State v. Steven Wayne Shaw

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 26, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP284-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF152

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

STEVEN WAYNE SHAW,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Washington County: TODD K. MARTENS and MICHAEL S. KENITZ, Judges.
Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Grogan, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP284-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Steven Wayne Shaw appeals a judgment of
conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to deliver and an order
denying his postconviction motion seeking plea withdrawal. He argues the circuit
court erred by concluding that Shaw’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary despite a defective plea colloquy that failed to inform Shaw that the
court was not bound by the parties’ joint sentencing recommendation. Shaw also
alleges defects at his sentencing hearing, specifically that the prosecutor breached
the joint sentencing recommendation and that the court was biased and improperly
sentenced him based upon his race. We reject Shaw’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Following an extensive investigation into a drug distribution
network, Shaw was charged in a multi-count complaint with, among other things,
conspiracy to possess more than forty grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver.
He reached a plea agreement with the State, under which he would plead guilty to
that count, the remaining counts would be dismissed and read in, the charges in
another case would be dismissed and read in, and another uncharged offense
would be read in at sentencing. The parties agreed to jointly recommend a
concurrent sentence of eight and one-half years’ initial confinement and were free
to argue the length of extended supervision.

¶3 Shaw reviewed and signed a Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights
form with his attorney. The circuit court conducted a plea colloquy with Shaw,
after which it accepted his guilty plea.1 Though Shaw was informed of the

1
The Honorable Todd K. Martens presided over the plea and sentencing hearings.

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No. 2023AP284-CR

maximum penalties for the offense to which he was pleading, he was not informed
during the colloquy that the court was not bound by the plea agreement or joint
recommendation at sentencing.

¶4 At sentencing, after hearing argument from the State and defense,
the circuit court ultimately imposed a sentence consisting of eleven years each of
initial confinement and extended supervision. The court commented upon Shaw’s
voluminous criminal history, his “garbage” claims that he was an unwitting
accomplice to the drug distribution organization rather than its ringleader, his poor
character, the harm to the community by his actions, and the need to protect the
public and send a deterrent message.

¶5 Shaw sought postconviction plea withdrawal or, in the alternative,
resentencing. As relevant here, Shaw argued that he was entitled to plea
withdrawal because at the time of his plea he was not told, and did not know, that
the circuit court was not bound by the joint sentencing recommendation.
Alternatively, Shaw argued he was entitled to resentencing because the prosecutor
had implicitly breached the plea agreement by highlighting negative information
about Shaw. Shaw also asserted he was entitled to resentencing because the court
displayed racial and personal bias toward Shaw.

¶6 The circuit court conducted a Machner hearing,2 after which it
denied Shaw’s motion.3 Acknowledging that the plea colloquy was defective
insofar as the court failed to advise Shaw that it was not bound by the plea

2
See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).
3
The Honorable Michael S. Kenitz entered the order denying Shaw’s postconviction
motion.

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No. 2023AP284-CR

agreement, the court nonetheless found that Shaw “expected Judge Martens to
follow the joint recommendation but that he knew it was not guaranteed.”
Accordingly, the court concluded the State had met its burden of demonstrating
that Shaw’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite the defect in the
plea colloquy.

¶7 Next, because there had been no contemporaneous objection to the
prosecutor’s comments at sentencing, the circuit court approached the alleged
breach of the plea agreement through the lens of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court concluded that Shaw’s defense counsel had not performed deficiently
because the prosecutor’s argument did not constitute a material and substantial
breach of the plea agreement regarding the joint initial confinement
recommendation.

¶8 The circuit court also concluded Shaw was not entitled to
resentencing based on the court’s sentencing statements. The court regarded all of
the judge’s comments as relating to valid sentencing factors. Though the judge’s
comments were “harsh,” the sentencing transcript, considered in its totality, did
not demonstrate that the judge harbored inappropriate bias of either a racial or
personal nature toward Shaw. Shaw appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Shaw’s appeal raises a plethora of issues, including his request for
plea withdrawal based on a defect in the plea colloquy, alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel stemming from Shaw’s attorney’s failure to object to the
prosecutor’s sentencing comments, and alleged structural error relating to racial
and personal bias on the part of the sentencing judge. We address the issues in
that order and agree with the circuit court that none of them warrant relief.

