Midland Credit Management, Inc. v. Abel Ceron

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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED

October 1, 2026

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

Appeal No. 2025AP1065
STATE OF WISCONSIN

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.

A party may file with the Supreme Court a
petition to review an adverse decision by the
Court of Appeals. See Wis. STAT. § 80810
and RULE 809.62.

Cir. Ct. No. 2023SC6714

IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.,
PLAINTTFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
ABEL CERON,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane County:

RHONDA L. LANFORD, Judge. Affirmed.

ql © BLANCHARD, J.! Abel Ceron appeals a circuit cout order
denying his motion to reopen a default judgment entered against him in a small
claims action pursued by Midland Credit Management, Inc., after Ceron failed to

' This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 752.31(2)(a). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

No. 2025AP1065
2
appear in court on the return date in response to Midland’s summons and
complaint and also failed to take any other step to respond to the complaint for
nearly one year before moving to reopen the case. For the reasons provided
below, the court’s order is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
¶2 On November 13, 2023, Midland named Ceron as the defendant in a
summons and small claims complaint filed in the circuit court. The complaint
stated claims of contract breach, account stated, and implied contract-unjust
enrichment. Midland’s claims were based on allegations that Midland had
succeeded in interest to a creditor on a credit account extended to Ceron, and that
Ceron had “failed to pay the amount set forth on the statements and there remains
a balance due.” The complaint further alleged that the net amount Midland was
owed was $1,947.93, after subtracting all payments received from and credits due
to Ceron from the total principal, interest, and fees that Ceron owed as of
November 8, 2023. Attached to the complaint was a billing statement addressed
to Ceron purporting to reflect the total outstanding balance due.
¶3 On November 30, 2023, Midland filed an affidavit of service. A
process server averred that on November 27, 2023, he had personally served the
summons and complaint on Ceron at the address that Midland asserted was
Ceron’s residence. The summons allegedly served on Ceron stated that he “must
file a written answer and provide a copy to” Midland or its attorney on or before
the return date of December 13, 2023, at 9 a.m. The summons also stated that, if
Ceron did not appear in circuit court or answer the complaint, Midland “may win
this case” and that a judgment could be entered for what Midland was asking the
court to order as a money judgment.

No. 2025AP1065
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¶4 The record does not contain an answer, or any other pleading or
correspondence, filed by Ceron during the period November 13 to December 13,
2023, or, for that matter, for nearly a year after that. Further, the parties in the
circuit court and now on appeal, as well as the circuit court, have all operated from
the following premise. Ceron did not file any papers or correspondence with the
court or make any appearance in advance of the clerk of the circuit court entering
a money judgment, on December 14, 2023, in favor of Midland for $2,097.43,
based on clerk or court commissioner action on December 13. The default
judgment amount consisted of the $1,947.93 claimed in the complaint, plus filing
fees, service fees, and other costs. Also on December 14, a court commissioner
issued an order for financial disclosure. This directed Ceron to either pay the
judgment in full, or to accurately complete a financial disclosure statement form
and mail or deliver it to Midland or its attorney, within 15 days of entry of the
judgment.
¶5 Nearly one year later, on November 19, 2024, an attorney filed a
notice of appearance for Ceron. On December 12, 2024, Ceron’s attorney
followed up that notice with a motion to reopen the case, making arguments
similar to those addressed in discussion below. Midland opposed the motion to
reopen, making arguments similar to those that it also renews on appeal.
¶6 After a court commissioner denied Ceron’s motion to reopen, Ceron
requested a de novo hearing in the circuit court, and the parties each filed briefs
that repeated their arguments on the merits of reopening the case. In addition,
Ceron filed a proposed answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaims. The
de novo hearing was held on April 16, 2025. The circuit court denied the motion
to reopen. Ceron appeals.

