Joe W. Trimm Et Ano, Respondents V. Starbucks Corporation Et Al, Appellants

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JOE W. TRIMM and ANDRE
RODNEY, Derivatively on Behalf of
STARBUCKS CORPORATION,
Respondents,
v.
SARA KELLY, DENNIS
BROCKMAN, HOWARD SCHULTZ,
MELLODY HOBSON, RICHARD E.
ALLISON, JR., ANDREW CAMPION,
JORGEN VIG KNUDSTORP, SATYA
NADELLA, KEVIN R. JOHNSON,
ISABEL GE MAHE, CLARA SHIH,
JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, JAVIER
G. TERUEL, MARY N. DILLON, and
STARBUCKS CORPORATION, a
Washington Corporation,
Petitioners.
No. 86734-2-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DÍAZ, J. — Joe W. Trimm and Andre Rodney (hereafter, respondents) filed
a stockholder derivative complaint against Starbucks Corporation (Starbucks) and
various officers and members of its board of directors (hereafter, petitioners).
Respondents alleged the petitioners breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to the
company 	and 	its 	stockholders 	by 	failing 	to 	oversee 	the 	company’s 	labor
management practices. A commissioner of this court granted discretionary review

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after the superior court denied petitoners’ motion to dismiss the complaint under
CR 23.1. We reverse the trial court’s order and direct it to dismiss the case, without
prejudice, for respondents’ failure to make a pre-suit demand on Starbucks’ board
or showing it would have been futile.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In a November 2023 amended complaint, respondents derivatively sued 14
officers and members of Starbucks’ board of directors as well as the corporation,
as a nominal defendant. Respondents claimed that, from 2019 to 2023, the
petitioners breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by “utterly failing” to implement
any oversight and reporting system concerning Starbucks’s labor management
and by failing to abide by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169.
Starbucks 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	complaint 	under 	CR 	23.1 	and 	the
individually named petitioners also moved to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6). 	In May
2024, the trial court denied both motions. This court then granted the petitioners’
motion for discretionary review.
II. 	ANALYSIS
Petitioners assert that the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss
because respondents did not make a pre-suit demand on the Starbucks board and
failed to establish demand futility, as required by CR 23.1 and RCW 23B.07.400(2).
We agree.
The 	Washington 	Superior 	Court 	rule 	governing 	derivative 	actions 	by
shareholders states that a complaint “shall . . . allege with particularity the efforts,

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if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires . . . and the
reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”
CR 23.1.
Likewise, the Washington statute setting the procedure for derivative
proceedings states that a complaint brought in such a suit “must . . . allege with
particularity the demand made, if any, to obtain action by the board of directors
and either that the demand was refused or ignored or why a demand was not
made.” RCW 23B.07.400(2).
And under Washington common law, courts have long held that plaintiffs
are exempt from making such a showing—i.e., of exhausting internal recourse—
only if they “can ‘clearly show that a demand for corporate action would have been
useless.’” See In re F5 Networks, Inc., Derivative Litig., 166 Wn.2d 229, 236-37,
207 P.3d 433 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams v. Erie
Mountain Consol. Mining Co., 47 Wash. 360, 363, 91 P. 1091 (1907)).
Our Supreme Court has explained that Washington follows Delaware law in
explicating this standard. Id. at 240. Adopting what is known as “demand futility,”
the Court explained that courts must look to whether a complaint includes
particularized factual allegations which create a reasonable doubt that a board of
directors could not have properly exercised its independent and disinterested
business judgment in responding to a demand. Id. at 237.
Under applicable Delaware law, “the universal test for assessing whether
[a] demand should be excused as futile” is to evaluate the allegations in the
complaint 	“on 	a 	director-by-director 	basis” 	by 	asking 	the 	“following 	three

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questions”:
(i) whether the director received a material personal benefit from the
alleged misconduct that is the subject of the litigation demand;
(ii) whether the director faces a substantial likelihood of liability on
any of the claims that would be the subject of the litigation demand;
and
(iii) whether the director lacks independence from someone who
received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that
would be the subject of the litigation demand or who would face a
substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that are the
subject of the litigation demand.
United Food & Com. Workers Union & Participating Food Indus. Emps. TriState
Pension Fund v. Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d 1034, 1058-59 (Del. 2021). “If the answer
to any of the questions is ‘yes’ for at least half of the members of the demand
board, then demand is excused as futile.” Id. at 1059.
In considering prong (ii)—whether a substantial likelihood of liability exists,
courts must also consider statutes which authorize “corporations to adopt a charter
provision insulating directors from liability for breaching their duty.” Id. at 1050-54.
Here, in their amended complaint, respondents acknowledge they did not
make a pre-suit demand on the board, but claim, in conclusory fashion, that doing
so would have been futile because the board faced a substantial likelihood of
liability “for their actions and inactions pertaining to the claims that form the basis
of the Demand.” 	In other words, respondents demand futility argument is based
only on prong (ii).1
1 In another part of the complaint, respondents flatly allege that “a majority of
current Starbucks directors . . . face a substantial likelihood of liability.” 	But to
support that claim—as to a majority of the directors—it simply notes that it was
charging six of the board’s eight directors and it does not otherwise reference

