CourtListener 10802944•State v. Marion Larue Pattillo
Gesamter Gesetzestext
COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 3, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2024AP705-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF2243
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
MARION LARUE PATTILLO,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee
County: REBECCA A. KIEFER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before White, C.J., Donald, and Geenen, JJ.
Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent
or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP705-CR
¶1 PER CURIAM. Marion Larue Pattillo appeals the judgment
convicting him of physical abuse of a child (repeated acts causing bodily harm),
felony intimidation of a witness, and disorderly conduct as an act of domestic
abuse. Pattillo argues the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for
physical abuse of a child and felony intimidation of a witness.1 We disagree and
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
¶2 A jury convicted Pattillo of multiple crimes stemming from injuries
he inflicted on Donald, who was four years old at the time.2 The convictions
included repeated physical abuse of a child, based on Pattillo’s abuse of Donald,
and felony intimidation of a witness, based on a threat Pattillo made to Donald’s
half-sister, Debbie, not to tell anyone about the abuse.
¶3 At trial, the jury heard testimony that on June 19, 2020, Donald’s
mother, Cindi, called police to report that Pattillo, her live-in boyfriend and the
father of one of her children, had given Donald two black eyes, a golf-ball-sized
knot on his head, and other injuries. A pediatrician examined Donald that day and
concluded that his injuries were indicative of abuse based on their severity and
locations. The pediatrician, who was qualified as a child abuse expert, testified to
her observations of the following injuries:
1
Pattillo does not challenge the disorderly conduct conviction.
2
The parties use the pseudonyms identified herein in their briefing. Pursuant to the
policy underlying WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86(4) (2023-24), we will do the same.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
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No. 2024AP705-CR
Donald had two black eyes, usually caused by blunt force impact.
The pediatrician testified that the eyes are a protected area on the
body and that if a child’s eye was injured by accidental means, “it
would be only one side[.]” The pediatrician testified that two black
eyes raised concerns for abuse.
Donald had swelling to his head and injuries to and behind his ears.
The pediatrician opined that based on the severity and location of
those injuries, they were caused by “a large amount of force,” such
as a punch, kick, or slam, not the amount of force one would see
“with taking care of a child, or normal discipline, or anything like
that[.]” She testified that ears, like eyes, are a protected area and are
rarely injured accidentally.
Donald had two unexplained fractures. One was in his right upper
arm that the pediatrician noted was then “in the very, very early
stages of healing,” which she estimated as “definitely within two
weeks.” Donald also had a fractured rib that the pediatrician
estimated had occurred “that day, but it could have been maybe up to
a week before” she examined Donald.
¶4 Donald’s older twin siblings, David and Debbie, also testified, and
the jury viewed forensic interviews that they participated in when Donald’s
injuries were first reported. At the time Pattillo was abusing Donald, David and
Debbie were eleven years old. They lived in the home with Pattillo, Cindi,
Donald, and a baby brother. Cindi worked two jobs. As a result, the children
were frequently in Pattillo’s care without Cindi present.
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No. 2024AP705-CR
¶5 Both David and Debbie testified that Pattillo regularly beat and
mistreated Donald for minor occurrences such as urinating on himself or taking
food from the refrigerator. The following exchange took place when Debbie
testified:
[Prosecutor]: How often did [Pattillo] hit [Donald],
specifically around the week that the police came?
[Debbie]: A lot.
[Prosecutor]: Would you say it was one day that week?
Two days that week? Three? Four? Everyday that week?
[Debbie]: It depends because, like, if he peed on himself, it
was a lot, but if it wasn’t and it was just like a regular day
and he didn’t pee on himself, it was, like, always, like,
sometimes every two hours or three.
[Prosecutor]: So was it everyday but every two hours?
[Debbie]: Yeah. Yes.
[Prosecutor]: So [Patillo] hit [Donald] everyday, but how
many times that day depended on if he peed on himself?
[Debbie]: Yes.
[Prosecutor]: And if he did pee on himself, how many
times that day would [Donald] get hit?
[Debbie]: He’ll be in the corner and then always get called
on, and then, like, he always somehow, like, get beat, like,
a lot and then go back in the corner and put his hands up.
An officer who responded to Cindi’s call testified that Debbie told him Pattillo had
choked Donald until Donald was unconscious earlier that week.
¶6 David and Debbie testified that Pattillo did not abuse them or
mistreat them like he did with Donald. Debbie testified that Pattillo told her that
she would “get in trouble” if she told anyone about what he did to Donald. Debbie
testified that she understood Pattillo’s threat to mean “[n]ot being able to eat or,
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No. 2024AP705-CR
like, get treated how [Donald] was [treated].” She confirmed that when Pattillo
told her she would get in trouble, she was afraid what was happening to Donald
would happen to her.
¶7 Cindi testified that she confronted Pattillo the morning she saw
Donald’s black eyes and the knot on his head. Pattillo was evasive about what had
happened. Cindi testified that when she persisted, Pattillo reacted with violence,
flipping over a table, taking Cindi’s phone to prevent her from calling police, and
throwing a metal water bottle at Cindi so hard that it made a hole in the wall.
Pattillo then packed some belongings, called his sister, told his sister that he beat
Donald for peeing on himself, and left before police arrived. Trial testimony
revealed that Pattillo was located in Iowa a year later and extradited to Wisconsin.
¶8 After the State rested its case, Pattillo moved for dismissal as a
directed verdict. The circuit court denied the motion, and the defense rested
without presenting any evidence. Following the jury’s guilty verdicts, Pattillo
moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts. The court denied that motion as
well. Pattillo appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
¶9 The issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support
Pattillo’s convictions for repeated acts of physical abuse of Donald and felony
intimidation of Debbie. “The question of whether the evidence was sufficient to
sustain a verdict of guilt in a criminal prosecution is a question of law, subject to
our de novo review.” State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817
N.W.2d 410.
