Dawn Clendenen v. Riley Solberg

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
October 10, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP261 Cir. Ct. No. 2023SC179

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

DAWN CLENDENEN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

RILEY SOLBERG,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Lafayette County:
DUANE M. JORGENSON, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 BLANCHARD, J.1 Riley Solberg, pro se, appeals a judgment
entered by the circuit court in this small claims action brought by Dawn
Clendenen. The judgment awards Clendenen an amount that the court determined

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(a) (2021-22).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2024AP261

represents the value of residential cleaning services that Clendenen provided to
Solberg. I conclude that Solberg does not develop in this appeal any argument
that is supported by legal authority, based on relevant facts in the record, that
establishes court error. Accordingly, I affirm.

¶2 Clendenen’s small claims complaint alleged the following. Solberg
hired Clendenen’s cleaning company to clean Solberg’s new residence, before
Solberg’s family planned to move into the house. Clendenen “advised” Solberg
that Clendenen and four other employees would do the cleaning work at a rate of
$50 per hour per worker. After Clendenen’s team cleaned the house, she charged
Solberg a total of $1,075 (i.e., for 20.5 hours of work performed by five cleaners
collectively). Solberg paid Clendenen $550, but declined to pay more.

¶3 The circuit court held a hearing on Clendenen’s claim, with both
Clendenen and Solberg appearing pro se. Both parties were sworn in, gave
testimony, and presented exhibits. Clendenen presented the court with messages
that the parties exchanged via Facebook. Solberg presented photographs that
purported to show portions of the home that had allegedly been left uncleaned or
poorly cleaned by Clendenen’s team.

¶4 After considering this evidence, the circuit court made the following
explicit and implicit factual findings and rulings. The parties did not have a
“meeting of the minds” regarding “the basic” or “material” terms of a contract,
including how many people Clendenen would have working with her and
approximately how many hours would be required for Clendenen to complete her
work. Although there was no contract, Clendenen provided labor and materials
for the cleaning job requested by Solberg, which were accepted by Solberg with
the expectation that Clendenen would be fairly compensated. Therefore, the court

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reasoned, Clendenen is entitled to compensation under the legal doctrine of
quantum meruit, for labor and materials. The court implicitly determined that the
mutually understood hourly rate of $50 per hour approximated the value of the
time and materials; this included crediting Clendenen’s testimony about the
number of hours that her team put into the job.

¶5 The court further found that Solberg’s photographs did not establish
that Clendenen’s team did not spend the amount of time on cleaning claimed by
Clendenen. The court also expressed the view that it was not clear from the
photos what the quality of the cleaning work was overall, and the court implicitly
credited Clendenen’s testimony that the work was of compensable quality. The
court also appeared to credit Clendenen’s testimony that Solberg presented
Clendenen with nearly all of her photographs of allegedly substandard work for
the first time at the hearing, and further that, if Solberg had timely alerted
Clendenen to the deficiencies allegedly reflected in the photos, Clendenen would
have returned to fix them.

¶6 The circuit court ruled that Clendenen could cash a check from
Solberg already in Clendenen’s possession, in the amount of $521.50, and that a
judgment would be further entered against Solberg in the amount of $500.
Solberg appeals.

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¶7 After Solberg filed her brief in chief, Clendenen did not file a
response brief.2

¶8 Solberg asserts that the circuit court denied her the opportunity to
present evidence that: contrary to Clendenen’s testimony, Solberg sent Clendenen
the photos of areas of the home that Clendenen had allegedly failed to properly
clean before the hearing; and, relatedly, Clendenen did not offer to return to the
house to remedy any cleaning deficiencies. More broadly, she makes assertions to
the effect that the court did not conduct the hearing in a way that was fair to
Solberg. For example, she notes that the court at times interrupted Solberg’s
testimony or argument. She further alleges that the court appeared “agitated and
non[-]attentive” toward Solberg, prevented her from seeing evidence presented by
Clendenen (presumably copies of the Facebook messages), and did not allow
Solberg to respond to Clendenen’s testimony.

