Town of Vinland v. Loren's Auto Recycling, LLC

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 4, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP343 Cir. Ct. No. 2023CV96

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

TOWN OF VINLAND,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

LOREN’S AUTO RECYCLING, LLC AND LORENZ RANGELOFF,

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Winnebago County:
TERESA S. BASILIERE, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Grogan, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP343

¶1 PER CURIAM. Loren’s Auto Recycling, LLC1 appeals from an
order granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Vinland. The order
required Loren’s Auto to abate a public nuisance. On appeal, Loren’s Auto argues
the circuit court erred by granting judgment in favor of the Town because the
Town failed to establish the existence of a public nuisance and Loren’s Auto’s
liability for abatement. Loren’s Auto also argues various equitable defenses bar
summary judgment. We reject Loren’s Auto’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2020, Loren’s Auto purchased a vehicle salvage yard located in
the Town. Loren’s Auto purchased the property with the expectation that it would
continue to operate a vehicle salvage yard on the property. The Town’s
ordinances require an owner/operator to obtain a salvage yard permit and a
conditional use permit (“CUP”) before operating a salvage yard. To facilitate
Loren’s Auto’s vehicle-salvage-yard operation, in 2020, the Town issued Loren’s
Auto a salvage yard permit and a provisional CUP. The provisional CUP outlined
conditions that Loren’s Auto was required to complete and/or comply with by
September 2021.

¶3 Ultimately, Loren’s Auto did not complete and/or comply with the
conditions in the provisional CUP. In 2021, the Town notified Loren’s Auto that
it would not renew its salvage yard permit. It also terminated the CUP. Loren’s

1
Lorenz Rangeloff, owner of Loren’s Auto Recycling, LLC, is also named as a
defendant-appellant in this appeal. However, Loren’s Auto advises this court that “this appeal is
brought only by Loren’s Auto because it is the only party adversely affected by the challenged
order.”

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Auto appealed the Town’s decision, and, in December 2022, the circuit court
affirmed the Town’s actions. Loren’s Auto did not appeal that determination.

¶4 On February 2, 2023, the Town sent notice to Loren’s Auto. The
notice provided:

Pursuant to [Town of Vinland Ordinance] Section
284-6 B, this letter is being submitted to you to put you on
notice that the salvage business operations being conducted
[on your property] constitutes a public nuisance in violation
of § 284-1 and 284[-]2 of the Town of Vinland Ordinances.

This salvage operation is being conducted without
proper State and County permits, which have resulted in the
termination of the previously granted Town of Vinland
Conditional Use Permit and Town of Vinland salvage
license. In addition, these violations have continued for
more than a one[-]year time period.

You are hereby required to abate the nuisance by
stopping the business and by removing all salvage items
from the property within three (3) days from receiving this
letter, and unless this nuisance is so abated the Town shall
have the right to abate the nuisance and charge the cost of
doing so to the owner, occupant, and/or person causing,
permitting, or maintaining the nuisance.

¶5 The Town later brought suit against Loren’s Auto. As relevant, the
complaint alleged that Loren’s Auto was operating a salvage yard without a
salvage-yard permit and a CUP in violation of the Town’s ordinances. The
complaint stated there were “an estimated number of 1,500 wrecked, damaged,
and inoperable motor vehicles … on the [p]roperty in various stages of damage
and general deterioration[.]” The complaint alleged:

these damaged, deteriorated, wrecked, and junked vehicles
present serious and dangerous risks of various fluid
leakages to surface stormwater, soil, and ground water
contamination if proper safeguards are not implemented.
To date such safeguards have not been implemented,
putting the property, groundwater, stormwater, and

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neighboring properties at risk due to unregulated
environmental hazards[.]

The complaint also alleged the business being conducted by Loren’s Auto on the
property was “a public nuisance prohibited by Town Ordinances §§ 284-1 and
284-2.”