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No. 2023AP284-CR

I. The circuit court properly concluded that the State met its burden of
demonstrating that Shaw’s plea was valid despite the defective plea
colloquy.

¶10 When a defendant seeks post-sentencing plea withdrawal, he or she
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that plea withdrawal is necessary
to avoid a manifest injustice. State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 594,
716 N.W.2d 906. A guilty plea entered on anything less than a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary basis constitutes a manifest injustice and violates due
process. Id., ¶¶18-19.

¶11 Here, there is no dispute that Shaw’s plea colloquy was defective,
causing genuine concern about the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of
his plea. Contrary to well-settled law, the circuit court did not advise Shaw that it
was not bound by the term of the plea agreement, including the parties’ joint
sentencing recommendation. See id., ¶35.

¶12 As a result, the burden shifted to the State during postconviction
proceedings to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Shaw’s plea
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite the defective plea colloquy. Id.,
¶40. The circuit court found that Shaw knew at the time he entered his plea that
the court was not bound by the joint sentencing recommendation of eight and one-
half years’ initial confinement. Shaw challenges that factual finding as clearly
erroneous.

¶13 Overturning a finding of fact is a high hurdle for an appellant. A
factual finding is not clearly erroneous merely because another factfinder could
have reached a different conclusion or drawn different inferences from the record.
Bray v. Gateway Ins. Co., 2010 WI App 22, ¶24, 323 Wis. 2d 421, 779 N.W.2d
695 (2009). Rather, to overturn a finding of fact, the appellant must demonstrate

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No. 2023AP284-CR

that the evidence in support of the contrary finding constitutes the great weight
and clear preponderance of the evidence. Noll v. Dimiceli’s, Inc., 115 Wis. 2d
641, 643-44, 340 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1983).

¶14 Shaw fails to satisfy that standard here. In his reply brief, he “agrees
that [his defense attorney] read [to him] that portion of the [Plea] Questionnaire
advising that ‘the judge is not bound by any plea agreement or
recommendation.’”4 Shaw’s concession on this point of fact is consistent with his
defense counsel’s testimony and is supportive of the circuit court’s finding that
Shaw knew the court was not bound by the joint recommendation.

¶15 Though the fact that Shaw’s defense counsel explicitly told him the
circuit court was not bound by the joint recommendation is the strongest evidence
of such knowledge, other portions of the appellate record also support the court’s
finding. During the plea colloquy, Shaw was told that if he entered a guilty plea to
the charge he faced up to the maximum penalty of forty years’ incarceration.
Shaw acknowledged the maximum penalty and did not ask for clarification about
why the court could order a forty-year sentence if the joint recommendation was
for eight and one-half years’ initial confinement.

¶16 Also, by Shaw’s own account, he and his defense attorney had
several discussions about whether the sentencing judge was “going to go along
with it” (i.e., the joint recommendation). Indeed, Shaw’s defense attorney testified

4
Curiously, later on the same page, Shaw states that “there is nothing in the record to
support a finding that [his defense counsel] ever told Shaw, anytime, that Judge Martens was not
bound by the terms of the joint IC recommendation.” This assertion appears to be wholly
inconsistent with Shaw’s concession that his attorney read him the plea questionnaire’s “not
bound” language. Regardless, as we explain, the circuit court’s factual finding about Shaw’s
knowledge is not clearly erroneous.

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No. 2023AP284-CR

their sentencing strategy was to get the circuit court “to go along with the joint
recommendation.” As the court recognized with denying Shaw’s motion, there
would have been no need for conversations about the likelihood of the court
complying with or deviating from the joint recommendation if Shaw believed the
court could impose no other sentence.

