CRS Properties LLC v. William J. Mossuto

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 24, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP1738 Cir. Ct. No. 2022CV53

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

CRS PROPERTIES LLC,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

WILLIAM J. MOSSUTO AND LISA MOSSUTO,

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,

SAWYER COUNTY,

DEFENDANT,

V.

CARL CHRISTENSEN, CR CONTRACTING, LLC AND CAROL L.
CHRISTENSEN,

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Sawyer County:
MONICA M. ISHAM, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2024AP1738

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. William and Lisa Mossuto (husband and wife)
appeal from a summary judgment that granted CRS Properties LLC strict
foreclosure on a parcel of land subject to an amended land contract between the
parties and that dismissed the Mossutos’ counterclaims against CRS Properties and
third-party claims against two employees of CRS Properties. The issues on appeal
are: (1) whether all of the Mossutos’ claims were barred by statutes of limitations;
(2) if not, whether there were material factual disputes regarding the Mossutos’
claims; and (3) whether there were material facts in dispute regarding the Mossutos’
default status that would preclude strict foreclosure. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Pursuant to a land contract recorded in Sawyer County on June 28,
2013, William Mossuto agreed to buy a parcel of land encompassing several lots
from CRS Properties. Under this original contract, William was to pay CRS
Properties $65,000 with interest at a rate of 6% per annum, in monthly installments
of $635 for 12 years, so that the purchase would be completed by June 1, 2025.
William could take possession of the property upon closing, but title to the property
would not be conveyed until full performance of the contract by William.

¶3 The original contract required William to “pay prior to delinquency
all taxes and assessments levied on the Property,” to “keep the improvements on the
Property insured against loss or damage occasioned by fire” or other hazards, and
to “pay the insurance premiums when due.” However, the contract also required

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William to pay CRS Properties an additional $65 per month toward property taxes
and insurance. Any payments William made were to “be applied first to interest on
the unpaid balance at the rate specified and then to principal.” CRS Properties
would have the right to pursue strict foreclosure in the event of any default in the
payment of principal or interest continuing for more than 30 days.

¶4 On October 25, 2014, a fire destroyed a home located on the property.
The property was uninsured at the time of the fire. As a result of this loss, the parties
amended the land contract.

¶5 Under the amended land contract, which was recorded on February 4,
2015, CRS Properties agreed to loan $55,000 to William and his wife (who was
added to the contract) so they could reconstruct a new home on the property, making
the total principal due on the contract $120,000. The interest rate was increased to
6.25% per annum, and the monthly installment for interest and principal was
increased to $800, with the outstanding principal and interest still to be paid in full
by June 1, 2025. The Mossutos were also to make an additional $50 payment each
month to be “used for the payment of homeowner’s insurance and real estate taxes.”
All other terms of the original land contract were to remain in effect.

¶6 William paid CRS Properties $7,000 between July 1, 2013, and
December 31, 2014, while the original land contract was in effect, and another
$55,830 between January 1, 2015, and August 1, 2021, on behalf of himself and his
wife, while the amended land contract was in effect. All of the Mossutos’ payments
were applied to principal and interest.

¶7 CRS Properties paid the property tax bills for 2013, 2014, and 2018.
The Mossutos paid $3,678.64 in property taxes while the amended land contract
was in effect. CRS Properties alleged that it paid premiums to keep an insurance

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policy in place on the property from 2015 onward; however, it could produce
receipts from only 2019 forward. The Mossutos disputed at what time CRS
Properties had obtained insurance coverage for the property.

¶8 On May 26, 2022, CRS Properties filed a strict foreclosure action
against the Mossutos to recover the property. CRS Properties alleged that the
Mossutos had not made any payment on the amended land contract for over nine
months.

¶9 The Mossutos filed counterclaims against CRS Properties for
intentional misrepresentation, strict responsibility misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, property loss through fraudulent misrepresentation, civil theft,
slander of title, a violation of the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act,
declaratory judgment, and unjust enrichment. The Mossutos also filed a third-party
complaint against CRS Properties employees Carl Christensen and Carol
Christensen for breach of contract and civil theft. Broadly speaking, the Mossutos’
counterclaims and third-party claims were all premised on allegations that CRS
Properties and/or its employees had represented that CRS Properties would pay the
insurance premiums and property taxes but had taken the Mossutos’ payments
intended for those purposes without doing so. As a result of the allegedly
misapplied payments and CRS Properties’ failure to insure the property under the
original land contract, the Mossutos alleged that they had suffered the loss of the
house and incurred additional costs under the second amended land contract.

¶10 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, supported by
briefs, depositions, and affidavits. Following two hearings, the circuit court denied
the Mossutos’ motion for summary judgment on their counterclaims and third-party

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claims, and it granted CRS Properties’ summary judgment motions for strict
foreclosure and for the dismissal of all the Mossutos’ claims.