¶6 The complaint requested the circuit court enjoin Loren’s Auto from
continued operations and to abate the nuisance by removing the wrecked and
damaged vehicles from its property. In the event that Loren’s Auto failed to abate
the nuisance, the Town also asked the court to authorize the Town to abate the
nuisance and recover the costs of abatement against Loren’s Auto.

¶7 Loren’s Auto answered the complaint. As relevant, it specifically
denied that “any salvage operation [was] being conducted on the Property.” It also
alleged, as affirmative defenses, that the Town “is estopped to take the actions
contemplated in the Complaint” and the Town’s “claims may be barred by
laches.” Loren’s Auto did not plead any facts in support of its affirmative
defenses.

¶8 In August 2023, the Town moved for summary judgment. It
emphasized its complaint sought “equitable relief … on grounds of nuisance and
violation of the Town zoning laws” and sought “the remedy of abatement,
termination of business operations, and removal of the junked and wrecked
vehicles from the site.”

¶9 In support, the Town attached an affidavit from the Town Chairman,
Don O’Connell. O’Connell averred he had viewed and was familiar with Loren’s
Auto’s property. He averred the property “is an auto salvage yard on which
[Loren’s Auto is] storing an estimated 1,500 wrecked and salvaged motor

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vehicles.” O’Connell attached aerial photographs of the vehicles on the property.
O’Connell averred Loren’s Auto has “continued storing the junked, salvaged, and
inoperable vehicles on the site without a Conditional Use Permit and without a
salvage/junkyard license.” O’Connell explained the Town’s zoning ordinances
prohibited storing wrecked or junked vehicles, see TOWN OF VINLAND, WIS.,
CODE § 410-32 B. (8) (2024),2 and state statute also prohibited storing junked
vehicles without a permit issued by the Town, see WIS. STAT. § 175.25(1)
(2023-24).3 According to O’Connell, the wrecked and salvaged vehicles “create
environmental hazards due to fuel, oil, and other lubricants and pollutants that may
escape from these vehicles and enter the ground, the groundwater, and the
stormwater systems in Town ditches thereby affecting other properties.”

¶10 Loren’s Auto filed a brief in opposition to summary judgment.
Loren’s Auto generally offered three arguments in opposition to summary
judgment—two are relevant for appeal.4 Loren’s Auto argued summary judgment
was improper because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether it
was operating a vehicle salvage yard on the property and whether its property
posed an environmental threat to surrounding properties. In support, it offered an
affidavit from Lorenz Rangeloff, owner of Loren’s Auto, who averred that, once

2
All references to the Town of Vinland Municipal Code are to the 2024 version. The
Town’s Code is available at https://ecode360.com/VI3589 (last visited May 8, 2025).
3
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
4
The third argument was that judgment against Loren’s Auto’s owner, Lorenz
Rangeloff, was improper because Loren’s Auto was a distinct legal entity and nothing would
make Rangeloff personally liable for the Town’s requested remedies. At the summary judgment
hearing, the Town agreed to “dismiss the claim about the nuisance and the junkyard violation
against [Rangeloff] individually.” The circuit court therefore determined its summary judgment
order “does not apply personally to Lorenz Rangeloff.”

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No. 2024AP343

the Town revoked the CUP and refused to renew its salvage license, Loren’s Auto
“ceased its salvage business.” Rangeloff also averred that on July 26, 2023, the
Department of Natural Resources issued a storm water permit and that Loren’s
Auto was “fully prepared to fulfill the continued monitoring that is contemplated
in the permit.”

¶11 The Town filed a reply. As relevant, the Town argued that Loren’s
Auto’s opposition to summary judgment did not demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact. The Town asserted that, even if Loren’s Auto was no longer
engaged in salvage operations on the property, it was still storing junked vehicles
on the property without a CUP or a salvage yard permit. The Town argued that
storing junked or wrecked vehicles on the property violated the Town’s zoning
ordinance prohibiting the “storage of junked or wrecked vehicles.” TOWN OF
VINLAND, WIS., CODE § 410-32 B. (8). The Town also argued storing junked
automobiles without a permit violated the Wisconsin statutes. See WIS. STAT.
§ 175.25(1).5 And, as relevant to this appeal, the Town argued:

Town Ordinance 284-1 and 284-2 prohibit public nuisances
(Complaint paragraphs 19 and 22) and more specifically
284-3, subsection O, defines “junked vehicles” to be a
public nuisance, the only exception being if a CUP is in
place, which it is not[.]

