State v. L. M. P.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 6, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP2231-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2024CF1589

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

L.M.P.,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
MARK A. SANDERS, Judge. Dismissed.

Before Colón, P.J., Donald, and Geenen, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2025AP2231-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Lauren appeals from an order of the circuit court
authorizing the involuntary administration of medication to restore her to
competency to stand trial under WIS. STAT. § 971.14 (2023-24).1 Lauren argues
that the State failed to prove all four factors set forth in Sell v. United States, 539
U.S. 166 (2003), by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, Lauren argues
that the State failed to prove that it had an important interest in prosecuting her,
and that the court inadequately considered less intrusive alternatives to involuntary
medication. In response, the State contends that this appeal is moot because
Lauren is no longer subject to the involuntary medication order. Upon review, we
conclude that this appeal is moot and Lauren has not shown that any of the
exceptions to mootness apply; therefore, we dismiss this appeal.

BACKGROUND

¶2 According to the criminal complaint, Lauren entered the Milwaukee
Public Museum, remained in the museum until after it closed, and then used a
bottle of olive oil to vandalize multiple exhibits. Damages were estimated at over
$100,000. Lauren was arrested and charged with criminal damage to property in
excess of $2,500, a Class I felony contrary to WIS. STAT. § 943.01(2)(d), and
disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 947.01.

¶3 The circuit court found that Lauren was not competent to stand trial
and, after initially referring her to the Outpatient Competency Restoration

1
We use the pseudonym “Lauren” to refer to the defendant in this case for both ease of
reading and to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2025AP2231-CR

Program, remanded Lauren into custody for competency treatment at the Mendota
Mental Health Institute (“Mendota”).

¶4 The Department of Health Services (“DHS”) moved the circuit court
for an order to allow DHS to involuntarily medicate Lauren on the grounds that
she was not competent to refuse medication. DHS also submitted a treatment plan
prepared by an inpatient psychiatrist at Mendota, Amanda Vastag, MD, with its
motion. The court held an evidentiary hearing, during which it heard testimony
from Lauren and Dr. Vastag.

¶5 After hearing the testimony and the parties’ arguments, the circuit
court considered the Sell factors2 and concluded that the State had proven them by
clear and convincing evidence. The court then ordered the involuntary
administration of medication to restore Lauren to competency. Shortly after the
hearing, Lauren filed a notice of intent to pursue postdisposition relief with the
circuit court which triggered an automatic stay of the order, see WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.109(7)(a), and a motion to continue the stay pending postconviction
proceedings and appeal with this court, which we granted. Lauren now appeals
the circuit court’s order.

2
The following are the four factors outlined in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166
(2003), that must be proven before a circuit court may enter an order for involuntary
medication: “(1) the government has an important interest in proceeding to trial; (2) involuntary
medication will significantly further the governmental interest; (3) involuntary medication is
necessary to further the governmental interest; and (4) involuntary medication is medically
appropriate.” State v. Green, 2021 WI App 18, ¶14, 396 Wis. 2d 658, 957 N.W.2d 583.

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No. 2025AP2231-CR

DISCUSSION

¶6 Before addressing the merits of Lauren’s claims, we must first
consider the threshold issue of whether Lauren’s appeal should be dismissed as
moot. “Appellate courts generally decline to reach moot issues, and if all issues
on appeal are moot, the appeal should be dismissed.” Portage Cnty. v. J.W.K.,
2019 WI 54, ¶12, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. “An issue is moot when its
resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying controversy.” Id., ¶11
(citation omitted). “Mootness is a question of law” which we review
independently. Id., ¶10.

¶7 There are exceptions to the mootness doctrine and if an issue is moot
this court may still decide it if the issue is:

(1) is of great public importance; (2) occurs so frequently
that a definitive decision is necessary to guide circuit
courts; (3) is likely to arise again and a decision of the court
would alleviate uncertainty; or (4) will likely be repeated,
but evades appellate review because the appellate review
process cannot be completed or even undertaken in time to
have a practical effect on the parties.

Outagamie Cnty. v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶80, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d
607 (citation omitted).

¶8 Both parties noted in their briefing that a competency hearing was
scheduled in the circuit court while this appeal was pending, and addressed
whether an exception to mootness would apply if Lauren was no longer subject to

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No. 2025AP2231-CR

the involuntary medication order. According to CCAP,3 on November 24, 2025,
the circuit court ordered Lauren’s criminal case administratively closed and
converted the matter to a civil commitment under WIS. STAT. ch. 51 because it
found Lauren was not likely to regain the competency to stand trial within the
statutory timeframe. See WIS. STAT. § 971.14(5). Thus, Lauren is no longer
subject to the involuntary medication order and her appeal is moot.

¶9 Lauren raises two reasons for why we should nonetheless address
the merits of her arguments. Lauren argues that her appeal raises issues that are
likely to be repeated, but evade appellate review, and that the cost of preparing the
treatment plan is a collateral consequence of the involuntary medication order that
prevents her appeal from being moot. We disagree.

