Christina Tietz v. Ryan Tietz

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 11, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos. 2024AP1025 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2023CV372
2023CV373
2024AP1026

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN THE INTEREST OF G. T., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

CHRISTINA TIETZ,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

RYAN TIETZ,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

IN THE INTEREST OF N. T., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

CHRISTINA TIETZ,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

RYAN TIETZ,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
Nos. 2024AP1025
2024AP1026

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for St. Croix County:
EDWARD F. VLACK III, Judge. Reversed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. In these consolidated cases, Ryan Tietz appeals
from two child abuse injunctions issued against him, which pertain to two minor
children that he shares with his estranged wife, Christina Tietz.1 Ryan argues that
the circuit court erred by determining there were reasonable grounds to believe
that he has engaged in or may engage in abuse of the children. See WIS. STAT.
§ 813.122(5)(a)3. (2023-24).2 Ryan also argues that the court lost competency
when it failed to rule on the injunction petitions within 14 days after the issuance
of temporary restraining orders. See § 813.122(4)(c).

¶2 We assume without deciding that the circuit court retained
competency to issue the child abuse injunctions. Nevertheless, we conclude the
court erred by determining that the requisite reasonable grounds existed to issue
the injunctions. We therefore reverse the injunction orders.

1
For ease of reading and to protect confidentiality, rather than referring to the children
involved in this matter using their initials, we refer to them using pseudonyms that do not
correspond to the first letters of their names. Because Ryan and Christina Tietz share a surname,
we refer to them by their first names throughout the remainder of this opinion.
2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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BACKGROUND

¶3 Ryan and Christina were married in 2003. They have four children
together. Christina filed for divorce from Ryan on August 23, 2023.

¶4 The record indicates that the parties had been experiencing marital
difficulties for several years before the divorce filing. From mid-2020 until
August 2023, Ryan primarily slept in the basement of the family home. During
that time period, numerous reports were made to child protective services (CPS)
regarding the parties’ children. The vast majority of those reports were screened
out. The remaining three proceeded to “Initial Assessments,” all of which found
allegations of abuse against Ryan to be unsubstantiated.

¶5 In the various CPS reports, multiple professionals expressed
concerns about Christina manipulating the children by, for instance, “influencing
the [children’s] perception of [Ryan] and heightening their responses.” In 2020,
Christina told the family’s therapist that she would leave Ryan “if she was able to
have 100% custody of the children,” and the therapist reported “concerns that
Christina may have motives to falsely report” abuse allegations against Ryan. In
another report, a sheriff’s department investigator opined that “Christina is trying
to build a case for divorce, so Ryan won’t get the children.”

¶6 On August 29, 2023, six days after filing for divorce, Christina
recorded a conversation with two of the parties’ children, Ann and Beth. During
that conversation, Beth stated she had “seen Dad touch us … [l]ike when he’s
drunk and he comes into my bed, like, in his underwear.” Beth went on to state
that Ryan “touches my private part.” She reported that the touching was over her
underwear, but “[o]ne time he might have went under.” After prompting by
Christina, Ann stated that Ryan put his hands in her underwear, after which Ann

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“slapped him in the face.” Ann then stated that Ryan had touched her inside her
underwear two times, that he touched her vagina, and that he had also touched her
butt. During the conversation, Christina suggested a date for the alleged abuse,
stating it had occurred on a night when Ann slept in Beth’s room because she was
upset that Ryan was drunk and Ann screamed when she saw Ryan in his
underwear outside Beth’s door.

¶7 Ann’s and Beth’s sexual assault allegations against Ryan were
reported to CPS, which investigated the allegations and found them to be
unsubstantiated. During the investigation, Christina alleged that Ryan had
sexually assaulted the children on January 7, 2023, a night when Ryan had gotten
drunk while watching wrestling with his brother. CPS workers ultimately “found
Christina to be inconsistent with information that she provided to law
enforcement, along with her interviews,” and found that Ann’s and Beth’s
disclosures “lacked consistent information that would indicate that sexual abuse
occurred.” The St. Croix County Sheriff’s Office also investigated the sexual
assault allegations, and following completion of the investigation, no criminal
charges were filed against Ryan. Sergeant Thomas Williams concluded that
Christina’s statements during the investigation were “inconsistent and dishonest.”

