State v. Jeffries-Porter

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
JEREMIAH J. JEFFRIES-PORTER,
Petitioner.
No. 104576-0
EN BANC
Filed: October 15, 2026
GORDON MCCLOUD, J.—Jeremiah Jeffries-Porter was convicted
of first degree child molestation. At sentencing, the court imposed a
community custody condition prohibiting him from possessing or accessing
“sexually exploitive materials (as defined by Defendant’s treating therapist or
CCO [(Community Corrections Officer)]).” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 75.
Trial courts have discretion to impose all sorts of conditions of release
to protect the public and rehabilitate the offender. And trial courts have the
discretion to delegate supervision of conditions to experts—like a therapist or
CCO—with the skills to promote and monitor compliance.
FILE
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
OCTOBER 15, 2026
THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
OCTOBER 15, 2026
SARAH R. PENDLETON
SUPREME COURT CLERK

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
2
But constitutional due process clause protections limit the trial court’s power
to create and delegate those conditions. The due process clauses of the state and
United States constitutions require such conditions to be clear enough to provide fair
notice to not just the therapist and CCO—but also to the defendant—of what is
prohibited. U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. In a case like this,
where 	a 	government 	prohibition 	limits 	access 	to 	First-Amendment-protected
content, the state and federal constitutions also require such conditions to be
narrowly tailored and directly related to the goals of protecting the public and
promoting rehabilitation. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Jeffries-Porter argues that this community custody condition fails those
constitutional requirements. We agree. “Sexually exploitive” can mean many
different things. The community custody condition does not define that phrase or
specify which one of its many possible meanings applies to Jeffries-Porter. Neither
does any statute, regulation, or court case. The State has offered several competing
definitions of that phrase in this very case. And of all the appellate court decisions
that have considered the constitutionality of this condition, not one has been able to
define what it means in this context.
Neither 	can 	we. 	We 	therefore 	hold 	that 	the 	condition 	prohibiting
Jeffries-Porter from possessing or accessing “sexually exploitive materials (as

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
3
defined by Defendant’s treating therapist or CCO)” is unconstitutionally vague.
CP at 75. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Jeremiah 	Jeffries-Porter 	pleaded 	guilty 	to 	one 	count 	of 	first 	degree
child molestation in violation of RCW 9A.44.083.1 The trial court sentenced him
to 51 months in prison and 36 months of community custody. CP at 1, 72-73.
The trial court also imposed several community custody conditions, to start
upon 	his 	release 	from 	prison. 	One 	of 	those 	conditions 	directs 	him 	to
“[p]ossess/access no sexually exploitive materials (as defined by Defendant’s
treating therapist or CCO).” CP at 75.
Jeffries-Porter challenged this condition as unconstitutionally vague. The
Court of Appeals rejected that challenge in a split decision. State v. Jeffries-Porter,
No. 	59267-3-II 	(Wash. 	Ct. 	App. 	Aug. 	19, 	2025) 	(unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2059267-3-
II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf.
1 “A person is guilty of child molestation in the first degree when the person
has . . . sexual contact with another who is less than twelve years old and the perpetrator
is at least thirty-six months older than the victim.” RCW 9A.44.083(1).

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
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The 	Court 	of Appeals 	majority 	reasoned 	that 	the 	condition 	survived
a constitutional vagueness challenge because two statutes—which were neither
charged nor referenced in the condition or anywhere else in this case and which were
not called to the defendant’s, the therapist’s, or the CCO’s attention—could define
the condition’s scope.
The first unreferenced statute upon which the Court of Appeals relied
is RCW 9.68A.040. That statute defines the crime of sexual exploitation of a minor
(not charged here) as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor if the person:
(a) Compels a minor by threat or force to engage in sexually
explicit conduct, knowing that such conduct will be photographed or
part of a live performance;
(b) Aids, invites, employs, authorizes, or causes a minor to
engage in sexually explicit conduct, knowing that such conduct will be
photographed or part of a live performance; or
(c) Being a parent, legal guardian, or person having custody or
control of a minor, permits the minor to engage in sexually explicit
conduct, knowing that the conduct will be photographed or part of a
live performance.
RCW 9.68A.040.
But this statute does not define or mention the term at issue here, “sexually
exploitive materials,” at all. Instead, it defines a different crime than the one charged
here—the crime of “sexual exploitation of a minor.” It defines that crime as

