Vernon County v. F. W. R.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 21, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP203 Cir. Ct. No. 2023ME13

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONDITION OF F.W.R.:

VERNON COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

F.W.R.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Vernon County:
DARCY JO ROOD, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2024AP203

¶1 TAYLOR, J.1 F.W.R. appeals an order for involuntary commitment
under WIS. STAT. § 51.20. As relevant to this appeal, the circuit court determined
that F.W.R. satisfied the criteria for involuntary commitment under § 51.20
because of his dependency on alcohol. On appeal, F.W.R. argues that the
involuntary commitment order should be vacated for three reasons: (1) a person
cannot be committed under § 51.20 for the purpose of treating alcoholism; (2) the
court did not follow the proper procedures during the probable cause hearing; and
(3) Vernon County (“the County”) failed to satisfy its burden of showing that
F.W.R. met the criteria for an involuntary commitment by clear and convincing
evidence. For the following reasons, I reject F.W.R.’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On May 16, 2023, the County filed a three-party Petition for
Examination of F.W.R. (the petition) pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20 for an
involuntary commitment for treatment. The petition was signed by Dr. James
Deline—F.W.R.’s personal physician—as well as a supervisor and a case manager
from the Vernon County Community Support Program (“CSP”), in which F.W.R.
had been participating since 2021 and receiving outpatient services for his alcohol
use and mental health. The petition stated that F.W.R. had been the subject of a
previous WIS. STAT. ch. 51 commitment to treat his alcohol use, but he resumed
drinking alcohol soon after that commitment expired in April 2022.2 In a written
statement attached to the petition, F.W.R.’s CSP caseworker reported the

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2021-22).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
2
It is unclear from the record whether F.W.R.’s previous commitment was under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20 or a different provision of WIS. STAT. ch. 51.

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following. F.W.R. had regularly attended substance abuse counseling and had
participated in detoxification treatments on four occasions in 2022. F.W.R. was
aware that he had significant health issues as a direct result of his alcohol use and
that his continued alcohol use would exasperate these issues, resulting in
premature death. F.W.R. had recently reported that he had been drinking up to
three quarts of alcohol per day, and had missed his appointments for services in
the community.

¶3 Dr. Deline’s written statement attached to the petition stated as
follows. F.W.R.’s drinking was causing serious health problems and F.W.R. had
been hospitalized twice for alcohol detoxification, including a hospitalization in
December 2022 that required F.W.R. to be intubated and placed on a ventilator.
F.W.R.’s current level of alcohol use would likely lead to more “catastrophic
hospitalizations” and, ultimately, his premature death. Based on the allegations in
the petition, the circuit court issued an order for detention and scheduled a
probable cause hearing on the petition.

¶4 On May 22, 2023, the circuit court held a probable cause hearing on
the petition. At the hearing, Dr. Deline and Dr. Benjamin Strand—a psychiatrist
appointed by the court to examine F.W.R.—testified in favor of an involuntary
commitment. The circuit court determined that there was probable cause to
believe that F.W.R. satisfied the criteria for involuntary commitment under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1) for drug dependence or mental illness and that F.W.R. was
dangerous to himself or others. The court ordered that F.W.R. continue to be
detained until the final hearing on the petition and ordered that he be examined by
Dr. Jeffrey Marcus, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Thomas Ledoux, a psychologist.
Drs. Marcus and Ledoux each examined F.W.R. and provided independent reports
to the court.

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¶5 On May 31, 2023, the circuit court held the final hearing on the
petition. Dr. Marcus testified that F.W.R. satisfied all of the requirements for
commitment for drug dependence and mental illness under WIS. STAT. § 51.20,
and he recommended that F.W.R. be committed to a locked inpatient facility.
Dr. Ledoux agreed that F.W.R. satisfied the requirements for commitment, but he
believed that F.W.R. should be committed on an outpatient basis.3

¶6 The circuit court determined that there was clear and convincing
evidence that F.W.R. satisfied the criteria for involuntary commitment under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20. Specifically, the court determined that F.W.R. was both drug
dependent and mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous to
himself under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. The court ordered six months of commitment to
the County and designated the “maximum level of inpatient facility” as locked
inpatient care. See § 51.20(13)(c)2. F.W.R. appeals.4

3
Dr. Ledoux wrote in his report and testified at the hearing that F.W.R. was not
“dangerous” for the purposes of WIS. STAT. § 51.20 because his judgment was not impaired by
mental illness. However, after further questioning from the circuit court, Dr. Ledoux appeared to
admit that F.W.R. was “dangerous” because his judgment was impaired by his consumption of
alcohol. As a result, the only disagreement between Drs. Marcus and Ledoux was whether
F.W.R. needed inpatient treatment.
4
F.W.R.’s six-month commitment expired in November 2023, before which the circuit
court ordered a one-year extension based on a stipulation between the parties that F.W.R. was
mentally ill and would receive outpatient services. F.W.R. does not challenge the extension of
his commitment.