¶8 On September 1, 2023, Christina filed four petitions for child abuse
injunctions against Ryan, one related to each of their four children. Temporary
restraining orders against Ryan were granted the same day, and a hearing on the
injunction petitions was scheduled for September 7. Christina subsequently opted
to proceed only with the petitions related to Ann and Beth, and she withdrew the
petitions regarding the parties’ other two children.

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¶9 Between September 7, 2023, and March 13, 2024, the circuit court
held 24 hearings on the injunction petitions, some of which were evidentiary and
some of which were for scheduling purposes. In addition, on February 12, 2024,
the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) submitted her written recommendations to
the court.

¶10 With respect to Beth, the GAL opined that there was no evidence of
“physical injury” perpetrated by Ryan, as that term is defined in WIS. STAT.
§ 48.02(14g). With regard to the sexual assault allegations, the GAL concluded
that “[t]he evidence presented demonstrated a thorough investigation done by
St. Croix County child protection in conjunction with the St. Croix County
Sheriff’s office that did not result in any findings or decisions stating that the
children were unsafe.” The GAL also concluded that the evidence did not support
a finding of “emotional damage” to Beth, as that term is defined in
§ 48.02(1)(gm).

¶11 As for Ann, the GAL did not find any evidence of “physical injury”
perpetrated by Ryan. Addressing the sexual assault allegations pertaining to Ann,
the GAL stated that she was “concerned regarding the large inconsistencies with
[Ann’s] disclosures.” The GAL also noted that “[Ann] has expressed a desire to
see [Ryan,] and I have not directly witnessed any apprehension or fear related to
her father.” Addressing emotional damage, the GAL noted it was undisputed that
Ann “is currently struggling with her mental health.” The GAL stated, however,
that “both parents have cooperated in getting her the recommended treatment” and
that “[n]o evidence was presented that showed [Ryan] was refusing to follow any
mental health recommendations.”

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¶12 Ultimately, the GAL concluded there were not “reasonable grounds
to grant the petitions for child abuse injunction[s].” In support of that conclusion,
the GAL noted:

The most credible evidence presented was the testimony
and corresponding reports by Sergeant Williams. Through
the criminal investigation, it was determined that there
were credibility concerns related to [Christina] and
discrepancies in the disclosures made by the children.
Additionally, child protection made the decision that the
children are safe with [Ryan]. All of the allegations
brought up in the multiple hearings have at one point been
reported to child protection. While the burden for these
different agencies differ[s], weight should still be given to
the professional investigations that have taken place and the
determinations related to those investigations.

¶13 The circuit court issued an oral ruling on April 15, 2024, over seven
months after the child abuse injunction petitions were filed. The court noted that
there had been a “multitude of hearings” on the petitions and that “the presentation
of the evidence was very often incredibly confusing.” The court then stated it was
“clear” “that one of the key incidents was this incident of January 7th, 2023.”
However, the court stated the “events surrounding January 7th became so muddy”
that “it was very difficult to sift out exactly what may have happened or not
happened.”

¶14 Addressing the issue of emotional damage to Ann, the circuit court
cited the testimony of Ann’s therapist “that at some point the mental health of
[Ann] changed dramatically. And it was at that point in time that her contact with
[Ann] went from once a week to twice a week … [a]nd that was due to the mental
health issues.” The court stated, “It’s clear to me that [Ann] has had some, from
my opinion, severe issues involving her mental health and emotional health.” In
contrast, with respect to Beth, the court stated it “really couldn’t tell … the extent

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of the severity” of any mental health issues based on the testimony of Beth’s
therapist and the other evidence presented.