No. 2025AP1065
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DISCUSSION
¶7 The issue in this appeal is whether Ceron has shown that the circuit
court, on its de novo review of Ceron’s motion to reopen the judgment,
erroneously exercised its discretion in denying the motion. I conclude that Ceron
has not made that showing. I begin with pertinent legal standards and then explain
my conclusion.
¶8 As pertinent here, if the defendant in a small claims action “fails to
appear on the return date …, the court may enter a judgment upon due proof of
facts which show the plaintiff entitled thereto,” commonly referred to as a default
judgment. WIS. STAT. § 799.22(2).
¶9 WISCONSIN STAT. § 799.29(1)(a) provides the exclusive procedure
for reopening a default judgment in a small claims proceeding. King v. Moore, 95
Wis. 2d 686, 689-90, 291 N.W.2d 304 (Ct. App. 1980) (concluding that
predecessor statute to § 799.29(1) “provides the exclusive procedure for reopening
a default judgment in small claims proceedings”); see also Wisconsin Nat. Gas
Co. v. Kletsch, 95 Wis. 2d 691, 696, 291 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating that
what is now § 799.29(1) “provides the sole means of attacking a default judgment
in small claims actions which have been commenced, as here, by personal service
of the summons”).
¶10 Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 799.29(1)(a), “the trial court may, by order,
reopen default judgments upon notice and motion or petition duly made and good
cause shown.” As discussed further below, “good cause” in this context is not
defined in WIS. STAT. ch. 799.

No. 2025AP1065
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¶11 The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen a default judgment
is committed to the sound discretion of the circuit court. Kovalic v. DEC Int’l,
186 Wis. 2d 162, 166, 519 N.W.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1994). This means that a circuit
court’s decision resolving a motion to reopen will not be disturbed unless the
appellant shows an erroneous exercise of discretion. Miller v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
2010 WI 75, ¶29, 326 Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493. “‘A circuit court does not
erroneously exercise its discretion if its decision is based on the facts of record and
on the application of a correct legal standard.’” Id. (quoting Larry v. Harris, 2008
WI 81, ¶15, 311 Wis. 2d 326, 752 N.W.2d 279). This court may search the record
to determine whether the record supports the circuit court’s discretionary decision.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Schmidt, 2007 WI App 243, ¶22, 306 Wis. 2d
200, 742 N.W.2d 901.
¶12 Whether a circuit court, in exercising its discretion, applied a correct
legal standard presents an issue of law, which this court reviews de novo.
Robin K. v. Lamanda M., 2006 WI 68, ¶12, 291 Wis. 2d 333, 718 N.W.2d 38.
¶13 One dispute between the parties on a legal issue ends up being
dispositive, given Ceron’s approach in arguing his motion to reopen and in this
appeal. The dispute is over what constitutes a showing of “good cause” necessary
to support a discretionary decision to reopen a default judgment in a small claims
case.
¶14 In the absence of a statutory definition, Ceron relies on dictionary
definitions. He argues that good cause in this context means that the litigant has
provided the circuit court “with an adequate, legally valid reason for reopening a
case.”

No. 2025AP1065
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¶15 Midland disagrees. To ascertain the meaning of WIS. STAT.
§ 799.29(1)(a) for small claims cases, Midland turns to a related statute used for
civil cases outside small claims procedure, WIS. STAT. § 806.07. See State ex rel.
Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681
N.W.2d 110 (stating that statutory language is interpreted, in part, “in relation to
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes”). “Paragraphs
§ 806.07(1)(a)-(g) permit relief for specific circumstances, and paragraph
806.07(1)(h) is a ‘catch-all’ provision allowing relief from judgment for ‘any other
reasons justifying relief.’”2 Sukala v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 WI 83, ¶9,
282 Wis. 2d 46, 698 N.W.2d 610 (quoted source omitted).
2 WISCONSIN STAT. § 806.07 states in pertinent part:
(1) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court,
subject to sub[]. (2) …, may relieve a party or legal
representative from a judgment, order or stipulation for the
following reasons:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(b) Newly-discovered evidence which entitles a party to
a new trial under [WIS. STAT. §] 805.15(3);
(c) Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party;
(d) The judgment is void;
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged;
(f) A prior judgment upon which the judgment is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated;
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment.
(continued)

