Wood County v. P. J. L.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 9, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2098-FT Cir. Ct. No. 2009GN71

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF P.J.L.:

WOOD COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

P. J. L.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Wood County:
TODD P. WOLF, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2024AP2098-FT

¶1 BLANCHARD, J.1 P.J.L. appeals an order for his protective
placement under WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1) following a jury trial. He argues that
Wood County failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following
“standards” for placement required by statute: that P.J.L. was incompetent at the
time of trial; that P.J.L. has “a primary need for residential care and custody”; and
that mental illness and other like incapacities rendered him so totally incapable of
providing for his own care that it created a substantial risk of serious harm to
himself or others. See WIS. STAT. §§ 55.075(3) (addressing petitions for
protective services or placement), 55.08(1) (stating required standards). I
conclude that, viewing the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to
the verdict, there was sufficient evidence for the County to carry its burden of
proving the necessity of continued protective placement and therefore supporting
entry of the challenged order.

¶2 P.J.L. asserts in the alternative that, even though the placement
continuation was supported by the jury’s findings, the circuit court failed to make
sufficient findings supporting the continuation of his placement before entering an
order. I reject this alternative position because it is not presented in a developed
argument. P.J.L. does not provide legally supported reasoning, applied to the
circuit court’s post-verdict actions, that could require reversal on that ground.

¶3 Accordingly, I affirm.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2021-22).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
Neither side in this appeal suggests that any of the case law cited in this opinion must be
construed in light of statutory changes that may have occurred since a cited opinion was issued,
and I am not independently aware of any such statutory changes. Therefore, I do not note the
prior versions of the statutes that were relied on in cited case law.

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

BACKGROUND

¶4 P.J.L. was placed under a guardianship in 2009 after he attempted
suicide, resulting in a brain injury.

¶5 He first became subject to a protective placement in 2021. This
placement continued following several annual reviews resulting in circuit court
extensions of the placement. See WIS. STAT. § 55.18 (outlining procedures for
annual review of protective placement, which may call for the circuit court to
“order the continuation of the protective placement”). The County petitioned for
the continuation of P.J.L.’s placement most recently in November 2023, leading to
the order that P.J.L. now challenges. Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 55.10(4)(c), P.J.L.
demanded a jury trial to address whether the County’s petition should be granted.

¶6 The County called three witnesses to testify at trial: Dr. Nicholas
Starr, who was appointed by the circuit court in these proceedings to evaluate
P.J.L.; Sarah Dortch, a County case worker assigned to work with P.J.L.; and
Ryan Schultz, another County employee, who facilitated and oversaw the
provision of services to P.J.L. during his placement. P.J.L. called his sister, C.L.,
who is also P.J.L.’s guardian.

¶7 The jury returned verdicts in favor of continuing protective
placement. The three specific jury findings supporting this result were that P.J.L.
was incompetent, that he suffered from a disability that was “permanent or likely
to be permanent,” and that he was in need of protective placement. Based on the
jury’s verdicts and corresponding findings by the circuit court that he continued to
meet the standards for protective placement, the court entered an order continuing
placement. P.J.L. appeals.

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

DISCUSSION

¶8 The parties agree that the following standards of review apply in this
appeal. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts is a
question of law this court reviews de novo. See Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011
WI 30, ¶17, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854; Sheboygan Cnty. DHHS v. Tanya
M.B., 2010 WI 55, ¶18, 325 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 369. When reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, this court
“views evidence most favorably to sustaining a verdict.” See Outagamie County
v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, ¶21, 359 Wis. 2d 272, 856 N.W.2d 603 (citing
Tammy W-G., 333 Wis. 2d 273, ¶17).

¶9 Pertinent here, the circuit court may “order protective placement for
an individual who meets all of” four “standards”:

“(a) The individual has a primary need for
residential care and custody.

(b) The individual is ... an adult who has been
determined to be incompetent by a circuit court.

(c) As a result of developmental disability,
degenerative brain disorder, serious and persistent mental
illness, or other like incapacities, the individual is so totally
incapable of providing for his or her own care or custody as
to create a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or
herself or others ....

(d) The individual has a disability that is permanent
or likely to be permanent.”

