State v. Daylin T. Bridges

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 27, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2338-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2022CF2188

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DAYLIN T. BRIDGES,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee
County: JEAN M. KIES, Judge. Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Donald, and Geenen, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP2338-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Daylin T. Bridges appeals a judgment convicting
him of one count of first-degree reckless homicide as a party to a crime and two
counts of first-degree recklessly endangering safety as a party to a crime. Bridges
contends that the trial court issued an erroneous jury instruction and that the
evidence was insufficient to support the homicide conviction. Upon review, we
affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On June 4, 2022, the State charged Bridges with one count of first-
degree reckless homicide as a party to a crime and two counts of first-degree
recklessly endangering safety as a party to a crime. The charges stemmed from a
shooting that took place outside of a Milwaukee home resulting in the death of one
woman and injuries to another. According to the facts adduced from the record,
Bridges, along with Omarion McNealy and Rashaun Seaberry, were attending a
graduation party at Seaberry’s house when they noticed a vehicle pass by the
home multiple times. Bridges, McNealy, Seaberry, and others began shooting at
the vehicle, striking it several times. Unbeknownst to the shooters, the three
occupants of the vehicle were Bridges’ girlfriend, C.F., McNealy’s girlfriend, and
Seaberry’s former girlfriend. C.F. died at the scene and McNealy’s girlfriend was
injured.

¶3 After the shooting, police searched Seaberry’s house and discovered
five handguns, four of which were hidden inside a pillowcase in a drawer in the
basement. Police also recovered several casings, bullets, and bullet fragments
from the vehicle and the area around the vehicle. Forensic testing matched most
of the casings and projectiles to the guns found in the house; however, the two

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No. 2024AP2338-CR

bullets recovered from C.F.’s body were not conclusively linked to any of the five
guns.

¶4 Police conducted a Mirandized1 interview with Bridges in the days
following the shooting. Bridges admitted that he shot at the vehicle and that he
and several others became concerned after seeing the vehicle drive by the house
multiple times. He stated that McNealy, Seaberry, himself, and several others
stood on both sides of the house holding guns after they saw the vehicle pass for
the second time. When the car drove by a third time, Bridges heard someone say
“on that car” and then heard gun shots. Bridges and the others fired their weapons
towards the vehicle as well. Bridges estimated that he shot about ten to twelve
shots before running back into the house. He collected the guns that had been
used in the shooting, put them in a pillowcase, and hid them.

¶5 The matter proceeded to trial where the jury heard Bridges’
interview. The jury also heard testimony from the other two occupants of the
vehicle, several law enforcement officers, and the firearms examiner who
examined the recovered projectiles and guns. At the close of evidence, the trial
court issued modified jury instructions as to aiding and abetting first-degree
reckless homicide, prompting counsel for Bridges to object2 on the grounds that

1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
Counsel for Bridges first objected to the trial court’s modified jury instructions on the
first day of trial, stating:

“My concern … is that the jury instruction which says party to a crime in many places …
says the defendant or the person, and clearly the defendant is not the person who fired the death
shot…. So my concern … is [that it is] going to be confusing for the jury if we have statements
saying that either the defendant or the person. That he aided and abetted and caused the death of
[the victim]. I think that’s basically the problem. There [are] a number of places throughout the
instruction where that language is used.”

(continued)

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No. 2024AP2338-CR

the trial court’s modified instructions would confuse the jury. The trial court
overruled the objection.

¶6 The jury ultimately found Bridges guilty on all three charges. The
trial court sentenced Bridges to 20 years of imprisonment on the first-degree
reckless homicide charge, with two 5-year sentences on the first-degree reckless
endangerment charges running concurrently. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

¶7 On appeal, Bridges contends that the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury with regard to whether first-degree reckless homicide was a
natural and probable result of Bridges aiding and abetting the first-degree reckless
endangerment crime. He contends that the trial court deviated from the standard
party to a crime jury instruction on aiding and abetting, WIS JI—CRIMINAL 406,
“which explains that when a defendant intentionally aids and abets a person who
directly commits a crime, the defendant is also guilty of any crime that is the
natural and probable consequence of the underlying crime.” He argues that the
trial court’s instruction erroneously indicated that the jury “could convict if [it]
found that [Bridges] had either intentionally aided and abetted the person who
recklessly endangered safety or if [it] found that [Bridges] had directly committed
the crime of recklessly endangering safety himself.” (Emphasis in original.) He
also contends that the modified instruction relieved the State of its burden of
proof, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for first-
degree reckless homicide as a party to the crime.

At the close of evidence, counsel referred to his statements at the beginning of the trial to reiterate
his objection.

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No. 2024AP2338-CR

¶8 A trial court has broad discretion in instructing a jury but must
exercise that discretion in order to fully and fairly inform the jury of the applicable
rules of law. State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 212, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996)
(citation omitted). Whether a crime charged was a natural and probable
consequence of the crime with which a defendant allegedly assisted is a factual
issue for the jury. State v. Ivy, 119 Wis. 2d 591, 601, 350 N.W.2d 622 (1984).
Whether a jury instruction is appropriate, under the given facts of a case, is a legal
issue subject to independent review. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 639, 492
N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).

¶9 In evaluating instructions given to a jury, an error may be rendered
harmless if other correct statements of law are contained in the instructions;
however, “even if the error is not rendered harmless by other portions of the
instructions, there is no reversible error unless it may reasonably be said that, had
the error not been made, the verdict might probably have been different.” State v.
Paulson, 106 Wis. 2d 96, 108, 315 N.W.2d 350 (1982) (citation omitted). In other
words, an error is harmless if it is “‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational
jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’” State v. Beamon,
2013 WI 47, ¶27, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681 (citation omitted). This
determination requires the court to consider the totality of the circumstances. Id.

