State v. Jordan Paul Fricke

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 31, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP278-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF605

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JORDAN PAUL FRICKE,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Milwaukee County: JEFFREY A. WAGNER, Judge. Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Donald, and Geenen, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP278-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jordan Paul Fricke appeals a judgment of
conviction for first-degree intentional homicide, two counts of first-degree
recklessly endangering safety, and maintaining a drug trafficking place. He also
appeals an order denying his postconviction motions without an evidentiary
hearing. He argues that: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing
argument warranting a new trial under the plain error doctrine; and (2) he was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
We reject both arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On February 6, 2019, Milwaukee police officers obtained and
executed a no-knock search warrant at Fricke’s residence. Officers breached the
exterior entry door and loudly announced, “Police, search warrant,” as they
ascended the stairs toward Fricke’s apartment door. Officer Matthew Rittner used
a battering ram to breach the interior door. Fricke fired four shots as the door was
being opened, fatally striking Officer Rittner and endangering two other officers in
the stairwell.

¶3 At trial, Fricke did not dispute that he shot Officer Rittner. Instead,
he asserted that he acted in self-defense because he believed unknown intruders—
not police—were breaking into his home. The jury rejected this defense and
convicted Fricke on all counts.

¶4 Fricke moved for postconviction relief, asserting prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument and ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit
court denied the claims without a hearing. This appeal follows.

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No. 2024AP278-CR

DISCUSSION

¶5 Fricke first argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during
closing argument by stating that Fricke did not claim he feared imminent harm
until his trial testimony. Fricke did not object during closing argument, so we
review this claim under the plain error doctrine. See WIS. STAT. § 901.03(4)
(2023-24).1

¶5 Plain error is error that is fundamental, obvious, and substantial.
State v. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, ¶21, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 N.W.2d 77. The
defendant bears the burden to show such an error occurred. Id., ¶23. The doctrine
is used sparingly. Id., ¶21.

¶6 Here, the prosecutor’s comments were grounded in the evidence
presented at trial. Fricke’s statements immediately after the shooting were that he
believed someone was “breaking in” to his home. Officers testified that Fricke
was upset and said he did not know police were at the door. On the body camera
footage, Fricke repeatedly asserted that he thought intruders were forcing entry,
not that he understood himself to be facing an imminent deadly attack.

¶7 Fricke’s account also developed over time. In his initial statement to
police following the shooting, Fricke described being awakened by loud noises
and hearing a “boom” at the door. At trial, however, Fricke testified that he
believed the sound was a gunshot, but he acknowledged that he had never
previously told anyone that he thought the noise was gunfire until he took the
witness stand. The prosecutor’s closing argument highlighted this timing,

1
All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP278-CR

emphasizing that Fricke’s description of the noises as gunshots—and the
implication of imminent deadly harm—was not part of his earlier explanations to
police or to others.

¶8 Counsel is afforded wide latitude in closing argument to comment
on the evidence and argue reasonable inferences from the record. State v. Burns,
2011 WI 22, ¶48, 332 Wis. 2d 730, 798 N.W.2d 166. The jury was also instructed
that arguments of counsel are not evidence and that it must draw its own
conclusions from the testimony and exhibits. In context, the prosecutor’s remarks
did not improperly inject facts outside the record, but rather asked the jury to
evaluate the credibility and timing of Fricke’s evolving account in assessing
whether he reasonably believed deadly force was necessary.

¶9 Moreover, even if the prosecutor’s remarks could be viewed as
imprecise, Fricke is not entitled to relief because any error was harmless. The
evidence supporting the jury’s rejection of self-defense was strong. Multiple
witnesses testified that the officers loudly announced “Police, search warrant,” and
Fricke testified that he heard them say police several times. Fricke fired four shots
through the door with lethal ammunition before seeing any weapon or confirming
any threat beyond forced entry. In light of the evidence, there is no reasonable
possibility that the prosecutor’s brief comments regarding the timing of Fricke’s
gunshot explanation contributed to the verdict. Accordingly, Fricke has not
demonstrated that a new trial is warranted.

¶10 Fricke next argues that trial counsel was ineffective and that he was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. A defendant is entitled to a hearing only if the
postconviction motion alleges sufficient material facts that, if true, would entitle
the defendant to relief. State v. Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, ¶27, 401 Wis. 2d 619, 974

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No. 2024AP278-CR

N.W.2d 432. A court may deny the motion without a hearing if the claims are
conclusory or the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not
entitled to relief. Id., ¶28.

¶11 To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show
both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). If a defendant fails to prove one prong, we need not address the
other. Id. at 697. Prejudice requires a reasonable probability of a different result.
Id. at 694.

¶12 Fricke first contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
introduce body camera video showing his emotional reaction after the shooting.
The record reflects that the jury heard testimony that Fricke was upset and said he
did not know police were at the door. We reject this argument because Fricke has
not demonstrated prejudice. His post-shooting remorse does not establish that he
reasonably believed that he faced imminent death or great bodily harm at the time
he fired. Moreover, any additional video evidence would have been cumulative to
Fricke’s testimony that he was upset after the shooting because he had not been
aware that the police were present. Cf. State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶44, 244
Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801 (ruling that evidence that incrementally weakens the
credibility of the witnesses was not sufficient to establish a reasonable probability
that the jury would have reached a different verdict). We conclude that counsel’s
failure to introduce the video evidence does not undermine our confidence in the
outcome.

¶13 Fricke next argues counsel was ineffective for failing to present
evidence that a loud fan impaired what he could hear as the police announced their
arrival. The circuit court noted, however, that neither Fricke nor his girlfriend

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No. 2024AP278-CR

Powell mentioned the fan during their trial testimony as a reason they could not
hear when the police arrived. Fricke fails to adequately explain how counsel was
deficient where the evidence Fricke claims should have been presented was
something that Fricke did not raise in his own trial testimony. In addition, Fricke
does not demonstrate prejudice. There is no reasonable probability that evidence
of the fan would have changed the jury’s verdict.

¶14 Fricke also argues counsel should have presented corroborating
evidence of home invasions in the neighborhood. But the jury heard Fricke’s
testimony that the area was high-crime and that he was aware of prior home
invasions. The State did not dispute that testimony. Additional evidence would
have been cumulative and would not have altered the central issue: whether Fricke
reasonably believed deadly force was necessary at the moment he fired. Because
there is no reasonable probability that additional corroborative evidence of home
invasions in the neighborhood would have changed the outcome of the trial, Fricke
cannot show prejudice. See id.

¶17 Finally, Fricke contends counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the prosecutor’s closing argument. Because we have concluded above that the
prosecutor’s argument was not improper, counsel was not deficient for failing to
object. See State v. Ziebart, 2003 WI App 258, ¶14, 268 Wis. 2d 468, 673
N.W.2d 369 (counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to or raise a meritless
claim).

¶18 In sum, Fricke’s claims are either conclusory or refuted by the
record, and he has not demonstrated deficient performance or prejudice. The
circuit court’s decision to deny the postconviction motion without an evidentiary

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No. 2024AP278-CR

hearing was within its discretion. Fricke has not established that his counsel was
ineffective.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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