F.W.R. argues that his appeal of the expired initial commitment order is not moot due to
the collateral consequences of that order. See Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶21, 402
Wis. 2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162. Because the County does not dispute F.W.R.’s argument on
mootness in this appeal, the issue is conceded by the County. See Shadley v. Lloyds of London,
2009 WI App 165, ¶26, 322 Wis. 2d 189, 776 N.W.2d 838 (“Arguments not rebutted on appeal
are deemed conceded.”).

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No. 2024AP203

DISCUSSION

¶7 As stated, on appeal, F.W.R. argues that his involuntary commitment
was improper for three reasons: (1) a person cannot be committed under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20 for the purpose of treating that person’s alcoholism; (2) the circuit
court did not follow the proper procedures during the probable cause hearing; and
(3) the County failed to satisfy its burden of showing that F.W.R. met the criteria
for commitment by clear and convincing evidence.

¶8 For the following reasons, I reject these arguments and conclude
that, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20, a person may be involuntarily committed for
treatment for alcoholism; the circuit court followed the proper procedures in the
probable cause hearing; and the County met its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that F.W.R. was drug dependent and dangerous.

I. Standard of Review

¶9 A person may be involuntarily committed for treatment under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20 if the individual is: (1) “mentally ill or … drug dependent or
developmentally disabled”; (2) “a proper subject for treatment”; and
(3) “dangerous” under one of five standards set forth in § 51.20(1)(a)2.
Sec. 51.20(1)(a). The County has the burden to prove all required facts by clear
and convincing evidence. Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶23, 391
Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. Whether the County has met its burden involves
questions of law and fact. Id., ¶24. This court upholds a circuit court’s findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but independently reviews whether the facts
satisfy the statutory standards for commitment. Id., ¶¶24-25. “Whether a party
has met its burden of proof is a question of law that an appellate court reviews

5
No. 2024AP203

de novo.” Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶88 n.25, 349 Wis. 2d
148, 833 N.W.2d 607.

¶10 This case also involves the interpretation of the involuntary
commitment statutes under WIS. STAT. ch. 51. Statutory interpretation and
application are questions of law that this court reviews independently. D.J.W.,
391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶25. Statutory interpretation “‘begins with the language of the
statute.’” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citation omitted). Statutory language is given “its
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-
defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional
meaning.” Id. “‘If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear statutory meaning,
then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied according to this
ascertainment of its meaning.’” Id., ¶46 (citation omitted).

II. Commitment for Alcoholism Under WIS. STAT. § 51.20

¶11 As noted, F.W.R. argues that a person cannot be involuntarily
committed under WIS. STAT. § 51.20 for the purpose of treating alcoholism
because § 51.20 authorizes commitment of a person who is “drug dependent,”
which he contends does not include alcoholism. For the following reasons, I reject
F.W.R.’s argument and conclude that § 51.20 authorizes an involuntary
commitment for the treatment of alcoholism.

6
No. 2024AP203

A. WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.20 Authorizes Involuntary
Commitments for Alcoholism

¶12 As pertinent here, under WIS. STAT. § 51.20, a person who is “drug
dependent” may be involuntarily committed for treatment. Sec. 51.20(1)(a)1.5
For the purposes of WIS. STAT. ch. 51, the term “drug dependence” is specially
defined as “a disease that is characterized by a person’s use of one or more drugs
that is beyond the person’s ability to control to the extent that the person’s
physical health is substantially impaired or his or her social or economic
functioning is substantially disrupted.” WIS. STAT. § 51.01(8). Whether “drug
dependence” for purposes of § 51.20 includes alcohol dependence is a matter of
first impression in Wisconsin.