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
5
compelling, aiding, or permitting sexually explicit conduct by a child, knowing that
such conduct would be photographed or part of a live performance.
The second unreferenced statute upon which the Court of Appeals relied,
RCW 9.68A.011, defines yet another phrase—“sexually explicit conduct”—not
sexually exploitive conduct. And of course “explicit” carries a different meaning
than “exploitive.” The statute defines that other phrase—sexually explicit conduct—
as “actual or simulated”:
(a) Sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital,
anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or
opposite sex or between humans and animals;
(b) Penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object;
(c) Masturbation;
(d) Sadomasochistic abuse;
(e) Defecation or urination for the purpose of sexual stimulation
of the viewer;
(f) Depiction of the genitals or unclothed pubic or rectal areas of
any minor, or the unclothed breast of a female minor, for the purpose of
sexual stimulation of the viewer . . . ; or
(g) Touching of a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic
area, buttocks, or breast area for the purpose of sexual stimulation of
the viewer.
RCW 9.68A.011(8).2
2 A prior version of this statute was in effect when Jeffries-Porter committed his
crime. See LAWS OF 2010, ch. 227, § 3. The subsection has been amended and renumbered.
L AWS OF 2026, ch. 223, § 2. Because the amendments do not affect our analysis, we cite
the current version of the statute.

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
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In other words, this statute defines a phrase, “sexually explicit conduct,”
that is absent from the child molestation statute defining Jeffries-Porter’s crime and
absent from the condition at issue in this case.
The Court of Appeals majority concluded that reading the community custody
condition at issue in this child molestation case in conjunction with these statutes
concerning 	different 	phrases 	and 	a 	different 	crime 	narrows 	the 	condition’s
meaning—even though nothing in Jeffries-Porter’s case told him or his CCO or
his 	therapist 	to 	read 	the 	condition 	in 	conjunction 	with 	those 	statutes.
Jeffries-Porter, slip op. at 9. The majority also noted that several other unpublished
Court of Appeals decisions upheld this same condition for the same reasons. Id. at
7-8 (citing State v. Perkins, No. 42793-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2013)
(unpublished), 	https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2042793-1-
II%20%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf; 	State 	v. 	Thompson,
No. 	81044-8-I 	(Wash. 	Ct. 	App. 	June 	8, 	2020) 	(unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/810448.pdf; 	State 	v. 	Fenney,
No. 	56886-1-II 	(Wash. 	Ct. 	App. 	Aug. 	29, 	2023) 	(unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056886-1-
II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf).3 The majority did not mention an additional
3 We discuss these cases at pages 13-14, infra.

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
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unpublished 	Court 	of Appeals 	decision 	that 	accepted 	the 	State’s 	concession
that “sexually exploitative materials” was “‘vague as written’” and remanded
for the trial court to clarify it. State v. Foley, No. 56498-0-II, 	slip op. at 28
(Wash. 	Ct. 	App. 	Mar. 	21, 	2023) 	(unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056498-0-
II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf#search=56498-0-II.
The Court of Appeals dissent came to the opposite conclusion. It decided that
this condition does not explain to a person of ordinary intelligence what materials
were off-limits. Jeffries-Porter, slip op. at 18 (Veljacic, A.C.J., dissenting). The
dissent explained that neither statute cited by the majority defines the term at issue
in this case. It explained that only one of those cited statutes even uses the word
“exploitation,” that the statute that uses the word “exploitation” fails to define that
word, and that the statute that uses that word uses it only to explain the elements of
a different crime. Id. at 18-19. The dissent continued that the other statute upon
which 	the 	majority 	relied 	defines 	“sexually 	explicit 	conduct,” 	not 	“sexually
exploitive materials,” and “explicit” carries a different meaning from “exploitive.”
See id.
Finally, the dissent pointed out that although other Court of Appeals decisions
rely on those two statutes to conclude that the phrase “sexually exploitive materials”

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
8
survives a constitutional vagueness challenge, “[t]ellingly, no opinion . . . actually
provides a definition” of that challenged phrase. Id. at 19.
We granted review to resolve this conflict over whether a condition barring
a defendant from accessing or possessing “sexually exploitive materials (as defined
by defendant’s therapist or CCO)” provides sufficient notice, protects against
arbitrary enforcement, and is narrowly tailored to promote the State’s interest
in community safety and offender rehabilitation.
We hold that it does not. We also conclude that everything that might be
prohibited by this phrase, according to any of the multiple definitions that the State
has offered, is already covered by a separate, broader community custody condition
already imposed in this case. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ANALYSIS
The 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	and 	article 	I, 	section 	3 	of 	the
Washington Constitution require the government to provide fair warning about
what conduct it prohibits.4 State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 752, 193 P.3d 678 (2008)
4 Jeffries-Porter cites both the federal and state constitutional provisions but does
not argue that the state constitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution
in this context.

