Ruthie Freeman v. Morocco Investments, LLC

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
September 9, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP177 Cir. Ct. No. 2022CV860

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

RUTHIE FREEMAN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

MOROCCO INVESTMENTS, LLC,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,

ABC INSURANCE COMPANY AND ALEX M. AZAR, II,

DEFENDANTS.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee
County: KASHOUA KRISTY YANG, Judge. Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Donald, J.
No. 2024AP177

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Morocco Investments, LLC appeals from a
judgment entered by the trial court in favor of Ruthie Freeman. On appeal,
Morocco argues that the trial court erroneously permitted its counsel to withdraw a
mere 24 days before trial. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On February 10, 2022, Freeman filed suit against her landlord,
Morocco, after she slipped and fell on some ice and snow that had accumulated on
the stairs outside of her apartment building. In her complaint, she alleged
negligence and a violation of Wisconsin’s Safe Place Statute, WIS. STAT. § 101.11
(2023-24).1

¶3 Morocco initially retained Attorney Robert N. Meyeroff as counsel.
During his representation, Attorney Meyeroff filed an answer, which raised no
affirmative defenses, and also filed a witness list on Morocco’s behalf. Attorney
Meyeroff moved to withdraw from representing Morocco on September 19, 2022.
Attorney Meyeroff cited to a “parting of the ways” and the fact that Morocco’s
sole member, Will Sherard, lost confidence in Attorney Meyeroff as the reasons
for withdrawal. Attorney Meyeroff indicated that he and Sherard spent hours
arguing and it became impossible for Attorney Meyeroff to represent Morocco.
The trial court granted the motion to withdraw on October 11, 2022.

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP177

¶4 The trial court held a pretrial conference on February 8, 2023.2
Despite having nearly five months to obtain counsel since Attorney Meyeroff’s
withdrawal, Morocco appeared without counsel and orally requested more time to
obtain counsel. The trial court granted Morocco more time.

¶5 The trial court held a status conference on March 3, 2023. Morocco
again appeared without counsel and again orally requested more time to obtain
counsel. The trial court granted Morocco’s request but warned that no more
adjournments would be granted.

¶6 On April 26, 2023, nearly seven months after Attorney Meyeroff’s
withdrawal from the case, Morocco retained Attorney David J. Lang. Attorney
Lang filed a pretrial report on Morocco’s behalf on May 31, 2023. However, on
October 2, 2023, Attorney Lang also moved to withdraw, citing to a breakdown in
the representation that could not be resolved. Attorney Lang noted an incident that
occurred at his office on September 28, 2023, where Attorney Lang asked Sherard
to leave after Sherard became hostile and belligerent, and the police escorted
Sherard from Attorney Lang’s office. Attorney Lang indicated that he feared for
his safety and the safety of his staff. The trial court held a hearing on October 20,
2023, to address Attorney Lang’s motion to withdraw, and the trial court granted
the motion.

2
To the extent necessary, we take judicial notice of those facts contained in CCAP
records. See Kirk v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 2013 WI App 32, ¶5 n.1, 346 Wis. 2d 635, 829
N.W.2d 522 (recognizing that “CCAP is an acronym for Wisconsin’s Consolidated Court
Automation Programs” that is an “online website [that] reflects information entered by court
staff”).

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¶7 On November 13, 2023, the trial court held a bench trial. Morocco
appeared without counsel, and the trial court entered judgment for Freeman.
Morocco appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶8 On appeal, Morocco argues that the trial court erroneously exercised
its discretion when it granted Attorney Lang’s motion to withdraw. We review the
trial court’s decision to grant a motion to withdraw for an erroneous exercise of
discretion. State ex rel. Dressler v. Circuit Ct. for Racine Cnty., Branch 1, 163
Wis. 2d 622, 632, 472 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1991). We sustain a trial court’s
discretionary act if “the trial court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper
standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion
that a reasonable judge could reach.” Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-
15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).

¶9 Morocco correctly cites that “[t]he general rule is that although a
lawyer has justifiable cause for withdrawing from a case, the attorney is not
entitled to withdraw until the client has been given ‘reasonable notice and
opportunity to obtain substitute counsel.’” Johnson v. Johnson, 199 Wis. 2d 367,
372, 545 N.W.2d 239 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). In this case, there can be
no dispute that Attorney Lang had justifiable cause to withdraw when Sherard
became belligerent and hostile to the point that police had to escort Sherard out of
Attorney Lang’s office. Rather, the issue here revolves around whether Morocco
had reasonable notice and opportunity to obtain substitute counsel. We conclude
that Morocco had both reasonable notice and an opportunity to obtain substitute
counsel.