¶13 Although the word “drug” is not specifically defined in WIS. STAT.
ch. 51, other definitions set forth under WIS. STAT. § 51.01 refer to alcohol as a
“drug” on which a person can be dependent. Specifically, the term “alcoholism”
is defined as “a disease which is characterized by the dependency of a person on
the drug alcohol, to the extent that the person’s health is substantially impaired or
endangered or his or her social or economic functioning is substantially
disrupted.” Sec. 51.01(1m) (emphasis added). This definition indicates not only
that alcohol is considered a drug for the purposes of ch. 51, but also that
alcoholism is a category of drug dependence involving a person’s dependence on
the drug alcohol.

5
Here, in addition to determining that F.W.R. was drug dependent, the circuit court also
determined that F.W.R. was “mentally ill” for the purposes of WIS. STAT. § 51.20. Because the
issue of drug dependence is dispositive, I need not address the issue of mental illness. See
Barrows v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 2014 WI App 11, ¶9, 252 Wis. 2d 436, 842 N.W.2d 508
(2013) (“An appellate court need not address every issue raised by the parties when one issue is
dispositive.”).

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No. 2024AP203

¶14 Had the legislature so intended, it could have carved out an explicit
exclusion for alcoholism in the definition of “drug dependence.” For example, for
the purposes of an involuntary commitment under WIS. STAT. ch. 51, the
definition of “mental illness” explicitly excludes “alcoholism.” WIS. STAT.
§ 51.01(13)(b).6 In contrast, the definition of “drug dependence” does not contain
any such exclusion for alcoholism. Had the legislature intended to exclude
alcoholism from the definition of “drug dependence,” it could have done so. See
Milwaukee J. Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶36, 341 Wis. 2d 607,
815 N.W.2d 367 (“[I]f the legislature had intended to accomplish what a party is
urging on the court …, the legislature knew how to draft that language and could
have done so had it wished.”).

¶15 Other statutes in WIS. STAT. ch. 51 also support the conclusion that
“drug dependence” includes alcoholism. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46
(“[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used” and “in
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes.”). For instance,
the legislature’s statement of policy for ch. 51 provides: “It is the policy of the
state to assure the provision of a full range of treatment and rehabilitation services
in the state for … alcoholism and other drug abuse.” WIS. STAT. § 51.001(1)
(emphasis added).

¶16 Surrounding statutes, such as WIS. STAT. § 51.45, also underscore
this point. The continuum of treatment options set forth under § 51.45—from

6
WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.01(13)(b) provides: “‘Mental illness’, for purposes of
involuntary commitment, means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation,
or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to
meet the ordinary demands of life, but does not include alcoholism.”

8
No. 2024AP203

voluntary admission to a treatment facility to involuntary commitment—applies to
individuals who consume “alcohol beverages or other drugs,” § 51.45(13), or who
are “[i]ncapacitated by alcohol or another drug,” § 51.45(11)-(12). Further,
§ 51.45(2)(f) defines the term “[i]ntoxicated person” as including “a person whose
mental or physical functioning is substantially impaired as a result of the use of
alcohol … or another drug.” Sec. 51.45(2)(f). By referring to “other drugs” or
“another drug” after “alcohol,” these statutes indicate that the legislature
understood that the word “drug” includes alcohol. See Stroede v. Society Ins.,
2021 WI 43, ¶14, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959 N.W.2d 305 (“‘[W]hen general words
follow specific words in the statutory text, the general words should be construed
in light of the specific words listed. Thus, the general word or phrase will
encompass only things of the same type as those specific words listed.’” (citation
omitted)). Accordingly, I reject F.W.R.’s argument that alcoholism does not
constitute a drug dependence under the scope of WIS. STAT. § 51.20.

B. Commitment for Alcoholism Under WIS. STAT. § 51.20 Does Not
Render WIS. STAT. § 51.45(13) Superfluous.

¶17 F.W.R. argues that an involuntary commitment for treatment of
alcoholism is solely governed by WIS. STAT. § 51.45(13). According to F.W.R., if
a person could be involuntarily committed for alcoholism under WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20, then the statutory procedures set forth in § 51.45(13) would be rendered
superfluous. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (“Statutory language is read where
possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage.”).
This argument fails for the following reasons.

¶18 First, although there are similarities between WIS. STAT. §§ 51.20
and 51.45, including the procedural framework for involuntary commitments,
there are material differences between the two statutes, such as the factual findings

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a court must make, the legal standard that must be met, and the length of the
commitment.

