In re J.C.

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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
In re J.C.
No. 25-603 (Boone County CC-03-2024-JA-67)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner Mother S.F.1 appeals the Circuit Court of Boone County’s August 13, 2025,
order terminating her parental rights to J.C., arguing that the court erred in denying her a
post-adjudicatory improvement period and in terminating her rights when the DHS failed make
reasonable efforts to achieve reunification.2 Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is
unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.
The DHS filed a child abuse and neglect petition in December 2024, alleging that the
petitioner’s continued drug use following a 2019 abuse and neglect proceeding placed J.C. at risk
of physical injury and had caused the child emotional injury. Although J.C. was in a legal
guardianship with his maternal grandmother, he primarily resided with the petitioner, and the DHS
further alleged that she failed to provide a safe and suitable home. The DHS implemented a safety
plan after an October 2024 walk-through of the petitioner’s home revealed suspected
methamphetamine residue and drug paraphernalia, including a scale, as well as a large knife on
the child’s bed. The safety plan required that J.C. reside with the maternal grandmother and that
the petitioner submit to drug screens. However, shortly after the plan was implemented, the
petitioner also moved in with the maternal grandmother. The petitioner subsequently tested
positive for methamphetamine, among other substances, on several occasions, and failed to
participate in substance abuse treatment offered by the DHS while the safety plan was in place.
At a preliminary hearing in February 2025, the investigating DHS worker testified to the
petition’s allegations and to the safety plan initiated prior to J.C.’s removal. The worker reported
that the petitioner initially denied any drug use, despite her positive screens, but ultimately
admitted to abusing methamphetamine. The petitioner denied that her home contained drugs or
paraphernalia, testifying that the suspected methamphetamine residue was sugar and that her
boyfriend used the scales to weigh gold. She denied using drugs (other than marijuana) prior to
1 The petitioner appears by counsel Lorena E. Litten. The Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) appears by counsel Attorney General John B. McCuskey and Assistant Attorney General
Wyclif S. Farquharson. Counsel L. Scott Briscoe appears as the child’s guardian ad litem
(“guardian”).
2 We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
FILED
October 14, 2026
C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA

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October 2024 and claimed that her first positive screen for methamphetamine in November 2024
was due to “laced” marijuana. She admitted to using methamphetamine in late November 2024
but stated that she did not use around the child and that she subsequently attended a substance
abuse treatment program.3 The court ultimately found that imminent danger existed at the time of
J.C.’s removal, noting its concern regarding the petitioner’s truthfulness. The court further ordered
that the petitioner have supervised phone visitation with the child.
At an adjudicatory hearing in March 2025, the DHS requested that the circuit court take
judicial notice of the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. The court then found that the
petitioner “was in active addiction” and that her testimony had been “incredible.” The court also
found that, although the petitioner did not have custodial rights to J.C., she had permitted the child
to reside with her in unsafe conditions. On this basis, the circuit court adjudicated the petitioner as
an abusive and neglectful parent and found that J.C. was an abused and neglected child.
The petitioner subsequently moved for a post-adjudicatory improvement period, which the
circuit court considered at a dispositional hearing in August 2025. The assigned DHS worker
testified that the petitioner left substance abuse treatment prior to completion “and ha[d] [not]
shown any interest since,” having responded negatively to the need for treatment at a
multidisciplinary team meeting. The worker explained that she had only minimal contact with the
petitioner after she left treatment, and that the petitioner likely lacked housing, as her former home
had been repossessed. However, the petitioner was seeking housing assistance. The worker also
reported that the petitioner had not visited J.C. during the proceedings, but the worker clarified
that the DHS had been slow to set up phone visitation and that the petitioner left treatment before
arrangements could be made. The worker admitted that the petitioner’s recent drug screens had
been clean and that the petitioner was not provided parenting classes, though “she was supposed
to be part of those services.” The worker recommended termination of the petitioner’s parental
rights, noting that this was the second time J.C. had been involved in an abuse and neglect
proceeding due to the petitioner’s addiction and that his short life had been significantly disrupted.
The petitioner testified that she was living with friends and claimed that she had not used
methamphetamine since December 2024, although she acknowledged a positive screen in late
January 2025. The petitioner explained that she left inpatient treatment early (in May 2025)
because she “wanted to work,” but acknowledged that she had not yet obtained employment.
Further, although the petitioner admitted to having a substance abuse problem, she acknowledged
that she had not attempted to resume inpatient treatment. The petitioner stated that she was willing
to do so, but “[didn’t] think [she] necessarily need[ed] it.” The petitioner also admitted that she
had not contacted the DHS for assistance because she “figured [she] . . . could do it on [her] own
instead of always needing help.” She testified that she was willing to do whatever was asked of
her and would fully participate in an improvement period. When the court inquired whether the
petitioner believed she had abused and neglected J.C., she responded: “No, I truly don’t.” She then
qualified her response, stating, “I guess you could say I did,” and upon further questioning by her
counsel, acknowledged that her home had been inappropriate and that she had relapsed. In closing
3 The petitioner’s counsel proffered that the petitioner had completed a treatment program
at Saint Francis Hospital, having been admitted in late December 2024 and discharged in early
January 2025.