¶15 The circuit court then continued to address emotional damage by
stating:

I believe that something took place January 7th. Whether
or not that has met the burden is difficult for me to say
because thing[s] got so muddy. The other thing that’s
concerning to me is that … the definition of emotional
damage is—makes this very limited. And I say that
because it’s clear to me that when I read the definition of
emotional damage, and that is under [WIS. STAT.
§] 48.02(5j), and that again, reminder, “Evidence[d] by one
[or] more of the following characteristics exhibited to a
severe degree: anxiety; depression; withdrawal; outward
aggressive behavior; or a substantial and observable change
in behavior, emotional response or cognition that is not
within the normal range for the child’s age and stage of
development.” It’s clear to me that fits exactly what [Ann]
is going through.

The difficulty is that when you read [WIS. STAT.
§] 48.02(1)(gm), that says[,] “Emotional damage which the
child’s parent, guardian, or legal custodian has neglected,
refused, or been unable or for reasons other than poverty to
obtain necessary treatment or to take steps to ameliorate the
symptoms.”

The court then noted that both children “are seeing [mental health] professionals.”
The court continued, “The emotional damage situation on that statute makes it
difficult to make that finding, other than, … in my opinion I could make the
finding that [Ryan] neglected to provide for the treatment with regard to the
emotional damage. And, … I’m tempted to make that finding.”

¶16 The circuit court then stated, “But also, I could make a finding that
there was some physical injury. Again, physical injury, is very, very broad. That
may have even taken place on January 7th that resulted in the need for that type of
therapy for both children.” The court then issued its ruling, stating: “So I’m

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making a finding under the physical injury, I’m also making a finding of the
emotional damage, … I’m granting the injunctions for a period of 18 months, and
that the children should participate in this reunification therapy. And that is my
decision.”

¶17 The circuit court issued child abuse injunctions with respect to Ann
and Beth on April 15, 2024, and subsequently issued amended injunctions
regarding both children. Ryan now appeals the injunction orders.3

DISCUSSION

I. Competency

¶18 Ryan argues that the circuit court lost competency to grant the child
abuse injunctions by failing to rule on the injunction petitions within the requisite
statutory time period. The relevant statute provides:

A judge shall hold a hearing on issuance of an injunction
within 14 days after the temporary restraining order is
issued, unless the time is extended upon the written consent
of the parties, extended under [WIS. STAT. §] 801.58(2m),
or extended once for 14 days upon a finding that the
respondent has not been served with a copy of the
temporary restraining order although the petitioner has
exercised due diligence.

WIS. STAT. § 813.122(4)(c). “A judge or court commissioner may not extend the
temporary restraining order in lieu of ruling on the issuance of an injunction.” Id.

3
The child abuse injunctions expired on October 15, 2025. These appeals are not moot,
however, because the circuit court’s electronic docket shows that the divorce action between
Christina and Ryan remains pending. This court has recognized that an appeal from an expired
child abuse injunction is not moot where there is a pending or anticipated divorce action between
the parties because the existence of the injunction may affect the divorce proceedings. See M.Q.
v. Z.Q., 152 Wis. 2d 701, 707-08, 449 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1989).

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Nos. 2024AP1025
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¶19 Here, it is undisputed that the circuit court did not issue the child
abuse injunctions within 14 days after issuance of the temporary restraining
orders. In addition, the appellate records contain no evidence that the parties
consented in writing to extend the 14-day time period. Furthermore, the 14-day
time period was not extended under WIS. STAT. § 801.58(2m), pertaining to
judicial substitution, nor was any extension granted based upon issues regarding
service of the temporary restraining orders. Rather, the circuit court repeatedly
extended the time for completing the injunction hearing based on “good cause to
extend” or a finding that “[f]urther time is needed to complete the hearing.”