See TOWN OF VINLAND, WIS., CODE §§ 284-1 to 284-3. As to Loren’s Auto’s
assertion it had obtained a permit from the DNR, the Town contended Loren
Auto’s belated storm water permit was irrelevant because a different circuit court

5
WISCONSIN STAT. § 175.25(1) provides, in relevant part: “No person … shall
accumulate or store any junked automobiles or parts thereof outside of any building on any real
estate located within the corporate limits of any … town except upon a permit issued by the …
town board.”

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No. 2024AP343

had already affirmed the Town’s revocation of the salvage yard permit and CUP
and Loren’s Auto still had other, unsatisfied CUP provisions.

¶12 The circuit court scheduled a summary judgment hearing. At the
beginning of the hearing, the court advised the parties that the purpose of the
hearing would be for the parties to make additional arguments and for the court to
ask questions. The court stated it would issue a decision at a later date. During
the hearing, the following exchange occurred between Loren’s Auto’s counsel and
the court:

THE COURT: All right. [Counsel], I had a couple
questions on your brief. You spent a fair amount of time
elaborating that [Loren’s Auto wasn’t] really operating a
business on the grounds. However -- and in [the Town’s]
brief they defined -- the regulations define -- basically, the
ordinance define[s] the definition of junked vehicles.
You’re not disputing that there are junked vehicles on this
land.

[Loren’s Auto’s Counsel]: No.

THE COURT: All right. And so -- and it does appear
that the statute prohibits storage of junked automobiles.
The remedy of that would be by getting a license or
conditional use permit; correct?

[Loren’s Auto’s Counsel]: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And you don’t dispute that your
client doesn’t have that.

[Loren’s Auto’s Counsel]: No.

¶13 At an oral decision, the circuit court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Town. In a written order, the court provided:

The Court finds there are no issues of material fact and
that Town ordinance 410-32B prohibits the storage of junk
vehicles without a junkyard license and further than that a
conditional use permit is required for such storage. There
is no dispute that there are junk vehicles stored on the
property. There was a previous decision in Winnebago

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No. 2024AP343

County case number 21 CV 749 whereby Judge John J.
Jorgensen dismissed the Defendants petition for certiorari,
the effect of which was of the validation of the termination
of the Conditional Use Permit and Junkyard License by the
Town.

The court further finds that these junk vehicles
constitute a nuisance that must be abated by the Defendant
Loren’s Auto Recycling, LLC by removal of the junk
vehicles from the property no later than November 11th,
2024, and that if not removed by the defendant the Town
shall be granted the right to both sell and have the vehicles
removed, by any reasonable commercial means, and the
Town may reimburse itself for all costs and expenses
related to the removal and sale, upon filing the appropriate
affidavit with supporting documentation for those expenses
with the Court.

The Court further finds that all costs and expenses
incurred by the Town for the removal and sale of the junk
vehicles to the extent not reimbursed in full from proceeds
of sale shall constitute a special charge for municipal
services under [WIS. STAT. § 66.0627] as a lien on the real
estate where the junk vehicles are stored.

¶14 Loren’s Auto appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶15 On appeal, Loren’s Auto argues the circuit court erred by granting
judgment in favor of the Town because the Town failed to establish the existence
of a public nuisance and Loren’s Auto’s liability for abatement. Loren’s Auto also
argues various equitable defenses bar summary judgment.

