In re P.C.-1 and D.C.

25-841Wva14.10.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

1
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
In re P.C.-1 and D.C.
No. 25-841 (Mason County CC-26-2024-JA-87 and CC-26-2024-JA-88)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner Father P.C.-21 appeals the Circuit Court of Mason County’s November 16, 2025,
order terminating his parental rights to P.C.-1 and D.C., arguing that the evidence did not support
termination of his rights.2 Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and
that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App.
P. 21.
In November 2024, the DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging, in pertinent part,
that the petitioner’s mental health issues negatively affected his ability to parent the children.
Specifically, the DHS alleged that the petitioner brought P.C.-1 to the hospital because he
persistently believed the child had worms (despite hospital staff informing him that the child was
healthy) and acted in a “hyper nonsensical way.” However, the DHS stated that removal of the
children was unnecessary as services were being implemented for the family and, thus, the children
remained in the parents’ custody.
In March 2025, the circuit court granted the petitioner a preadjudicatory improvement
period which required him to participate in a parental fitness evaluation, mental health treatment,
and parenting classes. However, in April 2025, the guardian moved the court to immediately
remove the children from the home based on concerns about the petitioner’s mental health and the
mother’s failure to protect the children from the same. Specifically, a service provider informed
the guardian that when the service provider arrived at the home, the petitioner began acting
strangely and aggressively toward the provider, the parents’ demeanor indicated the possible
existence of domestic violence, and the top and side of a recliner had been sliced open with a
1 The petitioner appears by counsel Robert W. Bright. The West Virginia Department of
Human Services (“DHS”) appears by counsel Attorney General John B. McCuskey and Assistant
Attorney General James Wegman. Counsel Tanya Hunt Handley appears as the children’s guardian
ad litem (“guardian”).
2 We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See
W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e). Additionally, because one of the children and the petitioner share initials,
we use numbers to differentiate them.
FILED
October 14, 2026
C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
2
knife.3 Ultimately, the court removed the children from the parents’ care and placed them in the
legal and physical custody of the DHS upon testimony from the service provider who witnessed
the petitioner’s troubling conduct. In the resulting order, the circuit court noted that the petitioner’s
behavior during the removal hearing was “fundamentally different,” as he appeared more
“agitated” and “vocal,” and that his conduct made it “apparent [to the court] . . . that the mental
health of the [petitioner] has not been appropriately addressed.” The court thereafter revoked the
petitioner’s preadjudicatory improvement period.
According to the parties, the petitioner was then incarcerated for charges related to arson
of the family’s home, and he remained incarcerated for the rest of the case.4 As such, the petitioner
appeared by remote connection for the adjudicatory hearing in June 2025. The petitioner admitted
to being P.C.-1 and D.C.’s biological father but claimed that none of his children were under the
age of eighteen5 and further testified that he had participated in mental health treatment leading up
to his incarceration as he met regularly with his therapist via phone calls. However, when asked if
he ever attended any in-person sessions, the petitioner stated that he had not due to insurance
issues, but that he continued to treat his mental health through services offered in his current
incarceration. Upon the DHS’s request, the court took judicial notice of the testimony presented
in support of the children’s emergency removal, which detailed how the petitioner’s mental health
issues led to the instant petition. Ultimately, the circuit court adjudicated the petitioner as an
abusing and/or neglecting parent of the children based on his mental health issues. Afterwards, the
petitioner filed a written motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period.
The circuit court held a series of dispositional hearings culminating in July 2025, wherein
the petitioner testified that, while incarcerated, he took prescribed medication for his mental health
issues and participated in mental health treatment. He further claimed that he had attended some
parenting classes prior to his incarceration. When asked about his role in the abuse and neglect,
the petitioner explained that he was experiencing a lot of stress during that time but failed to
acknowledge that he was an abusing and/or neglecting parent. The petitioner further stated that he
was willing to do anything to regain custody of his children and confirmed that he had failed to
successfully complete his preadjudicatory improvement period. A DHS worker testified that the
petitioner was unstable and posed a safety risk to the children, which was why the DHS sought
termination of his parental rights. Ultimately, the circuit court found that the petitioner failed to
acknowledge the issues that led to the filing of the instant petition. The court therefore concluded
that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be
substantially corrected in the near future. In considering the children’s need for stability and best
interests, the court found that termination of the petitioner’s parental rights was necessary for the
children’s welfare. Accordingly, the court denied the petitioner’s motion for a post-adjudicatory
3 The petitioner later revealed that he had cut the recliner open because he believed one of
the children was getting sick and that their sickness had been possibly contracted from something
inside the recliner.
4 The status of these charges is unclear from the record.
5 At the time, P.C.-1 was two years old and D.C. was approximately seven months old.
3
improvement period and terminated his parental rights to both children.6 It is from this order that
the petitioner now appeals.
On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s substantive rulings for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and issues
of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026). Before this Court, the
petitioner argues that the circuit court erred by terminating his parental rights because the evidence
did not support such disposition as he was consistently participating in mental health treatment.
We disagree. West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) allows circuit courts to terminate parental
rights without the use of a less restrictive alternative “[u]pon a finding that there is no reasonable
likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future
and, when necessary for the welfare of the child.” See also Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va.
558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (permitting termination of rights “without the use of intervening less
restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of
neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected” (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496,
266 S.E.2d 114 (1980))). According to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d), “‘[n]o reasonable
likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected’ means that . . . the
abusing adult . . . [has] demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or
neglect on [his] own or with help.” Additionally, we have repeatedly emphasized that “[c]ourts are
not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement . . . where it appears
that the welfare of the child will be seriously threatened” before proceeding to disposition. Syl. Pt.
4, in part, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 91, 717 S.E.2d 873, 875 (quoting In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va.
at 496, 266 S.E.2d at 114, Syl. Pt. 1, in part). Here, the evidence demonstrated that despite
participating in mental health treatment, the petitioner’s mental health failed to improve and,
instead, worsened throughout these proceedings, leading to the removal of the children and
revocation of his preadjudicatory improvement period. The petitioner’s circumstances also
devolved throughout the case as he was incarcerated shortly after the children were removed.
Additionally, the court found that the petitioner failed to acknowledge the issues that led to the
filing of the petition, which is an imperative step in treating the problem. See In re Timber M., 231
W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (“In order to remedy the abuse and/or neglect problem,
the problem must first be acknowledged. Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, . .
. results in making the problem untreatable.” (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 217, 599
S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004))). The court further considered the children’s need for stability and best
interests when finding that termination was necessary for their welfare. Accordingly, we conclude
that the circuit court did not err in terminating the petitioner’s parental rights to both children.7
6 The mother’s parental rights remain intact as she successfully completed her improvement
period. The permanency plan for the children is to remain in their mother’s care.
7 The petitioner also argues that the circuit court erred in ratifying the emergency removal
of the children. However, he fails to include any law to support such argument, and we therefore
decline to address the issue. See W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7) (the petitioner’s “brief must contain
an argument clearly exhibiting the points of fact and law presented, . . . and cit[e] the authorities
relied on.”) (emphasis added); Id. (giving this Court discretion to disregard errors which fail to
conform to such requirements).
4
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court and affirm
the circuit court’s November 16, 2025, dispositional order.
Affirmed.
ISSUED: October 14, 2026
CONCURRED IN BY:
Chief Justice C. Haley Bunn
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice Charles S. Trump IV
Justice H. L. Kirkpatrick
Justice James W. Flanigan

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