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

See Jackson Cnty. DHHS v. Susan H., 2010 WI App 82, ¶3, 326 Wis. 2d 246,
785 N.W.2d 677 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1)).2

¶10 As noted above, P.J.L.’s sufficiency argument challenges whether
the County met its burden of proof regarding the following: that P.J.L. was
incompetent at the time of trial, which he argues is required to meet WIS. STAT.
§ 55.08(1)(b); that he had “a primary need for residential care and custody” as
required under § 55.08(1)(a); and that mental illness and other like incapacities
rendered him so totally incapable of providing for his own care that it created a
substantial risk of serious harm to himself or others as required under
§ 55.08(1)(c).

I. Incompetency

¶11 As an initial matter, the parties dispute what the County was
required to prove at trial regarding P.J.L.’s competency. P.J.L. argues that the
County had to prove that he was, in the words of WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1)(b), “an
adult who has been determined to be incompetent by a circuit court” at the time of
trial. The County argues that it merely had to prove that P.J.L. was “an adult who
has been determined to be incompetent by a circuit court” at any time leading up

2
I note that there is overlap between the required standards for ordering protective
placement. For example, both WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1)(a) and (c) reference “care” and “custody.”
See Jackson Cnty. DHHS v. Susan H., 2010 WI App 82, ¶¶16-17, 326 Wis. 2d 246, 785 N.W.2d
677 (interpreting meaning of “care” and “custody” for purposes of both provisions). Also
overlapping with “care” and “custody” are statutory definitions of the conditions that meet the
standard in § 55.08(1)(c). See WIS. STAT. § 55.01(6v) (“‘Serious and persistent mental illness’
means a mental illness that … causes a substantially diminished level of functioning in the
primary aspects of daily living and an inability to cope with the ordinary demands of life ….”),
§ 55.01(5) (“‘Other like incapacities’ means those conditions … which substantially impairs an
individual from adequately providing for his or her care or custody.”). Accordingly, much of the
trial testimony was relevant to more than one of the required standards.

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

to or including the time of trial. I assume without deciding, in P.J.L.’s favor, that
the County was required to prove incompetence as of the time of trial.3

¶12 As an alternative argument on this issue, the County contends that
there was sufficient evidence at trial to support a finding that P.J.L. was
incompetent at the time of trial. After providing additional pertinent legal
standards, I explain why I agree with this alternative argument, and I address
P.J.L.’s arguments to the contrary.

¶13 Setting aside the County’s argument that it did not need to prove
incompetency at the time of trial, there is no dispute that the circuit court
accurately instructed the jury regarding what was required as that proof that P.J.L.
was incompetent at the time of trial. Specifically, the court instructed the jury that
the following, which I sometimes refer to as “the elements of incompetence,” had
to be established by clear and convincing evidence:

That [P.J.L.] is aged at least 17 years and 9 months and that
[P.J.L.] suffers from persistent and [serious] mental illness
or other like incapacity and that because of the impairment
[P.J.L.] is unable to effectively receive or evaluate
information or to make or communicate decisions to such
an extent that he cannot meet the essential requirements of
his physical health and safety.

3
As P.J.L. notes on appeal, the circuit court’s instructions to the jury required the jury to
find that P.J.L. was incompetent at the time of trial in order to enter a verdict in the County’s
favor. See WIS JI—CIVIL 7060. Moreover, at least one statute outside WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1)
strongly suggests, if it does not mandate, that incompetency be addressed with each annual
review. See WIS. STAT. § 55.075 (“If the individual is adjudicated incompetent in this state more
than 12 months before the filing of an application for protective placement … on his or her
behalf, the court shall review the finding of incompetency.”); see also Sheboygan County v.
Terry L. M., No. 2014AP2010, unpublished slip op. ¶¶8-9 (Apr. 1, 2015) (“squarely reject[ing]”
county’s argument that it did “not need to prove incompetency at a continuation review hearing”
under § 55.08(1) and WIS. STAT. § 55.18).

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

… [A]nd … [P.J.L.]’s need for assistance in
decision-making or communication cannot be effectively
[and ]less restrictively through appropriate and reasonable
available training, education, support services, healthcare,
assistive devices or other means that the individual will
accept.

See WIS JI—CIVIL 7060; see also WIS. STAT. § 54.10(3)(a) (listing required
findings for the appointment of a guardian of the person or of the estate, or both);
WIS. STAT. § 55.075(3) (requiring that petition for guardianship “be heard prior to
ordering protective placement” and that the circuit court review “the finding of
incompetency” if a previous finding had been made more than 12 months before
the application for protective services). There is also no dispute about the
accuracy of the court’s instructions to the jury regarding the statutory definitions
for the phrases “met with the essential requirements for health and safety,”
“serious persistent mental illness,” and “other like incapacity.” See WIS. STAT.
§ 54.01(19), (22), (30); WIS. STAT. § 55.01(5), (6v).

