fencing diagram).
Exhibit “A” to the plan in turn contains a diagram of a fence, in plan view, comprised
of cedar boards, 5 feet in height, with 1/2 inch spacing between the vertical boards.
The Annamreddys’ fence, consisting of 5-foot vertical cedar boards spaced
a 1/2 inch on alternating sides of horizontal boards, was in poor condition and
needed to be replaced. 	In January 2020, Suresh Annamreddy attended an
Association board meeting and received verbal approval to replace the fence. In
late January or early February 2020, a windstorm damaged a portion of the fencing
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No. 83025-2-I/4
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bordering the 	Annamreddy and Mullor 	properties, and Suresh Annamreddy
removed the damaged fencing. He arranged to replace the remaining dilapidated
fencing with a “solid cedar style wood fence” similar in design to existing fencing
in various areas of Renaissance Ridge and lacking the 1/2 inch space between the
vertical boards.
Before the Annamreddys had completed the fence replacement project,
Mullor submitted a written complaint to the Association asking the board to order
the Annamreddys to remove any new fencing and to replace it with an alternating
cedar slat fence. Mullor argued that under article XII, section 4 of the CC&Rs, the
only permissible fence style is that described in Exhibit “A” to the Wildlife Network
Management Plan.
On August 13, 2020, two board members and the Association attorney
visited the Mullors’ property to inspect the Annamreddys’ new solid cedar fence,
the remaining pre-existing “alternating slat style” fencing, and the gap along the
property line where a portion of the old fencing had blown over during the
windstorm. 	On August 31, 2020, the Committee issued a written approval of the
Annamreddys’ fence. It stated that
• 	The remaining portion of the original fence and the portion of the
fence that was removed after it fell must be replaced for safety
and aesthetic purposes. The fence is dilapidated and sits on top
of a retaining wall, creating safety concerns.
• 	The Association will not require you to remove the new fencing
you installed. That fencing is approved, so long as you stain the
fencing in the required cappuccino color. 	Please complete this
staining within 30 days.
• 	The Association approves your request to replace the remaining
original fencing and missing fencing with fencing of the same
style and height as that fencing already replaced, so long as that
new fencing is stained the required cappuccino color. 	Please
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No. 83025-2-I/5
5
complete this replacement within 30 days to ensure that the
dilapidated and missing fencing is promptly addressed.
The Annamreddys complied with this letter, installing solid cedar style fencing in
the gap atop the retaining wall bordering the Mullors’ lot.
By letter of the same date, the Association’s attorney notified the Mullors
that it was rejecting their complaint. The Association determined that the CC&Rs
did 	not mandate fencing of 	a 	design 	and 	height 	described 	in 	the Wildlife
Management Plan unless the fencing ran along wetlands and wildlife networks. It
further concluded that the solid cedar fencing that the Annamreddys had erected
was the same as the type erected by many homeowners within the community.
The Committee found the style to be “more modern” and “more attractive” than the
original fencing, and found that the new fence did not unreasonably block sunlight
in a manner that could be characterized as a nuisance or a violation of the CC&Rs.
In September 2020, the Mullors filed a lawsuit against the Association and
the Annamreddys, alleging breach of duty of reasonable and ordinary care and
breach of the CC&Rs. They subsequently amended their complaint to add a claim
for nuisance against the Annamreddys. They sought damages and a permanent
injunction requiring the Annamreddys to remove the solid cedar fencing and
replace it with a fence the “same design and dimensions as the previously existing
fence on the property.”
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Annamreddys and
the Association, dismissing the Mullors’ claims. The Mullors appeal.
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No. 83025-2-I/6
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ANALYSIS
The Mullors assign error to the summary judgment dismissal of their claims
for breach of the CC&Rs and nuisance. 	They contend the trial court erred in
holding that the CC&Rs allow the Annamreddys to install a solid cedar fence. They
argue the Committee lacked the authority to approve any fencing retroactively or
to grant a variance that is inconsistent with the Wildlife Network Management Plan.