¶19 For instance, WIS. STAT. § 51.20 requires clear and convincing proof
that the “drug dependent” individual is “dangerous” under one of five standards
set forth in § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e. Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, ¶8,
393 Wis. 2d 511, 947 N.W.2d 761. Here, the circuit court determined that F.W.R.
satisfied the dangerousness standard set forth under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. as a matter
of law. Under this dangerousness standard, the County must provide evidence of
recent acts or omissions demonstrating that the individual is a danger to himself or
herself or to others. Sec. 51.20(1)(a)2.c. Further, under this standard, an
individual is not “dangerous” if community services are available to protect the
individual from physical injury or impairment and there is a reasonable probability
that the individual will avail himself or herself of these services.
Sec. 51.20(1)(a)2.c.7

¶20 In contrast, an involuntary commitment under WIS. STAT.
§ 51.45(13) requires proof that the individual “habitually lacks self-control as to
the use of alcohol beverages or other drugs” and that the individual’s use of
alcohol beverages or other drugs “substantially impaired or endangered” the

7
WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. provides in pertinent part:

[T]he subject individual … [e]vidences such impaired judgment,
manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions,
that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or
injury to himself or herself or other individuals. The probability
of physical impairment or injury is not substantial under this
[subdivision paragraph] if reasonable provision for the subject
individual’s protection is available in the community and there is
a reasonable probability that the individual will avail himself or
herself of these services.

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individual’s health and “substantially disrupted” the individual’s “social or
economic functioning.” Sec. 51.45(13)(a)1. Instead of requiring “recent acts or
omissions” that demonstrate that the person is a danger to themselves or others (as
is required under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.), § 51.45(13) requires that the
individual’s lack of self-control be evidenced by a “pattern of conduct which is
dangerous to the person or to others.” Sec. 51.45(13)(a)2. Additionally,
§ 51.45(13) requires that there be a “relationship” between the individual’s
“alcoholic or drug dependent condition” and the individual’s pattern of conduct
during the 12 months immediately preceding the time of the petition.
Sec. 51.45(13)(g)1.b. This section also requires that there be an “extreme
likelihood” that the pattern of conduct will continue or repeat itself without the
intervention of involuntary treatment or institutionalization. Sec. 51.45(13)(g)1.c.

¶21 Another difference between the two involuntary commitment
statutes involves the duration of the initial commitment and extension of the
commitment. Under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(13)(g)1., a circuit court may authorize an
involuntary commitment for up to six months and can extend that commitment for
a period not to exceed one year, with no specific statutory limit on the number of
extensions that can be granted. Sec. 51.20(13)(g)1.8 In contrast, WIS. STAT.
§ 51.45(13) only authorizes an involuntary commitment not to exceed 90 days and
provides that the time period can be extended only one time for up to six months.
Sec. 51.45(13)(h). Accordingly, § 51.20 authorizes a longer initial period of

8
The extension of an involuntary commitment requires proof of the same three elements
that must be proved for the initial involuntary commitment, except that, instead of proving
dangerousness under one of the five standards set forth under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e., the
County may rely on the “‘alternative evidentiary path’ of § 51.20(1)(am).” Winnebago County v.
S.H., 2020 WI App 46, ¶8, 393 Wis. 2d 511, 947 N.W.2d 761 (citation omitted).

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commitment and a longer extension of a commitment than § 51.45 and may be
more appropriate for an individual struggling with a more significant drug
dependency.

¶22 To be sure, there are some circumstances where an individual
suffering from alcoholism may satisfy the conditions for involuntary commitment
under both WIS. STAT. §§ 51.20 and 51.45(13). However, the foregoing examples
demonstrate that § 51.20 is not a mirror image of § 51.45(13). In other words,
§§ 51.20 and 51.45(13) perform different functions in that each statute imposes
distinct standards that must be met for involuntary commitments and allow
different lengths for initial involuntary commitments and extensions of the
commitments. See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2019 WI
24, ¶17, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d 153 (concluding that the canon against
surplusage did not apply where two provisions of an ordinance “operate on
different categories of [individuals] and perform different functions”). Therefore,
involuntarily committing a person for treatment of alcoholism under § 51.20 does
not render § 51.45(13) superfluous.

¶23 Second, F.W.R.’s argument that permitting involuntary
commitments for alcoholism under WIS. STAT. § 51.20 would render WIS. STAT.
§ 51.45(13) superfluous rests on the flawed premises that an involuntary
commitment under § 51.20 is limited to individuals who are dependent on drugs
other than alcohol and that an involuntary commitment for alcoholism is only
permitted under § 51.45(13). F.W.R. references the “history of [WIS. STAT.
ch.] 51” to support this argument, citing a reference in case law to the enactments
of new civil commitment laws in the 1970s, including “one for persons who are
acutely mentally ill, developmentally disabled or drug dependent” (referencing
§ 51.20), and “another law for alcoholics” (referencing § 51.45). State ex rel.