¶10 Assuming without deciding that the trial court’s modified instruction
was erroneous, the error was harmless because Bridges was not prejudiced by the
manner in which the jury was instructed. In order to prove that Bridges was guilty
of first-degree reckless homicide as a party to the crime, the State needed to
prove: (1) that Bridges intentionally aided and abetted in the crime of first-degree
recklessly endangering safety; (2) that the crime of first-degree reckless homicide
was committed; and (3) that first-degree reckless homicide was a natural and

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No. 2024AP2338-CR

probable consequence of first-degree recklessly endangering safety. See WIS JI—
CRIMINAL 406. Regardless of any potentially erroneous jury instructions, the State
met its burden of proof on each of these elements.

¶11 As to the first factor, a person recklessly endangers safety in the
first-degree if he or she “recklessly endangers another’s safety under
circumstances which show utter disregard for human life.” WIS. STAT.
§ 941.30(1). This requires the State to prove that the person: (1) endangered the
safety of another person; (2) by criminally reckless conduct; and (3) the
circumstances of that conduct showed utter disregard for human life. WIS
JI-CRIMINAL 1345. Here, Bridges admitted that he, along with several others,
fired shots at what they thought was an unknown vehicle. Several bullet casings
were recovered at the scene, bullet holes were found in the vehicle, and the two
surviving victims attested to the shooting. A person aids and abets in the
commission of a crime by knowingly either (1) assisting the person who commits
the crime, or (2) being ready and willing to assist the person who commits the
crime. State v. Hibbard, 2022 WI App 53, ¶12, 404 Wis. 2d 668, 982 N.W.2d
105; see also WIS JI—CRIMINAL 406. The person who commits the crime must
also know of the willingness to assist. See id. Here, Bridges admitted that when
the vehicle drove by a second time, he and several others took positions on the
street while armed. He began firing after a co-actor declared “on that car.” He
then attempted to hide the firearms involved in the shooting. Based on this
evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Bridges aided and abetted in
committing the crime of first-degree recklessly endangering safety.

¶12 As to the second factor—that a first-degree reckless homicide was
committed—the State was required to prove that one of the shooters (1) caused the
death of another person; (2) by criminally reckless conduct; and (3) the

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No. 2024AP2338-CR

circumstances of that conduct showed utter disregard for human life. WIS JI—
CRIMINAL 1022. Here, the State showed that C.F. was killed as a result of the
shots fired from one of the many shooters. A reasonable jury could find that
multiple people taking up arms and shooting at a moving vehicle, resulting in
C.F.’s death, was criminally reckless and showed utter disregard for human life.

¶13 As to the final factor—that first-degree reckless homicide was a
natural and probable consequence of first-degree recklessly endangering safety—a
reasonable jury could find that multiple people shooting at a vehicle could
naturally and probably result in the death of one of the vehicle’s occupants. Thus,
even if the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on first-degree reckless
homicide as a party to a crime, that error was harmless because it is “clear beyond
a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty
absent the error.” See Beamon, 347 Wis. 2d 559, ¶27 (citation omitted).

¶14 Bridges also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support
the first-degree reckless homicide as a party to the crime conviction because the
State did not show that he acted in concert with or was otherwise associated with
the person who killed C.F. Again, we disagree.

¶15 Although we have discussed the evidence presented at trial, for
completeness we note that when reviewing whether there was sufficient evidence
to support a jury’s verdict, this court “may not substitute its judgment for that of
the trier of fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the [S]tate and the
conviction, is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting
reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). This standard applies
whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. See id. at 503. “Our review of a

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No. 2024AP2338-CR

sufficiency of the evidence claim is therefore very narrow.” State v. Hayes, 2004
WI 80, ¶57, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203. This court “will uphold the
conviction if there is any reasonable hypothesis that supports it.” State v. Smith,
2012 WI 91, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410.

¶16 A person may be convicted as a party to a crime, even if he did not
directly commit the crime, if he intentionally aids and abets its commission. See
State v. Sharlow, 110 Wis. 2d 226, 238, 327 N.W.2d 692 (1983) (citation
omitted). As stated, a person intentionally aids and abets the commission of a
crime when he or she knowingly either assists the person who commits the crime
or is ready and willing to assist, and the person who commits the crime knows of
that willingness. See WIS JI—CRIMINAL 400. “Intent for purposes of establishing
liability as an aider and abettor is evidenced by knowledge or belief that a person
is committing or intends to commit a criminal act.” Ivy, 119 Wis. 2d at 606.

¶17 Bridges contends that the State failed to prove the requisite intent to
show that he aided and abetted the person who killed C.F. As stated, the State
presented ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The jury heard evidence
that Bridges took up arms with several other individuals, positioned himself on the
street where he saw a vehicle circle the area multiple times, began shooting with
multiple others upon hearing “on that car,” and then attempted to hide multiple
firearms. A jury is allowed to make reasonable inferences from the evidence. See
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 506. We “must accept and follow the inference drawn
by the trier of fact unless the evidence on which that inference is based is
incredible as a matter of law.” Id. at 507. The evidence supports the jury’s
inference that Bridges intended to aid and abet whoever killed C.F. We cannot
conclude that the jury’s inference is incredible as a matter of law.

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No. 2024AP2338-CR

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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