They also argue the trial court erred in concluding that the fence is not a nuisance
as a matter of law. We reject these arguments.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's order on a motion for summary judgment de novo.
Bangerter v. Hat Island Cmty. Ass'n, 199 Wn.2d 183, 188, 504 P.3d 813 (2022).
Interpretation of covenants is a question of law based on the rules of contract
interpretation. Id. at 189. (citing Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmtys. Ass’n, 180 Wn.2d
241, 249, 327 P.3d 614 (2014)); Kiona Park Ests. v. Dehls, 18 Wn. App. 2d 328,
334-35, 491 P.3d 247 (2021). 	The court's primary objective is to determine the
intent of the original parties that established the covenants. 	Id. (citing Riss v.
Angel, 131 Wn.2d 612, 621, 934 P.2d 669 (1997)). 	“In determining intent,
language is given its ordinary and common meaning.” 	Riss, 131 Wn.2d at 621.
We may resolve any ambiguity as to the parties' intent by considering evidence of
the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 623. The court will place special emphasis
on protecting the homeowners’ collective interests. Id. at 623-24. 	A covenant is
ambiguous when its meaning is uncertain or two or more reasonable and fair
interpretations are possible. 	White v. Wilhelm, 34 Wn. App. 763, 771, 665 P.2d
407 (1983). 	While intent is a factual question, when the available evidence
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No. 83025-2-I/7
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warrants but one conclusion, assessing intent may be determined by this court as
a matter of law. Wilkinson, 180 Wn.2d at 250.
Permissible Fences under Article XII, Section 4
The Mullors first maintain that article XII, section 4 unambiguously requires
all homeowners to install only the types of fencing depicted in the Wildlife Network
Management Plan, regardless of whether the parcel is adjacent to a wetland or the
wildlife network. They focus on the language that provides that “[a]ll fencing must
be of the style shown on the attached Exhibit “C,” and location approved by the
Architectural Control Committee.”
On the record before this court, we conclude the language of article XII,
section 4 is ambiguous. First, the Wildlife Network Management Plan, by its terms,
places no restrictions on parcels other than those with “[f]encing along wetlands
and wildlife networks.” It is undisputed that the Annamreddy fencing is not along
any wetland and their parcel is not adjacent to the wildlife network. 	Jason
Kaufman, the current Association president, testified that neither the Mullor nor
Annamreddy parcel is located within the tracts defined as “sensitive areas” in the
CC&Rs and that neither is adjacent to any wetlands or wildlife networks. 	The
Mullors submitted no evidence to dispute this testimony. The language reasonably
supports the Association’s understanding that the fencing style restrictions in the
Wildlife Network Management Plan apply only to a limited number of parcels and
not to the Annamreddy lot.
Second, the sentence preceding the one on which the Mullors rely provides
that “[a]ll fences, open and solid, are to meet the standards set by the Committee
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No. 83025-2-I/8
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and must be approved by the Committee prior to construction.” This provision also
arguably supports the Association’s interpretation that “solid” fences—i.e., fences
lacking the 1/2 inch gap between slats, are generally permissible if approved by
the Committee.
But the Mullors argue the word “solid” as used in article XII, section 4 must
be interpreted in light of the way this word is used in the Wildlife Network
Management Plan which labels the cedar fence depicted in the Plan’s Exhibit “A”
as “solid,” even though the depiction shows a 1/2-inch gap between the vertical
fence slats. The Wildlife Network Management Plan does state that “[b]ack yards
of all lots adjacent to the wildlife network will be fenced with a solid type 5’ – 6’
fence per Exhibit ‘A.’ ” (Emphasis added.) 	This language supports the Mullors’
interpretation of the fencing restrictions.
So too does the testimony of Eric Wells, the agent for the developer and
declarant involved in the drafting of the CC&Rs. Wells testified that even though
the drawings of fencing originally related only to the wildlife network areas, it was
his intent that all fencing in the development should be one of the three styles
shown in the Wildlife Network Management Plan. 	The Wells testimony would
support an interpretation that the reference to “solid” fencing in article XII, section
4 is merely a reference to the “solid” style of fencing depicted in the Wildlife
Network Management Plan, and not a grant of broader authority for homeowners
to erect any style of solid fence they choose.
