Constitution of Connecticut (2025 publisher edition) — Article FIRST

Publisher edition notice: The publisher identifies this compilation as revised to January 1, 2025. It preserves the annotated original 1965 text and all ratified amendments, alongside the Revisors' unofficial convenience version incorporating extant amendments. The latter does not supersede the original Constitution and amendments; later changes have not been independently verified.

Article FIRST Revisors’ compilation incorporating extant amendments; publisher convenience version.

ARTICLE FIRST.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.
That the great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be rec-
ognized and established,
*

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248 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. I
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
WE DECLARE:
(Equality of rights.)
Sec. 1. All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man
or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the
community.
(Source of political power. Right to alter form of government.)
Sec. 2. All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are
founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit; and they have at all times
an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter their form of government in such manner
as they may think expedient.
(Right of religious liberty.)
Sec. 3. The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination, shall forever be free to all persons in the state; provided, that the right
hereby declared and established, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licen-
tiousness, or to justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.
(Liberty of speech and the press.)
Sec. 4. Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all sub-
jects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.
(Prohibiting laws limiting liberty of speech or press.)
Sec. 5. No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of
the press.
(Prosecutions for libel; defenses.)
Sec. 6. In all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evi-
dence, and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the
direction of the court.
(Security from searches and seizures.)
Sec. 7. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions
from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize
any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
(Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions. What cases bailable. Speedy trial.
Due process. Excessive bail or fines. Probable cause shown at hearing, when nec-
essary. Rights of victims of crime.)
Sec. 8. a. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard
by himself and by counsel; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process to obtain
witnesses in his behalf; to be released on bail upon sufficient security, except in capital
offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption great; and in all prosecutions
by information, to a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury. No person shall be com-
pelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall excessive bail be required nor excessive fines
imposed. No person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death or
life imprisonment, unless upon probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with

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Art. I CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 249
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
procedures prescribed by law, except in the armed forces, or in the militia when in
actual service in time of war or public danger.
b. In all criminal prosecutions, a victim, as the general assembly may define
by law, shall have the following rights: (1) The right to be treated with fairness
and respect throughout the criminal justice process; (2) the right to timely disposi-
tion of the case following arrest of the accused, provided no right of the accused is
abridged; (3) the right to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the
criminal justice process; (4) the right to notification of court proceedings; (5) the
right to attend the trial and all other court proceedings the accused has the right to
attend, unless such person is to testify and the court determines that such person’s
testimony would be materially affected if such person hears other testimony; (6) the
right to communicate with the prosecution; (7) the right to object to or support any
plea agreement entered into by the accused and the prosecution and to make a state-
ment to the court prior to the acceptance by the court of the plea of guilty or nolo
contendere by the accused; (8) the right to make a statement to the court at sentenc-
ing; (9) the right to restitution which shall be enforceable in the same manner as any
other cause of action or as otherwise provided by law; and (10) the right to informa-
tion about the arrest, conviction, sentence, imprisonment and release of the accused.
The general assembly shall provide by law for the enforcement of this subsection.
Nothing in this subsection or in any law enacted pursuant to this subsection shall be
construed as creating a basis for vacating a conviction or ground for appellate relief
in any criminal case.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XVII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut, and Article XXIX., of said Amendments. Said Article XVII., was adopted on November 24,
1982, and deleted reference to prosecutions by “indictment” and replaced provision barring the prosecution of persons
for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment except “on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury” with provi-
sion requiring a finding of “probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures prescribed by law”. Said
Article XXIX., was adopted on November 27, 1996, and designated existing section as subsection a. and added subsec-
tion b. enumerating rights of victims in all criminal prosecutions, requiring the general assembly to enforce those rights
and prohibiting construction of the subsection and related laws subsequently enacted so as to create a basis for vacating
a conviction or ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.
(Right of personal liberty.)
Sec. 9. No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly
warranted by law.
(Right of redress for injuries.)
Sec. 10. All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
(Right of private property.)
Sec. 11. The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation therefor.
(Writ of habeas corpus.)
Sec. 12. The privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless,
when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it; nor in any case,
but by the legislature.
(No attainder.)
Sec. 13. No person shall be attainted of treason or felony, by the legislature.