¶17 This is not to say there was no contrary evidence. The circuit court
acknowledged the testimony of Shaw’s defense attorney that it was reasonable for
Shaw to have believed, upon entering his plea, that he would be getting eight and
one-half years’ initial confinement. However, the court found this belief was more
along the lines of an expectation that the court would sentence him in accordance
with the joint recommendation, rather than a belief that the court was required to
sentence him accordingly. The court’s finding that Shaw knew the sentencing
court was not bound by the joint recommendation despite the plea colloquy defect
is not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.

II. The prosecutor’s sentencing argument was an explicit rebuttal to
Shaw’s attempts to minimize his culpability to the presentence
investigation report author and did not constitute a material and
substantial breach of the plea agreement’s joint sentencing
recommendation.

¶18 Next, Shaw argues the prosecutor at his sentencing breached the
joint recommendation “by uttering a multitude of statements, some racially tinged
and some merely irrelevant, that were far more than hints that the State was
advocating a longer initial confinement than agreed to.” Because Shaw’s defense
attorney did not object to the State’s comments at the sentencing hearing, Shaw
can raise this issue only through the lens of ineffective assistance of counsel. See
State v. Duckett, 2010 WI App 44, ¶6, 324 Wis. 2d 244, 781 N.W.2d 522.

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No. 2023AP284-CR

¶19 Duckett provides that analytical framework we follow here. First,
we must determine whether the State breached the plea agreement, which is a
question of law that we review de novo. See id. If there was a material and
substantial breach of the plea agreement, we then consider whether Shaw’s
attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object. See id.

¶20 We start with the alleged breach. “[N]ot all conduct that deviates
from the precise terms of a plea agreement constitutes a breach entitling the
defendant to relief.” State v. Campbell, 2011 WI App 18, ¶7, 331 Wis. 2d 91, 794
N.W.2d 276 (2010). The defendant must demonstrate a “material and substantial”
breach. Id. A material and substantial breach is one that violates the terms of the
plea agreement and deprives the defendant of a material and substantial benefit for
which he or she bargained. Id.

¶21 As an initial matter, we note that the prosecutor did make the agreed-
upon sentencing recommendation—twice. Both at the beginning of the hearing
and at the inception of her sentencing remarks, the prosecutor recited that the joint
recommendation was for eight and one-half years of initial confinement.

¶22 Shaw does not highlight specific problematic statements by the
prosecutor. Though the argument section of Shaw’s brief-in-chief is non-specific,5

5
Shaw does attempt to make a more refined argument in his reply brief, but his attempt
to cherry-pick comments he regards as irrelevant is unpersuasive. Shaw relies on his defense
attorney’s testimony at the Machner hearing that certain of the prosecutor’s comments did not
appear to support the joint recommendation. But here we consider a slightly different question,
whether the comments constituted a material and substantial breach of the plea agreement. That
is a question of law on which we need not defer to the testimony of a witness. More importantly,
we take a wholistic view of the sentencing argument when resolving that issue. See State v.
Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶46, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733 (“We must examine the entire
sentencing proceeding to evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks.”).

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No. 2023AP284-CR

more than a page of the facts section is devoted to the prosecutor’s sentencing
comments. Many of the prosecutor’s comments referenced there were proper
sentencing remarks and do not even arguably fit Shaw’s “inappropriate” and
“racially tinged” characterizations. As just one example, Shaw highlights the
prosecutor’s argument that Shaw “essentially made Main Street cocaine central in
West Bend.” That was, in fact, exactly what Shaw was accused of doing—using
his clothing store on Main Street in West Bend as a distribution hub for cocaine.
Shaw stipulated to the facts set forth in the criminal complaint as a factual basis
for his plea.

¶23 Rather, Shaw argues that the totality of the prosecutor’s comments
suggested that Shaw should receive much more than the jointly recommended
eight and one-half years’ initial confinement. He appears particularly aggrieved
by the prosecutor’s reference to the sentence recommended by the presentence
investigation report (PSI), which the prosecutor mentioned immediately before she
articulated the State’s recommendation of eight and one-half years’ initial
confinement and twelve years’ extended supervision. The PSI author
recommended nine to ten years of initial confinement and seven to eight years of
extended supervision.