As the Association and the Annamreddys point out, the credibility of Wells’
testimony is undercut by what Renaissance Ridge homeowners have actually
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No. 83025-2-I/9
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done over the years. Kaufman testified that, when he surveyed the community, he
counted at least 52 of the 300 lots, or nearly one in six, with fences of solid cedar
planks. 	Kaufman’s own property has two fences with two alternative slat style
fences and two fences with the same solid cedar slats as the Annamreddys
erected. The Association’s treasurer, Yogesh Gupta, testified that he has lived in
Renaissance Ridge since the development opened and when he moved into his
new home, there were a number of lots with solid cedar style fences as part of the
original construction. 	He stated “[t]hat style of fencing is and has always been
commonly used in Renaissance Ridge.” This testimony supports the Association’s
contention that the original intent in adopting fencing restrictions is not as Wells
claims it to be.
Because the record supports two reasonable interpretations of article XII,
section 4, we conclude the language is ambiguous and an issue of fact exists as
to whether the fence limitations described in the Wildlife Network Management
Plan apply to lots outside the wildlife network.
Variances under Article XV, Section 14
But even if a trier of fact adopted the Mullors’ interpretation of article XII,
section 4, we nevertheless conclude that the Committee has the authority to grant
a variance, even retroactively, to the Annamreddys under article XV, section 14 of
the CC&Rs. This section provides:
The Committee . . . shall have the sole and exclusive authority to
approve plans and specifications which do not conform to these
restrictions in order to (1) overcome practical difficulties, or (2)
prevent undue hardship from being imposed on an owner as a result
of applying these restrictions, or (3) allow alternative construction
upon specific request by an owner. 	However, such variations will
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No. 83025-2-I/10
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only be approved in the event that the variation, in the sole and
exclusive discretion of the Committee . . . will not (1) detrimentally
impact the overall appearance of the development, (2) impair the
attractive development of the subdivision, or (3) adversely affect the
character of nearby lots to a significant degree. Granting such a
variation 	shall 	not 	constitute 	a 	waiver 	of 	the 	restrictions 	or
requirements articulated in this Declaration.
For 	purposes 	of 	approval 	of 	architectural 	design
requirements, structure placement, analysis of view restrictions and
all other aspects of review authority granted to the Committee and
the Declarant through this Declaration, the decision of the Committee
and the Declarant shall be final.
(Emphasis added.) 	This language bestows sole and exclusive authority on the
Committee 	to 	consider 	and 	grant 	variances 	from 	any 	restriction, 	and 	the
Committee’s 	decision 	is 	final. 	The 	Washington 	Supreme 	Court 	recently
emphasized that homeowner association decision-makers are due significant
deference in these situations: “[W]hen a homeowners’ association makes a
discretionary decision in a procedurally valid way, courts will not substitute their
judgment for that of the association absent a showing of ‘fraud, dishonesty, or
incompetence 	(i.e., 	failure 	to 	exercise 	proper 	care, 	skill, 	and 	diligence)[.]’”
Bangerter, 199 Wn.2d at 190 (quoting Riss v. Angel, 131 Wn.2d at 632 (quoting In
re Spokane Concrete Prods., Inc., 126 Wn.2d 269, 279, 892 P.2d 98 (1995)))
(alteration in original).
The Mullors argue that the Committee did not render its variance decision
in a procedurally valid way because the Annamreddys failed to submit formal plans
before they erected the fence. 	But article XV, section 14 does not prohibit the
granting of an after-the-fact variance. 	The language of the variance provision
appears to contemplate just such an event by allowing the Committee to grant a
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No. 83025-2-I/11
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variance to “prevent undue hardship from being imposed on an owner as a result
of applying these restrictions[.]”
The Mullors also maintain that the Committee’s chief concern in granting
the variance was not whether the Annamreddy fence met the criteria for a variance.
