County of Milwaukee v. Sharon A. Dawson

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 22, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP584 Cir. Ct. No. 2023TR13965

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

COUNTY OF MILWAUKEE,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

SHARON A. DAWSON,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
RAPHAEL F. RAMOS, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 DONALD, P.J.1 Sharon Dawson, pro se, appeals her judgment of
conviction in which the circuit court found her guilty of speeding, resulting in her

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This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2024AP584

being assessed a forfeiture of $254.40. For the following reasons, the judgment is
affirmed.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On May 22, 2023, the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office issued a
citation to Dawson, alleging a violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.57(5) (Exceeding speed
zones, etc. (25-29 mph)), and of failing to wear a seatbelt. Dawson entered a plea
of not guilty and requested a court trial. At the court trial, the County called the
sheriff’s deputy who had issued the citation, Deputy Adam Bjerke, who testified
that on May 22, 2023, he was patrolling Interstate 43 in the vicinity of 6th Street in
Milwaukee. He stated that he noticed a tan GMC Yukon pass his squad car at a
high rate of speed. When he began to pace the vehicle, he determined that the
vehicle was driving 75 miles per hour in a posted 50-mile-per-hour zone. This led
Deputy Bjerke to conduct a traffic stop on the vehicle and both vehicles pulled into
the highway median.

¶3 Deputy Bjerke further testified that, as he approached the driver of the
GMC Yukon, he noticed that the driver was not wearing a seatbelt. Deputy Bjerke
identified Dawson in court as being the driver of the vehicle. He further stated that,
after introducing himself and explaining the reason for the stop, he asked Dawson
about her speed and the seatbelt, at which point she became argumentative and
stated, “Don’t worry about me or my seatbelt.” At that point, Deputy Bjerke issued
the two citations and ended the traffic stop.

¶4 Dawson testified in her own defense at the court trial. According to
Dawson, at the time of the traffic stop, she had been getting onto the shoulder of the
road, at which point she and Deputy Bjerke were driving “neck-to-neck.” She stated
that “two cars pulled up” and then she “pulled up.” At that point, she saw the squad

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car turn on its lights. After having pulled Dawson over, Deputy Bjerke asked her
where she was going, she told him “None of your business,” at which point Deputy
Bjerke purportedly said, “Since you’re going to be hostile, I’m going to give you—
that’s a ticket for seat belt.” Dawson insisted at trial that there was no way she could
have been going 75 miles per hour, as Deputy Bjerke alleged, because her car is
“raggedy” and “doesn’t even reach up to that” speed. Further, she asserted that it
was impossible for her to have been going that fast with two other cars in front of
her.

¶5 After considering the testimonies of both Deputy Bjerke and Dawson,
the circuit court found Dawson guilty of the speeding charge, stating that

Ms. Dawson did not provide any testimony specific to her
speed indicating that she’d observed her own speedometer at
any point. She indicated only that there were cars in front of
her that would have impeded … her vehicle, but there’s also
no testimony or indication that those cars were not travelling
in excess of the speed limit as well.

However, the court dismissed the citation for failure to wear a seat belt, finding that
there was a lack of information regarding whether Dawson was wearing a seatbelt
at the time she was actually operating the vehicle. The court imposed a forfeiture
of $254.40. Dawson now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶6 In evaluating Dawson’s brief, it is not entirely clear on which legal
basis she is challenging her conviction. She makes brief, conclusory allegations of
“[r]acial [p]rofiling,” but does not clarify as to whether she believes racial profiling
was a factor in Deputy Bjerke’s decision to issue her the citations, or in the circuit
court’s finding that she was guilty of speeding. She also appears to challenge the
circuit court’s finding of guilt, alleging that Deputy Bjerke “lied and said [she] was

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hostile,” and that the “court did not recognize that.” Dawson also makes vague
allegations as to “[h]arassment,” “[i]ndignant attitude,” and “lieing [sic],” but does
not develop any related arguments. She further states, “Judge Ramos court is
incorrect related to not inquiring facts and information on details.”

¶7 The County interprets Dawson’s brief as raising two issues: (1) racial
profiling by Deputy Bjerke in issuing the citations to Dawson, and (2) insufficiency
of the evidence, as to contesting the circuit court’s findings of fact and decision that
Dawson was guilty of speeding.

¶8 The County argues that Dawson’s allegations of racial profiling are
“merely conclusory in nature and without factual support,” and that Dawson “fails
to present even a prima facie case for discrimination.” The County further argues
that, by failing to raise any challenge to Deputy Bjerke’s reasonable suspicion for
stopping her, Dawson may have waived this claim, although the County does not
develop this argument further. The County further points out that, when testifying
on the witness stand, Dawson “freely admitted … that she did not wear a seat belt,”
and thus essentially “admitted a violation that serves as yet another ground or basis
for the lawful stop of her tan GMC Yukon vehicle.”

¶9 The County notes that Deputy Bjerke never presented any evidence
that race was a motivating factor in his decision to stop Dawson, and, further, that
Dawson had an opportunity to cross-examine Deputy Bjerke at trial but did not raise
the issue at that time. As to sufficiency of the evidence, the County argues that, in
weighing the evidence provided at trial, “a reasonable person would have been
persuaded that Ms. Dawson was driving in excess of the posted speed limit” when
she was stopped by Deputy Bjerke.

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¶10 Dawson did not file any sort of reply brief addressing the County’s
arguments.

¶11 This court need not address the claims of racial profiling or
sufficiency of the evidence, to which Dawson so vaguely refers. We may decline
to address issues which are inadequately briefed. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627,
646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). Further, arguments unsupported by
references to legal authority will not be considered. Id. Indeed, a brief “so lacking
in organization and substance that for us to decide [the] issues, we would first have
to develop them,” is inadequate, as we “cannot serve as both advocate and judge.”
Id. at 647.

¶12 In addition, a “party must do more than simply toss a bunch of
concepts into the air with the hope that either the … court or the opposing party will
arrange them into viable and fact-supported legal theories.” State v. Jackson, 229
Wis. 2d 328, 337, 600 N.W.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1999). While pro se litigants are usually
granted a “degree of leeway,” this court does not “impute to pro se litigants the best
argument they could have, but did not, make.” State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson,
2019 WI 110, ¶25, 389 Wis. 2d 516, 936 N.W.2d 587 (citation omitted).

¶13 Dawson’s brief is wholly lacking in legal argument or theory. She
fails to cite to any sort of legal authority and appears to simply be tossing ideas into
the air in the hopes that one will stick. See Jackson, 229 Wis. 2d at 337. In order
to actually evaluate the issues raised by Dawson, this court would first have to
develop the arguments for her. We decline to do so.

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CONCLUSION

¶14 Dawson has not adequately challenged the circuit court’s decision and
has failed to properly develop any sort of legal argument For those reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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