Waupaca County DH&HS v. M. M. C.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 25, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos.
2026AP498 Cir. Ct. No. 2024TP13

2026AP647
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO C.M.C.,
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

WAUPACA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J.L.C.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO C.M.C.,
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

WAUPACA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.
Nos. 2026AP498
2026AP647

M.M.C.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from an order of the circuit court for Waupaca County:
VICKI L. CLUSSMAN, Judge. Reversed and causes remanded with directions.

¶1 GRAHAM, P.J.1 J.L.C. and M.M.C. each appeal the circuit court
order that terminated their parental rights to their child, C.M.C. The parents argue
that the court erred in granting Waupaca County’s motion for partial summary
judgment during the grounds phase of these termination of parental rights (TPR)
proceedings. The ground on which summary judgment was granted—continuing
denial of visitation—requires the County to prove that the parents received notice
of the conditions for resuming visitation with C.M.C. The County has not shown
that the parents received adequate notice of the conditions for resuming visitation,
so the ground was not satisfied.

¶2 I therefore reverse the order terminating J.L.C.’s and M.M.C.’s
parental rights and direct that on remand, the circuit court grant partial summary
judgment to both parents on the continuing denial of visitation ground. This grant
of partial summary judgment will not prevent the court from conducting further
proceedings as needed regarding the remaining alleged grounds for terminating
J.L.C.’s and M.M.C.’s parental rights.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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BACKGROUND

¶3 M.M.C. is C.M.C.’s mother, and C.M.C was removed from her care
in April 2023, shortly after C.M.C.’s birth. Testing of both mother and child
revealed positive results for THC, amphetamines, and opiates. C.M.C. was placed
with M.M.C.’s mother. The County filed a petition to have C.M.C. declared to be
a child in need of protection and services (CHIPS), and a CHIPS order was
entered later that same month.

¶4 There was an “emergency change of placement” in the CHIPS case
in October 2023, and C.M.C. was placed in the home of a foster family. M.M.C.
had regular visitation with C.M.C. during this time, and beginning in February
2024, J.L.C.—who had not initially been involved in the CHIPS case because he
had not been identified as C.M.C.’s father—began to have visitation as well. In
June of that same year, the foster parents alleged that C.M.C. showed problematic
behaviors after visiting with her birth parents. In response, M.M.C. voluntarily
suggested suspending visitation.

¶5 In July 2024, the CHIPS court entered an order formally suspending
visits between C.M.C. and her parents. The CHIPS court later amended that order
in April 2025. I discuss the July 2024 and April 2025 orders, which are the basis
of the grant of summary judgment in this TPR proceeding, at greater length below.

¶6 Meanwhile, in October 2024, the County filed a petition to terminate
both M.M.C.’s and J.L.C.’s parental rights. The petition, which initiated this TPR
proceeding, alleged two grounds as to both parents: continuing CHIPS under WIS.
STAT. § 48.415(2)(a), and failure to assume parental responsibility under
§ 48.415(6). The petition also alleged an additional ground as to J.L.C.:
abandonment under § 48.415(1)(a)2. and 3.

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¶7 The case was set for a jury trial to be held in September 2025.
However, in July 2025, the County filed an amended petition adding a new ground
for termination as to each parent: continuing denial of visitation under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.415(4). On the same day, the County moved for summary judgment on this
new continuing denial of visitation ground. The County based the new ground, as
well as the summary judgment motion, on the July 2024 order from the CHIPS
court that denied visitation, and the fact that a year had passed without that court
amending the order to permit visitation.

¶8 The parents objected to the amended petition and opposed the
motion for summary judgment. In particular, they pointed out that the original
July 2024 order denying visitation had not remained in force for a full year. As
the parents explained, the CHIPS court had entered an April 2025 “Order for
Revision of Dispositional Order with Termination of Parental Rights Notice,” and
that order imposed a set of conditions for resuming visitation that were
substantially different from the conditions that had been imposed by the July 2024
order. The parents argued that WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4) does not contemplate that
the one-year period of denial of visitation can be comprised of periods of less than
a year that are governed by different conditions for the resumption of visitation.
Alternatively, the parents argued that if the statute permitted termination of their
rights based in part on a failure to satisfy conditions that were added three months
before the end of the one-year period, that interpretation of the statute would
violate the parents’ due process rights. The parents also argued that some of the
conditions for resumption of visitation were impossible for them to meet.

¶9 The circuit court granted summary judgment to the County on the
continuing denial of visitation ground. The grant of summary judgment obviated
the need for a trial on grounds, and the case moved to the dispositional phase.

