State v. Travonta Emanuel Richmond

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 2, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP1129-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF3049

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

TRAVONTA EMANUEL RICHMOND,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee
County: STEPHANIE ROTHSTEIN, Judge. Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Geenen and Colón, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP1129-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Travonta Emanuel Richmond appeals from a
judgment of conviction entered following a jury trial for repeated sexual assault of
a child. On appeal, Richmond argues that the State failed to corroborate his
confession. For the reasons set forth below, we reject his argument and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On September 1, 2020, the State charged Richmond with one count
each of repeated sexual assault of a child, strangulation and suffocation, physical
abuse of a child, and two counts of bail jumping. The State moved to dismiss
several of the counts, and Richmond proceeded to a jury trial on one count of
repeated sexual assault of a child. The jury found Richmond guilty, and
Richmond was subsequently sentenced to four years of initial confinement and six
years of extended supervision.

¶3 At the trial, the jury heard Richmond’s confession to having a sexual
relationship with Amber, who Richmond knew was thirteen years old.1 In his
confession, Richmond stated that Amber originally presented herself as sixteen
years old, but even though Richmond eventually learned that Amber was only
thirteen years old, he continued his relationship with Amber. Richmond indicated
that he was in love with Amber, and he estimated that he had sexual intercourse
with Amber at least forty times over the course of the previous year.2

1
We use a pseudonym to refer to the child victim in this case. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.86 (2021-22). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version
unless otherwise noted.
2
As alleged in the criminal complaint, Amber estimated that she had sexual intercourse
with Richmond over 100 times.

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No. 2023AP1129-CR

¶4 Amber did not testify at trial. Instead, the State presented Amber’s
birth certificate to prove her age. The State also presented evidence from
investigating and arresting officers who spoke with Amber and Richmond around
the time of Richmond’s arrest, and the State presented two photographs taken
from surveillance video of a gas station near the scene of Richmond’s arrest. The
first photo was a picture of Amber, and the second photo depicted Richmond
standing next to Amber and holding Amber’s arm in a manner that the trial court
later described made it clear that the two were familiar with one another.

¶5 Following the State’s presentation of the evidence, trial counsel
moved to dismiss for lack of corroboration of Richmond’s confession. The trial
court denied the motion. After receipt of the jury’s verdict, the trial court also
denied another motion by trial counsel for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
on the same grounds that the State failed to corroborate Richmond’s confession.
Richmond now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶6 On appeal, Richmond argues that the State failed to produce
evidence to corroborate his confession. In particular, he argues that the State
needed to introduce independent evidence of a crime in order to corroborate his
confession. In this case, with the crime being repeated sexual assault of a child,
Richmond contends that the State was required to present independent evidence
that Richmond and Amber had a sexual relationship by, for example, providing
DNA evidence or testimony from friends or family members establishing the
nature of the relationship between Richmond and Amber. We disagree.

¶7 “A conviction will not stand on the basis of a defendant’s confession
alone.” State v. Bannister, 2007 WI 86, ¶23, 302 Wis. 2d 158, 734 N.W.2d 892.

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No. 2023AP1129-CR

Rather, the State must “present some evidence that the crime charged actually
occurred, independent of the defendant’s confession” and the State must
corroborate “any significant fact.” Id., ¶¶25-26 (citation omitted).

¶8 A significant fact “is one that gives confidence that the crime the
defendant confessed to actually occur[red],” and it “need not either independently
establish the specific elements of the crime or independently link the defendant to
the crime.” Id., ¶31.

¶9 “When a court addresses a defendant’s claim that his or her
confession was insufficiently corroborated, it examines the sufficiency of evidence
presented at trial.” Id., ¶32. Whether the State produced sufficient evidence to
corroborate a confession is a question of law that we review independently. Id.,
¶22. However, we review “the facts in evidence in a light most favorable to the
jury’s verdict.” Id.

¶10 We conclude that the State sufficiently corroborated Richmond’s
confession. In addition to Richmond’s confession, the State introduced the
testimony of officers, two photographs of Amber, and Amber’s birth certificate.
As the trial court recognized when it denied trial counsel’s motion at trial, the
officer testimony, the photographs of Amber, and Amber’s birth certificate
establish both Amber’s identity and age, which are two significant facts in and of
themselves to corroborate Richmond’s confession.

¶11 Moreover, the State also introduced a photograph of Richmond and
Amber together at the gas station just prior to Richmond’s arrest. Significantly,
the moment captured in the photo indicates that Richmond and Amber have a
certain familiarity with one another given how Richmond is positioned next to
Amber and holding her arm. While the photograph does not itself depict a sexual

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No. 2023AP1129-CR

act, a depiction of a sexual act between Richmond and Amber is not required. The
simple fact that Richmond and Amber have a certain familiarity with one another
as shown in the photo where Richmond is positioned next to Amber and holding
Amber’s arm is sufficient because that photo establishes a connection between
them, where one reasonable interpretation is that the two were also romantically
involved. Thus, the photograph of Richmond and Amber at the gas station
established another significant fact to corroborate Richmond’s confession.

¶12 Contrary to Richmond’s contention, the evidence used to corroborate
his confession need not independently establish an element of the crime, and it is
sufficient corroboration of his confession to establish Amber’s identity and age
and a certain familiarity between Richmond and Amber. “All the elements of the
crime do not have to be proved independent of an accused’s confession,” and
corroboration “can be far less than is necessary to establish the crime independent
of the confession.” Holt v. State, 17 Wis. 2d 468, 480, 117 N.W.2d 626 (1962).

¶13 Indeed, in State v. Thomas, 2021 WI App 55, ¶¶4, 13-14, 399
Wis. 2d 277, 963 N.W.2d 887, we rejected a similar argument that corroboration
of a defendant’s confession to first-degree sexual assault required “some
corroboration that sexual contact occurred.” In rejecting the argument, we stated,
“The corroboration rule is not so narrowly drawn,” and we accepted corroboration
in the form of recovery of a pornographic video referenced in the defendant’s
confession and an account from a neighbor in which the neighbor described noises
consistent with those the defendant described in his confession. Id., ¶¶12-14.

¶14 Returning to Richmond’s case, the State produced evidence
establishing Amber’s identity and age, as well as some sort of connection between
Amber and Richmond. While this evidence produced by the State to corroborate

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No. 2023AP1129-CR

Richmond’s confession would not independently establish each element of the
crime of repeated sexual assault of a child, we conclude that the evidence
nonetheless gives us confidence that the crime to which Richmond confessed and
was convicted—repeated sexual assault of Amber—actually did occur, and that is
all that is required to corroborate Richmond’s confession. See Bannister, 302
Wis. 2d 158, ¶26.

¶15 Consequently, we reject Richmond’s argument and affirm.3

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

3
We do not address the State’s argument that we should modify or abrogate the
corroboration rule. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997)
(explaining that the court of appeals may not “overrule, modify, or withdraw” a previous
decision).

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