There is no evidence to support this contention. 	It is undisputed that the
Committee visited the property and determined that the replacement fence was
more attractive than the original fencing, well-harmonized with the surrounding
environment, matched many other solid cedar style fences in the community, did
not significantly block light to the Mullors’ property, and likely improved the value
of neighboring properties.
The Mullors next contend that the Annamreddys’ failure to submit plans in
advance of building the fence was a procedural violation that can only be remedied
by removal of the structure. 	While article XII, section 4 does require Committee
approval of plans “prior to construction,” article IX, section 4 of the CC&Rs grants
the Association flexibility in its enforcement choices.
In the event that an owner shall fail to comply with any section or
provision of the Declaration, and any Amendments thereto, the
Board may undertake to enforce compliance through the provisions
of 	Section 3 herein, as well 	as 	Article XVI, 	Section 4 of 	the
Declaration, or any other authority granted to the Board through this
Declaration.
(Emphasis added.) 	In other words, the Association has the discretion to choose
whether certain situations warrant moving forward with enforcement action. If the
Committee did not deem the Annamreddys’ failure to submit formal plans an
egregious violation sufficient to warrant requiring them to remove the fence, we
defer to that decision.
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No. 83025-2-I/12
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Because the Association has the authority to grant a variance to the
Annamreddys to permit them to build a solid cedar fence along the border of their
property, 	the 	Mullors 	failed 	to 	establish 	that 	either 	the 	Association 	or 	the
Annamreddys violated the CC&Rs. Summary judgment was appropriate.1
Nuisance
The 	Mullors 	next 	argue 	that 	genuine 	issues 	of 	material 	fact 	remain
regarding whether the Annamreddy’s fence created a nuisance. We disagree.
The Mullors alleged a violation of RCW 7.48.120, which provides:
Nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to
perform a duty, which act or omission either annoys, injures or
endangers the comfort, repose, health or safety of others, offends
decency, or unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends to obstruct,
or render dangerous for passage, any lake or navigable river, bay,
stream, canal or basin, or any public park, square, street or highway;
or in any way renders other persons insecure in life, or in the use of
property.
The Mullors’ nuisance claim was premised on the allegation that the fence was
unapproved and violated the CC&Rs. 	But the fence was not unapproved, and it
did not breach the CC&Rs because the Committee granted a variance. Mullor has
not identified any other law that has been violated or any other common law duty
1 The Association also argues that any Wildlife Network Management Plan fencing
restrictions applicable to lots other than those adjacent to the wildlife network have been
abandoned. Abandonment is an equitable defense available to preclude enforcement of
a covenant. Mountain Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Tydings, 125 Wn.2d 337, 341-42, 883
P.2d 1383 (1994). The defense requires evidence that prior violations by other residents
have so eroded the general plan as to make enforcement useless or inequitable. Id. at
342. Generally, whether evidence supports a finding of abandonment is a question of fact.
Green v. Normandy Park Riviera Section Cmty. Club, 137 Wn. App. 665, 697, 151 P.3d
1038 (2007). 	See also White v. Wilhelm, 34 Wn. App. at 770 (“Applicability of [the
abandonment] doctrine, which is based on estoppel, is a factual determination.”) We do
not need to reach the issue of whether the Association members have abandoned the
fencing restrictions for lots such as the Annamreddys’ parcel because summary judgment
was appropriate under article XV, section 4’s variance provision.
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No. 83025-2-I/13
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breached. 	There is no common law duty independent of those listed in the
nuisance statute or required by the CC&Rs. “At common law a man has a right to
build a fence or other structure on his own land as high as he pleases, although
he thereby completely obstructs his neighbors' light and air, and the motive by
which he is actuated is immaterial.” 	Karasek v. Peier, 22 Wash. 419, 427, 61 P.
33 (1900). See also Asche v. Bloomquist, 132 Wn. App. 784, 133 P.3d 475 (2006)
(a nuisance action fails when it is based on rights conferred by a statute and the
statutory rights have not been violated). Mullor failed to establish the existence of
a nuisance as a matter of law. Summary judgment dismissal of this claim was also
proper.