¶20 Ryan contends that, under these circumstances, the circuit court lost
competency to rule on the injunction petitions. We assume, without deciding, that
the court retained competency because, as explained below, we reverse the child
abuse injunctions on other grounds. We therefore decline to address the parties’
arguments regarding competency. See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256, ¶1
n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 628, 673 N.W.2d 716 (explaining that the court of appeals need
not address all issues raised by the parties if one is dispositive). We emphasize,
however, that the best practice would be for a circuit court to decide a petition for
a child abuse injunction within 14 days after the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, unless one of the grounds for extension set forth in WIS. STAT.
§ 813.122(4)(c) applies.

II. Child abuse injunctions

¶21 The decision whether to grant a child abuse injunction “is left to the
discretion of the judge who hears the petition.” M.Q. v. Z.Q., 152 Wis. 2d 701,
708, 449 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1989). However, the judge may not grant the
injunction unless he or she “finds reasonable grounds to believe that the

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respondent has engaged in, or based upon prior conduct of the child victim and the
respondent may engage in, abuse of the child victim.” WIS. STAT.
§ 813.122(5)(a)3.; M.Q., 152 Wis. 2d at 708. “Whether such reasonable grounds
exist is a question of mixed fact and law.” M.Q., 152 Wis. 2d at 708. We will not
set aside the circuit court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but
“[w]e independently review the judge’s conclusion, based on the established facts,
whether such reasonable grounds exist.” Id.

¶22 “For purposes of WIS. STAT. § 813.122, the word ‘abuse’ has the
meaning given in the Children’s Code, Chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes.”
Kristi L.M. v. Dennis E.M., 2007 WI 85, ¶24, 302 Wis. 2d 185, 734 N.W.2d 375
(citing § 813.122(1)(a)). As relevant here, abuse includes: (1) “[p]hysical injury
inflicted on a child by other than accidental means”; (2) “sexual intercourse or
sexual contact” under WIS. STAT. §§ 940.225, 948.02, 948.025, or 948.085; and
(3) “[e]motional damage for which the child’s parent, guardian or legal custodian
has neglected, refused or been unable for reasons other than poverty to obtain the
necessary treatment or to take steps to ameliorate the symptoms.” See WIS. STAT.
§ 48.02(1)(a), (b), (gm).

¶23 As an initial matter, we note that in this case, one of the major
allegations in the child abuse injunction petitions was that Ryan had sexually
assaulted both Ann and Beth. Notably, however, the circuit court did not make a
finding that any sexual assaults had occurred. The court stated in its oral ruling
that it believed “something took place” on January 7, 2023, the night Ryan
allegedly sexually assaulted the children, but the court did not find that sexual
intercourse or sexual contact had occurred, for purposes of WIS. STAT.
§ 48.02(1)(b). We agree with Ryan that the court’s “vague statement” that

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“something” happened on January 7 “is not a finding of abuse as it is defined in
the statute” and “cannot support the issuance of the child abuse injunction[s].”

¶24 Rather than finding that any sexual assaults had occurred, the circuit
court stated that it was “making a finding under the physical injury” and “making
a finding of the emotional damage.” See WIS. STAT. § 48.02(1)(a), (gm). Again,
however, we agree with Ryan that the court’s analysis of both of these issues was
flawed.

¶25 The circuit court stated that physical injury is “very, very broad” and
“may have even taken place on January 7th.” In making that finding, however, the
court did not apply the definition of “physical injury” in WIS. STAT. § 48.02(14g),
which states that physical injury “includes but is not limited to lacerations,
fractured bones, burns, internal injuries, severe or frequent bruising or great bodily
harm.” Great bodily harm, in turn, “means bodily injury which creates a
substantial risk of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or
which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ or other serious bodily injury.” WIS. STAT. § 939.22(14).

¶26 The circuit court did not explain what type of physical injury it
believed may have taken place on January 7, 2023. The court did not make any
finding that any type of injury akin to the injuries listed in WIS. STAT.
§ 48.02(14g) occurred on that date.4 Christina did not argue in the circuit court

4
While WIS. STAT. § 48.02(14g) states that physical injury “includes but is not limited
to” the specific injuries listed in the statute, “[u]nder the rule of ejusdem generis, where a general
term is preceded or followed by a series of specific terms, the general term is viewed as being
limited to an item of the same type or nature as those specifically enumerated.” Hatheway v.
Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 157 Wis. 2d 395, 400, 459 N.W.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1990).

