County of Milwaukee v. Kent Austin Williams

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 16, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP2110 Cir. Ct. No. 2025TR8577

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

COUNTY OF MILWAUKEE,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

KENT AUSTIN WILLIAMS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee
County: MARISABEL CABRERA, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 PETRASHEK, J.1 Kent Austin Williams, pro se, appeals from a
judgment of the circuit court finding him guilty of a traffic violation for excessive

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(c) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2025AP2110

speed. Williams argues that Milwaukee County did not present sufficient
evidence to support the violation alleged. We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Williams was stopped by Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Deputy
Anthony Machowski for exceeding the speed limit in a 55-mile-per-hour zone by
between 25 and 29 miles per hour. He was issued a Wisconsin Uniform Citation.
Williams pled not guilty and the case proceeded to a bench trial, at which
Williams represented himself.

¶3 The County called Machowski, who testified that he paced a silver
Cadillac on Interstate 41 in a construction zone. He matched pace with the
Cadillac for over a mile, relying on his certified speedometer in his squad car to
determine the Cadillac’s speed, which he estimated, “to the benefit of the doubt, at
80 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour … zone.” Machowski initiated a traffic
stop and issued the citation. He identified Williams in court as the driver.

¶4 During cross-examination, Machowski admitted there were vehicles
between his squad and Williams’s vehicle while he was pacing Williams. He also
stated that the speedometer in his squad was certified, but he did not know the
specifics of that designation, adding that the information would be in the sheriff’s
department records.

¶5 After the County rested its case, Williams informed the circuit court
he did not want to testify, but he had evidence he wanted to present. The court
informed Williams he would need to first show any evidence to the prosecutor.
Williams stated he wanted to discuss misinformation on the citation. The

2
No. 2025AP2110

prosecutor suggested he could recall Machowski to ask those questions, and
Williams did so.

¶6 Williams asked Machowski what WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h) (2023-
24),2 which was listed on the citation, stated. The deputy testified there were
several speeding statutes, but he believed that subsection (4)(h) proscribed
speeding in a 55-mile-per-hour zone. Williams then offered his own commentary
in response, stating that the subsection sets a “recommended speed” of 55 miles
per hour if the road is “unmarked.” Williams added, “the whole time that I was on
that road, there were actually signs posted, saying that it was 55 miles per hour.”
Williams also asked Machowski what the notation “N” meant in the field for
“minor children” on the citation. The deputy stated he did not know, but he
recalled that Williams had a child in the car.

¶7 Williams then stated that he obtained Machowski’s dash camera
footage; however, he did not present that evidence to the court and it was not
admitted. Williams attempted to challenge the reliability of Machowski’s speed
assessment, asking Machowski about him “rattling off other numbers -- 79, 81,
83” in the dash camera footage; inquiring how Machowski decided that Williams
was going 80 miles per hour and not one of the other speeds; and suggesting,
through questioning, that the pacing assessment may have been impaired by the
presence of other vehicles. Machowski testified that he followed Williams
carefully within traffic, and he stated that he was giving Williams the “benefit of
the doubt” by issuing the citation for 80 miles per hour.

2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

3
No. 2025AP2110

¶8 In its closing argument, the County asserted that Machowski’s
testimony constituted credible evidence to establish that Williams violated the
applicable speed limit. The prosecutor stated that the deputy had years of
experience as a patrol officer, he was operating a vehicle that was regularly
maintained by his department, and the speedometer was certified at periodic
intervals. The County asserted that Machowski’s testimony established
Williams’s identity as the driver, the venue for the citation, that the speed limit at
this location was 55 miles per hour, and that Williams was traveling at least 25
miles per hour over the speed limit based on the pacing technique.

¶9 In Williams’s closing argument, he argued that WIS. STAT.
§ 346.57(4)(h) was inapplicable because it established a speed limit in the absence
of fixed limits or posted signs, and there were posted signs for the speed limit
where he was stopped. He asserted that the citation was inaccurate because
Machowski acknowledged Williams had a child with him, but the citation was
marked “N” in the minor children field. He also argued that the deputy’s pacing
method was unreliable and the deputy gave inconsistent speed estimates on the
dash camera footage.

¶10 The circuit court found Williams guilty as charged. The court noted
that the only evidence presented in the trial was Machowski’s testimony, which
the court found credible. The court stated that “based on [Deputy Machowski’s]
training and experience, he observed that Mr. Williams was driving at a high
speed” and he then paced Williams “with his certified speedometer” for “roughly,
one mile and found that, even giving Mr. Williams the benefit of the doubt, he was
going 25 over the speed limit.” There was no evidence in the record that showed
“the speedometer was defective, working improperly, or anything was wrong with
it.” The court acknowledged Williams’s allegations that the deputy made

4
No. 2025AP2110

inconsistent estimates of speed on the dash camera footage, but this footage was
not placed into evidence.