¶16 We independently review the circuit court’s grant of summary
judgment by applying the same standards and methods utilized by the circuit
court, and benefiting from its analysis. Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest
Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 80, ¶18, 254 Wis. 2d 77, 646 N.W.2d 777. Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

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genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2).

¶17 There are three elements for a tort claim for public nuisance: (1) the
existence of a public nuisance; (2) actual or constructive notice of the nuisance;
and (3) causation. Physicians Plus, 254 Wis. 2d 77, ¶2. We address each element
in the context of Loren’s Auto’s arguments.

¶18 Loren’s Auto first argues the circuit court erred by granting
summary judgment because the Record “contains no evidence that any nuisance
exists.” (Emphasis omitted.) When determining whether a public nuisance exists,
“[t]he circuit court’s inquiry appropriately focuses on the dangerous condition, and
whether it meets the definition of public nuisance.” Id., ¶28.

¶19 In this case, we will start with the definition of “public nuisance” as
stated in the Town’s ordinances. See Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, ¶67,
311 Wis. 2d 1, 751 N.W.2d 780 (circuit courts use municipality’s definition of
public nuisance). The Town defines a “public nuisance” as

a thing, act, occupation, condition or use of property which
shall continue for such length of time as to:

A. Substantially annoy, injure or endanger the comfort,
health, repose or safety of the public;

B. In any way render the public insecure in life or in the
use of property;

C. Greatly offend the public morals or decency;

D. Unlawfully and substantially interfere with, obstruct or
tend to obstruct or render dangerous for passage any street,
alley, highway, navigable body of water or other public
way or the use of public property.

E. Any condition or use of premises or of building
exteriors which is detrimental to the property of others or

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No. 2024AP343

which causes or tends to cause substantial diminution in the
value of other property in the neighborhood in which such
premises are located.

TOWN OF VINLAND, WIS., CODE, § 284-2. The Town has further declared a
“public health nuisance[]” to include:

Junked vehicles. Disassembled, dismantled, partially
dismantled, inoperable, junked, wrecked or unlicensed
motor vehicles, truck bodies, tractors, trailers, boats or
campers in such state of physical or mechanical ruin as to
be incapable of propulsion or of being operated upon the
public streets, highways or waters.

TOWN OF VINLAND, WIS., CODE, § 284-3(O).

¶20 Loren’s Auto argues the Town failed to put forth sufficient facts that
junked vehicles constitute a public nuisance. It contends “the Town needed to
present evidence that the presence of junked vehicles substantially, unreasonably,
or unduly interferes with the use of a public place or with the activities of an entire
community.” Loren’s Auto also argues that, because it has obtained a storm water
discharge general permit from the DNR, there is a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether the vehicles on Loren’s Auto’s property constitute an environmental
nuisance.

¶21 However, “[m]unicipalities have broad authority through their police
powers to protect ‘the health, safety, and welfare’ of their residents, including the
ability to define and take action against public nuisances.” City of S. Milwaukee
v. Kester, 2013 WI App 50, ¶9, 347 Wis. 2d 334, 830 N.W.2d 710 (citation
omitted); see also Town of Delafield v. Sharpley, 212 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 568
N.W.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1997) (“The police power of a municipality extends to
declaring certain acts or conditions to be a public nuisance.”). When a
municipality has enacted an ordinance that defines a public nuisance, “[circuit]

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courts should not interfere in this determination absent a showing of
‘oppressiveness or unreasonableness.’” Kester, 347 Wis. 2d 334, ¶9 (citing Boden
v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 318, 325, 99 N.W.2d 156 (1959)).

¶22 Here, the Town has specifically defined a public health nuisance to
include junked vehicles. Based on its enacted nuisance ordinance, the Town was
not required to separately prove that the presence of junked vehicles interfered
with the public or harmed the environment. We also observe that in the circuit
court, Loren’s Auto made no argument that the Town’s prohibition against storing
junked vehicles was “oppressive or unreasonable.”