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
9
(citing City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)).
A community custody condition violates these due process protections if it (1) fails
to define the offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people (not just
therapists or CCOs) can understand what is proscribed or (2) fails to provide
ascertainable standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement. Id. at 752-53. We
apply these due process protections to community custody conditions in essentially
the same manner as we apply them to statutes and other enactments. See id. at 753.
But a condition like this, which implicates First Amendment rights, must meet
an additional constitutional requirement. To prevent a chilling effect on free speech,
conditions that restrict free speech rights must also be “narrowly tailored and
directly related to the goals of protecting the public and promoting the defendant’s
rehabilitation.” Id. at 757 (emphasis added); see Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 109, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972) (“Uncertain meanings
inevitably lead citizens to ‘“steer far wider of the unlawful zone” . . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377
(1964) 	(quoting 	Speiser 	v. 	Randall, 	357 	U.S. 	513, 	526, 	78 	S. 	Ct. 	1332,
2 L. Ed. 2d 1460 (1958)))).

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
10
As discussed below, the condition barring access to “sexually exploitive
materials” (without defining those terms, without relying on statutes that do define
those terms, and without providing helpful examples) is not clear and definite,
does not 	protect 	against 	arbitrary 	enforcement, 	and 	is 	not 	narrowly 	tailored
to protecting the public or promoting rehabilitation.
I. State and federal due process clause protections require community
custody conditions to be clear and definite. The condition barring access
to “sexually exploitive materials” fails to define that phrase or use other
permissible sources to define that phrase; it therefore violates due
process clause protections
A. The Condition at Issue Here Is Not Clear. We Must Therefore
Consider Whether Anything Else in This Case or in Any Other
Relevant Source Provides the Needed Clarity
As discussed above, a community custody condition must be clear and
definite. 	Such 	a 	condition 	is 	not 	unconstitutionally 	vague 	“‘merely 	because
a person cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which their actions
would 	be 	classified 	as 	prohibited 	conduct.’” 	State 	v. 	Hai 	Minh 	Nguyen,
191 Wn.2d 671, 	679, 	425 	P.3d 	847 	(2018) 	(quoting 	City 	of 	Seattle 	v. 	Eze,
111 Wn.2d 22, 27, 759 P.2d 366 (1988)).
However, the condition must be clear enough that a person of ordinary
intelligence 	can 	understand 	what 	is 	prohibited, 	despite 	some 	possible 	areas
of disagreement. Id. (quoting Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179).

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
11
The condition in this case is not clear enough for a person of ordinary
intelligence to understand what is prohibited. The State essentially acknowledges
this 	by 	directing 	our 	attention 	to 	other 	sources 	to 	explain 	what 	it 	means.
And the Court of Appeals essentially acknowledges this by looking to other sources
to explain it, too.
We 	agree 	that 	an 	imperfectly 	written 	community 	custody 	condition
might survive constitutional scrutiny if other appropriate sources clarify its meaning.
That clarity can come from a definition in the judgment and sentence (J&S) itself.
That clarity can come from a dictionary definition. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 754, 759;
Nguyen, 	191 	Wn.2d 	at 	681-82. 	It 	can 	come 	from 	a 	statutory 	definition.
State v. J.H.-M., 4 Wn.3d 648, 652, 566 P.3d 847 (2025). It can come from other
cases providing a definition. Id. at 656-58. That clarity might even come from a list
of illustrative examples. See State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d 234, 236, 449 P.3d 619
(2019) 	(an 	illustrative 	list 	of 	prohibited 	places 	clarified 	and 	defined 	the
condition, such that it was not vague); State v. Frederick, 20 Wn. App. 2d 890, 906,
506 P.3d 690 (2022) (a clarifying list of prohibited material limits vagueness).
But none of those potential sources clarify the meaning of “sexually exploitive
materials” in this case.