¶11 The circuit court concluded that the County met its burden by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence. The court imposed a fine in the amount
recommended by the County. Williams now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶12 Williams presents two main arguments on appeal, both of which turn
on the application of WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h). First, Williams argues in
multiple ways that there was insufficient evidence to support a violation of
subsection (4)(h). Second, he argues that the citation should have been dismissed
because it failed to properly state the ordinance violated, which deprived him of
notice and the ability to prepare a defense.

¶13 We first address Williams’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. “The standard of proof for conviction of any person charged with
violation of any traffic regulation shall be evidence that is clear, satisfactory and
convincing.” WIS. STAT. § 345.45. In a trial to the circuit court, the court’s
“[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the [circuit] court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.” WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2). When the circuit court acts as the trier of
fact, the court “is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of witnesses.” Stevenson v.
Stevenson, 2009 WI App 29, ¶14, 316 Wis. 2d 442, 765 N.W.2d 811.

¶14 As a reviewing court, we will not reject an inference drawn by the
trier of fact “when the inference drawn is reasonable.” Global Steel Prods. Corp.
v. Ecklund, 2002 WI App 91, ¶10, 253 Wis. 2d 588, 644 N.W.2d 269. We search

5
No. 2025AP2110

the record for evidence to support the findings made by the circuit court, “not for
findings that the [circuit] court could have made but did not.” Id. We will sustain
the circuit court’s findings “unless they are inherently or patently incredible or in
conflict with the uniform course of nature or with fully established or conceded
facts.” Id.

¶15 Williams asserts the County presented insufficient evidence of a
violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h). The citation described the violation as
“speeding in a 55 mph zone (25-29 mph)” and referenced the ordinance appendix
and WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h). Subsection (4)(h) provides that “[i]n the absence
of any other fixed limits or the posting of limits as required or authorized by law,”
no person shall drive a vehicle in excess of “55 miles per hour.”

¶16 Williams asserts that he was driving in a posted 55 mile-per-hour
zone, making WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h) inapplicable. In making that claim, he
relies upon dash camera footage and his own statements that the roadway had a
posted speed limit—neither of which was admitted as evidence. Williams never
sought the admission of the dash camera footage, and he declined to offer
testimony. His unsworn statements while he cross-examined Machowski were not
evidence. See WIS. STAT. § 906.03(1) (requiring all witnesses to “declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation” before testifying); WIS JI—
CIVIL 50 (2024) (stating among other rules that “evidence is” the “testimony of
witnesses given in court” and that cases must be decided solely upon “the
evidence offered and received at trial”); cf. Van De Hey v. Calumet Cnty., 40
Wis. 2d 390, 397, 161 N.W.2d 923 (1968) (noting that counsel’s commentary
upon the credibility of a witness was improper because it was based on
impeachment material that was not admitted into evidence).

6
No. 2025AP2110

¶17 In our examination of the record, there is no evidence that
establishes whether the highway had a posted speed limit. Machowski testified
only generally that they were traveling in a 55-mile-per-hour zone during the
encounter, without specifying whether the speed limit was posted. Because there
is no evidence that the highway had a posted speed, Williams cannot demonstrate
that he was improperly cited for a violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h).
Moreover, Machowski’s testimony was sufficient to establish that that the speed
limit in the area was 55 miles per hour—and Williams does not appear to dispute
that was the applicable speed limit.3

¶18 We now turn to Williams’s arguments that the evidence was
insufficient to support finding him guilty of violating a 55-mile-per-hour speed
limit by more than 25 miles per hour. He contends the evidence was insufficient
for three reasons: the County failed to establish a reliable basis for the alleged
speed; the circuit court relied upon facts not in evidence; and errors and
inaccuracies on the citation undermine its reliability. We reject all three
arguments.

¶19 Williams first argues that the County failed to present reliable
evidence that he was speeding. He asserts there was no evidence that the

3
Williams makes several other arguments that we decline to address because they are
not supported by legal authority or developed legal reasoning. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d
627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). These include (1) that the ordinance did not adopt
this statute, which is factually incorrect because MILWAUKEE COUNTY ORDINANCES APP. C
§ 1(b) (1989) adopts the chapter which includes WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h); (2) that because
Machowski could not recite the provisions of § 346.57(4)(h) at trial, his testimony was
insufficient to establish that the elements were satisfied; and (3) that the citation was fatally
defective because it did not identify the correct statute violated or adopted contrary to WIS. STAT.
§ 345.11(2), which sets forth the information required to be listed on a citation, including the
statute or ordinance violated.

7
No. 2025AP2110

speedometer in Machowski’s vehicle was properly calibrated and that pacing
requires proof of proper calibration and continuous observation. He argues that
Machowski admitted he did not personally calibrate the speedometer and
acknowledged that there were vehicles between their cars.

¶20 Contrary to Williams’s arguments, the evidence was sufficient to
establish a speeding violation. Machowski testified that he determined Williams’s
speed through pacing, he described how he determined Williams’s speed, and he
stated that his speedometer was maintained by the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s
department. The court found Machowski credible and noted that there was no
evidence that there was a problem with the speedometer. Although Williams
challenges the pacing method and speedometer, he fails to demonstrate that the
court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous or that the County’s evidence was
“patently incredible.” See Global Steel Prods. Corp., 253 Wis. 2d 588, ¶10.