¶23 In its appellate brief, Loren’s Auto complains that the Town did not
advise the circuit court until its summary judgment reply brief that, within its
nuisance code, it had specifically declared junked vehicles to be a public health
nuisance. See TOWN OF VINELAND, WIS., CODE, § 284-3(O). In Loren’s Auto’s
appellate reply brief to this court, it argues that because § 284-3(O) “never
appeared in the Complaint nor in any notice provided to Loren’s Auto,” the
Town’s pleading was deficient and the Town was not permitted to rely on this
specific nuisance ordinance in support of its summary judgment argument.

¶24 We disagree. First, as the circuit court advised the parties, the
purpose of the summary judgment hearing was for the parties to make additional
arguments and for the court to ask questions; the court’s decision would be issued
at a later date. At the hearing, Loren’s Auto made no argument regarding the
Town’s purported belated reference to its specific nuisance ordinance, TOWN OF
VINELAND, WIS., CODE, § 284-3(O). Instead, at that hearing, Loren’s Auto
admitted there were junked vehicles on the property and their presence was
prohibited without a permit. We disagree with Loren’s Auto’s assertion that it did

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No. 2024AP343

not have an opportunity in the circuit court to meaningfully respond to the Town’s
reliance on § 284-3(O).

¶25 As for the Town’s pleading, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 802.02(1)(a),
pleadings shall contain “[a] short and plain statement of the claim, identifying the
transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences out of which the
claim arises and showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Here, the Town’s
complaint alleged there were approximately “1,500 wrecked, damaged, and
inoperable motor vehicles … on the Property” and the “operation being conducted
by Loren’s Auto at the Property has and continues to constitute a public nuisance
prohibited by … [TOWN OF VINELAND, WIS., CODE,] §§ 284-1 and 284-2[.]”
Although the Town’s pleading did not specifically reference the more specific
public nuisance ordinance, TOWN OF VINELAND, WIS., CODE, § 284-3, “what
controls whether a complaint properly states a claim for relief are the factual
allegations pled in the complaint, and not the causes of action that are explicitly
identified in the complaint.” Hubbard v. Neuman, 2024 WI App 22, ¶16, 411
Wis. 2d 586, 5 N.W.3d 852, review granted, 2024 WI 40, 15 N.W.3d 24. The
Town’s complaint demonstrates it was seeking an injunction and abatement
pursuant to its nuisance code because there were junked vehicles on Loren’s
Auto’s property.

¶26 Based on the Town’s definition of a public nuisance, we next review
the Town’s evidence that Loren’s Auto maintained a public nuisance. On appeal,
Loren’s Auto argues O’Donnell’s affidavit only establishes that there were
salvaged vehicles on the property and it is unclear whether those vehicles meet the
Town’s definition of junked vehicles. Loren’s Auto also complains the aerial
photographs submitted by the Town were undated and therefore do not establish
that junked vehicles were on the property.

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No. 2024AP343

¶27 Although Loren’s Auto offers criticisms of the Town’s summary
judgment evidence, Loren’s Auto never raised these critiques in the circuit court
or disputed the Town’s allegations or evidence that there were junked vehicles on
the property. Most significantly, at the summary judgment hearing, counsel for
Loren’s Auto unequivocally admitted to the court there were junked vehicles on
the property. We therefore conclude the Record sufficiently establishes the first
element of a public nuisance claim—the existence of a public nuisance.
Physicians Plus, 254 Wis. 2d 77, ¶2.

¶28 Loren’s Auto next appears to offer an equitable defense to the
existence-of-a-public-nuisance element. It asserts “to the extent the Town is
deemed to have submitted any competent evidence to allow a nuisance finding, the
Record contains a genuine dispute over a material fact.” Specifically, Loren’s
Auto asserts that “[t]he Town’s decades-long acquiescence to the … Property’s
use as for vehicle salvage and junkyard operations creates a prima facie case that
the vehicles present no substantial, unreasonable, or undue interference with the
use of a public place or with the activities of the entire Town community.”