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¶10 As to reasonable notice, the record reflects that Morocco was put on
notice that Attorney Lang would withdraw by way of Sherard’s presence at the
incident on September 28, 2023, that resulted in Sherard’s removal from Attorney
Lang’s office by police. We note that Sherard indicated at the hearing that he was
surprised by Attorney Lang’s motion to withdraw. However, Attorney Lang
explained at the hearing that he informed Sherard that he would be moving to
withdraw as a result of the September 28 incident. In particular, Attorney Lang
stated that he told Sherard “over and over” that “there’s no way I’m going to
represent him” and “he wouldn’t listen.” The trial court addressed the situation
finding that Sherard was there that day when he had to be escorted by police from
Attorney Lang’s office and Sherard could not reasonably believe that Attorney
Lang would continue to represent Morocco following that incident. We agree
with the trial court’s assessment, and therefore, we conclude that Morocco,
through Sherard’s presence at the incident on September 28, 2023, had reasonable
notice that Attorney Lang would be moving to withdraw from the case.

¶11 Morocco argues that the trial court applied an incorrect legal
standard and inaccurately recited the facts because the trial court placed all the
blame on Sherard, did not take Sherard’s objection and circumstances into
consideration, and recited a skewed version of facts evincing a personal issue with
Sherard. He further argues in his reply brief that a disagreement does not
automatically result in a situation warranting withdrawal.

¶12 We are not persuaded. Rather, a review of the record indicates that
the trial court engaged in ample discussion with Sherard about his version of
events. The trial court further noted that this was not the first time Morocco
encountered problems with counsel, and Morocco was previously warned that no
more adjournments would be allowed. The trial court further impressed upon

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Morocco the importance of keeping the case moving after it had been delayed on
prior occasions. In short, we discern no erroneous exercise of the trial court’s
discretion in establishing whether Morocco had reasonable notice of Attorney
Lang’s motion to withdraw and, to the extent applicable, whether there were even
grounds for the motion in the first place.

¶13 This leaves us with the final question of whether Morocco had an
opportunity to obtain substitute counsel prior to the scheduled trial date of
November 13, 2023. While we acknowledge that Morocco as an LLC had no
choice but to obtain counsel to appear in court, our conclusion nevertheless
remains the same. See Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d
187, 202-03, 562 N.W.2d 401 (1997). Morocco had from September 28, 2023,
when it was on notice of Attorney Lang’s withdrawal until November 13, 2023, to
obtain counsel to replace Attorney Lang.

¶14 Morocco cites to Sherman v. Heiser, 85 Wis. 2d 246, 270 N.W.2d
397 (1978), for the proposition that the trial court in this case had two
choices: (1) set a new trial date or (2) deny the motion to withdraw and order
Attorney Lang to represent Morocco to the best of his abilities. Id. at 255-56. We
are not persuaded that Sherman requires such a result.

¶15 In Sherman, our supreme court addressed the following
question: “May an attorney for a party litigant withdraw from representation upon
the day of trial without notice to his [or her] client?” Id. at 250. Thus, the
resulting analysis emphasized the fact that counsel was permitted to withdraw on
the day of trial and without notice to the client. Id. at 254-56. That is not the case
here. Attorney Lang was permitted to withdraw weeks before trial and with notice

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to the client. Thus, we are not persuaded that Sherman left the trial court with the
two options for which Morocco argues.

¶16 Morocco continues by arguing that Attorney Lang did not take
reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to Morocco, and he cites the
following from the Code of Professional Responsibility discussed in Sherman:

[A] lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he
[or she] has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable
prejudice to the right of his [or her] client, including giving
due notice to his [or her] client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all
papers and property to which the client is entitled, and
complying with applicable laws and rules.

Id. at 251 (citation omitted).

¶17 We have already concluded that Morocco had both reasonable notice
and an opportunity to obtain counsel. We further note that Attorney Lang
provided Morocco with its file. Morocco has not otherwise developed any other
law or rule with which Attorney Lang failed to comply. See State v. Pettit, 171
Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). Consequently, we are not
persuaded by Morocco’s additional argument.

CONCLUSION

¶18 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion when it granted Attorney Lang’s motion to withdraw, and
therefore, we affirm.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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