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After an evidentiary hearing, the court determined that the termination of both
parents’ rights was in C.M.C.’s best interests. J.L.C. and M.M.C. appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶10 There is a “two-part statutory procedure” for an involuntary
termination of parental rights in Wisconsin. Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47,
¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856. In the first factfinding or “grounds” phase,
the petitioner must prove the existence of “one or more of the statutorily
enumerated grounds for termination of parental rights” by clear and convincing
evidence. Id.; WIS. STAT. § 48.31(1). If such grounds are found to exist, the
circuit court then proceeds to the second “dispositional” phase, in which it decides
whether it is in the best interests of the child that the parent’s rights be terminated.
Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27; WIS. STAT. § 48.426(2).

¶11 Here, the circuit court concluded the grounds phase by granting
summary judgment to the County on one of the alleged grounds. Parental
unfitness may be decided on summary judgment if there are no material facts in
dispute. Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶5. This court reviews a grant of summary
judgment de novo. Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 164 Wis. 2d 639, 651, 476
N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1991). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are
no material facts in dispute and a party is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law. WIS. STAT. § 802.08; Tomlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins.
Co., 95 Wis. 2d 215, 218, 290 N.W.2d 285 (1980).

¶12 J.L.C. and M.M.C. argue that the circuit court erred when it
concluded that the WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4) ground for termination of parental
rights had been met as a matter of law. That ground is established by proving:

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(a) That the parent has been denied periods of
physical placement by [a] court order in an action affecting
the family or has been denied visitation under an order
under [WIS. STAT. §§] 48.345, 48.363, 48.365, 938.345,
938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice required by [WIS.
STAT. §§] 48.356(2) or 938.356(2).

(b) That at least one year has elapsed since the order
denying periods of physical placement or visitation was
issued and the court has not subsequently modified its order
so as to permit periods of physical placement or visitation.

§ 48.415(4). Focusing on the statutory language that pertains to this case, the
questions are whether the parents had “been denied visitation under an order under
[§] 48.345 … containing the notice required by [§] 48.356(2)” and whether “at
least one year has elapsed since the order denying … visitation was issued and the
court has not subsequently modified its order so as to permit periods of …
visitation.”

¶13 There are no pattern jury instructions for this ground, and there are
few cases interpreting it. WIS JI—CHILDREN 335 (“No instruction is
recommended.”) But no party disputes that here, the County was required to
prove that the parents were denied visitation by a court order in a CHIPS case; that
the order denying visitation contained written notice of any ground for termination
of parental rights that might be applicable and the conditions necessary for the
parents to be granted visitation; and that the order had been in place for at least
one year without having been modified to allow visitation. WIS. STAT.
§ 48.415(4).

¶14 The parents offer several arguments that these elements were not
satisfied. Among other things, the parents argue that the orders denying visitation
did not “contain[] the notice required by [WIS. STAT. §] 48.356(2).” There is no
dispute that the CHIPS court’s July 2024 order gave notice of potential TPR

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grounds; the argument is that the order did not give notice of the conditions
necessary for the parents to resume visitation.

¶15 I agree with the parents that they did not receive notice of the
conditions to resume visitation, and that this lack of notice requires reversal of the
summary judgment. I reach this conclusion because, even assuming that the July
2024 order and the April 2025 order can be considered together as covering the
entire one-year period, these orders failed to give adequate notice of what the
parents needed to do to resume visitation. See Waukesha County v. Steven H.,
2000 WI 28, ¶37, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607 (WIS. STAT. § 48.356(2) “is
meant to ensure that a parent has adequate notice” of conditions). Accordingly, I
do not address the other arguments the parents raise.2

¶16 The July 2024 order sets forth three broad categories of conditions,
each of which is followed by a bulleted list of more specific conditions that fall
within the broad categories. The three categories are: “Complete a psychological
evaluation and complete any recommendations per the approved provider”;
“Participate in meaningful visitation reintegration per the recommendations of the
2
See League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 2013 WI App
77, ¶93 n.13, 348 Wis. 2d 714, 834 N.W.2d 393 (“[A]ppellate courts need not address non-
dispositive issues.”). Among the issues I decline to address are as follows. J.L.C. argues that
because he was not a party to the CHIPS case until some months after the initial July 2024 order
was entered, he cannot reasonably be said to have been denied visitation by that order for a full
year. Both parents renew their argument that the April 2025 order, which imposed new
conditions for the resumption of visitation, interrupted the one-year period that began with the
July 2024 order, such that the parents were not “denied visitation under an order” for “at least one
year.” WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4) (emphasis added). The parents also argue that some of the listed
conditions for resumption of visitation would be impossible for them to meet in the absence of
contact with C.M.C.: for example, the requirements that they “[m]ake sure that your child see[s]
the doctor and dentist when [s]he should,” and that they visit the child without including other
family members. The parents further argue that terminating their parental rights based on
conditions for resuming visitation that changed substantially three months before the end of the
one-year period would violate their rights to due process.