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Watts v. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd. of Milwaukee Cnty., 122 Wis. 2d 65, 72,
362 N.W.2d 104 (1985). F.W.R. also cites a case in which this court stated that a
previous version of § 51.45(13) “concerns involuntary commitment of alleged
alcoholics.” State v. B.A.S., 134 Wis. 2d 291, 293, 397 N.W.2d 114 (Ct. App.
1986). F.W.R. does not develop any further argument or cite to any other relevant
legal support for his argument.

¶24 It is correct that, in the not-so-distant past, WIS. STAT. § 51.45 was
limited to persons needing treatment for alcoholism. See § 51.45(1) (through 2017
Wis. Act 34, enacted July 17, 2017) (stating that § 51.45 applies to “alcoholics and
intoxicated persons”); see also State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 208 Wis. 2d 39, 49-
50, 559 N.W.2d 900 (1997) (explaining that § 51.45 was patterned on the Uniform
Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act). This limitation is reflected in the
cases that interpreted the previous version of § 51.45, including Watts and B.A.S.,
discussed above. In 2017, however, the legislature expanded the reach of § 51.45
to include individuals who are “drug dependent.” See 2017 Wis. Act 34, § 20. As
a result, § 51.45 now applies to “alcoholics, persons who are drug dependent, and
intoxicated persons.” Sec. 51.45(1) (emphasis added). The criteria for
involuntary commitment under § 51.45(13) now require proof that the person
“habitually lacks self-control as to the use of alcohol beverages or other drugs.”
Sec. 51.45(13)(a)1. (emphasis added).

¶25 Similarly, the definition of “alcoholism” set forth in WIS. STAT.
§ 51.01(1m) did not exist when WIS. STAT. § 51.45 was originally enacted. See
WIS. STAT. § 51.01(1) (through 1985 Wis. Act 265, enacted Apr. 15, 1986). In
1986, the legislature created the definition of “alcoholism” which, as discussed
above, specifies that alcohol is a drug on which a person can be dependent. See
1985 Wis. Act 265 (creating § 51.01(1m) to define “alcoholism,” in part, as “a

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No. 2024AP203

disease which is characterized by the dependency of a person on the drug
alcohol”). F.W.R.’s argument fails to acknowledge that the statutes governing
WIS. STAT. ch. 51 proceedings have evolved over the decades such that both WIS.
STAT. §§ 51.20 and 51.45(13) are available for treating a person’s alcoholism,
each without rendering the other superfluous.

¶26 For these reasons, I reject F.W.R.’s argument that an individual
cannot be involuntarily committed for alcoholism under WIS. STAT. § 51.20 and
conclude that an involuntary commitment for an individual who is “drug
dependent” under § 51.20 includes an individual in need of treatment for
alcoholism.

III. Probable Cause Hearing

¶27 Next, F.W.R. argues that the circuit court did not follow the proper
procedures during the probable cause hearing. According to F.W.R., the court
erred by: (1) allowing the County to convert the involuntary commitment petition
from a WIS. STAT. § 51.45 petition to a WIS. STAT. § 51.20 petition without proper
notice; and (2) failing to determine that there was probable cause to believe that
F.W.R. satisfied the criteria for an involuntary commitment under § 51.20. I reject
these arguments for the following reasons.

¶28 First, the County’s petition for involuntary commitment was filed
under WIS. STAT. § 51.20, not WIS. STAT. § 51.45(13). The County used the
standard form petition for a § 51.20 commitment and explicitly alleged that
F.W.R. satisfied the three main criteria for commitment under § 51.20: (1) mental
illness, drug dependence, or developmental disability; (2) suitability for treatment;
and (3) dangerousness. The form used by the County did not set forth any of the
criteria for involuntary commitment under § 51.45(13).