¶10 “The capable of repetition, yet evading review doctrine is limited to
situations involving a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
would be subjected to the same action again.” J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶30
(citation modified).

¶11 Lauren explains that because the State initially chose to pursue
charges against her that it will likely want to do so again, and that it is possible for
the State to reexamine Lauren’s competency to resume the criminal proceedings
against her after she is discharged from her civil commitment, such that there is a

3
Wisconsin’s CCAP (“Consolidated Court Automation Programs”) is a case
management system provided by the Wisconsin Circuit Court Access program, which “provides
public access online to reports of activity in Wisconsin circuit courts[.]” State v. Bonds, 2006 WI
83, ¶6, 292 Wis. 2d 344, 717 N.W.2d 133. “The online website reflects information entered by
court staff.” Kirk v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 2013 WI App 32, ¶5 n.1, 346 Wis. 2d 635, 829
N.W.2d 522. We may take judicial notice of CCAP records. See id.; see also WIS. STAT.
§ 902.01.

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No. 2025AP2231-CR

reasonable expectation that this situation will arise again. See State v. A.L., 2019
WI 20, ¶25, 385 Wis. 2d 612, 923 N.W.2d 827 (explaining that the circuit court
maintains jurisdiction over the criminal charges independent of a defendant’s civil
commitment).

¶12 We do not agree that the mere possibility that the State could
reexamine Lauren’s competency in the future means that there is a reasonable
expectation that the State will actually reexamine Lauren’s competency, that
Lauren will still be incompetent to stand trial but will also be able to be treated to
competency within the statutory time period, that Lauren will refuse treatment,
and that DHS will again move to involuntarily medicate Lauren to competency.
Thus, we reject Lauren’s argument.

¶13 Lauren also argues that the capable of repetition, yet evading review
exception applies because this court in J.D.B. declined to apply the mootness
doctrine due to the short timelines involved in competency cases and the
importance of the rights and issues raised by the defendant. See State v. J.D.B.,
2024 WI App 61, ¶29, 414 Wis. 2d 108, 13 N.W.3d 525, review granted, 2025 WI
8, 18 N.W.3d 694. Lauren does not develop an argument for why the issues she
raises are of similar importance to warrant review despite being moot.
Furthermore, her arguments are fact-specific challenges to the circuit court’s
decision regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the circuit court’s alleged
failure to consider a specific alternative to involuntary medication. See Waukesha
Cnty. v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, ¶20 n.3, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590 (stating
that fact specific challenges are unlikely to have any impact outside the bounds of
the factual circumstances of that case). Therefore we conclude that an exception
to mootness does not apply here. See J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶30.

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No. 2025AP2231-CR

¶14 Finally, Lauren argues that the costs associated with the preparation
of the treatment plan, that she will be liable for under WIS. STAT. § 46.10(2),
constitute a collateral consequence of the involuntary medication order. Appeals
are not moot “when the direct or collateral consequences of the order persist and
vacatur of that order would practically affect those consequences.” Sauk Cnty. v.
S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶19, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162. Under § 46.10(2),
“any person … receiving care, maintenance, services and supplies provided by any
institution in this state … shall be liable for the cost of the care, maintenance,
services and supplies[.]”

¶15 Lauren’s argument is undeveloped. Citing to WIS. STAT. § 46.10(2),
Lauren simply concludes that she will be liable for the costs of preparing the
treatment plan.4 However it is not clear that § 46.10(2) applies to the treatment
plan, and Lauren fails to explain how the treatment plan qualifies as care,
maintenance, services, or supplies that she received under the involuntary
medication order pursuant to the statute. See also WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DHS
1.02(9) (through November 2024) (defining “services”).

¶16 The treatment plan is a document that was submitted alongside
DHS’s motion to seek permission from the circuit court to involuntarily provide
care to Lauren. As such, it contains information about the type of care DHS
would like to provide and why Dr. Vastag believed it was necessary to provide it
to Lauren involuntarily. The involuntary medication order was stayed shortly after
the court ordered it, and there is nothing in the record indicating that Lauren ever

4
We note that there is no evidence in the record supporting that the treatment plan
resulted in any additional costs to Lauren.

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No. 2025AP2231-CR

received the care detailed in the treatment plan under the involuntary medication
order.

¶17 To the extent that Lauren’s argument could be construed as an
argument that costs associated with the examinations that yielded the information
included in the treatment plan are collateral consequences of the involuntarily
medication order, we note that Lauren was examined by medical professionals
with the goal of restoring her to competency under the court’s initial order for
commitment for treatment at Mendota. Lauren fails to identify the specific
examinations she is referring to or develop an argument explaining why any
potential costs of the examinations are collateral consequences of the subsequent
order for involuntarily medication instead of the initial order for treatment.
Therefore, we reject Lauren’s argument as undeveloped. See State v. Pettit, 171
Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that this court
will not “serve as both advocate and judge” by developing arguments for the
parties).

¶18 Because we conclude that the appeal is moot, we do not reach
Lauren’s arguments disputing whether the State proved the Sell factors by clear
and convincing evidence. See J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶11.

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed as moot.

By the Court.—Dismissed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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