¶24 We agree that the singular reference to the PSI author’s
recommendation appears gratuitous, but it does not follow that the prosecutor’s
remarks, considered in their totality, deprived Shaw of the benefit of the plea
agreement. The prosecutor had good reason for referring to the PSI, in particular
highlighting Shaw’s statements to the PSI author. Shaw had portrayed himself to
the PSI author (and, later, in his allocution) as a somewhat reluctant middleman,
with his co-defendants using his “connections” in Milwaukee to distribute drugs.

9
No. 2023AP284-CR

He argued that his involvement was animated by his “extreme use of crack
cocaine” and his desire to afford rent at his clothing store.

¶25 The prosecutor pushed back against that narrative. She noted the
extensive evidence that Shaw was at the top of the distribution chain, including
monitored jail calls that law enforcement understood as coded messages about
where to store and deliver drugs. According to a transaction ledger obtained from
a co-defendant, Shaw had profited over $28,000 from drug sales in just one month.
The prosecutor argued it was reasonable to believe Shaw was making more than
$300,000 per year dealing, with “[n]o taxes, no arrears, all for the Defendant.”

¶26 The prosecutor’s reference to “arrears” is particularly notable, both
in this context and in the context of Shaw’s challenge to the circuit court’s
exercise of sentencing discretion. The prosecutor argued that Shaw had failed to
take responsibility throughout his life, including in supporting his “five children
with five different women.” The prosecutor highlighted that Shaw owed more
than $200,000 in past child support, which he refused to pay even with an
estimated annual income of $300,000.

¶27 The prosecutor also spent considerable time describing Shaw’s
offense history (more than two dozen convictions) and the details of the
investigation that led to Shaw’s present conviction in an explicit effort to rebut
Shaw’s claimed motivations for his crime. Toward the end of her comments, the
prosecutor summarized:

While the Defendant attempts to control and manipulate the
narrative of the PSI as just a poor drug addict, who never
received treatment, it is clear this Defendant does have a
problem with drugs; the Defendant is a drug dealer. And
the problem for this Defendant is he got caught. The
narrative in the PSI is nothing more than an attempt to

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No. 2023AP284-CR

provoke sympathy with the Court as to the true motivations
for his criminal enterprise.

She concluded with a reference to the 1991 film “New Jack City,” arguing that
Shaw viewed the “glorified drug dealing” depicted in that movie as a “career path”
and that it was his employment for the last “30 plus years.”

¶28 We agree with the circuit court that the prosecutor’s comments did
not rise to the level of a material and substantial breach. The State did not attempt
to make an “end run” around the plea agreement by giving the impression that
more confinement time was warranted than the joint recommendation. See State
v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶42, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733. Rather, “[t]he
State was permitted to support its prison recommendation with facts from the PSI
report, the file, and other sources describing the details of the crime, aggravating
factors, and [the defendant’s] criminal record.” Duckett, 324 Wis. 2d 244, ¶14. In
the face of Shaw’s attempts to minimize his culpability, the State no doubt viewed
reference to those materials as necessary to justify the lengthy eight-and-one-half-
year joint recommendation as to initial confinement.

¶29 This situation is the inverse of that in the Williams case. There, our
supreme court determined the State stepped over the line when it distanced itself
from the agreed-to probation recommendation after learning additional negative
information about the defendant from the PSI and other sources. Williams, 249
Wis. 2d 492, ¶50. But here, the State was confronted by Shaw’s minimization of
his culpability to the PSI author. The State needed to justify a joint
recommendation for a significant amount of initial confinement and its assertion
that a lengthy period of extended supervision was appropriate.