¶11 As to the Mossutos’ claims, the circuit court found both that they were
barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and that the facts alleged did not
support the elements of the claims. As to the strict foreclosure, the court made
factual findings that the Mossutos had defaulted on the payments for the amended
land contract for a period of more than 30 days and owed a redemption amount of
$132,910.73 in outstanding principal and interest. The court ordered that if the
Mossutos did not pay the full redemption amount within a period of 30 days, they
would be “forever barred of all right, title and interest as to the premises described”
in the amended land contract.

¶12 On appeal, the Mossutos challenge the circuit court’s summary
judgment decisions on both the dismissal of their claims and the strict foreclosure.

DISCUSSION

¶13 This court reviews summary judgment decisions de novo, applying
the same legal standard and methodology employed by the circuit court. Palisades
Collection LLC v. Kalal, 2010 WI App 38, ¶9, 324 Wis. 2d 180, 781 N.W.2d 503.
The legal standard is whether there are any material facts in dispute that entitle the
opposing party to a trial. Lambrecht v. Estate of Kaczmarczyk, 2001 WI 25, ¶24,
241 Wis. 2d 804, 623 N.W.2d 751. Our methodology begins with an examination
of the pleadings to determine whether the complaint states a claim and the answer
joins issue. State v. Dunn, 213 Wis. 2d 363, 368, 570 N.W.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1997).
Assuming the pleadings are sufficient, we then examine the moving party’s
supporting materials (such as depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions,
and affidavits) to determine whether they establish a prima facie case for summary

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judgment, and if so, whether the materials submitted by the opposing party are
sufficient to place in dispute any material facts that would require a trial. Id.; see
also WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2) (2023-24).1

¶14 Whether a complaint has been timely filed is a threshold question in
deciding whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief could be granted,
because an otherwise sufficient claim will be dismissed if it is time barred. John
Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶15, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d
827; WIS. STAT. § 893.05. The first issue before us, then, is whether the Mossutos’
counterclaims and third-party claims were barred by statutes of limitations.

¶15 A statute of limitations requires a claim to be brought within a
specified period of time after it has accrued—that is, when there exists a claim
capable of enforcement, a suitable party against whom it may be enforced, and a
party with a present right to enforce it. Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194
Wis. 2d 302, 315, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995); see also WIS. STAT. § 893.04. A party
has a right to enforce a claim when the party has suffered actual damage, defined as
harm that has already occurred or is reasonably certain to occur in the future.
Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 315. Under the discovery rule, a statute of limitations may
be tolled until a claimant has sufficient evidence (or should have discovered such
evidence in the exercise of reasonable diligence) to believe that a wrong had been
committed by an identified person or entity. Id. at 315-16.

¶16 Here, neither party has specifically identified in their brief(s) the
relevant statutory limitation period for each of the twelve claims the Mossutos raised
in their counterclaims and third-party complaint, other than by reference to a chart

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP1738

filed in the circuit court, which does not cite all of the relevant statutes. Nonetheless,
the parties appear to agree that all of the claims at issue would have either a three or
six-year statutory limitation period, unless tolled. Because it makes no difference
to the outcome of this case, we will assume for the sake of argument that all of the
Mossutos’ counterclaims and third-party claims have a six-year statute of
limitations.

¶17 The bulk of the Mossutos’ counterclaims and third-party claims were
premised on the theory that CRS Properties’ failure to use payments William
Mossuto had made to CRS Properties to buy insurance while the original land
contract was in effect, resulted in the uninsured loss of their home and the need to
enter into an amended land contract with less favorable terms. The Mossutos
alleged damages on these claims in the amounts of $57,450 from having to take out
a loan to build the second house; $25,883.83 in additional interest already paid under
the amended land contract; and $78,865.89 in future interest due under the amended
land contract. The Mossutos made additional claims for damages in the amount of
$3,900 for “misapplied” payments made throughout the duration of both the original
and amended land contracts that were credited against the balance the Mossutos
owed on delinquent principal and interest, rather than used to either purchase
insurance or pay property taxes.

¶18 We are satisfied that the Mossutos had all of the information they
needed to assert their counterclaims and third-party claims related to the loss of their
home and the need to enter into a less favorable land contract by the time they signed
the amended land contract. Specifically, they knew at that time that CRS Properties
had not been using William Mossuto’s payments under the original land contract to
purchase insurance; that the Mossutos had suffered a $57,450 uninsured loss; and
that they would be required to pay an additional $104,749.72 in interest under the

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No. 2024AP1738

amended land contract. Those claims therefore accrued on January 20, 2015, and
were time barred by January 20, 2021, unless tolled.

¶19 The Mossutos contend that the statutes of limitations on these claims
were tolled by the continuing violation doctrine. That doctrine is inapplicable for
at least two reasons, however.

¶20 First, the continuing violation doctrine holds that the statute of
limitations on a criminal offense that is designated by statute as eligible to be
prosecuted as a single count rather than multiple counts does not begin to run “until
the last act is done which viewed by itself is a crime.” State v. Elverman, 2015 WI
91, ¶28, 366 Wis. 2d 169, 873 N.W.2d 528 (citation omitted). The Mossutos have
cited no cases in which the doctrine ever has been used to toll the statute of
limitations for a civil claim. This court need not address arguments that are not
supported by citation to relevant authority. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646,
492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).