12
State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
B. Nothing in Jeffries-Porter’s Case Defines This Condition
Neither the J&S nor any other document in Jeffries-Porter’s own case defines
this condition or provides a list of clarifying examples.
C. No Statute, Combination of Statutes, or Court of Appeals Decision
Defines This Condition
We have stated that criminal defendants are expected to research other statutes
and court rulings to clarify the meaning of an ambiguous community custody
condition. We have adopted the fiction that such sources satisfy due process clause
requirements because they are “‘presumptively available to all citizens.’”5 Bahl,
164 Wn.2d at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Watson,
5 This apparent limitation of the reach of due process clause protections to “citizens”
was certainly an oversight, even at the time it was written. The protections of the
due process clause, and the sources that might satisfy the due process clause, clearly apply
to all persons within the territory of the United States—not just citizens.
As the United States Supreme Court explained 130 years ago in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886), “The Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: ‘Nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’ These provisions
are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and
the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. . . . The
questions we have to consider and decide in these cases, therefore, are to be treated
as involving the rights of every citizen of the United States equally with those of the
strangers and aliens who now invoke the jurisdiction of the court.” (Emphasis added.);
see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982)
(noncitizens in this country are guaranteed equal protection of the laws, just as
they are guaranteed due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
13
160 Wn.2d 1, 8, 154 P.3d 909 (2007)); State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 7, 759 P.2d 372
(1988).
As a result, we have upheld community custody conditions against vagueness
challenges when their terms are sufficiently defined in cross-referenced statutes or
case law. J.H.-M., 4 Wn.3d at 656-58 (upholding condition in part because our prior
case law defines and limits the term’s scope), 652 (upholding condition in part
because sentencing court explicitly limited condition’s scope by cross-referencing a
statutory definition); Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 676 (upholding condition because an
ordinary person can understand its meaning in the context of its dictionary definition
and a cross-referenced statutory definition).
But the disputed community custody condition at issue here contains no such
cross-referenced statutory definition to limit its scope. And a defendant subject to
this condition (or a CCO/treating therapist supervising such a defendant) will find
no clarity about the definition of “sexually exploitive materials” in the handful of
Court of Appeals decisions that have considered it.
As the Court of Appeals dissent explained, that court has repeatedly said in
unpublished decisions that “sexually exploitive materials” is not vague. But the
Court of Appeals itself has never actually defined that term. It has simply concluded
that its meaning is clear from two different non-cross-referenced statutes, without

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
14
ever 	saying 	what 	that 	meaning 	is.6 And 	as 	the 	Court 	of Appeals 	dissent
further 	explained, 	those 	two 	non-cross-referenced 	statutes 	are 	not 	clarifying.
See Jeffries-Porter, slip op. at 18-19. They discuss a different crime and a different
phrase and can be read together to support different meanings for the phrase,
“sexually exploitive materials.”
6 Perkins, slip op. at 9 (“When viewed together, these statutes do not require persons
of ordinary intelligence to guess at what is meant by the condition prohibiting access to or
possession 	of 	‘sexually 	exploitive 	materials.’”); 	Thompson, 	slip 	op. 	at 	12-13
(“‘When viewed together, these statutes do not require persons of ordinary intelligence
to 	guess 	at 	what 	is 	meant 	by 	the 	condition 	prohibiting 	access 	to 	or 	possession
of “sexually exploitative materials.”’” (quoting Perkins, slip op. at 9)); State v. Amaro,
No. 56915-9-II, 	slip 	op. 	at 	13 	(Wash. 	Ct. 	App. 	Aug. 	15, 	2023) 	(unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056915-9-
II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf (“Together, the two statutes provide sufficient notice
of 	what 	‘sexually 	exploitive 	materials’ are 	prohibited 	and 	do 	not 	require 	persons
of ordinary intelligence to guess at what is meant by the condition prohibiting access
to or possession of ‘sexually exploitive materials.’”); Fenney, slip op. at 13 (“Together, the
two 	statutes 	provide 	sufficient 	notice 	of 	what 	sexually 	exploitive 	materials 	are
prohibited. Ordinary people would not have to guess at the meaning of a condition
prohibiting 	access 	or 	possession 	of 	sexually 	exploitive 	materials 	after 	reviewing
these statutes, which are presumptively available to all.”); State v. Braae, No. 59270-3-II,
slip 	op. 	at 	21 	(Wash. 	Ct. 	App. 	Oct. 	14, 	2025) 	(unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2059270-3-
II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf (“Two statutory provisions, when viewed together,
provide 	sufficient 	information 	so 	that 	a 	person 	of 	ordinary 	intelligence 	is 	aware
of what type of materials this condition refers to.”), 22 (“Considering these two statutes
together, 	it 	is 	not 	so 	subjective 	what 	types 	of 	materials 	would 	qualify
as ‘sexually exploitive’ so to make the term constitutionally suspect.”), review denied,
5 Wn.3d 1039 (2026); Jeffries-Porter, slip op. at 9 (“We agree that the statutory elements
of the crime of sexual exploitation of a minor read in conjunction with the statutory
definition 	of 	‘sexually 	explicit 	conduct’ 	are 	sufficient 	to 	limit 	the 	discretion
of therapists and CCOs when defining the types of materials that offenders may not
access under this condition.”).