¶14 Regarding P.J.L.’s age, he does not dispute that he was older than 17
years and 9 months at all pertinent times.

¶15 Turning to the next element of incompetence, P.J.L. acknowledges
that Dr. Starr’s testimony identified conditions that the County argued constituted
a “serious and persistent mental illness” and “other like incapacity.” Specifically,
Dr. Starr testified that P.J.L. suffered from antisocial personality disorder, which
Dr. Starr considered in P.J.L.’s case to be a serious and persistent mental illness.
In addition, Dr. Starr testified that P.J.L.’s brain injury qualified as an “other like
incapacity,” and that P.J.L. further suffered from alcohol dependence to a degree
that itself created “an incapacity.” P.J.L. does not dispute that he in fact suffered
from both antisocial personality disorder and the brain injury, nor does he directly
challenge Dr. Starr’s testimony as a basis to establish that these conditions meet

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

the respective statutory definitions for a “serious and persistent mental illness” and
“other like incapacities.” See WIS. STAT. § 55.01(6v) (“‘Serious and persistent
mental illness’ includes schizophrenia as well as a wide spectrum of psychotic and
other severely disabling psychiatric diagnostic categories, but does not include
degenerative brain disorder or a primary diagnosis of a developmental disability or
of alcohol or drug dependence,” which are defined separately.). To the extent that
P.J.L. indirectly challenges this aspect of Dr. Starr’s testimony through other
arguments regarding incompetence or the other required standards of protective
placement, I address and reject those arguments below.

¶16 Regarding the trial evidence involving P.J.L.’s ability to receive and
evaluation information, he acknowledges that it was “certainly concerning,” but he
contends that it did not amount to clear and convincing evidence. I conclude that
Dr. Starr’s testimony presented clear and convincing evidence that: P.J.L.’s
incapacities prevented him from effectively receiving or evaluating information;
that these incapacities prevented P.J.L. from effectively communicating decisions;
and that the extent of P.J.L.’s evaluation and communication difficulties were such
that he could not meet what one guardianship provision refers to as “the essential
requirements for his or her physical health and safety.” See WIS. STAT.
§ 54.10(3)(a)2.

¶17 Explaining this conclusion further, Dr. Starr testified that P.J.L.’s
antisocial personality disorder and brain injury interfere with his ability to “receive
and evaluate information.” When asked to elaborate, Dr. Starr testified that these
conditions, in addition to P.J.L.’s alcohol dependence, “impair” his “perception,
[his] ability to relate to other people, [his] ability to control [his] behaviors, and
[his ]ability to control [his] emotions.” Dr. Starr further testified that P.J.L.’s
incapacities interfered with his ability to: “communicate decisions”; “protect

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

himself from abuse, exploitation, neglect[,] or rights violations”; and “meet[] his
essential requirements” for health and safety. Dr. Starr testified that the “[m]ost
recent and clear example” of P.J.L.’s incapacities having these effects was that he
“continued to use alcohol with his medications[,] which presented a significant
medical danger” resulting in “the psychiatrist [having] to discontinue his
medications.” Regarding this last, County employee Schultz testified that P.J.L.’s
psychiatrist expressed concern that “it could be lethal” for P.J.L. to take his
medications in combination with alcohol. Schultz testified that when this was
explained to P.J.L., his response was, “I guess we’ll just see.”

¶18 The jury was free to credit Dr. Starr’s explanation that P.J.L.’s
incapacities impaired his ability to relate with others. From this, the jury could
reasonably infer that this prevented P.J.L.’s effective receipt and evaluation of
information from others and that it also interfered with his ability to communicate
his decisions to others. Further, the example of P.J.L. using alcohol while on his
medications—and his expression on at least one occasion of a seemingly
indifferent attitude about the potential lethality of his conduct—connected P.J.L.’s
ability to receive and evaluate information to his ability to “perform those actions
necessary to provide … health care” for himself. See WIS. STAT.
§§ 54.01(19), 54.10(3)(a)2.

