State v. Paul K. Strasser

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 21, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP1994-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2022CF713

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

PAUL K. STRASSER,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Eau Claire
County: JON M. THEISEN, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Paul Strasser appeals a judgment of conviction
entered after the circuit court denied his motion to suppress evidence of various
No. 2023AP1994-CR

drug crimes discovered during a warrantless search of the vehicle he was driving.
Strasser argues that the motion to suppress should have been granted because the
search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and improper under WIS.
STAT. § 302.113(7r) (2023-24).1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Shortly before midnight, Officer Matthew Sanda observed a vehicle
pull onto a roadway without its headlights activated. Sanda followed the vehicle,
and he observed it swerve within its lane and accelerate rapidly to approximately
55 miles per hour (mph) in a zone that transitioned from 35 mph to 45 mph. After
Sanda moved behind the vehicle, the vehicle changed lanes and continued into a
mall area where most businesses were closed.

¶3 Sanda ran a registration check that showed the vehicle’s registered
owner had a revoked driver’s license. When the vehicle entered a car wash
parking lot, Sanda initiated a traffic stop. As Sanda illuminated the vehicle’s
interior, he observed Strasser reach toward a backpack in “the passenger seat
area.” Once Sanda was standing outside of the vehicle, Strasser identified himself
with a Wisconsin ID card and admitted that he did not have a valid driver’s
license. Sanda confirmed that Strasser’s operating privileges were revoked due to
an alcohol-related offense and that he was required to have an ignition interlock
device, which was not present in the vehicle.

¶4 Around this time, dispatch advised Sanda that Strasser was on
extended supervision for prior methamphetamine-related convictions. After

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2023AP1994-CR

Strasser declined Sanda’s request to search the vehicle, Sanda searched the vehicle
without a warrant. The search revealed approximately 66 grams of
methamphetamine.

¶5 The circuit court denied Strasser’s suppression motion, concluding
the search of his vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment and was permitted
under WIS. STAT. § 302.113(7r), which provides that

[a] person released under [extended supervision], his or her
residence, and any property under his or her control may be
searched by a law enforcement officer at any time during
his or her period of supervision if the officer reasonably
suspects that the person is committing, is about to commit,
or has committed a crime or a violation of a condition of
release to extended supervision. Any search conducted
pursuant to this subsection shall be conducted in a
reasonable manner and may not be arbitrary, capricious, or
harassing.

(Emphasis added.)

¶6 After the circuit court denied his suppression motion, Strasser pled
guilty to possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, as a second and
subsequent offense and as a repeater. Strasser now appeals, arguing that the court
erred by denying his suppression motion.2

DISCUSSION

¶7 The Fourth Amendment protects the rights of individuals to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; State v. Floyd,

2
WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.31(10) allows an appeal from an order denying a suppression
motion, despite the general rule that guilty pleas constitute a waiver of nonjurisdictional defects
and defenses.

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No. 2023AP1994-CR

2017 WI 78, ¶19, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560. A police officer “may stop a
vehicle when he or she reasonably believes the driver is violating a traffic law;
and, once stopped, the driver may be asked questions reasonably related to the
nature of the stop—including his or her destination and purpose.” State v. Betow,
226 Wis. 2d 90, 93, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999). “Such a stop and detention
is constitutionally permissible if the officer has an ‘articulable suspicion that the
person has committed or is about to commit’ [an offense].’” Id. at 93-94
(alteration in original; citation omitted). Whether a traffic stop or detention is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law that we review
de novo. Id. at 93.

¶8 Strasser does not challenge the legality of the traffic stop. He argues
instead that the search was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and
violated WIS. STAT. § 302.113(7r) because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion
that evidence of a particular offense would be found in the vehicle. While Strasser
advances an argument concerning the proper interpretation of § 302.113(7r), we
resolve the case on narrower grounds. Namely, we conclude that the search did
not violate the Fourth Amendment in the first instance. Because this
determination is dispositive, we do not reach Strasser’s statutory claim.

¶9 The United States Supreme Court has held that individuals on
probation have significantly diminished expectations of privacy. See
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-21 (2001). This diminished privacy
interest is even more pronounced where, as here, an individual is serving a portion
of their criminal sentence in the community on parole, see Samson v. California,
547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006); United States v. Caya, 956 F.3d 498, 503 (7th Cir.
2020), known in Wisconsin as extended supervision. This rule recognizes that
extended supervision is a release from prison before the completion of a sentence

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No. 2023AP1994-CR

and thus “is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.”
Samson, 547 U.S. at 846, 850, 857 (ruling that a California law that allowed law
enforcement officers to search parolees “at any time of the day or night, with or
without a search warrant and with or without cause,” did not violate the Fourth
Amendment). To determine whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, we consider the totality of the circumstances. See Knights, 534 U.S.
at 118-19.

¶10 The search of Strasser’s vehicle occurred during a lawful stop and
after Sanda confirmed that Strasser was actively serving a criminal sentence on
extended supervision. Sanda was aware that Strasser had a history of
methamphetamine-related crimes and observed Strasser reach toward a backpack,
which could be an action taken by someone attempting to hide contraband. Sanda
had also just observed Strasser driving erratically with his headlights off in the
middle of the night. Strasser told Sanda that he did not have a valid driver’s
license and gave inconsistent explanations about what he was doing. All of the
foregoing observations easily establish reasonable suspicion that Strasser was
committing, or had committed, a crime or rules violation. And, given Strasser’s
significantly diminished right to privacy, we conclude that, under the totality of
the circumstances, the search of Strasser’s vehicle was reasonable for
constitutional purposes.

¶11 Because the search complied with the Fourth Amendment, we need
not decide whether WIS. STAT. § 302.113(7r) imposes any additional requirements
regarding the officer’s suspicion that a search will yield evidence of the suspected
offense.

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No. 2023AP1994-CR

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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