¶29 This argument was not made in Loren’s Auto’s brief in opposition to
summary judgment, and it is therefore forfeited. See Gruber v. Village of
N. Fond du Lac, 2003 WI App 217, ¶27, 267 Wis. 2d 368, 671 N.W.2d 692
(“Although this court engages in summary judgment review de novo, we
nonetheless may apply [forfeiture] to arguments presented for the first time on
appeal.”); see also Hopper v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 120, 137, 256 N.W.2d
139 (1977) (“It is the practice of this court not to consider issues raised for the first
time on appeal since the [circuit] court has had no opportunity to pass upon
them.”). In any event, we observe “estoppel will not lie against a municipality so
as to bar it from enforcing an ordinance enacted pursuant to the police power.”

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City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Amusement, Inc., 22 Wis. 2d 240, 253, 125
N.W.2d 625 (1964).

¶30 Turning to the second element of a public nuisance claim—actual or
constructive notice of the nuisance, see Physicians Plus, 254 Wis. 2d 77, ¶2,
Loren’s Auto does not dispute on appeal that it did not have actual or constructive
notice of the nuisance. We also observe the Record establishes the Town sent
notice of the violation to Loren’s Auto before commencing the underlying lawsuit,
and Loren’s Auto admitted there were junked vehicles on the property.

¶31 The third element of a public nuisance claim requires proof that
failure to abate the nuisance was a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Id., ¶30. On
appeal, Loren’s Auto argues that “[n]othing in the Record can support a finding
that Loren’s Auto engaged in any ‘wrongful act’ sufficient to sustain liability for
the abatement.” It asserts that after its salvage license and CUP lapsed, “Loren’s
Auto ceased all salvage and junkyard operations at the [property].”

¶32 Assuming, for purposes of summary judgment, that Loren’s Auto
ceased operating a vehicle salvage yard, this does not change the undisputed fact
that Loren’s Auto continued to store junked vehicles on its property and therefore
violated the Town’s public nuisance ordinance. As stated previously, the Town
has the power to enact and enforce its public nuisance ordinance for the “good
order of the [Town], for its commercial benefit and for the health, safety, welfare
and convenience of the public[.]” See WIS. STAT. § 61.34(1); see also WIS. STAT.
§ 60.22(3); TOWN OF VINLAND, WIS., CODE § 122-2. The harm in this case is
caused by the existence of the nuisance which is by definition a harm to the health
of those who live in the Town.

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¶33 Loren’s Auto then argues that “[a]lternatively, even if liability can
be sustained on this Record, Loren’s Auto is still entitled to have any such liability
apportioned based on its share of responsibility in creating or maintaining the
subject nuisance.” Loren’s Auto asserts that because the previous owners operated
a vehicle salvage yard on the property, it is entitled to “fact finding and potentially
a trial to determine” which vehicles on its property were put there by the previous
owners and to apportion liability accordingly.

¶34 We reject this alternative argument. The argument was not made in
Loren’s Auto’s brief in opposition to summary judgment, and it is therefore
forfeited. See Gruber, 267 Wis. 2d 368, ¶27; see also Hopper, 79 Wis. 2d at 137.
Moreover, the previous owners are not a party to this case, and Loren’s Auto never
attempted to plead them into this action. We also observe that when answering the
Town’s complaint, Loren’s Auto made an unqualified admission that it owned the
property at issue in this case. We do not consider this argument further.

¶35 Finally, Loren’s Auto asserts two affirmative defenses—laches and
equitable estoppel—should apply to bar the Town’s current action. Again, these
arguments were never made in Loren’s Auto brief in opposition to summary
judgment, and we conclude they are forfeited. See Gruber, 267 Wis. 2d 368, ¶27;
see also Hopper, 79 Wis. 2d at 137.

¶36 In the end, we conclude the Town presented sufficient credible
evidence to establish Loren’s Auto violated the underlying ordinances and
maintained a public nuisance. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court.

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No. 2024AP343

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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