¶19 Turning to the next element of incompetence, P.J.L. argues that there
was not clear and convincing evidence that P.J.L.’s “need for assistance in
decision-making or communication cannot be met effectively and less
restrictively” through services not involving a guardianship and protective
placement. See WIS. STAT. § 54.10(3)(a)4. I reject this argument because the jury
could reasonably credit Dr. Starr’s related testimony. Dr. Starr opined that less
restrictive measures would not be successful in assisting P.J.L., based on P.J.L.’s

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

history of receiving “services and placements over the years” that did not result in
eliminating the need for a guardian. Dr. Starr also based this opinion on P.J.L.
being “uncooperative” and having “a history of noncompliance.”

¶20 It is true that Dr. Starr’s specific testimony on this topic was not
detailed. But viewed in light of the testimony of other witnesses, it sufficiently
supports the jury’s verdict on incompetence. For example, County employee
Dortch testified that, while P.J.L. had recently been making some “better decisions
as far as life choices” given the placement support, P.J.L. still needed prompting to
perform certain tasks and had been “caught with alcohol within the last couple of
months.” Schultz gave similar testimony. Dortch supported continued placement
to see if P.J.L. could “go for longer periods of time without any incident reports
showing that he has more self-control as far as alcohol use or other behaviors.”
This raised the reasonable inference that whatever improvements P.J.L. had made
in his ability to take care of himself were not likely to continue without the added
oversight and support provided by protective placement compared with less
restrictive measures.

¶21 P.J.L. emphasizes particular evidence introduced at trial that he
asserts shows that his alcohol consumption was decreasing by the time of trial.
Specifically, he notes that the guardian testified that P.J.L. understood that he had
a problem with alcohol and had been undergoing treatment for alcohol dependence
for about four months as of the time of trial. And, more generally, P.J.L.
highlights the guardian’s testimony that P.J.L. had shown improvement in certain
areas of day-to-day care for himself, and that on that basis the guardian no longer
believed that a guardianship and protective placement were necessary. However,
the jury was free to weigh the guardian’s testimony as less significant than
testimony from others which tended to show that P.J.L.’s alcohol consumption

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

was still a serious problem even as he showed improvement in other areas. See
Geise v. American Transmission Co. LLC ex rel. ATC Mgmt. Inc., 2014 WI App
72, ¶13, 355 Wis. 2d 454, 853 N.W.2d 564 (“The jury, as the trier of fact,
‘determines the credibility of the witnesses, resolves conflicts in the testimony,
weighs the evidence and draws reasonable inferences from the evidence.’” (quoted
source omitted)). For example, Schultz testified that the most recent episode of
P.J.L. consuming alcohol was in April 2024, approximately one month before
trial.

II. Primary Need for Residential Care and Custody

¶22 In addition to proving incompetence, as noted above, the County had
the burden to prove additional required standards set forth in WIS. STAT.
§ 55.08(1), which included that P.J.L. had a “primary need for residential care and
custody.” See § 55.08(1)(a). More specifically, the County had to prove that
P.J.L. had “primary” needs to: (1) have his daily needs provided for in a
residential setting; and (2) to have someone else exercising control and
supervision in that residential setting for the purpose of protecting the person from
abuse, financial exploitation, neglect, and self-neglect. See Susan H., 326 Wis. 2d
246, ¶16 (interpreting § 55.08(1)(a), in part in light of WIS. STAT. § 55.001).

¶23 I conclude that the following evidence was sufficient to sustain the
jury’s verdicts with respect to this required protective placement standard.
Dr. Starr testified that P.J.L. had a primary need for residential care and custody.
Dr. Starr took the position that residential care and custody were “essential” in
order for “any other interventions” to be “successful” in protecting P.J.L. Further,
as noted, Dortch’s testimony was to the effect that the oversight provided by
protective placement was important to prevent P.J.L. from making harmful

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

choices such as consuming alcohol with his medications. Dortch also testified that
the “added support” of protective placement was a factor in P.J.L.’s improved
decision making, but that even with this added support, P.J.L. still needed
prompting and reminders for hygiene and other “daily tasks.” Dortch also testified
that continued oversight was necessary to detect whether P.J.L. again attempts
suicide, and to call in emergency medical assistance if that occurs. Schultz
acknowledged that P.J.L. had shown improvement in his medication and hygiene
management, but that he still needed “continued follow-through on his daily
chores” and continued to need improvement in avoiding alcohol consumption and
controlling risky impulses.