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250 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. II
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(Right to assemble and petition.)
Sec. 14. The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their
common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for
redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.
(Right to bear arms.)
Sec. 15. Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.
(Military power subordinate to civil.)
Sec. 16. The military shall, in all cases, and at all times, be in strict subordination
to the civil power.
(Quartering of soldiers.)
Sec. 17. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
(No hereditary emoluments.)
Sec. 18. No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or
conferred in this state.
(Trial by jury. Challenging of jurors.)
Sec. 19. The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, the number of such jurors,
which shall not be less than six, to be established by law; but no person shall, for a
capital offense, be tried by a jury of less than twelve jurors without his consent. In all
civil and criminal actions tried by a jury, the parties shall have the right to challenge
jurors peremptorily, the number of such challenges to be established by law. The right
to question each juror individually by counsel shall be inviolate.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article IV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
State of Connecticut. Said Article IV., was certified as adopted on December 22, 1972, (See Ponsor et al v. Schaffer,
Hartford Superior Court Docket No. 179114), and added provisions re minimum number of jurors, re parties’ rights to
make peremptory challenges and re counsels’ rights to question jurors individually.
(Equal protection. No segregation or discrimination.)
Sec. 20. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected
to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or
political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or phys-
ical or mental disability.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article V., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
State of Connecticut, and Article XXI., of said Amendments. Said Article V., was adopted on November 27, 1974, and
prohibited discrimination based on sex. Said Article XXI., was adopted on November 28, 1984, and prohibited discrimi-
nation based on physical or mental disability.

Article FIRST Original 1965 text and publisher annotations; retained historical context.

ARTICLE FIRST.*
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.
*All protections contained in this article are fundamental civil liberties as to which Connecticut Supreme Court sits
as court of last resort, except that it may not restrict federal constitutional rights; first referent is Connecticut law and full
panoply of rights Connecticut residents expect; decisions of U.S. Supreme Court are persuasive authority to be afforded
respectful consideration, but will be followed only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed
by Connecticut law. 172 C. 615. Cited. 192 C. 48; 199 C. 88. Federal constitutional right to liberty cited. 201 C. 605.
Cited. 209 C. 219; 216 C. 150, see also 26 CA 423, 27 CA 291, 223 C. 902 and 225 C. 10, reversing judgment in State
v. Marsala; 224 C. 627; 227 C. 363; 232 C. 740. State has no obligation under the constitution to provide subsistence
benefits including obligation to provide shelter. 233 C. 701. Cited. 240 C. 489.
Fundamental right to liberty cited. 24 CA 612. Cited. 29 CA 207; 33 CA 603. Violation of state constitution cited.
Id. Cited. 37 CA 561; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 216; 38 CA 198. Jury instruction in which the phrases “reason-
able doubt” and “the benefit of the doubt” are included does not suggest that jury could only acquit in a close case if
it could give defendant “the benefit of the doubt” and therefore does not impinge on defendant’s right to due process.
62 CA 625.
Cited. 37 CS 90; 41 CS 525.
1 That the great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be rec-
ognized and established,
WE DECLARE:
(Equality of rights.)
Sec. 1. 2 All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no
man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the
community.
1 State constitutional rights cited. 209 C. 679. Cited. 216 C. 85. Equal protection of the laws cited. Id. Cited. 224 C.
915; 228 C. 699; 230 C. 183; 231 C. 918; Id., 919; 232 C. 707; 233 C. 701. Unenumerated right to shelter implicit in
preamble to Art. I cited. Id. 1997 amendment to Sec. 22a-208a prohibiting establishment or construction of new plant
or station within 1/4 mile of day care center operating as of July 8, 1997, in municipality with population greater than
100,000 persons violates right to equal protection guaranteed by Connecticut Constitution, Art. I, Secs. 1 and 20 by
creating classifications unrelated to legitimate state interest. 257 C. 429.
Cited. 26 CA 785. Sec. 52-584 is constitutional as applied to plaintiff because although classification under repose
section of statute of limitations under said Sec. results in disparate treatment for those who do not discover their injury
within three-year limitations period, the classification bears a reasonable relationship to legislative goal of said repose
section. 66 CA 518.