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psychological evaluation”; and “Show that you can care for and control your child
properly and that you understand her special needs.” After each of the three
category headings, the order states: “This condition includes but is not limited to”
a bulleted list of conditions that follow. (Emphasis in original.) In total, the order
lists 22 specific conditions under the three broad headings.

¶17 As shown, the July 2024 order expressly states that the conditions
are “not limited to” the specific items that are listed under each heading. The
“includ[ing] but … not limited to” language unambiguously contemplates that the
parents may have been required to satisfy additional unspecified conditions before
they would be able to resume visitation with C.M.C. If the conditions are “not
limited to” those that are listed in the order, it follows the order does not specify
all of the “conditions necessary” to resume visitation, contrary to WIS. STAT.
§ 48.356(2). As the parents note, when the revised order was issued in April 2025,
additional conditions were added and the “not limited to” language was removed,
further indicating that the July 2024 order was not complete in its list of
requirements for resuming visitation.

¶18 The County’s sole response to the parents’ argument that the July
2024 order did not purport to list all of the conditions for resumption of visitation
is to offer a different interpretation of that order. The County asserts that the three
broad headings were the only “conditions” that were imposed on resuming
visitation, and the items listed after each heading were merely “examples and
ways to comply with the condition.” This is not a tenable interpretation of the
language of the July 2024 order, which expressly states that each heading
“includes” the listed items. It strains credulity to suggest that, for example, the
instruction to “[t]ake any medications that your treating doctor or psychiatrist tells
you to” or to “[p]articipate in parenting education with the assigned parent aid”

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were merely “examples” rather than specific conditions that the County was
expecting the parents to meet before they could resume visitation with C.M.C.

¶19 The County may also be arguing that the substance of any conditions
is immaterial to establish the continuing denial of visitation ground. It argues that
“[t]he focus [of this ground] is on the amount of time a parent goes without seeing
his or her child, not the conditions.”

¶20 If the County is making this argument, it is undermined by this
court’s decision in Chippewa County v. C.F., No. 2025AP1744, unpublished slip
op. (WI App Jan. 21, 2026).3 There, the circuit court had granted summary
judgment against a mother on the continuing denial of visitation ground, and on
appeal, the mother argued that the order denying visitation did not give adequate
notice of the conditions she needed to meet in order to be granted visitation with
her child. Id., ¶1. The County relied in part on a memorandum listing conditions
which had been incorporated into the order denying visitation. Id., ¶¶4-5, 17-18.
The C.F. court concluded that the conditions in the memorandum did not satisfy
the County’s obligation to give the notice required by WIS. STAT. § 48.356. C.F.,
No. 2025AP1744, ¶¶18-19. In addition to other defects, the memorandum
described the listed items as being “among the conditions” that had been ordered.
Id. The C.F. court observed that “[s]tating that these three conditions were
‘among’ the conditions of reunification … indicates that there may have been
other conditions that the County did not include,” and reversed the termination of
parental rights on that basis. Id., ¶¶19-20.

3
I cite Chippewa County v. C.F., No. 2025AP1744, unpublished slip op. (WI App
Jan. 21, 2026) for its persuasive value pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b).

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¶21 Here, the parents rely on this line of reasoning from C.F., and the
County does not meaningfully distinguish it. Although C.F. is not binding, I find
it to be persuasive on these points. An order denying visitation, with its attached
conditions for resumption of visitation, is an important legal document. It controls
whether a parent is allowed to see the parent’s child, which is a weighty
constitutional matter. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Still more
gravely, as in this case, the terms of the order can determine whether a parent’s
right to be involved with the child is forever extinguished. A document of this
significance must be sufficiently precise so that a parent receives meaningful
notice of the conduct that is expected of the parent to regain visitation with the
child. WIS. STAT. § 48.356(2). The substance of the written conditions may not
be the focus of the continuing denial of visitation ground, but any argument that
the adequacy of the notice of conditions is wholly immaterial is unavailing.

¶22 For these reasons, I conclude that the circuit court erred in granting
summary judgment to the County on the continuing denial of visitation ground.
The County does not argue that there are material factual disputes that would
require a jury trial on this ground, and no such disputes are apparent from the
record. Accordingly, I reverse the order terminating the parents’ rights to C.M.C.
and remand with directions that the parents be granted summary judgment on the
continuing denial of visitation ground. Further proceedings may be had on the
remaining alleged grounds.

By the Court.—Order reversed and causes remanded with directions.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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