¶21 Second, even if the continuing violation doctrine could be applied to
civil claims, CRS Properties’ alleged failure to use the monthly $50 payments from
the Mossutos to pay insurance premiums and property taxes under the amended land
contract is distinct from any claim for damages arising from CRS Properties’ alleged
failure to use the monthly $65 payments from William Mossuto to pay insurance
premiums under the original land contract. The claims involve alleged breaches of
different contract provisions, not repeated breaches of the same original contract
provision.

¶22 The Mossutos did not file their counterclaims and third-party
complaint until March 22, 2023, well over six years after they had signed the
amended land contract on January 20, 2015. We conclude that all counterclaims

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and third-party claims seeking damages arising out of CRS Properties’ failure to pay
insurance premiums under the original land contract (i.e., the uninsured fire loss and
the need to pay additional interest under the amended land contract) are time barred.

¶23 We turn next to the Mossutos’ remaining claims that payments
intended for insurance premiums and property taxes under the amended land
contract were misapplied as credits to the outstanding amount of principal and
interest that the Mossutos owed. We conclude that, regardless of whether some of
the more recent alleged misapplications occurred within an applicable statutory
limitation period, these claims fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.

¶24 The Mossutos do not dispute that they would need to prove actual
harm in order to recover damages on their claims that payments were misapplied.
They have not, however, identified any specific harm that was caused by having
payments intended for insurance premiums or property taxes under the amended
land contract instead applied to principal and interest. In particular, the Mossutos
do not allege that they suffered any additional uninsured losses or any seizure of the
property based upon unpaid property taxes while the amended land contract was in
effect. Moreover, applying the Mossutos’ payments entirely to their outstanding
principal and interest reduced the amount of additional interest that the Mossutos
owed, to their benefit.

¶25 At points in their brief, the Mossutos appear to argue that the harm
they suffered from the alleged misapplication of payments under the amended land
contract included the uninsured fire loss and the need to enter into the amended land
contract. Any such assertion is absurd on its face. Causation does not run
backwards. We therefore conclude that the circuit court also properly dismissed

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No. 2024AP1738

any claims related to misapplied payments under the amended land contract that
were not otherwise barred by statutes of limitation.

¶26 Finally, the Mossutos contend that there are material facts in dispute
as to whether they were in default on the amended land contract. We note that strict
foreclosure is an equitable remedy under which a land contract vendor may forgo
the right to collect the amount remaining on the debt and instead recover the
property. See Steiner v. Wisconsin Am. Mut. Ins., 2005 WI 72, ¶¶25-26, 281
Wis. 2d 395, 697 N.W.2d 452. Therefore, the actual amount by which the Mossutos
were in arrears is not essential to the default determination—only whether or not the
Mossutos had been in arrears by any amount for more than 30 days.2

¶27 There is no factual dispute that William Mossuto paid CRS Properties
$7,000 between July 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014. Under the terms of the
original land contract (which required monthly payments of $635 toward principal
and interest and $65 toward insurance and property taxes), $11,430 was due for
principal and interest and $1,170 was due for insurance and property taxes during
that 18-month period. It is further undisputed that the Mossutos paid CRS
Properties $55,830 between January 1, 2015, and August 1, 2021. Under the terms
of the amended land contract (which required monthly payments of $800 toward
principal and interest and $50 toward insurance and property taxes), $64,000 was
due for principal and interest and $4,000 was due for insurance and property taxes
during that 80-month period. Thus, without even taking into account what
additional interest may have accrued due to late payments, the Mossutos were
plainly in arrears on their principal and interest payments by August 1, 2021.

2
The amount of the arrears would be relevant to determining the redemption amount, but
the Mossutos have not challenged that determination on appeal.

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No. 2024AP1738

¶28 To the extent that the parties disagree about who was required to pay
the insurance premiums and property taxes; what, if any, portion of the inadequate
payments the Mossutos made should have been applied to insurance premiums and
property taxes; or how much CRS Properties actually paid for insurance premiums
or property taxes while the amended land contract was in effect, those factual
disputes are all immaterial to the default determination. There is no potential
resolution to any of those questions that would change the fact that the Mossutos
failed to make sufficient payments to cover the principal and interest due. In fact,
if CRS Properties had applied more of the Mossutos’ payments to insurance and
property taxes as the Mossutos contend it should have done, the Mossutos would be
even further in arrears on their principal and interest.

¶29 Given that it is further undisputed that the Mossutos did not make any
additional payments after August 1, 2021, their delinquency had indisputably
continued for more than 30 days by the time this action was filed on May 26, 2022.
Accordingly, the circuit court properly determined that the Mossutos were in default
of the terms of the amended land contract and that CRS Properties was entitled to
strict foreclosure.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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