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Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 145
Cited. 40 CS 394; 41 CS 48. Violation of constitutional rights cited. Id. Right to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. 42
CS 227.
2 This article is a limitation on legislative power. 85 C. 348. Not intended to affect practice of requiring candidates
for admission to the bar to be approved by it; 79 C. 55; nor to forbid licensing of sale of intoxicating liquors. 81 C. 534.
The language of this section, although broad in its scope, is limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus
formed, and does not include slaves. 12 C. 42, 43. A grant of the exclusive right to use streets for laying gas pipes is
void as being a monopoly. 25 C. 38. But such right, if acquired by contract, is protected by Art. I, Sec. 10 of the U.S.
Constitution, forbidding any state from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. 55 C. 9–15. Statute author-
izing town agents only to sell liquor does not create a monopoly. 25 C. 288. An act prohibiting the exercise of a lawful
and harmless business, unless a license therefor is first obtained, is in violation of the restrictions on legislative power
contained in the first article. 65 C. 483–492; 67 C. 550; but see 77 C. 328. Discrimination among classes for taxation
purposes valid. 74 C. 450; 76 C. 242; 104 C. 195, 200; limitations on right to discriminate. 107 C. 708.
Act authorizing city to sell land to a named person held valid. 75 C. 103. Provision in law authorizing cities to estab-
lish lighting plants by which private plants may be purchased not invalid. 76 C. 572. So act authorizing cemetery asso-
ciation to condemn land of another similar association. 77 C. 90. Law authorizing railroad companies to condemn shares
of stock in certain cases upheld. Id., 422; 203 U.S. 372. This section does not prevent legislature forbidding epileptics to
marry; 78 C. 243; or discriminating between various classes of money lenders in usury statute. 82 C. 233; 218 U.S. 563,
572; 125 C. 320. Statute forbidding keeping of house reputed to be house of ill-fame does not violate this section. 82 C.
112; 83 C. 56; Id., 551. Ordinance prohibiting making speeches in public parks or on streets or sidewalks without permit
from chief of police, and providing no guide for his decision is void; 96 C. 193; and this regardless of whether the chief
of police used proper judgment and discretion. Id., 196. This section and Sec. 10 of this article are coextensive with 14th
amendment of U.S. Constitution. 104 C. 195. Special act providing that particular lessee pay taxes held to deny equal
protection. 109 C. 388. Ordinance restricting use of public market to growers only held not discriminatory. 110 C. 293.
Special act validating deficient notice to city of defective sidewalk held constitutional. 124 C. 183. Common control
provision of unemployment compensation act is valid. 128 C. 213. Restriction of funeral directors’ licenses to relatives
of deceased or disabled directors held void. 129 C. 133. Requirement that liquor permittee be elector is not discrimina-
tory. Id., 619. State veterans’ bonus sustained. 133 C. 511. Act to provide housing for veterans is proper class legislation.
Id., 544. Cited. 134 C. 15 (Diss. Op.). Tax exemptions to veterans under Secs. 12-81(19), (20), (22), (27) and 12-82 held
valid. 135 C. 210. Statute held not to grant exclusive public emoluments. 136 C. 49. Zoning ordinance prohibiting sale
or display of new or used cars in any open lot in any zone is an unwarranted interference with the constitutional right to
carry on a lawful business. 137 C. 701. An appropriation may be proper provided it is for a public purpose, even though
the disbursement of it is not restricted to officers or agencies of the state itself. 138 C. 134. Special act granting prefer-
ential treatment to veterans taking civil service examinations either for original employment or for promotion does not
violate this section. 139 C. 102. Special act which did not benefit veterans generally, but only a very small group, held
unconstitutional. Id., 310. An act which serves no other purpose than individual gain is invalid. If the act serves a proper
public purpose, the fact that it incidentally confers a direct benefit upon some individual does not render it invalid. 140
C. 8. Neither the federal government nor the state is under any constitutional obligation to allow a deduction for a tax
imposed by the other. 141 C. 257. Does not require that taxation be equal and uniform. Id., 266. Substantially same as
the fourteenth amendment to U.S. Constitution. 143 C. 9. One cannot question the constitutional validity of a legislative
enactment on the ground that it is class legislation unless he is one of the class which is claimed to suffer from discrimi-
nation. Id., 405. The discriminations which are open to objection are those where persons engaged in the same business
are subjected to different restrictions, or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions. Id., 502.
Cited. Id., 698. A permit to sell liquor is a matter of privilege and not of right. By engaging in the liquor business the
permittee assumes the risk of a variety of situations which could impose liability on him. It is not an unconstitutional
exercise of the police power for a permittee who sells in violation of the law to be prevented from defending on the
ground that the particular drink which he sold did not cause or contribute to the buyer’s intoxication. 144 C. 241. Regu-
lation of ordinary businesses and those by nature dangerous to the public, distinguished. 145 C. 490. Allowance of sale
of antiques on Sunday held not a denial of equal protection of the laws. Id., 554. Ordinance licensing and regulating
trailer and mobile home parks held constitutional except for two provisions. 146 C. 720. Providing of school transporta-
tion to nonprofit private schools by towns under Sec. 10-281 held constitutional. 147 C. 374. Substantially the same as
the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. Id. A statute which serves a public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. Id. Defendant charged a denial of equal protection
since other persons, similarly circumstanced, were not sentenced as third offenders, held not a valid defense unless there
is a showing of intentional or arbitrary action amounting to discrimination. Id., 506. Ordinance requiring the attendance
of a police officer, at the expense of the theater owner, at each theater performance to see that safety precautions were
observed, held to be a valid exercise of police power by the city. Id., 546. In order to hold zoning regulation unconstitu-
tional as violative of equal protection, it must appear that provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Art. I, Sec. 1 has never been held to prevent legis-
lative bodies from dealing differently with different classes of persons, provided there is some natural and substantial
difference germane to the subject and purposes of the legislation between those within the class included and those
whom it leaves untouched. 149 C. 712. The delegation of legislative power in chapter 579 to a private corporation is not
a violation of the constitution. Chapter 579 serves a public purpose and it is not rendered unconstitutional by the fact that
it might incidentally benefit particular industries or lending institutions. The act sufficiently states a public purpose
though not spelled out with specificity. 150 C. 333. That some persons may derive a private advantage from an enterprise
designed to serve a public purpose does not defeat the public purpose of the enterprise. Id., 366. Clause in Sec. 10-6
exempting schools in existence before 1942 from its operation held discriminatory and unconstitutional. 151 C. 631.
Court cannot strike down as unconstitutional a legislative enactment merely because it contains technical words the exact
meaning of which is not evident, without explanation, to other persons disassociated from the technical field. 153 C. 465.
Since disability pay to a former Hartford employee is actually a form of pension for services rendered to the city, said