Attorney Fees Awarded by the Trial Court
The Mullors ask us to reverse the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the
Association and the Annamreddys because summary judgment was improper and
the trial court failed to enter written findings of fact as to the reasonableness of
those fees. 	We reject the first argument and need not address it. 	We further
conclude the Mullors waived their right to challenge the fee award to the
Association. But we agree the fee award to the Annamreddys must be remanded
to the trial court for entry of findings of fact justifying the reasonableness of the
amount awarded.
First, the Mullors did not assign error to, or challenge the reasonableness
of, the attorney fee award to the Association in their briefs to this court. 	If an
appellant fails to raise an issue in the assignments of error and fails to present any
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No. 83025-2-I/14
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argument on the issue in their brief, we generally will not consider the merits of
that issue. State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 321, 893 P.2d 629 (1995).
Second, in response to the Association’s motion for attorney fees, the
Mullors “acknowledge[d] that an award of costs and attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing party is appropriate in this case and that the costs and fees claimed by
defendant Renaissance Ridge Homeowners’ Association are not unreasonable.”
The Mullors did not object to the fee award, did not challenge the amount awarded,
and did not call any errors in computing the award to the trial court’s attention.
Under RAP 2.5(a), this court generally declines to review any claim of error not
raised before the trial court. The Mullors do not argue that any exceptions to this
rule apply. They have thus failed to preserve this claim of error.
Third, we conclude that the Mullors adequately preserved objections to the
amount of attorney fees awarded to the Annamreddys. 	The Annamreddys
requested an award of $19,156.91. 	The Mullors asked the court to reduce any
award by $1,079.50, an amount they deemed to reflect paralegals performing
clerical and administrative, rather than legal, tasks. 	The court awarded the full
amount the Annamreddys requested without making any findings as to the
reasonableness of the challenged paralegal services. Although the Mullors did not
separately assign error to the Annamreddy attorney fee award, it adequately
briefed the issue in its opening and reply briefs. While this type of flaw generally
precludes review, we nevertheless have the discretion under RAP 1.2(a) to reach
the issue because the record and briefing are adequate to do so.
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No. 83025-2-I/15
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The Mullors contend the trial court abused its discretion in failing to enter
written findings of fact to support the Annamreddy fee award. 	We agree. 	Trial
courts must articulate the grounds for a fee award, making a record sufficient to
permit meaningful review. 	White v. Clark County, 188 Wn. App. 622, 639, 354
P.3d 38 (2015). This generally means the court must supply findings of fact and
conclusions of law sufficient to permit a reviewing court to determine why the trial
court awarded the amount in question. Id. (quoting SentinelC3, Inc. v. Hunt, 181
Wn.2d 127, 144, 331 P.3d 40 (2014)). Our Supreme Court requires that the trial
court create a specific record when awarding attorneys’ fees and costs. “Not only
do we reaffirm the rule regarding an adequate record on review to support a fee
award, we hold findings of fact and conclusions of law are required to establish
such a record.” 	Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398, 435, 957 P.2d 632 (1998). 	If
the trial court does not make findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the
attorney fee award, the appropriate remedy is to remand to the trial court for entry
of proper findings and conclusions. White, 188 Wn. App. at 639.
The trial court did not enter findings of fact or conclusions of law in support
of its Annamreddy fee award, despite the fact that the Mullors raised objections to
certain charges. We thus remand for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of
law relating to the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the Annamreddys.
Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal
The Annamreddys and the Association request an award of attorney fees
and costs for this appeal under article XV, section 15 of the CC&Rs. This provision
states that “[i]n any judicial action to enforce a determination of the Committee, the
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No. 83025-2-I/16
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losing party shall pay the prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees, expert witness fees,
and other costs incurred in connection with such a legal action or appeal.” 	The
Annamreddys and the Association have substantially prevailed here, and we
award them reasonable attorney fees and costs, subject to their compliance with
RAP 18.1.
Affirmed but remanded for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of
law to support the attorney fee award to the Annamreddys.
WE CONCUR:
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