Mars Labs Properties, LLC v. John B. Bowman and Charlotte D. Bowman

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
June 2, 2026
MARS LABS PROPERTIES, LLC,
ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA

v.) No. 25-ICA-321 (Cir. Ct. Hardy Cnty. Case No. CC-16-2024-C-27)

JOHN B. BOWMAN and
CHARLOTTE D. BOWMAN,
Defendants Below, Respondents

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mars Labs Properties, LLC (“Mars Labs”) appeals the July 14, 2025,
order from the Circuit Court of Hardy County granting Respondents John B. Bowman and
Charlotte D. Bowman’s (collectively “the Bowmans”) Motion for Summary Declaratory
Judgment, denying Mars Labs’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment, and declaring that the
1.42 acre portion of land at issue is vested with the Bowmans. The Bowmans filed a
response.1 Mars Labs filed a reply.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate
under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Mars Labs and the Bowmans are owners of adjoining property located in Hardy
County, West Virginia. Both the Mars Labs tract and the Bowmans’ tract border property
owned by Jeremy Hawse, who is a non-party to this action. This action seeks to quiet title
to a 1.42-acre triangular parcel of land (hereafter “the disputed tract”), which is bordered
by the Bowmans’, Mars Labs’, and Hawse’s parcels.

On October 27, 1915, Jacob and Lucy Beam conveyed what is now the Bowmans’
parcel to Lorenzo and Minnie See. During the time that Lorenzo and Minnie See owned
the Bowmans’ tract, John F. Hawse owned the Hawse’s tract. On March 10, 1923, John F.
Hawse and Lorenzo See had the boundaries of their respective parcels surveyed by Henry
Hisghman (hereafter the “1923 Hisghman survey”). The 1923 Hisghman survey stated that

1
Mars Labs is represented by Gerald J. Langan, Esq. The Bowmans are represented
by Jonathan G. Brill, Esq., and Amanda W. Greene, Esq.

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Mr. Hisghman was requested to re-survey three lines between the adjoining Hawse and
See properties. Mars Labs argues that the following description from the Hisghman survey
was not included in earlier deeds: “Beginning at a blackoak, Thence North 59 West 17-4/5
poles to a planted stone at the end of the wire fence where 3 pines stood as the original
corner, on a hill.” The Hisghman survey was recorded on November 6, 1929, with the
Hardy County Clerk’s Office, and it is undisputed that neither John F. Hawse nor Lorenzo
See contested the 1923 Hisghman survey. In 1937, Henry Hisghman again surveyed the
Hawse parcel and prepared a plat, and the parties now dispute whether this survey
demonstrates an error in boundary lines drawn in the earlier 1923 Hisghman survey.

Lorenzo and Minnie See continued to own what would become the Bowmans’
parcel from the time of the 1923 Hisghman survey until their deaths in the 1970s.
Following their deaths, Attorney Ralph Bean was charged with settling Minnie See’s estate
and selling her and Lorenzo’s real estate. In June of 1972, Mr. Bean conducted a public
sale of Lorenzo and Minnie See’s land, and S. Barnes Bowman, Louise Bowman, Stanley
B. Bowman, and Judy Ann Bowman were the highest bidders. By deed dated September
12, 1972, Ralph Bean conveyed Minnie See’s property to S. Barnes Bowman, Louise
Bowman, Stanley B. Bowman, and Judy Ann Bowman. On May 15, 1976, Stanley B.
Bowman and Judy Ann Bowman conveyed their interests in this property to S. Barnes
Bowman and Louise Bowman. Finally, the heirs of S. Barnes Bowman and Louise
Bowman conveyed their interests to John, who is the son of S. Barnes Bowman, and his
wife Charlotte Bowman in a deed dated June 22, 2021.

Further, John F. Hawse continued to own the Hawse tract from the time of the 1923
Hisghman survey until May 5, 1948, when he conveyed the Hawse tract to his wife and
child. The Hawse tract continued to pass through generations of the Hawse family and was
conveyed to its current owner Jeremy Hawse by deed dated August 29, 2023.

In addition, the property that would become the Mars Labs tract was conveyed by
deed dated December 15, 1951, to James Bowman, who was the brother of S. Barnes
Bowman. James Bowman and his wife Reva Bowman resided on the Mars Labs tract until
Reva Bowman’s death in 2016 when she conveyed the property to her children. In 2020,
Reva Bowman’s heirs transferred the property into a limited liability company titled
“Moyers, LLC,” 2 and Moyers, LLC, decided to sell to Mars Labs. To assist with the sale,
Reva Bowman’s heirs and Mars Labs engaged the services of surveyor Tony Whetzel. In
November of 2021, Mr. Whetzel surveyed Reva Bowman’s property and did not include
the disputed tract as part of her property. Mr. Whetzel concluded that the Reva Bowman
property was bounded by a straight line that ran along the boundary of the Hawse tract to

2
Prior to this transfer, Reva Bowman’s heirs conveyed approximately 6.81 acres of
the parcel to Jimmie and Kathy Parker. No party argues that this excised portion of the
parcel has any relevance to the result in this matter.

