Mercer County Board of Education v. Rosemary S. Mitchell

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

FILED
MERCER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, May 1, 2026
Employer Below, Petitioner ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
v.) No. 25-ICA-427 (JCN: 2025009081)

ROSEMARY S. MITCHELL,
Claimant Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mercer County Board of Education (“MCBOE”) appeals the October 6,
2025, order of the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (“Board”).1 Respondent
Rosemary Mitchell did not respond. The issue on appeal is whether the Board erred in
reversing the claim administrator’s order, which rejected the claim.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the Board’s order is appropriate under
Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The claim administrator issued an order dated April 2, 2025, rejecting the claim on
the basis that Ms. Mitchell did not sustain an injury in the course of and resulting from her
employment. The order also indicated that the decision was based on a determination that
the injury “Does not Meet Statutory Definition of accident.”

In her protest letter Ms. Mitchell submitted to the Board dated April 22, 2025, she
stated that she was at work in the superintendent of schools’ office, discussing a situation,
when she stood up and rolled her right ankle and injured her foot. Ms. Mitchell alleged that
she got her right foot hung on the side of the chair and when she stood, the ankle rolled.
She identified the superintendent and the administrative assistant as witnesses to the
accident. Ms. Mitchell stated that she was directed by her employer to file an accident
report, and that the accident occurred during the regular workday. Ms. Mitchell indicated
that she was treated at the Orthopedic Center of the Virginias and was diagnosed with a

1
MCBOE is represented by Steven K. Wellman, Esq., and James W. Heslep, Esq.
Ms. Mitchell did not appear.

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hair-line fracture, sprain, and possible ligament damage. Ms. Mitchell stated that she was
prescribed a boot to stabilize her right foot, and that the accident impaired her mobility for
the first three weeks following the injury, but she continued working.

The Board indicates that:

The claimant attached a March 28, 2025, letter from the Claim Administrator
to her and the protested Order dated April 2, 2025, to the April 22, 2025,
protest letter. The letter stated that it had been notified that the claimant was
injured recently and that the injury may have occurred in the course of her
employment. She was advised that the Claim Administrator would be
collecting information to determine whether the injury should be covered by
her employer’s workers’ compensation insurance. The letter indicated that a
brochure was enclosed that would help her understand what happens now
that a workers’ compensation claim had been filed for her injury. The letter
indicated that a medical records release was attached and the claimant was
asked to sign and return the form. A copy of the brochure and the medical
release were also attached to her April 22, 2025, protest letter.

On October 6, 2025, the Board reversed the claim administrator’s order, which
rejected the claim. The Board found that, based on a preponderance of the evidence, Ms.
Mitchell has established that she sustained an injury to the right lower extremity in the
course of and resulting from her employment on March 25, 2025. MCBOE now appeals
the Board’s order.

Our standard of review is set forth in West Virginia Code § 23-5-12a(b) (2022), in
part, as follows:

The Intermediate Court of Appeals may affirm the order or decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Board of Review or remand the case for further
proceedings. It shall reverse, vacate, or modify the order or decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Board of Review, if the substantial rights of the
petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the Board of Review’s
findings are:

(1) In violation of statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Board of Review;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedures;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or

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(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.

Syl. Pt. 2, Duff v. Kanawha Cnty. Comm’n, 250 W. Va. 510, 905 S.E.2d 528 (2024).

MCBOE argues that Ms. Mitchell failed to establish a compensable claim. MCBOE
admits that the evidence on record establishes that Ms. Mitchell sustained an ankle injury
while standing up from a chair. However, MCBOE argues that Ms. Mitchell’s employment
offered no increased risk of injury beyond what any other person would have sustained
outside of their employment. MCBOE characterizes Ms. Mitchell’s injury as “idiopathic.”
Finally, MCBOE argues that the finding of compensability in this claim is in contradiction
to the increased risk test set forth in Hood v. Lincare Holdings, Inc., 249 W. Va. 108, 894
S.E.2d 890 (2023). We disagree.

Three elements must coexist in workers’ compensation cases to establish
compensability: (1) a personal injury (2) received in the course of employment and (3)
resulting from that employment. Barnett v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 153 W. Va.
796, 172 S.E.2d 698 (1970); Sansom v. Workers’ Comp. Comm’r, 176 W. Va. 545, 346
S.E.2d 63 (1986).

In Hood, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held, “[i]n the context of
workers’ compensation law, there are four types of injury-causing risks commonly faced
by an employee at work: (1) risks directly associated with employment; (2) risks personal
to the claimant; (3) mixed risks; and (4) neutral risks.” Hood at 110, 894 S.E.2d at 892, syl.
pt. 4.