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¶29 In support of his argument, F.W.R. points to a single sentence that
the County wrote on the petition form: “the subject habitually lacks self-control as
to the use of alcohol to the extent that his health and social functioning are
substantially disrupted.” According to F.W.R., this language was drawn from
WIS. STAT. § 51.45(13) and establishes that the County was petitioning for
commitment under that statute. This language does not change my conclusion
because it parrots the definition of alcoholism in WIS. STAT. § 51.01(1m), as
previously referenced, not § 51.45(13). But even if this particular language was
taken from § 51.45(13), it would not transform what would otherwise be a bona
fide petition under WIS. STAT. § 51.20 into a petition under § 51.45(13).9
Therefore, the County’s petition did not need to be converted to a § 51.45(13)
petition.

¶30 F.W.R. also argues that the circuit court did not determine that there
was probable cause to believe that F.W.R. was a proper subject for treatment
under WIS. STAT. § 51.20. Instead, F.W.R. contends that the court determined that
he was a proper subject for “alcohol treatment” under WIS. STAT. § 51.45(13).10 I
disagree.

9
As stated, both WIS. STAT. §§ 51.20 and 51.45(13) authorize involuntary commitments.
At the probable cause hearing, a petition for commitment under either of these statutes may be
converted to a petition for commitment under the other statute, so long as two criteria are
satisfied: (1) the petitioner notifies the other parties and the circuit court prior to the probable
cause hearing of its intent to proceed as though it petitioned for commitment under the other
statute; and (2) the court determines that “there is probable cause to believe that the subject
individual is a fit subject for treatment” under the other statute. Secs. 51.20(7)(dm),
51.45(13)(dg)1.
10
Additionally, F.W.R. argues that the circuit court’s probable cause determination was
not sufficient because a person cannot be committed under WIS. STAT. § 51.20 for alcoholism.
This argument fails because, as explained above, a person who is dependent on alcohol is drug
dependent and may be committed under § 51.20.

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No. 2024AP203

¶31 During the course of the probable cause hearing, the County twice
confirmed that it was petitioning for commitment under WIS. STAT. § 51.20, not
WIS. STAT. § 51.45(13). After the evidence was presented, the circuit court
explicitly stated that it was proceeding under § 51.20, and it determined that there
was probable cause to believe that the criteria for commitment under § 51.20 were
satisfied. F.W.R. argues that the court must have been operating under
§ 51.45(13) because it stated at one point that F.W.R.’s “inability to stop drinking
is impairing his life and his health substantially,” language that shares some
similarities with § 51.45(13)(a)1. This argument fails because the court explained
immediately after this statement that it was referencing the dangerousness standard
set forth under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., which requires “a substantial probability of
physical impairment or injury to himself or herself or others.” Accordingly, I
reject F.W.R.’s argument that the court followed an improper procedure during the
probable cause hearing.

IV. The County’s Burden of Proof

¶32 Next, F.W.R. argues that the County did not satisfy its burden of
proving the criteria for involuntary commitment under WIS. STAT. § 51.20. To
reiterate, the County has the burden of proving the following pertinent criteria
under § 51.20 by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the person is drug dependent;
(2) the person is a “proper subject for treatment”; and (3) the person is
“dangerous.” Sec. 51.20(1)(a). I conclude that the County met its burden on each
of these elements.

A. Drug Dependence

¶33 As noted above, “drug dependence” is defined as “a disease that is
characterized by a person’s use of one or more drugs that is beyond the person’s

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ability to control to the extent that the person’s physical health is substantially
impaired or his or her social or economic functioning is substantially disrupted.”
WIS. STAT. § 51.01(8). For the following reasons, the County met its burden with
respect to proving drug dependence.

¶34 First, the County provided clear and convincing evidence that
F.W.R.’s use of alcohol was beyond his ability to control. Dr. Marcus testified
that F.W.R. was dependent on alcohol because of his “extensive history” of “very
heavy alcohol usage over a number of years.” Dr. Marcus also opined that F.W.R.
had been “medicating with alcohol” to alleviate the symptoms of his mental health
issues. Similarly, Dr. Ledoux testified that F.W.R. had a “severe alcohol use
disorder” and a “chronic alcohol addiction.”