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a point in the Bowmans’ tract fence line and did not include the disputed tract. Mr. Whetzel
later revised the plat of his survey to include the disputed tract but made a note stating the
disputed tract “appear[ed] to have been claimed by Reva Bowman or her predecessors in
title” but that “no ownership could be found in the Reva Bowman title chain.”

In a deed dated January 21, 2022, Moyers, LLC, conveyed the Mars Labs tract to
Mars Labs. That deed conveyed Moyers, LLC’s purported interest in the disputed tract
separately from the remainder of the Mars Labs tract via quitclaim deed. Following this
sale, the Bowmans became concerned about the disputed tract and began construction of a
new fence. Before constructing the fence, the Bowmans had their land surveyed by Kerry
Schultz, and Mr. Schultz concluded that the disputed tract was part of the Bowmans’
property.

On September 18, 2024, Mars Labs filed a petition for preliminary injunction
pursuant to Rule 65 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure to enjoin the Bowmans
from the continued construction of a fence on the disputed tract, which Mars Labs alleged
it owned. Mars Labs alleged the Bowmans were claiming ownership of the disputed tract,
had cleared the land, appeared to be placing a fence, and were prohibiting Mars Labs from
possession of its property. The petition further sought to eject the Bowmans from their
alleged forced entry and to quiet title to the disputed tract.

On April 30, 2025, the parties filed cross motions for declaratory judgment pursuant
to Rule 57 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure each seeking a declaration
regarding the ownership of the disputed tract. In its motion, Mars Labs no longer argued
that the disputed tract belonged to it but instead moved the circuit court to declare that the
disputed tract belonged to the heirs of John F. Hawse, a predecessor in title to the
neighboring Hawse parcel. Mars Labs argued that the 1923 Hisghman survey was not
meant to grant the disputed tract from John F. Hawse to Lorenzo See, the predecessor in
title to the Bowmans’ tract. On June 6, 2025, the parties each filed responses. The
Bowmans’ response argued that Mars Labs had conceded that the record did not support
its ownership of the disputed tract and argued that Mars Labs lacked standing to challenge
the boundary between the Bowmans’ and Hawse’s parcels.

On June 10, 2025, the circuit court notified counsel for each party by email that it
intended to grant the Bowmans’ motion, deny Mars Labs’ motion, and find that Mars Labs
lacked standing to challenge the boundary between the Bowmans’ and Hawse’s parcels.
The circuit court directed the Bowmans’ counsel to prepare a proposed order embodying
those rulings. The Bowmans’ counsel circulated their proposed order on July 4, 2025. On
July 7, 2025, Mars Labs filed a motion in opposition to the Bowmans’ proposed order and
argued the order contained factual inaccuracies and legal conclusions that were not
supported by the law. Mars Labs further stated that the owner of the Hawse tract had
conveyed their rights and interests in the disputed tract via quitclaim deed to Mars Labs.

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Mars Labs argued this conveyance granted it standing to quiet title to the disputed tract.3
On July 14, 2025, the circuit court granted the Bowmans’ Motion for Summary Declaratory
Judgment and denied Mars Labs’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment. The circuit court
further ordered that the disputed tract is currently vested to the Bowmans and found Mars
Labs lacked standing to contest the 1923 Hisghman survey between the Bowmans and
Hawse tracts. It is from this order that Mars Labs now appeals.

In Cox v. Amick, 195 W. Va. 608, 612, 466 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1995), the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) observed that “the purpose of a declaratory
judgment action is to resolve legal questions” and held that “a circuit court’s entry of a
declaratory judgment is reviewed de novo.” Further, “any determinations of fact made by
the circuit court in reaching its ultimate resolution are reviewed pursuant to a clearly
erroneous standard.” Id; see also DWG Oil & Gas Acquisitions, LLC v. S. Country Farms,
Inc., 238 W. Va. 414, 418, 796 S.E.2d 201, 205 (2017); W. Va. Code § 55-13-7 (1941)
(“All orders, judgments and decrees under [the West Virginia Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act] may be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees.”).

On appeal, Mars Labs asserts four assignments of error, but its third assignment of
error is dispositive of this appeal.4 For its third assignment of error, Mars Labs argues the
circuit court erred in holding that it lacked standing to bring this declaratory judgment
action to quiet title between the Bowmans and the Hawses, who are its neighboring
landowners. We disagree. It is well established that,

[s]tanding is comprised of three elements: First, the party attempting to
establish standing must have suffered an “injury-in-fact”—an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct forming the basis

3
Mars Labs has never produced this alleged quitclaim deed and stated it was not
recorded.
4
Mars Labs asserts the following other assignments of error. First, it argues the
circuit court erred in holding the 1923 Hisghman survey resulted in the creation of a new
boundary line and conveyed the disputed tract to the Bowmans’ predecessors. Second, it
argues the circuit court erred in failing to address mistakes in the 1923 Hisghman survey
and failed to describe why an established boundary line dividing the tracts in question was
rejected while the errantly drawn boundary line was allowed to stand. Finally, Mars Labs
argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment without hearing and failed to
draw inferences, accept facts, and resolve doubts in favor of Mars Labs, who was the non-
moving party.