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
15
In fact, the State itself relies on those two non-cross-referenced statutes to
provide several inconsistent interpretations of “sexually exploitive materials.”
The State’s supplemental brief in this court asserts that based on those two
other statutes, the condition at issue here bars access to materials containing
“persons engaged in sexually explicit conduct” rather than “minors,” even though
both statutes apparently pertain to minors: RCW 9.68A.040 explicitly references
minors, and RCW 9.68A.011(8) appears in the “Definitions” section of chapter
9.68A RCW, titled “Sexual Exploitation of Children.” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 10-11
(emphasis added).
At 	oral 	argument 	before 	this 	court, 	however, 	the 	State 	changed
its 	proposed 	definition. 	It 	asserted 	that 	this 	condition, 	when 	read 	together
with those two other statutes, barred access to “live or photographic materials
that showed the performance of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”
Wash. Sup. Ct. oral arg., State v. Jeffries-Porter, No. 104576-0 (May 19, 2026),
at 17 min., 49 sec. through 18 min., 14 sec., (emphasis added), video recording by
TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://www.tvw.org.
The State also expressed uncertainty about whether the condition is limited to
materials depicting a live or photographed performance of actual sexually explicit
conduct or whether it includes material depicting simulated conduct. When asked

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
16
whether the condition includes material depicting simulated conduct, counsel
responded, “I believe it does . . . ”, id. at 21 min., 45 sec. through 21 min., 50 sec.,
even though the definitions proposed by the State in its brief and at oral argument
both 	included 	a 	limitation 	to 	“live 	or 	photographic 	performances.”
Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 10; Wash. Sup. Ct. oral arg., supra, at 17 min., 49 sec. through
18 min., 14 sec. (Remember, RCW 9.68A.011(8) includes simulated acts, but
RCW 9.68A.040 is limited to live or photographic performances, so either reading
is plausible.)
In sum, even the State acknowledges that the statutes upon which the
Court of Appeals majority relied support several conflicting definitions of the
condition. The State’s own proposed definitions based on these two statutes differ
on 	whether 	the 	condition 	refers 	to 	materials 	concerning 	persons, 	materials
concerning minors, materials concerning actual live and photographed or videoed
acts, or materials concerning simulated acts. These distinctions matter; a condition
that applies to depictions of persons engaged in simulated acts would capture a
significantly broader set of materials than a condition that applies to depictions of
minors engaged in live or photographed sex acts.
Adding 	to 	the 	confusion, 	all 	those 	statute-based 	definitions—alone 	or
in combination—differ from the dictionary definitions of the same words.

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
17
D. The Dictionary Defines the Words Used in the Disputed Condition. But the
Dictionary Definition Differs from Both the Court of Appeals Majority’s
Definition and the State’s Many Definitions
When a community custody condition uses an undefined term or phrase, the
court may also consider its plain and ordinary meaning as set forth in a standard
dictionary. See Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 754; Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 681-82.
In this case, though, the dictionary suggests a definition of the condition that
differs 	from 	the 	definitions 	suggested 	by 	the 	State. 	Webster’s 	Third 	New
International Dictionary defines “sexually” as “in a sexual manner” or “with regard
to or by means of sex.” WEBSTER’ S THIRD NEW I NTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2082
(2002). “Exploitive,” which shares the same definition as “exploitative,” is defined
as “relating to exploitation.” Id. at 802. “Exploitation” is defined as “an unjust or
improper use of another person for one’s own profit or advantage.” Id. at 801-02.
So, 	according 	to 	the 	dictionary, sexually 	exploitive 	materials 	are those 	that
“unjust[ly] or improper[ly] use … another person for one’s own profit or advantage”
“in a sexual manner.”
This dictionary definition is also plausible. But it conflicts with the definitions
that the State proposes and that the Court of Appeals majority seemed to accept
(discussed above).

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
18
E. 	The State Expressed Uncertainty About Whether a Separate Community
Custody Condition Already Imposed in This Case Covers the Prohibitions in
the “Sexually Exploitive Materials” Condition; Its Uncertainty on That Point
Underscores the Difficulty of Pinning Down the Phrase’s Meaning
At oral argument, the State expressed uncertainty about whether material
barred by its proposed interpretation(s) of “sexually exploitive materials” would also
be barred by a separate, broader condition in Jeffries-Porter’s J&S prohibiting him
from “own[ing], us[ing], possess[ing] or pursu[ing] sexually explicit materials.”7
CP at 83.
The fact that two community custody conditions overlap does not necessarily
indicate that one of the conditions is vague or problematic. But the State’s confusion
about whether these conditions overlap does underscore the “sexually exploitive
materials” phrase’s vagueness: it demonstrates that even the State has difficulty
defining that condition’s scope.
7 Wash. Sup. Ct. oral arg., supra, at 18 min., 21 sec. through 19 min, 02 sec.
(The Court: “So, going from [the State’s] definition, . . . isn’t everything that would
be covered by what you said . . . already covered in the bar on possessing sexually explicit
materials?” The State: “I think they’re pretty overlapping.”), 23 min., 8 sec. through
23 min., 24 sec. (The Court: “What [does] this condition [do] that isn’t already covered by
the sexually explicit materials condition that we’ve said repeatedly is constitutional?”
The State: “I was not involved in the drafting, so I really can’t answer that question
specifically.”), 32 min., 18 sec. through 32 min., 39 sec. (The Court: “So you really think
it is doing work independent of the bar on sexually explicit materials?” The State: “What
I think is that I am not enough of a specialist in the sex crime area to know if it’s doing
work.”).