¶21 Next, Williams asserts that the circuit court relied upon facts not in
evidence, specifically that the speedometer was properly calibrated, despite a lack
of evidence showing calibration. He argues that the court resolved factual
discrepancies in the State’s favor. Again, Williams did not offer evidence that the
speedometer was not properly calibrated. The court, acting as the trier of fact,
resolved factual discrepancies based on the evidence and testimony it found
credible. See Stevenson, 316 Wis. 2d 442, ¶14. Again, Williams has not shown
that the court’s findings were clearly erroneous. See Royster-Clark, Inc. v.
Olsen's Mill, Inc., 2006 WI 46, ¶12, 290 Wis. 2d 264, 714 N.W.2d 530 (“A circuit
court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the finding is against the great
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.”).

8
No. 2025AP2110

¶22 Williams also faulted the circuit court for stating it could not rely
upon any of the purported information in the dash camera footage. The court
cautioned Williams at the beginning of trial that only sworn testimony would be
considered evidence and the court must rely upon evidence in the record as the
basis of its decision. Although Williams asked Machowski about the contents of
the dash camera footage, he never requested that the court admit the footage into
the record. While the small claims procedure directs the court to admit evidence
“having reasonable probative value,” a party still must present the evidence to the
court and request admission. See WIS. STAT. § 799.209(2). Williams did neither,
and we cannot review a claim that the court denied Williams’s right to present
evidence when Williams did not attempt to do so. We conclude that Williams
forfeited appellate review of this argument.4 See State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30,
315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (discussing that the failure to exercise a right at
trial may forfeit a right of appellate review).

¶23 As for Williams’s statements in court related to the contents of the
dash camera footage, those statements, again, were not evidence. Williams chose
not to testify as a sworn witness. Although trials on traffic forfeiture actions occur
under small claims procedures, which are generally informal, an unsworn
statement in court is not considered evidence.5 See WIS. STAT. § 799.209(1)-(2)
(directing the circuit court to allow “each party to present arguments” and to admit
evidence “having reasonable probative value” while allowing it to “exclude

4
Likewise, by failing to seek to admit the dash camera footage, Williams has forfeited
his argument that the circuit court denied his right to present a defense.
5
The circuit court applies the procedures in small claims actions under WIS. STAT. ch.
799 when it conducts trials on forfeiture actions for violations of traffic regulations. WIS. STAT.
§§ 345.20(2)(a), 799.01(1)(b), 799.209.

9
No. 2025AP2110

irrelevant or repetitive evidence or arguments”); WIS. STAT. § 906.03(1); WIS JI—
CIVIL 50 (discussing that sworn testimony is considered evidence).

¶24 Next, Williams argues that the citation contains errors and
inaccuracies that undermine its reliability. He points to the notation “N” in the
“minor passengers” field, which he argues meant there were no minor passengers.
However, Machowski testified that Williams’s child was in the vehicle.6 Williams
has not established the meaning or relevance of the “N” and we are not persuaded
this undermines the citation’s reliability or makes the court’s findings and
inferences unreasonable.7 See Global Steel Prods. Corp., 253 Wis. 2d 588, ¶10.

¶25 We also reject Williams’s argument that the contents of the citation
impaired his ability to prepare an adequate defense. “A criminal charge must be
sufficiently stated to allow the defendant to plead and prepare a defense.” State v.
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 250, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988). 8 A defendant is
not prejudiced by errors if “the charging document verbally describes the offense
but refers to the wrong statute[.]” State v. Scott, 2017 WI App 40, ¶10, 376

6
We note that Machowski testified to not knowing what the “N” signified. While
Williams’s position is logical, he has not provided legal authority for that position or shown
evidence in the record to support that the citation indicates that minor children were not present.
See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646. Williams has not argued that the offense or penalty is affected by
having minor passengers in the vehicle.
7
Williams also argues that when a conviction relies upon a sole witness, errors such as
those on the citation cannot be considered harmless. He offers no legal authority for this position.
We decline to consider this argument. See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646.
8
Williams supports his due process arguments with criminal law cases, which are an
imperfect fit because violations of state traffic laws with monetary forfeitures as penalties are
civil offenses. State v. Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d 616, 621, 312 N.W.2d 784 (1981). Williams has
not established the applicability of criminal law standards. Nonetheless, we consider the law as it
relates to due process rights under the federal and Wisconsin constitutions. See State v.
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 645, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990).

10
No. 2025AP2110

Wis. 2d 430, 438, 899 N.W.2d 728. Even if Williams asserts that he was unsure
which statute he violated, the citation provides sufficient “notice of the nature and
cause of the accusations” to allow Williams to prepare a defense to violating a 55-
mile-per-hour speed limit, which he appears to agree was the applicable speed
limit regardless of whether it was posted. See id. Williams has failed to establish
that his right to due process was violated by the contents of the citation.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

11