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that any physical injury, as that term is defined in § 48.02(14g), had occurred on
January 7. Instead, Christina alleged that inappropriate sexual touching of the
children took place on that date. We agree with Ryan, however, that “touching
without injury does not meet the definition of ‘physical injury’ under the statute.”
On this record, the court’s finding that physical injury occurred on January 7 was
clearly erroneous.5

¶27 The circuit court’s findings regarding emotional damage were also
clearly erroneous. “Emotional damage” means “harm to a child’s psychological or
intellectual functioning” and “shall be evidenced by one or more of the following
characteristics exhibited to a severe degree: anxiety; depression; withdrawal;
outward aggressive behavior; or a substantial and observable change in behavior,
emotional response or cognition that is not within the normal range for the child’s
age and stage of development.” WIS. STAT. § 48.02(5j).

¶28 The circuit court did not make any finding that Beth had suffered
emotional damage, as that term is defined in WIS. STAT. § 48.02(5j). After
quoting the statutory definition of emotional damage, the court stated, “It’s clear to
me that fits exactly what [Ann] is going through.” (Emphasis added.) However,
the court made no similar finding regarding Beth. To the contrary, the court stated
with respect to Beth that it “really couldn’t tell … the extent of the severity” of
any mental health issues. Without a finding as to the severity of Beth’s symptoms,
the court could not have found that Beth suffered emotional damage, as that term
is defined in § 48.02(5j). See id. (stating that emotional damage must be

5
Although evidence was presented regarding alleged incidents of physical abuse on
other dates, the circuit court mentioned only January 7 in its oral ruling and did not make a
finding that Ryan had caused physical injury to the children at any other time.

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evidenced by certain characteristics “exhibited to a severe degree”); see also M.Q.,
152 Wis. 2d at 709 (explaining that evidence that a child was “upset” or
“concerned” “does not, in the absence of expert testimony, equal severe anxiety or
depression”).

¶29 Unlike Beth, the circuit court did make a finding that Ann’s
symptoms met the statutory definition of emotional damage. In so doing,
however, the court improperly considered evidence regarding Ann’s mental health
after the injunction petitions were filed. Citing the testimony of Ann’s therapist,
the court stated that “at some point the mental health of [Ann] changed
dramatically. And it was at that point in time that [the therapist’s] contact with
[Ann] went from once a week to twice a week … [a]nd that was due to the mental
health issues.” Ann’s therapist testified that the increase in Ann’s therapy sessions
occurred during the week of September 26, 2023, which was approximately three
weeks after the injunction petitions were filed. “[F]or the purpose of determining
whether grounds exist to issue a child abuse injunction pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§ 813.122, a trial court may consider only pre-petition evidence.” S.O. v. T.R.,
2016 WI App 24, ¶39, 367 Wis. 2d 669, 877 N.W.2d 408. Thus, to the extent the
circuit court’s finding of emotional damage to Ann was based on changes in Ann’s
treatment needs that occurred after the injunction petitions were filed, that finding
was clearly erroneous.

¶30 Moreover, emotional damage alone does not qualify as abuse under
WIS. STAT. § 48.02(1). Instead, as noted above, the statutory definition of abuse
includes “[e]motional damage for which the child’s parent, guardian or legal
custodian has neglected, refused or been unable for reasons other than poverty to
obtain the necessary treatment or to take steps to ameliorate the symptoms.”
Sec. 48.02(1)(gm) (emphasis added).