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argument, both the DHS and the guardian opposed an improvement period, noting that the
petitioner had successfully completed one in the past without lasting effect, and recommended
termination of the petitioner’s parental rights as being in J.C.’s best interests because the child
required stability.
Based on this evidence, the circuit court denied the petitioner’s motion for an improvement
period, finding that—despite her counsel’s attempts to rehabilitate her testimony—the petitioner
did not “seem to grasp what she did to put herself, and . . . her child, into [this] situation” and had
not acknowledged that her conduct was abusive and neglectful. Finding that the petitioner could
not correct a problem that she would not admit to, the court concluded that she was unlikely to
comply with an improvement period. The court further found that the petitioner’s testimony was
“inconsistent and not credible,” that she had not demonstrated “any ambition to improve,” and that
she was unable or unwilling to correct the issues that led to the petition’s filing. The court also
observed that the petitioner lacked employment and a stable home and had not been participating
in random drug screening, as ordered, until recently. The court noted that although the DHS had
failed to set up visitation, “that in itself [would] not cause [it] to make a finding that they didn’t
perform reasonable efforts.” The court found that the DHS made clear that the petitioner needed
to complete an inpatient substance abuse program and she did not and, further, that “treatment
[does] not work for a person who doesn’t think they have a problem.” Ultimately, the court
terminated the petitioner’s parental rights to J.C., finding that there was “no reasonable, available
less drastic alternative[]” and that it was in the child’s best interests.4 The court also found that the
DHS had made reasonable efforts to alleviate or eliminate the conditions of neglect and abuse and
to reunify the family. The petitioner now appeals this dispositional order.
On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s substantive rulings for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and issues
of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026). The petitioner first
asserts that the circuit court erred in denying her a post-adjudicatory improvement period. West
Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) permits a circuit court to grant a post-adjudicatory improvement
period when a parent “demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that [she] is likely to fully
participate,” but circuit courts have discretion to deny an improvement period when improvement
is unlikely. See In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002). Ample evidence
supports the circuit court’s finding that the petitioner was not likely to comply with the terms of
an improvement period, given her failure to acknowledge her abusive and neglectful conduct or
her need to address her longstanding substance use disorder by completing inpatient treatment. See
In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (“[I]n order to remedy [an] abuse
and/or neglect problem, the parent must recognize and acknowledge that . . . her conduct
constituted abuse.”). Further, it is undisputed that, despite the petitioner’s participation in extensive
services specifically aimed at addressing her substance abuse in an earlier proceeding, she relapsed
and continued to neglect the child. We have “frequently found improvement periods futile and . . .
improper where parents have previously received services, yet continue their behaviors unabated.”
State ex rel. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res. v. Dyer, 242 W. Va. 505, 520, 836 S.E.2d 472,
4 The court terminated the parental rights of J.C.’s father in an earlier abuse and neglect
proceeding. The child’s permanency plan is adoption in his current placement.

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487 (2019). As such, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
petitioner an improvement period.
Next, the petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights
because of the DHS’s failure to make reasonable reunification efforts. The petitioner specifically
takes issue with the DHS’s failure to provide her with parenting classes and to arrange phone
visitation with the child. However, the record shows that the DHS made reasonable efforts by
providing (or attempting to provide) some services to the petitioner, including drug screening and
assistance in obtaining inpatient substance abuse treatment, in accordance with West Virginia
Code § 49-4-604(c)(7). See also In re K.V., 251 W. Va. 418, 426, 914 S.E.2d 517, 525 (2025)
(explaining that the “DHS has a statutory obligation to provide services as a prerequisite
to . . . termination”). These limited services were reasonable under the circumstances of this case,
especially given that the petitioner failed to benefit from her participation in comprehensive
services in a prior proceeding. Further, it does not appear that the court considered the petitioner’s
lack of visitation with J.C. in terminating her parental rights, relying instead on her lackluster
motivation to fully acknowledge or treat her long-term substance use disorder, noting that no
treatment is effective when a parent will not admit to her problems. See W. Va. Code §
49-4-604(c)(6)(C)(iv) (requiring a circuit court’s dispositional order to indicate “[w]hether or not
the department made reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family . . . or that those efforts
were unreasonable due to specific circumstances”). As such, the petitioner is not entitled to relief
on this ground. Moreover, we have repeatedly held that “[t]ermination of parental rights . . . may
be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there
is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.”
Syl. Pt. 5 in part, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re
R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)); see also W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6). West
Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d) defines “[n]o reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or
abuse can be substantially corrected” to mean “that . . . the abusing adult . . . [has] demonstrated
an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their own or with help.” Here
the court found, based upon the evidence more thoroughly outlined above, that the petitioner was
unable or unwilling to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect. The court further concluded
that termination was in the child’s best interests, a finding the petitioner does not challenge on
appeal. Circuit courts are permitted to terminate a parent’s rights upon these findings. See W. Va.
Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its
August 13, 2025, order is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
ISSUED: October 14, 2026
CONCURRED IN BY:
Chief Justice C. Haley Bunn
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice Charles S. Trump IV
Justice H. L. Kirkpatrick
Justice James W. Flanigan