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Here also, Washington’s legislature enacted RCW 23B.08.320, which
states that a corporation’s articles of incorporation may eliminate or limit a
director’s personal liability for their conduct as a director, provided that their charter
“shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director for acts or omissions that involve
intentional misconduct by a director or a knowing violation of law by a director[.]”
(emphasis added). And, consistent with this statute, Starbucks’ charter exculpates
its directors against claims by shareholders through the following provision:
To the full extent that the Washington Business Corporation Act, as
it exists on the date hereof or may hereafter be amended, permits
the limitation or elimination of the liability of directors, a director of
the 	corporation 	shall 	not 	be 	liable 	to 	the 	corporation 	or 	its
shareholders for monetary damages for his or her acts or omissions
as a director.
This court has held a corporation’s adoption of such a liability-limiting provision
within its charter may be “applied to defeat a substantive claim” of breach by
corporate directors, in a motion to dismiss. Rodriguez v. Loudeye Corp., 144 Wn.
App. 709, 720, 189 P.3d 168 (2008).
As a result, respondents must allege with particularity that a majority of the
directors faced a substantial likelihood of liability because those directors engaged
in “intentional misconduct” or “a knowing violation of law” or face dismissal. 	As
petitioners rightly argue, the complaint nowhere pleads such intention or knowing
wrongdoing at all, let alone with particularity, so the respondents were not exempt
from making a pre-suit demand on the board.
Similarly, in United Food, defendant Facebook had a “broad” exculpatory
particular board members in detailing its allegations.

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provision and there were no allegations made with particularity that a majority of
the board “committed a non-exculpated breach of their fiduciary duty.” 	262 A.3d
at 1060. 	Thus, this failure to so plead “eliminate[d] the possibility that demand
could be excused under the second prong of the demand-futility test, as none of
the remaining four directors would face a substantial likelihood of liability on any of
the claims that would be the subject of the litigation demand.” Id.
Respondents respond—not by pointing to any specific allegation in the
complaint related to the petitioners intentional or knowing actions2—but by
claiming “[a]ll available precedent under Washington law” supports that the
directors on the board did face a substantial likelihood of liability. 	However,
respondents cite to only two cases, which are both distinguishable or fail to support
that their complaint adequately raised allegations the directors faced a substantial
likelihood of liability.
Respondents claim Senn v. N.W. Underwriters, Inc. supports their argument
the directors faced a likelihood of liability. 	74 Wn. App. 408, 414, 875 P.2d 637
2 When given the opportunity to identify where in their complaint plaintiffs made
allegations 	of 	petitioners’ 	intentional 	and 	knowing 	misconduct, 	respondents
pointed this court to a “combination” of “three buckets” of allegations; namely, the
company’s statements in its SEC filings “acknowledging the risk” of a lack of
oversight, a failure to produce documents showing the board asserting such
oversight, and non-substantive meetings on labor relations. Wash. Ct. of Appeals
oral argument, Trimm v. Kelly, No. 86734-2-I, (Oct. 29, 2025), at 10 min., 44 sec.
through 13 min., 41 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public
Affairs 	Network, 	https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-
2025101173/?eventID=2025101173. We hold that, even taking these generalized
statements as true as we must, these statements facially do not allege particular
actions by particular members of the board showing intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of the law, let alone such behavior by a majority of individual
members. There is, indeed, no allegation of any particular action by any individual
board member petitioner.

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(1994). 	Respondents cite it for the broad proposition that all directors have “an
affirmative duty to be aware of the affairs of the companies they serve[.]” 	They
claim Senn “clearly and unequivocally pronounced a duty applicable to officers and
directors of Washington corporations generally.” We disagree that Senn supports
their position, for three reasons.
First, the court in Senn addressed a duty imposed on a type of director in a
particular type of industry, specifically “under either the insurance code or similar
provisions of RCW 23A.08 and 23B.08.” 	74 Wn. App. at 414-15. 	These
provisions—which require directors of insurance organizations to discharge their
duties “in good faith, and with that diligence, care and skill which ordinary prudent
[people] would exercise under similar circumstances”—differ from the statutory
provisions in this case. Id. (quoting RCW 48.05.370). Here, plaintiff’s claims are
based on a distinct statute governing derivative suits.
Second, the court in Senn relied on a non-Delaware, out-of-state case
describing a director’s fiduciary duty of diligence, care, and skill. 	74 Wn. App. at
415 (citing Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981)). 	As
described by this court, the New Jersey Supreme Court there had concluded that
ignorance of a business’s affairs “does not excuse a director from liability for his or
her colleagues’ fraud or malfeasance.” 74 Wn. App. at 416 (emphasis added). In
turn, this court held that the defendant insurance company officer breached her
fiduciary duty under RCW 48.05.370, despite her claim of ignorance, by failing to
be sufficiently involved or properly familiarizing herself with the business where
another director had improperly converted funds. 	Id. at 417. 	In great contrast