¶35 Second, the County provided clear and convincing evidence that
F.W.R.’s use of alcohol substantially impaired his physical health. The common
definition of the word “impaired” is “being in an imperfect or weakened state or
condition” such as “diminished in function or ability.” Impaired, MERRIAM
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impaired
(last visited Nov. 18, 2024). Dr. Marcus testified that F.W.R. suffered from
multiple medical conditions as a result of his alcohol consumption, including
“advanced liver disease,” “complicated alcohol withdrawal syndrome,” and a
condition known as “delirium tremens” that has a high mortality rate. Dr. Marcus
opined that F.W.R. was “at [a] high risk of dying if he continues to consume
alcohol.” In his report, Dr. Marcus noted that F.W.R. had been hospitalized as
recently as December 2022 for “complicated alcohol withdrawal,” during which
F.W.R. needed a respirator and a tracheostomy. Similarly, Dr. Ledoux stated that
F.W.R. had “liver cirrhosis” and that his “alcohol abuse” was “plac[ing] his liver
functioning and overall health status at serious risk.” For these reasons, the expert

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testimony and reports provided clear and convincing evidence that F.W.R.’s
alcoholism has substantially impaired his physical health, such that his continued
use of alcohol placed him at a high risk of dying.

B. Proper Subject for Treatment

¶36 The County also has the burden of showing that F.W.R. is a “proper
subject for treatment” under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)1. “Treatment” is defined in
WIS. STAT. ch. 51 as “those psychological, educational, social, chemical, medical
or somatic techniques designed to bring about rehabilitation of a mentally ill,
alcoholic, drug dependent or developmentally disabled person.” WIS. STAT.
§ 51.01(17). The key determination for applying this definition is whether the
person is capable of rehabilitation. Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI
50, ¶30, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179. For example, our supreme court has
held that a person suffering from Alzheimer’s disease was not capable of
rehabilitation because her condition was “untreatable and incurable.” Id., ¶38.

¶37 Here, the County provided clear and convincing evidence that
F.W.R. was capable of rehabilitation. Although Drs. Marcus and Ledoux
disagreed as to the level of treatment facility needed to treat F.W.R., both agreed
that F.W.R.’s alcoholism was treatable in that it could be remedied by
“psychological, educational, social, chemical, medical or somatic techniques.”11
See WIS. STAT. § 51.01(17). There is no evidence in the record that F.W.R.’s

11
In addition to determining that F.W.R. is a “proper subject for treatment,” the circuit
court must also designate the “maximum level of inpatient facility … that may be used for
treatment.” WIS. STAT. § 51.20(13)(c)2. Here, the court agreed with Dr. Marcus and determined
that a locked inpatient facility was the “maximum level of inpatient facility” for F.W.R.’s
treatment. On appeal, F.W.R. does not challenge the court’s designation of the maximum level of
inpatient facility and I do not address it further.

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alcoholism was an “untreatable and incurable” condition. See Helen E.F., 340
Wis. 2d 500, ¶38.

¶38 F.W.R. argues that the circuit court’s determination as to his
suitability for treatment was improper because it was based on the court’s
“personal or professional experiences.” Specifically, F.W.R. points to the court’s
statement in its oral ruling that, in its “experience in alcohol [c]ourt,” “the
alcoholics … say after a few months of sobriety … their brain clears [and] they’re
able to think more clearly.” F.W.R.’s argument fails because this court
independently reviews the question of whether the County met its burden of
showing by clear and convincing evidence that F.W.R. was a proper subject for
treatment. See Melanie L., 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶88 n.25. The circuit court’s
reference to its own experience does not affect my conclusion that the County
satisfied its burden of proof that F.W.R. was a proper subject for treatment.

C. Dangerousness

¶39 Finally, the County must show by clear and convincing evidence that
F.W.R. is “dangerous” under one of the standards set forth in WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. As stated, relevant to this appeal, § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. requires proof
that the person “[e]vidences such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a
pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of
physical impairment or injury to himself or herself or other individuals.”
Sec. 51.20(1)(a)2.c. This provision also requires proof of at least one of the
following criteria: (1) there is not a “reasonable provision for the subject
individual’s protection … available in the community”; or (2) there is not “a
reasonable probability that the individual will avail himself or herself of these

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services.” Sec. 51.20(1)(a)2.c. For the following reasons, the County met its
burden with respect to dangerousness under this standard.

¶40 First, the County provided clear and convincing evidence of a
pattern of recent acts or omissions showing that F.W.R.’s judgment was impaired
such that there was a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to
himself. As stated, the common meaning of “impaired” is “being in [a] …
weakened state or condition” such as being “diminished in function or ability.”
Impaired, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, supra. Dr. Marcus testified that
F.W.R. had impaired judgment as evidenced by a pattern of recent acts in which
F.W.R. minimized the consequences of his heavy alcohol consumption.
Dr. Marcus also indicated that F.W.R.’s history of mental health issues, such as
anxiety and depression, contributed to his impaired judgment. Dr. Marcus opined
in his report that this pattern of impaired judgment caused F.W.R. to continue
consuming alcohol despite the serious medical consequences of doing so, such as
hospitalization and even the risk of premature death. According to Dr. Marcus,
there was a “substantial probability” that F.W.R.’s impaired judgment was
inhibiting his ability to stay sober and avoid the negative health consequences of
drinking alcohol.