Here, the Board noted the following regarding Hood and its application to the instant
case:

The Court, in Hood, referred to several memorandum decisions, including
American Medical Facilities v. Parsons, 2021 WL 1595434, at *1 (W. Va.
Apr. 23, 2021) (memorandum decision). The Hood Court stated that in
Parsons the factfinder was evaluating an injury within the first category of
risk, which is risks directly associated with employment because the
mechanism of injury was clear. The Court stated that Ms. Parsons, a nurse,
fell while walking through a tunnel “when her feet ‘got stuck’ and she fell to
the ground” and concurred that Ms. Parsons sustained a compensable injury
when she slipped and fell while walking to an employer-owned breakroom.
The Court cited to other claims that were not held compensable and noted
that, in those cases, the claimants did not trip or fall and the claimant’s knee
simply buckled/gave out. Similarly, in affirming the denial of Mr. Hood’s
claim, the Court noted that he did not slip, trip, or fall, and he was not

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carrying anything. The facts in the instant matter are very similar to the facts
presented in Parsons and distinguishable from the facts presented in Hood.
The uncontradicted evidence in the subject claim shows that the claimant was
at work on March 25, 2025; she was in the superintendent’s office; she was
discussing an issue with the superintendent; when she started to stand up, her
root foot got hung up on the chair and she rolled her right ankle; and that the
superintendent and the administrative assistant witnessed the accident. The
Court in Hood stated that the evaluation of the facts in Parsons was related
to an injury within the first category of risk, which is risks directly associated
with employment because the mechanism of injury was clear.

Further, the Board found that:

The claimant indicated in her written protest letter that her right foot got hung
on the chair when she went to stand from a seated position. There is no
evidence such as the claimant’s testimony to rebut her statement that her right
foot got hung on the chair as she stood causing her to roll her right ankle.
Further, there is no evidence such as pre-injury medical records that suggest
that the claimant had issues with lower extremity (knee or ankle) instability
or issues falling that would account for a sudden fall when standing from a
seated position if her right foot did not get caught up on the chair while she
stood from a seated position as she alleged. Based on the record, it is more
likely than not that the claimant’s right foot got caught up on the chair while
she stood from a seated position, which caused her to roll her right ankle.
The fact that the claimant’s right foot got caught up on the chair where she
was sitting during a meeting with the superintendent, as opposed to simply
having her knee or ankle give out while standing, supports a finding that the
right lower extremity injury resulted from her employment.

MCBOE cites this Court’s holding in Carter v. Humana, Inc., 24-ICA-283, 2024
WL 5201014 (W. Va. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2024) (memorandum decision), in support of its
arguments.2 In Carter, we affirmed the Board’s finding that the claimant did not sustain an
injury in the course of and resulting from her employment when she suffered a knee injury
while standing from a couch. We note that the claimant in that case did not catch her foot
on the couch while standing, she simply experienced pain in her knee while coming to a
standing position. We find that the instant case is more similar to Little Dogs Daycare v.
Carroll, 25-ICA-287, 2025 WL 3709035 (W. Va. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2025) (memorandum
decision). In Little Dogs Daycare, this Court affirmed the Board’s finding that the claimant
sustained an injury to the left lower extremity in the course of and resulting from her

2
The SCAWV affirmed this Court’s decision in Carter v. Humana, Inc., No. 25-
124, 2025 WL 3152588 (W. Va. Sept. 12, 2025) (memorandum decision).
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employment when she was attempting to stand from a chair and her foot became caught on
the bottom of the chair, and she fell. Like the claimant in Little Dogs Daycare, Ms.
Mitchell’s injury arose from more than simply standing or walking. She describes a
mechanism of injury caused by a definite, isolated, and fortuitous event, i.e., slipping or
tripping on a chair. “Whether an injury occurs in the course of and resulting from the
employment so as to be compensable under the workmen's compensation act depends upon
the particular facts in each case.” Syl. Pt. 2, Emmel v. State Comp. Dir., 150 W. Va. 277,
145 S.E.2d 29 (1965).

Further, we find no merit in MCBOE’s argument that the injury in this claim was
idiopathic in nature, meaning that the cause of the injury is unknown, nor that the injury
should have been evaluated as such. “In determining whether an injury resulted from
claimant's employment, a causal connection between the injury and employment must be
shown to have existed.” Syl. Pt. 2, Morton v. West Virginia Office of Ins. Comm’r, 231 W.
Va. 719, 749 S.E.2d 612 (2013). We note, as did the Board, that the clear cause of the
injury is Ms. Mitchell’s foot getting caught in a chair as she was standing up, meaning that
the cause and mechanism of the injury are known.

Upon review, we conclude that the Board was not clearly wrong in finding that Ms.
Mitchell sustained a left ankle injury in the course of and as a result of her employment.
Further, we conclude that the Board was not clearly wrong in finding that this claim fell
within the first risk category of Hood, and evaluating the claim under that category. As the
SCAWV has set forth, “[t]he ‘clearly wrong’ and the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standards
of review are deferential ones which presume an agency’s actions are valid as long as the
decision is supported by substantial evidence or by a rational basis.” Syl. Pt. 3, In re Queen,
196 W. Va. 442, 473 S.E.2d 483 (1996). With this deferential standard of review in mind,
we cannot conclude that the Board was clearly wrong in reversing the claim administrator’s
order, which rejected the claim.

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s October 6, 2025, order.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: May 1, 2026

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge S. Ryan White

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