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No. 2023AP284-CR

¶30 To the well-settled principles in Williams and Duckett, we add here
that when a defendant minimizes involvement in a crime of conviction to the PSI
author or otherwise posits matters at odds with the relevant facts, the State has
more latitude to support a jointly recommended prison sentence by highlighting
information that may not be favorable to the defendant. The prosecutor could
reasonably counter Shaw’s characterization of his crime to the PSI author, not as a
disservice to, but in support of, the joint sentencing recommendation.

III. The sentencing court’s comments do not indicate that Shaw was denied
a fair and impartial sentencing proceeding.

¶31 Shifting to the circuit court’s sentencing remarks, Shaw argues he
was denied due process and is entitled to resentencing. His resentencing argument
appears to have two components: that he was sentenced based on an improper
factor—his race6—and that he was denied a hearing before a fair and impartial
tribunal. Neither argument carries the day.

¶32 Before turning to the legal standards governing these arguments, we
briefly take stock of the circuit court’s sentencing remarks. The court began by
noting that Shaw was facing a possible sentence of twenty-five years’ initial
confinement and fifteen years’ extended supervision, and had received the benefit
of a plea bargain that dismissed “100 years of additional charges.” The court then
directly challenged Shaw’s narrative during his allocation:

You are convicted, because you ran a cocaine trafficking
ring both before and during your jail stay in the
Washington County Jail. You are a career criminal. You
are a drug dealer. You say there’s a misunderstanding. No,
there’s no misunderstanding here, you’re just a drug dealer,

6
Shaw is Black.

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No. 2023AP284-CR

and have been for a long time. You ran a substantial drug
… ring in our community. You brought large quantities of
poison. You brought large quantities of drugs which
corrode our community. And I just think it’s disgusting
when you present yourself like you’re a pillar of the
community. You are delusional. You say that the West
Bend community opened up to you and welcomed you.
And how did you repay them? By bringing poison, by
bringing drugs, starting a drug ring on Main Street in
downtown of West Bend. Well, let’s make you man of the
year. Maybe we can get a parade going for you around
Memorial Day. You are delusional. You are a parasite…
You are a drain on … society. Because of you, people are
dying, they are losing their kids, they themselves are going
to prison. You say you’re hard on yourself. You’re way
too easy on yourself. And you’re not just a drug dealer,
you’re a career criminal. Your whole adult life, you have
been nothing but a criminal. And not just a drug dealer.
You’re a violent criminal. You engage in a pattern of
intimidation. You’re a thug. This is thuggish behavior.
There’s no other way to put it. So don’t for a minute think
I am buying any of your garbage about being a pillar of this
community. And you hear garbage about, “I am going to
change when I get out.” You’re not going to change.
You’re 53 years old. You’ve committed enough crimes to
satisfy ten lifetimes. I strain to find anything positive to
say about you. I mean, you present as an intelligent person.
You sure are talkative. You had a lot to say, but I think you
primarily present as a delusional person. You talk about
yourself in a way that suggests that you think you are just
the victim here. And if you think for one second that I buy
this garbage that you’re slinging about oh, your minions,
your lackeys, your runners are really taking advantage of
you. That’s a bunch of garbage. You were running this
thing.

The foregoing provides the tenor of the court’s comments, which also touched
upon Shaw’s character, his lengthy criminal history, his “morality” in fathering
multiple children with multiple women outside of his long-term relationship, his
failure to support those children, and his past failures to adapt his conduct to the
requirements of the law.

¶33 Shaw first argues the circuit court improperly sentenced him based
on his race. Every defendant has a constitutional due process right not be

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No. 2023AP284-CR

sentenced on the basis of their race. State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶33, 326
Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409. A defendant bears the burden of showing that it is
highly probable or reasonably certain that the court actually relied on race when
imposing its sentence. Id., ¶35.

¶34 Shaw has not made that showing here. The State correctly observes
that, except as described below, the circuit court’s sentencing comments were
inarguably racially neutral and focused on relevant sentencing considerations.
And Shaw does not clearly articulate which of the court’s comments demonstrate
reliance on an improper racial factor, instead wholistically describing the
sentencing remarks as “infused with improper language, demeaning character
references, and racially tinged references.”