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
19
II. 	The First Amendment requires community custody conditions that limit
access 	to 	written 	or visual 	materials 	to 	meet 	“a greater degree of
specificity.” 	The 	condition 	barring 	access 	to 	“sexually 	exploitive
materials” also fails that First Amendment requirement
The First Amendment implications of the condition magnify its problems.
See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983)
(“Our 	concern 	[with 	the 	challenged 	statute’s 	vesting 	of 	discretion
to 	the 	police] 	is 	based 	upon 	the 	‘potential 	for 	arbitrarily 	suppressing
First Amendment liberties . . . .’” (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
382 U.S. 87, 91, 86 S. Ct. 211, 15 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1965))); Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 753
(“‘Vagueness concerns are more acute when a law implicates First Amendment
rights and a heightened level of clarity and precision is demanded of criminal statutes
because their consequences are more severe.’” (quoting United States v. Williams,
444 F.3d 1286, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 553 U.S. 285,
128 S. Ct. 1830, 170 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2008))).
“[A] restriction implicating First Amendment rights demands a greater degree
of specificity and must be reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of
the state and public order.” State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672, 678, 416 P.3d 712 (2018)
(citing 	State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 37-38, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993) (quoting
Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 1974))).

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
20
This condition fails to meet that stricter standard. It lacks definitional terms,
statutory references, case law definitions, illustrative examples, or any other
elaboration on what it covers. The trial court may certainly rely on the therapist and
CCO to define the precise contours of a condition based on those individuals’
professional expertise in supervising sex offenders. But the condition itself must
provide guidance to the therapist, the CCO, and the defendant about what the court
means. This condition fails to do so.
CONCLUSION
“[E]ither 	the 	condition 	as 	written 	provides 	constitutional 	notice 	and
protection against arbitrary enforcement or it does not.” State v. Sanchez Valencia,
169 Wn.2d 782, 789, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010).
Here, it does not. The condition fails to define “sexually exploitive materials.”
No statute or case defines that term. No list of explanatory examples helps limit the
condition. And although the State claims that two non-cross-referenced statutes
clarify 	the 	term’s 	meaning 	(and 	the 	Court 	of Appeals 	agreed 	in 	a 	series
of unpublished opinions), the State itself acknowledges that those two statutes can
be read together to produce multiple—materially different—possible definitions of
the phrase. In addition, all the State’s proposed definitions differ from the dictionary
definitions of the words at issue. We therefore hold that the condition prohibiting

State v. Jeffries-Porter (Jeremiah J.), No. 104576-0
21
Jeffries-Porter from possessing or accessing “sexually exploitive materials (as
defined by [his] treating therapist or CCO)” fails to provide constitutional notice,
fails to protect against arbitrary enforcement, and fails to narrowly tailor its
prohibition to achieve the State’s lawful goals.
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
Melody, J.
Angelis, J.

No. 104576-0
STEPHENS, C.J. (dissenting)—Jeremiah Jeffries-Porter pleaded guilty to
first-degree child molestation and as part of his conviction was required to follow
several community custody conditions. He challenges a condition that prohibits him
from possessing or accessing “sexually exploitive materials,” a phrase he argues is
unconstitutionally vague and violates his First Amendment rights. 	U.S. C ONST.
amend. I. The majority agrees, broadly construing the phrase “sexually exploitive
materials” based on dictionary definitions rather than the clear context of Jeffries-
Porter’s conviction and statutes defining “sexual exploitation.” 	When considered
in this proper context, the condition provides sufficient notice to Jeffries-Porter that
he may not access materials depicting the sexual exploitation of children. Such
materials are unprotected by the First Amendment, and the condition at issue
provides sufficient guidance to overcome a vagueness challenge. For this reason, I
respectfully dissent.
ANALYSIS
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 3
of our state constitution both prohibit overly vague criminal statutes or community