No. 2025AP1065
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¶16 Consistent with Midland’s position, persuasive opinions of this court
have stated that the WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1) factors provide a reasonable guide to
pertinent factors under WIS. STAT. § 799.29(1). See Martindale Pinnacle Constr.
v. Pulley, No. 2019AP2290-FT, unpublished slip op. ¶¶8, 13-15 (WI App Apr. 16,
2020); Ryan v. Friday, No. 2018AP1354, unpublished slip op. ¶11 (WI App May
14, 2019); Mandujano v. Mendoza, No. 2018AP109, unpublished slip op. ¶8 (WI
App July 25, 2018).3
¶17 The circuit court here agreed with Midland on this issue. I also
agree that circuit courts properly exercise their discretion by using the WIS. STAT.
§ 806.07 factors as guideposts for determining whether good cause is shown to
reopen a small claims case.
¶18 Ceron’s proposed dictionary-based definition provides no guidance
whatsoever for parties and courts. “Adequate” has no independent content.
Circuit courts are of course obligated to make rulings based on “legally valid”
reasons and not on legally invalid reasons. According to the logic of Ceron’s
argument, any disadvantage to him arising from a decision by the court to deny his
motion to reopen that has a valid legal basis not only could be considered good
cause, but any such disadvantage must be considered good cause.
(2) The motion shall be made within a reasonable time,
and, if based on sub. (1)(a) or (c), not more than one year after
the judgment was entered or the order or stipulation was made.
A motion based on sub. (1)(b) shall be made within the time
provided in [WIS. STAT. §] 805.16….
3 See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b) (an unpublished opinion issued on or after July 1,
2009, that is authored by a member of a three-judge panel or by a single judge under WIS. STAT.
§ 752.31(2) may be cited for its persuasive value).

No. 2025AP1065
8
¶19 In contrast, the WIS. STAT. § 806.07 standards, including the catch-
all provision, provide a meaningful yet flexible set of considerations that has been
the subject of extensive case law. See, e.g., City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI
65, ¶19, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738 (concluding that a civil forfeiture
judgment was not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
§ 806.07(1)(d)). Further, Ceron does not provide a good reason to think that the
legislature, in enacting WIS. STAT. § 799.29(1), was less concerned in the small
claims context than in the large claims context with the benefits of finality and
with encouraging timely responses to legal process, while recognizing the goal of
fair resolutions of disputes. See Miller, 326 Wis. 2d 640, ¶36 (identifying “the
competing interests of finality of judgments and fairness in the resolution of the
dispute” as overarching considerations for the circuit court considering whether to
grant relief from judgment).
¶20 Further, Ceron does not develop an argument based on the
proposition that, even if it is generally appropriate to use the terms of WIS. STAT.
§ 806.07 to inform the good cause standard under WIS. STAT. § 799.29(1)(a), the
facts of this case for some reason required the circuit court to diverge from using
some or all of the terms of § 806.07 as guideposts for the court’s consideration of
his motion to reopen.
¶21 With all of that as background, I conclude that Ceron’s approach
essentially leads to a dead end and accordingly he fails to show that the circuit
court erroneously exercised its discretion.
¶22 Ceron does not even attempt to provide arguments that could
constitute good cause when one considers the factors stated in WIS. STAT.
§ 806.07 as guideposts. For example, he does not offer any alternative arguments