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No. 2024AP705-CR
¶10 “[A] defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears a
heavy burden to show the evidence could not reasonably have supported a finding
of guilt.” State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶21, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681.
We will sustain a verdict unless the evidence “is so lacking in probative value and
force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752
(1990). The sufficiency of the evidence test is the same regardless of whether the
evidence is direct or circumstantial. Id. at 501. In reviewing sufficiency, we
examine the totality of the evidence, view it in the light most favorable to the State
and the verdict, and adopt reasonable inferences supporting the verdict; where
more than one reasonable inference may be drawn, the inference supporting the
verdict controls. Smith, 342 Wis. 2d 710, ¶¶24, 33, 36.
¶11 We first address the sufficiency of the evidence to establish three
separate acts in which Pattillo intentionally caused Donald bodily harm during the
timeframe from June 6, 2020, through June 19, 2020. Pattillo submits that on this
record, no reasonable trier of fact could have found that three separate qualifying
acts occurred during the specified period of time. He argues that the jury’s
findings hinged on unreasonable inferences.
¶12 The State needed to prove three acts where Pattillo intentionally
caused bodily harm to Donald and that the acts took place within the specified
period of time. WIS. STAT. § 948.03(2)(b), (5)(a)-(b); WIS JI—CRIMINAL 2114A
(2019). To establish that Pattillo intentionally caused bodily harm to Donald, the
State had to prove: (1) Pattillo caused Donald bodily harm, i.e., physical pain or
injury or any impairment of physical condition; (2) Pattillo intentionally caused
that bodily harm, i.e., Pattillo had the mental purpose to cause bodily harm or the
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No. 2024AP705-CR
awareness that his conduct was practically certain to cause that result; and
(3) Donald was under eighteen years old. WIS JI—CRIMINAL 2109.
¶13 The jury did not need to unanimously agree about which three acts
constituted the physical abuse. WIS. STAT. § 948.03(5)(b); WIS. JI—
CRIMINAL 2114A. The jury merely had to agree that all three acts of physical
abuse occurred during the specific time period at issue, which here was June 6
through June 19, i.e., the two-week period ending when Cindi called police and
the pediatrician observed Donald’s injuries.
¶14 The record contains numerous statements by witnesses supporting
findings that Pattillo physically abused Donald many times during the two-week
period at issue. For example, David testified that the week leading up to June 19,
he heard Donald crying and Pattillo hitting Donald with his hand and with a plastic
bat. David also testified that Donald had bruises on his face and body that week.
¶15 Additionally, the jury heard expert testimony from a pediatrician and
saw photographs of the numerous visible bruises and other injuries on Donald’s
body on June 19. The jury could find that those injuries were less than two weeks
old.
¶16 The jury also heard Debbie’s testimony that Pattillo hit and abused
Donald “every[ ]day.” She did not exclude the two-week period before police
arrived on June 19. A police officer who responded to the residence on June 19
said that Debbie told him Pattillo choked Donald until he was unconscious earlier
in the week.
¶17 Cindi testified that on the morning of June 19, Donald had two black
eyes and a golf-ball sized knot on his head; when she asked Pattillo how that had
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No. 2024AP705-CR
happened, Pattillo would not answer her. That testimony supports the reasonable
inference that Pattillo caused those injuries to Donald within hours or a day of
Cindi’s seeing them.
¶18 Pattillo contends that some of the evidence merely “assert[ed] injury
untied to causation.” According to Pattillo, while the evidence of injury existed, it
necessitated “unreasonable inference[s] to satisfy proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that [he] caused the injuries, and did so intentionally.” We disagree with Pattillo’s
categorization of the involved inferences as unreasonable. Circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences suffice, and where competing inferences exist,
we accept the one supporting the verdict. See Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 507-08.
We conclude that the jury had more than sufficient evidence—both direct and
circumstantial—to find three separate acts in which Pattillo intentionally caused
Donald bodily harm during the timeframe at issue.
¶19 Next, we address whether the evidence was sufficient to support
Pattillo’s conviction for felony intimidation of Debbie. To find Pattillo guilty of
intimidating Debbie, the jury needed to find the following elements: (1) Debbie
was a witness; (2) Pattillo attempted to prevent or dissuade Debbie “from
attending or giving testimony at a proceeding authorized by law”; and (3) Pattillo
acted knowingly and maliciously. WIS. STAT. § 940.42; WIS JI—CRIMINAL 1292.
In addition, to find that the crime was a felony, as opposed to a misdemeanor, the
jury had to find that Pattillo’s attempt to prevent or dissuade Debbie was
“accompanied by any express or implied threat of force, violence, injury[,] or
damage[.]” WIS. STAT. § 940.43(3); WIS JI—CRIMINAL 1292.
¶20 Pattillo’s conviction for this crime stems from his statement to
Debbie that she would get in trouble if she told anyone what he did to Donald.
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No. 2024AP705-CR
Pattillo contends that Debbie’s unwavering testimony that he only said she would
get into trouble and the lack of any testimony reflecting that he threatened force,
violence, or injury toward her provided insufficient evidence for a jury to find
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the felony offense.
¶21 Pattillo ignores Debbie’s testimony that she understood “get in
trouble” to mean that she would “get treated how [Donald] was.” She
testified: “[Pattillo] said that we can’t tell nobody, or we would get in trouble, but
trouble was, I thought, what was happening to [Donald].” During trial, Debbie
described Pattillo beating Donald regularly.
¶22 The evidence supported the reasonable inference that Debbie
understood Pattillo’s saying she would get into trouble to be an implied threat of
physical violence and abuse against her. Contrary to Pattillo’s assertions on
appeal, nothing more was needed.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.
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