State of Washington v. Jeffries-Porter, No. 104576-0
(Stephens, C.J., dissenting)
2
custody conditions.1 This due process protection ensures that individuals have fair
warning of proscribed conduct such that a person of ordinary intelligence could
reasonably understand what is prohibited. 	Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171,
178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). Under this framework, a community custody provision
is unconstitutionally vague if it (1) fails to define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what is proscribed or (2) fails to
provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement.
State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 752-53, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). 	We apply the same
rules of interpretation to community custody conditions as we do to statutes, but with
one distinction. See id. at 753. Unlike the “heavy burden” borne by challengers of
vague statutes and ordinances, community custody conditions are not enacted by the
legislature and, rather, are “within the discretion of the sentencing court and will be
reversed if manifestly unreasonable.” Id.
We do not consider community custody provisions in a vacuum; rather, we
examine them in the context in which they are used to determine whether they are
sufficiently definite to satisfy due process protections. 	Id. at 754 (citing Douglass,
115 Wn.2d at 180). 	Community custody conditions appropriately address risks
posed 	by 	an 	offender 	upon 	release 	and 	are 	therefore 	“afforded 	a 	sensible,
1 I agree with the majority that in this context, Jeffries-Porter does not argue that the state
constitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution and thus we need not
examine the issue. Majority at 8 n.4.

State of Washington v. Jeffries-Porter, No. 104576-0
(Stephens, C.J., dissenting)
3
meaningful, and practical interpretation.” 	Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 180; see also
State v. Dixon, 78 Wn.2d 796, 805, 479 P.2d 931 (1971) (“Where a statute is
specifically directed at a manifest evil and couched in language drawn from history
and practice, courts should not ‘parse the statute as grammarians or treat it as an
abstract exercise in lexicography.’” (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
253, 72 S. Ct. 725, 96 L. Ed. 919 (1952))).
Our 	precedent 	recognizes 	the 	impossibility 	of 	defining 	every 	risk 	or
prohibition with absolute certainty, and “[i]f ‘persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what the [law] proscribes, notwithstanding some possible areas of
disagreement, the [law] is sufficiently definite.’” 	Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 754 (second
and third alterations in original) (quoting Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179); In re Pers.
Restraint of Ansell, 1 Wn.3d 882, 899, 533 P.3d 875 (2023) (plurality opinion) (“Due
process does not require that [a defendant] should be able to ‘predict with complete
certainty the exact point at which [their] actions would be classified as prohibited
conduct,’ as long as a person of ordinary intelligence can understand what is
proscribed.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d
672, 677, 416 P.3d 712 (2018))). 	Courts will not strain to construe a statute or
community custody condition as vague simply because different interpretations are
possible. 	Dixon, 78 Wn.2d at 804-05; see, e.g., State v. Hai Minh Nguyen, 191
Wn.2d 671, 680-81, 425 P.3d 847 (2018). 	Indeed, we have avoided imposing

State of Washington v. Jeffries-Porter, No. 104576-0
(Stephens, C.J., dissenting)
4
“‘[i]mpossible standards of specificity,’” in large part because “language always
involves some degree of vagueness.” 	Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 759 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 118, 857 P.2d 270
(1993)).
This approach follows the tenet that the vagueness doctrine “is not a principle
designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing
criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human
conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct
are prohibited.” Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 32 L. Ed. 2d
584 (1972). 	We do not willingly walk into a constitutional crisis by construing
language 	broadly; 	rather, 	we 	endeavor 	to 	avoid 	constitutional 	concerns 	by
considering language in context. With respect to community custody conditions, the
context necessary to ascertain the meaning of a term used to proscribe the conduct
of a criminal defendant includes the nature of the conviction, language used in
related statutes, and, when appropriate, dictionary definitions of the words or phrases
used in similar contexts.
The 	phrase 	“sexually 	exploitive 	materials” 	is 	sufficiently 	clear 	when
considered in proper context. In Washington, the term “sexual exploitation” is used
in only one context in the criminal statutes and is uniquely tied to minors. See, e.g.,
RCW 9.68A.040 (defining the scope of “sexual exploitation of a minor”); RCW

State of Washington v. Jeffries-Porter, No. 104576-0
(Stephens, C.J., dissenting)
5
9.68A.011(8)2 (defining “sexually explicit conduct” in the context of sexual
exploitation 	of 	a 	minor). 	The 	majority 	points 	to 	other 	statutes 	describing
exploitation, but these neither reference nor define “sexual exploitation,” a term used
exclusively 	in 	the 	context 	of 	crimes 	involving 	minors. 	See, 	e.g., 	RCW
74.34.020(2)(a)-(d) (defining forms of abuse in the context of vulnerable adults as
“sexual abuse” and separate from “personal exploitation”), (2), (7) (defining
“abuse,” “personal exploitation,” and “financial exploitation”). Jeffries-Porter was
convicted of first-degree child molestation. It therefore follows that the “‘animating
context of [the] well-defined usage’” of “sexually exploitive materials” logically
refers to materials that depict the sexual exploitation of a minor. 	Dixon, 78 Wn.2d
at 805 (quoting Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 253); State v. J.H.-M., 4 Wn.3d 648, 661,
566 P.3d 847 (2025) (recognizing that the “facts of the underlying criminal offense”
provide “context to the prohibitions that would apply”).
The majority rejects the relevance of statutes using the phrase “sexual
exploitation” in connection with minors on the ground that these statutes were not
charged or referenced explicitly in the community custody condition. 	Majority at
13-14. 	No such requirement exists in our case law. 	To the contrary, in Bahl we
2 A prior version of this statute was in effect when Jeffries-Porter committed his crime. See
LAWS OF 2010, ch. 227, § 3. The subsection has been amended and renumbered. LAWS OF 2026,
ch. 223, § 2. Because the amendments do not affect our analysis, we cite the current version of
the statute.