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here, respondents claim the directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty,
pursuant to a different statute, and with no claims of fraud or malfeasance by any
party. See Chappel v. Johnson, 35 Wn. App. 2d 479, 576 P.3d 578 (2025) (noting
the petitioners in Senn had committed “blatant” fraud, and reiterating the case is
consistent with Washington law which exempts corporate officers from liability
unless, inter alia, they knowingly commit or condone wrongful conduct).
Third, even if Senn’s holding were applicable here, in order for the
respondents to be excused from making a pre-suit demand on the board, they had
to allege more than the directors “remain[ed] ignorant of what [their] duty entails”
or “of the affairs of a business.” 	74 Wn. App. at 416. 	Again, respondents were
required to allege particularized “intentional misconduct” or “a knowing violation of
law.” RCW 23B.08.320. Their allegations do not reach that standard.
Respondents otherwise cite to a federal order which held that a director’s
intentional or knowing breach of duty was not shielded from liability by RCW
23B.08.320. 	(Citing Grassmueck v. Barnett, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233 (W.D.
Wash. 2003)). But reiterating that legal rule does not help respondents to prevail
without showing their complaint actually pled such a breach.
In fact, the court in Grassmueck specifically held that, “[w]hile the Petitioners
maintain that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that the Directors acted intentionally
or knowingly, paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Complaint use those very words with
respect to the Petitioners’ actions or inactions.” 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1233 (emphasis
added). The same is not true here.
On appeal, respondents appear to claim that their complaint accused the

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directors of intentional misconduct by alleging a “knowing, bad faith, or intentional
failure to remain informed of the affairs of a corporation” company’s affairs.” 	But
their complaint simply does not include even such generalized allegations, let
alone allegations, e.g., that a majority of particular directors were aware of legal
obligations as to their oversight which they then intentionally or knowingly ignored.3
To the contrary, the complaint actually details facts which reflect that the
directors did attempt to be informed of labor management issues.4 	And, the
complaint acknowledges the directors received relevant information at three board
or committee meetings in 2022.5 Id.
3 What’s more, respondents expressly disclaimed that their complaint alleged the
board willfully ignored obvious misconduct in a way that they “consciously failed to
monitor or oversee” Starbucks’ operations. See Br. of Pet’r at 43; Rep. of Proc. at
43 (asserting that opposing counsel “makes this argument that we were . . . trying
to . . . [claim] that the board, in fact, had knowledge that the company was
potentially violating the law and stuck its head in the sand. They didn't do anything,
right? That's not what we’re claiming at all. 	Our complaint says nothing about
that.”) (emphasis added). To the extent the respondents now assert the complaint
does make such a claim, it has been waived. See, e.g., City of Auburn v. Hedlund,
137 Wn. App. 494, 504 n.20, 155 P.3d 149 (2007).
4 The complaint includes at least the following, half-a-dozen acknowledged facts:
(1) the board had three committees whose charters stated that their responsibilities
included oversight on labor matters, (2) corporate annual reports detailed an
employee survey process designed to share information with Starbucks’ highest
management levels, (3) in response to concerns over employee unionization at a
March 2023 annual general meeting, a board-member explained it had initiated a
“human rights impact assessment” to be conducted by a third party with expertise
on the right to collective bargaining, (4) at a June 2022 board meeting, the directors
received legal advice concerning union and labor relations issues, (5) at a
September 	2022 	committee 	meeting, 	members 	of 	the 	board 	received 	a
presentation and discussed plans to address employee concerns and labor
unionization activity and its impact on the company, and (6) at a September 2022
meeting, the board also discussed labor issues, a system for tracking employee
sentiment, and ways to potentially improve that system.
5 In support of their contention the directors still breached their fiduciary duties

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In summary, the two cases respondents rely on do not support their claim
that their complaint sufficed to allege a majority of the board faced a substantial
likelihood of liability in light of the exculpation provision in Starbucks’ corporate
charter. 	Because the complaint did not raise particularized factual allegations of
knowing or intentional misconduct by a majority of directors, they did not show it
would have been futile to make a pre-suit demand on the board, so they were not
excused from making one. 	Therefore, respondents did not satisfy the pleading
requirements of CR 23.1 and RCW 23B.07.400(2), and the court erred in denying
petitioners’ motion to dismiss for this procedural reason.6
III. 	CONCLUSION
We reverse the order of the trial court denying petitioners’ motion, and direct
the court to dismiss the case without prejudice.7
WE CONCUR:
notwithstanding 	these 	meetings, 	the 	only 	support 	respondents 	offer 	are
overgeneralized paraphrases of holdings or case law based in distinguishable,
comparatively extreme facts.
6 We do not reach the question—as a matter of first impression—whether
Washington courts should consider “Caremark claims” recognized by Delaware
law. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 961 (Del. Ch. 1996).
7 Finally, we repeat that the court must dismiss the matter, not on the merits of any
possible labor violations, but without prejudice as respondents will remain free to
bring another lawsuit after complying with CR 23.1 and the related statutes
reviewed above.