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of the lawsuit. Third, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed
through a favorable decision of the court.

Syl. Pt. 5, Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W. Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807 (2002);
accord Cain v. Town of Worthington, No. 25-ICA-230, 2026 WL 693461, at *3 (W. Va.
Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2026) (memorandum decision).

Further,

[s]tanding does not refer simply to a party’s capacity to appear in court.
Rather, standing is gauged by the specific common-law, statutory or
constitutional claims that a party presents. “Typically, ... the standing inquiry
requires careful judicial examination ... to ascertain whether the particular
plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.”

Id. at 94-95, 576 S.E.2d at 821-22 (quoting Int’l Primate Protection League v. Adms. of
Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77 (1991)). West Virginia Code § 55-13-2 addresses
standing in the specific context of a declaratory judgment action:

Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a . . . contract . . . , may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument [or] contract . . . and
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.

W. Va. Code § 55-13-2 (1941).

The SCAWV has explained that “when standing is placed in issue in a case, the
question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an
adjudication of a particular issue[.]” Findley at 95, 576 S.E.2d at 822 (quoting Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968)). While standing is typically discussed in the context
of a party’s right to raise a claim at the trial court level, it also applies to a party’s right to
raise an issue on appeal. See W. Va. AAA Statewide Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va.,
186 W. Va. 287, 288, 412 S.E.2d 481, 482 (1991) (finding that the petitioner lacked
standing to raise several of its assignments of error on appeal because it “lack[ed] a legally
protectable and tangible interest at stake pertaining to those matters and is therefore not the
proper party to raise those assignments”); Cain, 2026 WL 693461, at *3.

In this case, the focus of our standing inquiry is whether Mars Labs is the proper
party to seek a declaration to quiet title of the disputed tract between the Bowmans and the
Hawses. In its initial petition, Mars Labs sought a declaration that the disputed tract was
part of its tract. However, in its April 30, 2025, motion for declaratory judgment filed with
the circuit court, Mars Labs instead argued that the circuit court should declare that the

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disputed tract was owned by its neighbors, the Hawses. Mars Labs now claims Jeremy
Hawse conveyed the disputed tract to it via quitclaim deed, but Mars Labs has failed to
produce any evidence to support this claim either below or on appeal. Accordingly, Mars
Labs has not shown that it is interested in any deed to the disputed tract or that its rights
are affected by any contract affecting that parcel.

As a result, Mars Labs has failed to show that it has a legally cognizable interest in
the disputed tract and has no legally protected interest which could have been injured by
the circuit court’s rulings. See Butler v. Price, 212 W. Va. 450, 454, 574 S.E.2d 782, 786
(2002) (finding that a party with no legal interest in a parcel had no standing to appeal the
circuit court’s ruling related to an alleged right-of-way on that property). Moreover, Mars
Labs has no injury that could be redressed through a favorable decision of this Court
because it lacks an interest in the disputed tract. Mars Labs lacks standing to contest the
1923 Hisghman survey or to seek a declaration to quiet title between the Bowmans and the
Hawses. See Guido v. Guido, 202 W. Va. 198, 202-03, 503 S.E.2d 511, 515-16 (1998)
(finding that a party had no standing to appeal rulings that only affected the interests of
non-parties); see also Heavner v. Three Run Maint. Ass’n, Inc., No. 18-1080, 2020 WL
3072003, at *7 n.21 (W. Va. June 10, 2020) (memorandum decision) (“By force of logic,
statute, and case law, however, a party must have title to a property to bring an action to
quiet title. With no title, there is nothing to be quieted.” (quoting Barclay v. Robert C. Malt
& Co., 985 So.2d 53, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008))). Accordingly, Mars Labs lacks
standing to raise its additional substantive assignments of error related to the circuit court’s
rulings on the possession and ownership of the disputed tract, and we decline to address
Mars Labs’ remaining assignments of error.5

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Mars Labs has no interest in the
disputed tract and that it lacks standing to pursue this action. Accordingly, we affirm the
circuit court’s July 14, 2025, order.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: June 2, 2026

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Daniel Greear
Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge S. Ryan White

5
Our decision to affirm is solely based on Mars Labs’ lack of a legally protected
interest in the disputed tract and should not be construed as a determination related to the
circuit court’s conclusion that the Bowmans are the lawful owners of the disputed tract.

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