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¶31 The circuit court stated it was “tempted to make” a finding that Ryan
“neglected to provide for the treatment with regard to the emotional damage.” The
court did not, however, explain the basis for any such finding, and the record does
not support it. Instead, the evidence showed that Ann had been in therapy since
October 2022, eleven months before the injunction petitions were filed. While the
circuit court opined that, in the future, both children would “have to have some
type of contact with a professional in order to work into having contact with”
Ryan again, the court cited no evidence of any mental health treatment that Ryan
had neglected or refused to provide prior to the filing of the injunction petitions.
Notably, in her posthearing brief, Christina argued that both Ann and Beth had
suffered emotional damage, but she did not argue that Ryan had at any point
neglected or refused to provide necessary treatment for their symptoms. On this
record, we agree with Ryan that the circuit court’s finding of emotional damage
with respect to Ann was clearly erroneous.6

¶32 On appeal, Christina emphasizes that in order to grant a petition for a
child abuse injunction, a circuit court must find “reasonable grounds to believe
that the respondent has engaged in, or based upon prior conduct of the child victim
and the respondent may engage in, abuse of the child victim.” See WIS. STAT.
§ 813.122(5)(a)3. (emphasis added). Christina argues that, at a minimum, the
evidence was sufficient for the court to find reasonable grounds to believe that

6
As noted above, the circuit court did not make an express finding of emotional damage
with respect to Beth. On appeal, Christina argues that the court “implicitly found [Beth] was
‘emotionally damaged’ by virtue of her treatment needs.” The court’s oral ruling does not
support this assertion. Regardless, even if the court implicitly found that Beth had suffered
emotional damage, as that term is defined in WIS. STAT. § 48.02(5j), the court cited no evidence
that Ryan had neglected or refused to provide necessary treatment for Beth’s symptoms. See
§ 48.02(1)(gm). To the contrary, the record shows that Beth had been in therapy since
March 2020, over three years before the injunction petitions were filed.

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Ryan may cause physical injury and emotional damage to Ann and Beth in the
future.

¶33 As Ryan correctly notes, however, a “[s]peculative belief” that an
individual may engage in abuse of a child in the future is insufficient to support
the issuance of a child abuse injunction. Instead, there must be reasonable
grounds to believe that future abuse may occur “based upon prior conduct of the
child victim and the respondent.” See id. Christina does not provide a developed
argument as to what specific prior conduct would have supported a finding, in this
case, of reasonable grounds to believe that future abuse of the children may occur.
Moreover, we note that the circuit court did not expressly refer to potential future
abuse in its oral ruling, and it does not appear that the court relied on the prospect
of future abuse in making its decision.

¶34 In short, we conclude that the circuit court’s findings regarding
physical injury to Ann and Beth and emotional damage to Ann are clearly
erroneous. As such, the court erred by concluding that the requisite reasonable
grounds existed to issue the child abuse injunctions, and we therefore reverse the
injunction orders.

¶35 Christina argues that rather than reversing the injunction orders
outright, we should remand this matter to the circuit court for additional factual
findings, while retaining jurisdiction. Christina contends that the circuit court
“should be given the opportunity to clarify its legal and factual findings while
maintaining the injunction[s].”

¶36 Christina is correct that when a circuit court fails to make adequate
factual findings, this court may “remand for further findings and conclusions.”
See Minguey v. Brookens, 100 Wis. 2d 681, 688, 303 N.W.2d 581 (1981). Under

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the specific circumstances of this case, however, we decline to exercise that
option. The injunction petitions against Ryan were filed on September 1, 2023,
and temporary restraining orders were issued the same day. Although the
injunction hearing should have been held within 14 days after the temporary
restraining orders were issued, see WIS. STAT. § 813.122(4)(c), the evidentiary
portion of the hearing was not completed until January 2024, and the circuit court
did not issue its oral ruling until April 15, 2024. Additional delays occurred while
Ryan’s appeals of the injunction orders were pending, and the orders have now
expired. We agree with Ryan that, under these circumstances, the appropriate
course is to reverse the injunction orders, rather than remanding for additional
factfinding by the circuit court.

By the Court.—Orders reversed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

16