¶35 Scathing language and character assessments, of course, do not
themselves constitute, or even necessarily imply, a racial component to a sentence.
On that point, Shaw’s brief is rife with suggestions of comments the circuit court
never actually made. For example, the prosecutor used the words “flash and
show,” not the court. Elsewhere, Shaw suggests the court focused on the “biracial
babies [Shaw] doesn’t support,” but nowhere in the sentencing remarks is there
any reference to the race of Shaw or his children. Given Shaw’s failure to focus in
on any allegedly offending remarks and his embellishment of the transcript, we
deem his argument undeveloped. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492
N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that we need not address arguments that
consist only of undeveloped themes and general statements).

¶36 Nonetheless, the State concedes that the circuit court’s use of the
words “thug” and “thuggish” merit closer scrutiny. The State “acknowledges that
the word[s have] associations with Black hip-hop music and gang culture and can

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No. 2023AP284-CR

fairly be said to carry racial connotations in some contexts.” Harris provides a
roadmap for addressing allegations regarding the use of racial stereotypes at
sentencing.

¶37 Harris evaluated the context of the specific comments to assess
whether they were part of a discussion of proper factors and the explanation for
the sentencing decision. See Harris, 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶¶50, 53. We agree with
the State that here, the circuit court’s use of “thug” and similar verbiage did not
carry a racial connotation. The State asserts—and Shaw does not rebut—that the
word quite literally refers to a person who uses violence as a means to obtain a
desired result. That was precisely the context for the court’s use of that word,
which was preceded by references to Shaw as a “violent criminal” who “engag[ed]
in a pattern of intimidation.”7

¶38 Next, Harris argues that “[m]any of the [circuit court’s comments]
that demonstrate bias were racially neutral but still were so extreme as to ‘display
clear inability to render fair judgment’” under Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
540 (1994). Under Liteky, judicial bias encompasses a “disposition or opinion that
is somehow wrongful or inappropriate.” Id. at 550. For purposes of the recusal
statute at issue there, the opinion recognized that when a judge’s knowledge and
opinion are obtained in the course of the proceeding, the judge is not necessarily
recusable for bias or prejudice merely because the judge is “exceedingly ill

7
The circuit court used the phrase “thuggish behavior” a second time in a similar
fashion: “You have engaged in a nonstop lifetime of criminal behavior, both violent, drug-
related, and has [sic] a pattern of intimidation that is very disturbing. This kind of thuggish
behavior, you’re getting punished for all of this.”

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No. 2023AP284-CR

disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly
reprehensible person.” Id. at 550-51.

¶39 Wisconsin law takes a similar view. We indulge a rebuttable
presumption that a judge has acted fairly, impartially, and without bias. State v.
Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, ¶8, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385. A litigant
may rebut that presumption by demonstrating that the judge was actually or
objectively biased. Id.

¶40 Shaw appears to argue the sentencing judge was objectively biased.
Objective bias constitutes a due process violation “whenever a reasonable
person—taking into consideration human psychological tendencies and
weaknesses—concludes that the average judge could not be trusted to hold the
balance nice, clear and true under all the circumstances.” Id., ¶9 (quotation
omitted). Whether a party has demonstrated objective bias is a question of law.
Id., ¶7.

¶41 Nowhere in his briefing does Shaw articulate or attempt to apply the
standard for objective bias. Essentially, he invites this court to review the
sentencing transcript ourselves, as if doing so will manifestly demonstrate
“obviously biased and prejudiced language.” Our review shows something
different: a judge that was deeply troubled by Shaw’s minimization of his
extensive criminal behavior. The circuit court did not demonstrate obvious
objective bias by pointing out—in admittedly harsh language, at times—that
Shaw’s explanations and statements flew in the face of the evidence and failed to
take into account Shaw’s lengthy criminal history.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

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No. 2023AP284-CR

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

17