¶24 P.J.L. now emphasizes testimony establishing that under his current
protective placement he is allowed to exercise a certain amount of independence
for much of his day. In particular, he is allowed to leave his group home and walk
to local stores, and to generally spend his money and time as he pleases, without
direct oversight until he returns to the home in the evening. These facts could
have permitted the jury to draw inferences favorable to him. At the same time,
however, this level of permitted independence during the day presumably made it
possible for P.J.L. to continue to acquire and consume alcohol, placing him at risk
of death. And, as explained above, evidence regarding that consumption is by
itself a significant basis to sustain the jury’s verdicts.

¶25 As with his arguments regarding incompetence, P.J.L. emphasizes
only the evidence regarding areas of his day-to-day self-care in which he has
shown improvement and independence. For example, there was testimony that he
schedules, arranges, and attends his medical appointments, which are positive
points in his favor. But the jury was not required to weigh testimony on these
topics more heavily than the testimony summarized above supporting the finding

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

that P.J.L. continues to need the “added support” and oversight of a protective
placement.

III. Substantial Risk of Serious Harm

¶26 The final required protective placement standard that P.J.L.
challenges in his sufficiency argument is whether there was sufficient evidence
that P.J.L. was “so totally incapable of providing for his or her own care or
custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or herself or
others.” See WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1)(c). “Serious harm may be evidenced by overt
acts or acts of omission.” Sec. 55.08(1)(c). Pertinent here, the County had the
burden of proving that the risk of substantial harm was the result of P.J.L.’s
“serious and persistent mental illness” (antisocial personality disorder) or his
“other like incapacities” (the brain injury and alcoholism). See § 55.08(1)(c).

¶27 The term “care” as used in WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1)(c), “means that the
person’s incapacity to provide for his or her daily needs creates a substantial risk
of serious harm to the person or others.” Susan H., 326 Wis. 2d 246, ¶17.
“Custody” in § 55.08(1)(c) means “protection from abuse, financial exploitation,
neglect, and self-neglect that the control and supervision by others can provide.”
Id.

¶28 This court has explained the following regarding this required
placement standard:

The risk of harm must be substantial. Mere speculation as
to difficulties [that an individual] may encounter is not
sufficient. Specific harm must be foreseeable to fulfill this
[standard]. Furthermore, the foreseeable harm must be
serious .... [M]inor accidents, injuries and illness are not
sufficient to satisfy this [standard].

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

Zander v. County of Eau Claire, 87 Wis. 2d 503, 514-15, 275 N.W.2d 143 (Ct.
App. 1979).

¶29 As summarized above, the jury was presented with testimony
regarding the effects that P.J.L.’s incapacities had on his ability to receive and
evaluate information, and how this in turn related to his issues with the dangerous
consumption of alcohol in combination with his medications. This included
testimony that: the consumption of alcohol while being on these medications
“could be lethal”; P.J.L. had made several suicide attempts; and P.J.L. at one time
responded to the risk of consuming alcohol while on his medications by saying,
“we’ll … see.” These portions of the trial evidence gave the jury a clear and
convincing basis to find that P.J.L. was incapable of providing for his own care
and custody, i.e., making safe choices regarding the use of his medications, in a
way that created a substantial, potentially lethal, risk to his wellbeing.

¶30 P.J.L. argues that the County was required, but failed, to prove that
his alcohol use was caused by his antisocial personality disorder or by his brain
injury. One problem with this argument is that there was a significant amount of
evidence from which the jury could find that P.J.L.’s alcohol consumption was
itself an “other like incapacity” that created a substantial risk under WIS. STAT.
§ 55.08(1)(c). See WIS. STAT. § 55.01(5). Further, I reject P.J.L.’s argument for
the additional reason that, as explained above, there was evidence at trial
connecting P.J.L.’s antisocial personality disorder and brain injury to the risks
posed by his alcohol consumption. That is, there was evidence regarding the
impairment of P.J.L.’s receipt and evaluation of information, and his decision-
making related to alcohol consumption.

