State v. Laurence C. Paine

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 31, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2023 Cir. Ct. No. 2004CF2380

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

LAURENCE C. PAINE,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
JEFFREY A. WAGNER, Judge. Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Geenen, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP2023

¶1 PER CURIAM. Laurence Paine appeals an order denying his WIS.
STAT. § 974.06 (2023-24)1 motion. He argues: (1) he is entitled to a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence; (2) the State violated his rights under Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959);
(3) his postconviction counsel was ineffective; and (4) he is entitled to
discretionary reversal in the interest of justice. We reject his arguments and
affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On April 10, 2004, Janari Saddler and Aaron Harrington were shot
and killed in an upstairs unit of a Milwaukee duplex. The State’s case at trial
relied primarily on eyewitness testimony from individuals present in the duplex.
There was no DNA evidence linking Paine to the scene. Paine denied being
present and stated that he had been at Club Paradise in Milwaukee earlier that
night; however, he was in the middle of a five-hour drive to Minneapolis while the
murders occurred. The first trial ended in a hung jury. A second jury found Paine
guilty of two counts of first-degree intentional homicide.

¶3 Paine filed a postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. The circuit court denied relief without a hearing. On appeal, this
court reversed and remanded for a Machner2 hearing. State v. Paine,
No. 2006AP2634-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Nov. 6, 2007). Following
that hearing, the circuit court again denied relief. Paine brought a second appeal,

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

2
State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).

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No. 2024AP2023

and this court affirmed. State v. Paine, No. 2008AP2307-CR, unpublished slip
op. (WI App Nov. 24, 2009).

¶4 In 2019, Paine filed another WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion, alleging
newly discovered evidence related to DNA and alternative suspect evidence. The
circuit court denied relief, and this court affirmed in State v. Paine,
No. 2019AP1677, unpublished slip op. (WI App Mar. 16, 2021).

¶5 On March 31, 2023, Paine filed the present postconviction motion.
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on February 21, 2024, and denied the
motion in a written order dated September 16, 2024. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

I. Newly Discovered Evidence

¶6 Paine argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on three
categories of newly discovered evidence: (1) de-multiplexed surveillance footage
from Club Paradise;3 (2) motel room records and related testimony; and
(3) evidence concerning an NBA game used to impeach his testimony.

¶7 To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a
defendant must show that: (1) the evidence was discovered after conviction;
(2) the defendant was not negligent in seeking the evidence; (3) the evidence is
material to an issue in the case; and (4) the evidence is not cumulative. State v.
Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶25, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60. “If the defendant is

3
Paine asserts that the original surveillance footage from Club Paradise was in a
“multiplex format,” which made it difficult to view. In February 2022, Paine states Milwaukee
Police granted his request to “demultiplex” the video footage it had in its possession, using the
department’s digital resources.

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No. 2024AP2023

able to make this showing, then ‘the circuit court must determine whether a
reasonable probability exists that a different result would be reached in a trial.’”
Id. (citation omitted).

¶8 The circuit court assumed, without deciding, that Paine satisfied the
four requisite elements for newly discovered evidence, but concluded that he
failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different result. We review the
evidence Paine now claims constitutes newly discovered evidence.

A. Surveillance Footage

¶9 The surveillance footage shows Paine at Club Paradise at
approximately 1:44 a.m. The shootings occurred around 4:00 a.m. Even if the
footage corroborates Paine’s presence at the club, it does not place him elsewhere
at the time of the murders.

B. Motel Room Evidence

¶10 The motel room evidence relates to Paine’s claim that he was in
Minnesota later in the morning on the day of the homicides. This evidence, at
most, affects the credibility of the State’s argument that Paine fabricated aspects of
his account. It does not establish that he could not have committed the crimes.

C. NBA Game Evidence

¶11 The NBA-related evidence concerns impeachment of Paine’s
testimony about a basketball game. This is collateral impeachment evidence and
does not bear directly on whether Paine was the shooter or present at the time the
shootings occurred.

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No. 2024AP2023

D. Materiality

¶12 The State’s case included eyewitness testimony identifying Paine as
the shooter. Although Paine challenges the credibility of those witnesses and
emphasizes the absence of DNA evidence linking him to the scene, the newly
discovered evidence does not undermine the core identification testimony. The
evidence does not eliminate opportunity or otherwise create a reasonable
probability of a different result. See Avery, 345 Wis. 2d 407, ¶25. Because we
conclude that there is not a reasonable probability a different result would be
reached at trial had the jury heard Paine’s newly discovered evidence, we reject
his argument that he is entitled to a new trial.

II. Brady and Napue Claims

¶13 Paine contends that the State violated his constitutional rights by
suppressing favorable evidence. See Brady, 373 U.S. 83. A Brady violation
occurs when the State suppresses favorable evidence to the accused. See Strickler
v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). “The evidence at issue must be favorable
to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently;
and prejudice must have ensued.” See id.

¶14 The record reflects that the surveillance footage was collected and
viewed before trial, and Paine was aware of its existence. Although Paine argues
that the footage required specialized equipment to interpret, the State did not
conceal the existence of the recording. The fact that the footage may have been
difficult to interpret does not establish suppression where the defense knew of the
evidence and had the opportunity to pursue it. Moreover, Paine has not
demonstrated prejudice. As explained above, the footage does not place him

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No. 2024AP2023

elsewhere at the time of the murders and therefore does not create a reasonable
probability of a different outcome. Without such a showing, Paine’s Brady claim
fails.

¶15 Paine also contends that the State violated his constitutional rights
by presenting false testimony. See Napue, 360 U.S. 264,. 269. To establish a
Napue violation, a defendant must show that the State knowingly presented false
testimony and show that the testimony was material. See id. at 265, 269 (holding
that a conviction knowingly obtained through the use of false evidence violates the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); see also Glossip v. Oklahoma,
604 U.S. 226, 246 (2025).

¶16 Paine argues that Detective Katherine Hein’s testimony at trial about
the surveillance footage from Club Paradise left the impression that no evidence
corroborated his account of where he had been earlier the evening of the murders.
He contends that the surveillance video from the club, which has now been
rendered viewable through a technical process, shows that he was at the club and
thus is corroborative of his credibility.

¶17 We reject this argument. Detective Hein did not testify at trial about
what she saw on the surveillance footage from Club Paradise. She simply
acknowledged in response to questioning that Club Paradise had surveillance
footage. She said nothing about what was on the footage. Therefore, Paine has
not shown that the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony or left the
impression that Paine was untruthful about his movements earlier the evening of
the murders.

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No. 2024AP2023

III. Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel

¶18 Paine contends that postconviction counsel was ineffective for
failing to discover and present the evidence at issue. To prevail, Paine must show
deficient performance and prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). Paine’s argument fails because he cannot demonstrate prejudice.
As discussed above, the evidence he identifies does not create a reasonable
probability of a different result at trial. Therefore, counsel’s failure to raise or
develop these arguments does not undermine our confidence in the outcome.
Paine has not established that he received ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel.

IV. Interest of Justice

¶19 Paine requests discretionary reversal in the interest of justice. See
WIS. STAT. § 752.35; Avery, 345 Wis. 2d 407, ¶38. This authority is exercised
sparingly. The record reflects that the jury heard competing accounts and assessed
witness credibility. The real controversy—whether Paine was the shooter—was
fully tried. We are not persuaded that this is the exceptional case warranting
discretionary reversal.

CONCLUSION

¶20 The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying Paine’s
postconviction motion. He has not demonstrated entitlement to relief based on
newly discovered evidence, constitutional violations, ineffective assistance, or
discretionary reversal.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

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No. 2024AP2023

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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