No. 2025AP1065
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based on the considerations stated in § 806.07(1)(a)—mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect. See, e.g., Carmain v. Affiliated Capital Corp.,
2002 WI App 271, ¶23, 258 Wis. 2d 378, 654 N.W.2d 265 (“Excusable neglect is
that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under
similar circumstances.”); Martin v. Griffin, 117 Wis. 2d 438, 443, 344 N.W.2d
206 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that excusable neglect “is not synonymous with
neglect, carelessness[,] or inattentiveness”). Nor does he suggest that he is entitled
to relief under the “catch-all” provision of § 806.07(1)(h), which requires a
showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” See Miller, 326 Wis. 2d 640, ¶¶32, 34,
36 (listing five non-exhaustive factors for circuit courts to consider in determining
whether extraordinary circumstances exist).4 I cannot attempt to construct such
arguments for Ceron. See Herder Hallmark Consultants, Inc. v. Regnier
Consulting Grp., Inc., 2004 WI App 134, ¶16, 275 Wis. 2d 349, 685 N.W.2d 564
(this court will not develop an argument on a party’s behalf).
¶23 Further, attempting to construct such arguments would be virtually
impossible. This is because Ceron did not submit to the circuit court evidence in
any form such as an affidavit, or even allege facts through his attorney, to explain
4 The non-exhaustive factors for applying WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(h) are:
whether the judgment was the result of the conscientious,
deliberate and well-informed choice of the claimant; whether the
claimant received the effective assistance of counsel; whether
relief is sought from a judgment in which there has been no
judicial consideration of the merits and the interest of deciding
the particular case on the merits outweighs the finality of
judgments; whether there is a meritorious defense to the claim;
and whether there are intervening circumstances making it
inequitable to grant relief.
Miller v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2010 WI 75, ¶36, 326 Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493 (quotation
marks and quoted source omitted).

No. 2025AP1065
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or provide context for either his initial failure to appear or his failure to submit any
pleadings or correspondence for nearly one year, including his extreme delay in
seeking relief from the default judgment. Thus, Ceron failed to identify for the
court any facts that could make reopening this case the fair result, such as any
problems involving service of the lawsuit, communications that Ceron did or did
not have with any attorneys, or intervening events in Ceron’s life. As a result, as
far as the record revealed at the time of the hearing, the court could reasonably
have found that, when Ceron was served with the summons and complaint, he was
fully aware of his rights and obligations with respect to them, and he decided to
live with the default judgment, and that nearly one year later he simply changed
his mind.
¶24 What Ceron does argue appears to be entirely based on his faulty
understanding that, in his words, he “needs to only identify an adequate reason to
believe” that the case should be opened. As I have explained, this is not the
correct legal framework. He makes two arguments, neither of which shows an
erroneous exercise of discretion under the correct legal framework.
¶25 One argument is to the effect that the circuit court made the legal
error of not recognizing that the case must be reopened because otherwise Ceron
cannot pursue affirmative defenses and counterclaims against Midland that he
would now like to pursue. This includes references to the compulsory
counterclaim rule. But Ceron does not develop an argument showing that even if,
at the time of the hearing on the motion to reopen, the court had agreed with Ceron
on all of these legal theories, the only discretionary option open to the court was to
reopen the case. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct.
App. 1992) (“We may decline to review issues inadequately briefed.”). In order to
establish that the court erroneously exercised its discretion under the correct legal

No. 2025AP1065
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framework, Ceron would have to show why, under all relevant circumstances, he
is entitled to pursue these defenses and counterclaims so long after the default
judgment was entered.
¶26 It is the same with the other argument. This argument is to the effect
that the circuit court made the legal error of not recognizing that, under the
remedies and penalties chapter of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, a default
judgment could not be entered in this case because the complaint fails to specify
facts that could constitute default. See WIS. STAT. § 425.109(1)(c) (providing that
a complaint “shall include” “[a] specification of the facts constituting the alleged
default by the customer”); § 425.109(3) (providing that “[a] default judgment may
not be entered upon a complaint which fails to comply with” § 425.109). This
argument turns on the specifics of what could qualify as a default under the type of
credit arrangement that was used here. Again, even if the court at the time of the
hearing considered the complaint defective in this respect, this leaves unanswered
why the only discretionary option that the court had to take was to reopen the case.
At the hearing, the court said that it believed that it could safely assume that the
judge or court commissioner who reviewed the complaint and entered the default
judgment considered the complaint to meet all requirements for default. Ceron
fails to show that it was not reasonable for the court to take into account the
court’s confidence that the neutral officer who entered the judgment made a fair
assessment of the viability of the complaint. He further fails to show that this
could not be a reasonable contributing factor to the court’s conclusion that there is
not good cause to reopen the case so long after entry of judgment. For example,
Ceron does not direct my attention to any other alleged deficiency or deficiencies
in the complaint that should have, alone or in some combination, alerted the
issuing neutral officer that entering a default judgment was inappropriate.

No. 2025AP1065
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By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.