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

¶31 P.J.L. notes that some of the factors relied upon by the witnesses
called by the County consisted of actions taken by P.J.L. at unspecified times or
from incidents occurring as far back as 2009. For example, P.J.L. notes that
Dr. Starr’s report stated that P.J.L. had had multiple “psychiatric hospitalizations”
and stays in jails or prisons, but without providing specifics such as the timing of
those events. In another example, P.J.L. asserts that one of his “significant suicide
attempts” noted in the report occurred in 2009. To the extent that P.J.L. means to
argue that such incidents could not significantly support the jury’s verdicts, the
argument fails for two reasons. First, even if only recent, riskier behaviors could
matter, the jury could reasonably view his issues with alcohol consumption as
having been as recent as a few months before trial. Second, P.J.L. does not
present a legally supported argument establishing that the jury could not view
evidence regarding his suicide attempts or other less recent incidents as providing
some support for the County’s case that protective placement continued to be
appropriate. So far as P.J.L. shows on appeal, his challenges to reliance on such
evidence amount to concerns about their weight, which was for the jury to assess.

¶32 P.J.L. appears to again rely on the permission he was granted to go
into town unsupervised as a basis to challenge whether the WIS. STAT.
§ 55.08(1)(c) was met. That is, P.J.L. suggests that it undermined the County’s
position that he was dangerous to himself that he was allowed to leave his
placement facility daily without supervision. I reject these arguments for the
reasons noted above. The jury was free to infer that P.J.L.’s use of this level of
independence in ways that could harm him necessitated the level of oversight that
his placement provided.

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

IV. Circuit Court’s Post-Verdict Actions

¶33 P.J.L. briefly asserts that the circuit court did not satisfy WIS. STAT.
§ 55.18(3)(e)1. in ordering the continuation of P.J.L.’s protective placement
following the jury’s verdicts in the County’s favor. But P.J.L. does not address the
specific terms of § 55.18(3)(e) or cite any related case law. Rather, he only
passingly refers to the court’s post-verdict actions, and he otherwise fails to
develop an argument that reversal is necessary on this ground.

¶34 WISCONSIN STAT. § 55.18 governs the “[a]nnual review of
protective placement,” outlining the procedures for annual extensions of
placements under WIS. STAT. ch. 55. Under § 55.18(3)(e), following a hearing
(which at the person’s demand may be tried to a jury, as here) on whether
continued placement is appropriate, the circuit court “shall” take one of several
specified actions. See also § 55.18(3)(d); WIS. STAT. § 55.10(4)(c). Pertinent
here, if the court “finds that the individual continues to meet the standards under
[WIS. STAT. §] 55.08(1) and the protective placement of the individual is in the
least restrictive environment …, the court shall order the continuation of the
protective placement in the facility in which the individual resides at the time of
the hearing.” Sec. 55.18(3)(e)1. Further, subpart (3)(e)1. requires the court to
“include in the order the information relied upon as a basis for the order and shall
make findings based on the standards under [§] 55.08(1) in support of the need for
continuation of the protective placement.”

¶35 Here, after the jury rendered its verdicts, the County moved the
circuit court “to accept the jury’s verdicts” and to issue an order continuing the
protective placement. The court responded that “there was evidence introduced,
namely by Dr. Starr especially here, that the jury would be able to answer any

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

question yes as to [whether] the [in]competency is permanent or likely to be
permanent and that he was in need of then protective placement as well.” The
court further stated that it was “adopt[ing]” the jury’s findings that P.J.L.

continues to meet the standard for protective placement
because [he] has a primary need for residential care and
custody as a result of the serious and persistent mental
illness and the other like incapacities that [he] is so totally
incapable of providing for [his] own care and custody as to
create a substantial risk of serious harms to himself or
others; that serious harm was evidenced here by overt acts
then related to that; that [he] has a disability that’s
permanent or likely to be permanent; that the current
placement in a protective placement is the least restrictive
environment consistent with [his] needs ….

The written order issued by the court is not detailed. But it indicates that the court
held “a full due process hearing,” and contains checked boxes reflecting findings
consistent with the court’s comments following trial.

¶36 Assuming without deciding that WIS. STAT. § 55.18(3)(e)1. applies
when a placement continuation petition is tried to a jury, I reject as undeveloped
P.J.L.’s assertion that the circuit court did not do enough to satisfy § 55.18(3)(e)1.
See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). Given
the unambiguous findings of the jury and the evidence provided at trial as
discussed above, P.J.L. fails to provide a legally supported argument explaining
why I should conclude that reversal is appropriate because the court’s post-verdict
actions did not satisfy the terms of § 55.18(3)(e)1.

CONCLUSION

¶37 For all these reasons, I affirm the order of the circuit court.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

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No. 2024AP2098-FT

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

18