¶41 Similarly, Dr. Ledoux stated that F.W.R.’s judgment was likely
being affected by his “chronic alcohol addiction.” Dr. Ledoux testified that
F.W.R.’s impaired judgment was creating a “substantial probability of serious
harm to himself” and that F.W.R. was “continu[ing] to abuse alcohol despite
deleterious effects on his mental and physical health,” including liver cirrhosis and
F.W.R.’s overall health status.

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¶42 Second, the County provided clear and convincing evidence that the
treatment services F.W.R. was receiving in the community did not reasonably
provide for his protection. Dr. Marcus testified that F.W.R. had been consuming
large amounts of alcohol despite his participation in, and continued willingness to
participate in, the CSP and the panoply of services he had been receiving and
regularly accessing in the community. According to Dr. Marcus, the services
available in the community were not adequate for F.W.R.’s needs and would not
be adequate until F.W.R. became medically stable. Similarly, Dr. Ledoux noted in
his report that F.W.R. had been consistently and voluntarily engaged in substance
abuse counseling, but was still struggling to maintain sobriety. Dr. Ledoux also
stated that, although F.W.R. admitted that “daily intoxication [was] more than
likely impact[ing] his memory and ability to maintain treatment adherence,” he
had no plan to stop drinking alcohol. In other words, F.W.R.’s alcoholism was
diminishing his cognition and ability to comply with treatment services in the
community. In sum, I conclude that the County showed by clear and convincing
evidence that F.W.R. was “dangerous” under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

¶43 F.W.R. argues that the County did not meet its burden of showing
that he was dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. because his judgment
was not “impaired.” According to F.W.R., the evidence shows only that he was
making “bad decisions,” not that he had a “diminished ability to make evaluations
and reach conclusions.” This argument fails because, as discussed above, the
County provided ample evidence that F.W.R.’s ability to assess and evaluate his
actions was compromised. In particular, Dr. Marcus explained that F.W.R.’s
impaired judgment was evidenced by his inability to limit his alcohol consumption
despite knowing the severe health consequences, including a risk of early
mortality.

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¶44 F.W.R. also argues that the circuit court failed to make specific
factual findings with respect to dangerousness as required under D.J.W. In that
case, the circuit court did not specify the standard for dangerousness under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which D.J.W.’s commitment was based, and D.J.W. and
the county disagreed on appeal as to which dangerousness standard the court
applied. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶36-39. Given these “conflicting messages …
regarding the statutory basis for [D.J.W.’s] commitment,” our supreme court
directed that, in the future, circuit courts must “make specific factual findings with
reference to the subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the
[]commitment is based.” Id., ¶40.

¶45 Here, the circuit court satisfied this obligation under D.J.W. In its
oral ruling, the court determined that the County proved all the elements of
dangerousness under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and made the following
findings of evidentiary fact:

[H]e’s dangerous because he has a substantial probability
of physical impairment or injury to himself … [d]ue to his
impaired judgement [sic] …[.] [B]oth [d]octors agreed
with that and I think the evidence is clear and convincing
probably almost to beyond a reasonable doubt that … his
continued drinking which he [has] done in the
community[,] even though he has been in the CSP
program[,] is going to kill him. And this is shown by a
pattern of recent acts or [o]missions meaning that while he
was under the CSP program he did not stop drinking.

Additionally, the court’s written order for commitment explicitly indicates that
F.W.R. was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. In making these findings, the court
acknowledged the “serious nature” of the commitment proceeding and ensured
“meaningful appellate review” of the basis for his commitment. See id., ¶¶42-44
(explaining the justifications for our supreme court’s directive). Accordingly, I

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conclude that the court satisfied its obligation under D.J.W. in making specific
findings of evidentiary fact in legally concluding that F.W.R. was “dangerous”
under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

¶46 In sum, I conclude that the County met its burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence the criteria for F.W.R.’s involuntary commitment
under WIS. STAT. § 51.20.

CONCLUSION

¶47 For the foregoing reasons, I affirm the order of the circuit court.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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