¶9 I reject these arguments because Solberg does not support them with
legal authority and also fails to support them factually (with the arguable
exception of some interruptions of Solberg by the court). See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.19(1)(e) (requiring appellant’s brief to contain legal arguments with
citations to supporting statutes and other legal authorities); Wal-Mart Real Est.
Bus. Tr. v. City of Merrill, 2023 WI App 14, ¶32, 406 Wis. 2d 663, 987 N.W.2d

2
WISCONSIN STAT. RULE 809.19(3) requires a respondent to file a response brief.
Despite warnings from this court that failure to file a responsive brief could result in summary
reversal, see Raz v. Brown, 2003 WI 29, ¶¶18, 32, 260 Wis. 2d 614, 660 N.W.2d 647, Clendenen
has not done so. Under these circumstances, I could deem Clendenen’s failure to file a brief a
concession that the circuit court erred. See State ex rel. Blackdeer v. Township of Levis, 176
Wis. 2d 252, 260, 500 N.W.2d 339 (Ct. App. 1993). But taking into account the material
available in the record, the clarity of the circuit court’s challenged decisions, and the nature of
Solberg’s brief, I conclude that affirmance is appropriate for the reasons stated in the text.

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764 (court of appeals “need not consider arguments that are undeveloped and
unsupported by citations to legal authority”). As for the absence of legal
authority, she does not attempt to address the appropriate standard for this court to
review her arguments about how the hearing was conducted, or for that matter the
standards to review any of her arguments. Although this court liberally construes
filings by pro se litigants, see West v. Macht, 2000 WI App 134, ¶15 n.6, 237
Wis. 2d 265, 614 N.W.2d 34, pro se litigants are nonetheless “bound by the same
rules that apply to attorneys on appeal,” Waushara County v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d
442, 452, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992).

¶10 Further, Solberg does not identify what additional evidence she
would have presented to the circuit court if allowed, nor does she explain how any
additional evidence should have resulted in the court making different material
findings. The starting point of the type of fairness-based arguments that I
understand her to be attempting to raise would require showing one of two
categories of error that would require reversal: how the court allegedly cutting
short Solberg’s opportunity to present her case in fact prejudiced her; or how the
court’s alleged errors were structural in nature. Solberg’s brief does not attempt
either route.

¶11 I now turn to the absence of relevant facts, based on my own review
of the record. It is not clear from the hearing transcript that, even if the circuit
court did interrupt Solberg at times, the court did not give Solberg sufficient
opportunities to be heard or present evidence. The issues here were not complex
or technical. Further, a court in a hearing of this type has latitude to question
witnesses, to determine the order of proofs and arguments, and to reasonably move
the proceedings along in the interest of efficiency. See WIS. STAT. § 799.209(1)
(The court or commissioner “shall conduct the proceeding informally, allowing

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each party to present arguments and proofs and to examine witnesses to the extent
reasonably required for full and true disclosure of the facts.”); State v. Jackson,
2023 WI 3, ¶27, 405 Wis. 2d 458, 983 N.W.2d 608 (circuit courts generally have
wide latitude to manage the orderly and efficient presentation of evidence at a trial
on a case-by-case basis). Thus, even if I were to set to the side Solberg’s lack of
legal support for fairness-based arguments, they do not appear to be factually
supported.

¶12 Solberg appears to take the position that, contrary to the circuit
court’s reasoning, she and Clendenen formed an enforceable contract. However,
she does not develop an argument supported by references to relevant facts in the
record and legal authority undermining the court’s reasoning that no contract was
formed. She cites some Wisconsin and federal statutes, but all of those appear to
be off point. In any case, she does not develop an argument explaining why the
cited statutes apply here or how they create a problem with any aspect of the
court’s reasoning.

¶13 To the extent that Solberg may mean to suggest that the circuit
court’s application of the doctrine of quantum meruit, and the court’s
determination of damages, cannot be sustained based on the facts that were
explicitly and implicitly found by the court, she fails to develop an argument along
these lines. See Murray v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI App 62, ¶17, 252 Wis. 2d
613, 642 N.W.2d 541 (an implied contract under a theory of quantum meruit is
shown through proof that “the defendant requested the services and that the
plaintiff expected reasonable compensation”); see also Ramsey v. Ellis, 168
Wis. 2d 779, 785, 484 N.W.2d 331 (1992) (“[D]amages in a quantum meruit claim
are measured by the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s services.”). Solberg takes
the position that the circuit court was unreasonable in valuing Clendenen’s

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services. But she merely asserts this position and declares that the hearing was not
fair. She does not present an argument establishing that the court either clearly
erred in making any material finding of fact, see La Velle v. De Luca, 48 Wis. 2d
464, 467, 471, 180 N.W.2d 710 (1970) (upholding circuit court’s findings of fact
regarding quantum meruit claim because they were “not against the great weight
and clear preponderance of the evidence”), or erred in making any legal
determination.

¶14 For these reasons, I conclude that Solberg fails to identify a basis to
reverse the small claims judgment and accordingly I affirm.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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