State of Washington v. Jeffries-Porter, No. 104576-0
(Stephens, C.J., dissenting)
6
considered a statute that was not charged or explicitly referenced as part of the
context in which the phrase “sexually explicit” was used, declining to consider
whether, standing alone, this definition would provide sufficient notice to satisfy our
vagueness inquiry. 	164 Wn.2d at 760. 	The analysis is more nuanced than the
majority would allow. 	We have never adopted an explicit cross-referencing
requirement largely because our vagueness inquiry is not so formalistic. In Bahl we
drew on statutory and dictionary definitions the condition never cited, id. at 759-60;
in J.H.-M. we considered the facts of the underlying conviction, 4 Wn.3d at 661; and
while the condition in Nguyen happened to reference statutory definitions, nothing
in our analysis suggested the reference was necessary to survive a vagueness
challenge, 191 Wn.2d at 684-85.
In concluding that the condition at issue violates Jeffries-Porter’s First
Amendment rights, the majority seems to collapse the due process vagueness inquiry
under the Fourteenth Amendment with an overbreadth analysis under the First
Amendment. Majority at 19-20. While “vagueness and overbreadth may sometimes
overlap,” they are nonetheless distinct inquiries that impose discrete constitutional
requirements. J.H.-M., 4 Wn.3d at 654-55. The majority holds that the condition at
issue here is vague and then, based on the broadest possible reading of the phrase
“sexually exploitive materials,” concludes that it therefore must implicate Jeffries-
Porter’s First Amendment rights. 	Majority at 9-10, 19-21. 	This line of reasoning

State of Washington v. Jeffries-Porter, No. 104576-0
(Stephens, C.J., dissenting)
7
fails to account for the statutory definition of “sexual exploitation” that is used only
in the context of minors and therefore suggests a narrower definition of “sexually
exploitive materials” limited to materials that do not enjoy First Amendment
protections. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d
1113 (1982) (holding that child pornography falls outside the protections of the First
Amendment); cf. RCW 9.68A.001 (“The definition of ‘sexually explicit conduct’
and other operative definitions demarcate a line between protected and prohibited
conduct 	and 	should 	not 	inhibit 	legitimate 	scientific, 	medical, 	or 	educational
activities.”).
Even accepting that the condition at issue could be read broadly to encompass
other materials that enjoy First Amendment protection, that does not mean that it is
vague or overbroad. State v. Pauling, 149 Wn.2d 381, 389, 69 P.3d 331 (2003) (“A
statute will be invalidated only if the court is unable to limit sufficiently its
standardless sweep by a limiting construction.”). 	Rather, as discussed, reading the
condition in the context of Jeffries-Porter’s conviction and related statutes, a person
of ordinary intelligence can discern between materials depicting sexual exploitation
and “‘[c]ountless works of art, literature, film, and music.’” Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at
680 (alteration in original). The majority’s insistence on an explicit cross-reference
to statutes that define sexual exploitation is unsupported by our precedent and results

State of Washington v. Jeffries-Porter, No. 104576-0
(Stephens, C.J., dissenting)
8
in invalidating a provision that plainly addresses a crime-related risk posed by
Jeffries-Porter.
CONCLUSION
The 	majority 	concludes 	that 	a 	person 	convicted 	of 	first-degree 	child
molestation cannot understand what a prohibition on “sexually exploitive materials”
forbids. 	It reaches that result by demanding an explicit cross-reference our cases
have never required and by allowing overbreadth concerns to distort a distinct
vagueness inquiry. 	Our vagueness analysis has never demanded perfection in
drafting. 	It requires fair notice and ascertainable standards, judged in context,
including the nature of the conviction, related statutes, and ordinary dictionary
meanings. A person in Jeffries-Porter’s position, reading the prohibition against the
backdrop of his convictions and related statutes, understands what it forbids:
materials depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor. Due process requires nothing
more.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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