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146 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
payments must be based on income received from the city alone, not including income received from other sources or
employers. 154 C. 1, 8. Gravel removal ordinance enacted by planning and zoning commission was valid exercise of
police power and not discriminatory as to plaintiff who had previously sold gravel from his property. Id., 650. Special
zoning regulation to assist relocation of businesses on property condemned by redevelopment acts is not unreasonable
classification of beneficiaries of police power of local governments. 156 C. 287. Cited. 157 C. 179. Constitutionality of
chapter 581 (Secs. 32-32–32-46, 1972 public act 248, the “Connecticut Product Development Corporation Act”) upheld.
167 C. 111. When thrust of challenge is that act violates this article and section, plaintiffs have demonstrated such inva-
lidity if they can show beyond a reasonable doubt that legislation “directs the granting of an emolument or privilege to
an individual or class without any purpose, expressed or apparent, to serve the public welfare thereby.” Id. “Public pur-
pose” discussed. Id. In deciding whether an act serves such a purpose the court has traditionally vested the legislature
with wide discretion and suggests that the latter’s determination should not be reversed unless “manifestly and palpably
incorrect.” Id. When plaintiffs claim ultimate benefits to be realized by the state are “remote,” they are merely disputing
business judgment of legislature. Id. The strong presumption of act’s constitutionality will not be overcome simply be-
cause plaintiffs’ economic forecasts differ from those of the legislature. Id. Chapter 581 (Secs. 32-32–32-46, 1972 public
act 248, the “Connecticut Product Development Corporation Act”) contains provisions which in their totality comprise
a system of barriers preventing any automatic flow of public funds to preferred persons or groups. Id. Plaintiffs failed to
sustain burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of the act’s (1972 public act 248) constitutionality by showing
beyond a reasonable doubt that it entitles successful applicants to exclusive public welfare thereby. Id. Sec. 14-66 is a
proper exercise of the police power of the state and hence not a denial of equal protection of the laws. Id., 304. As Sec.
7-433c was enacted for a proper public purpose, direct benefit incidentally conferred on a certain class of citizens does
not render it invalid as a class preference. 168 C. 84. Equal protection not violated by Sec. 14-111(c). Legislature reason-
ably decided public safety is ensured by removing from the highway by license suspensions that class of drivers respon-
sible for accidents that cause death. Id., 94. Cited. Id., 212; 169 C. 454, 471 (Diss. Op.). Present system of public school
financing, relying principally on local taxes, violates this section; meaning and application of section and relationship to
federal equal protection clause. 172 C. 615. Even a privilege may not be bestowed in an unconstitutional manner. Id.,
615, 656 (Diss. Op.). Cited. 173 C. 220; Id., 473. Section does not require taxation to be equal and uniform. 174 C. 556.
Exercise of judicial power by a retired judge who has been designated a referee is not unconstitutional. 177 C. 173.
Cited. Id., 304; 178 C. 664; 179 C. 311; Id., 627; 188 C. 98, 100; 189 C. 550. Sec. 29-45 held to be constitutional. 192
C. 127. Cited. Id., 207. Inapplicable to case on its face. 193 C. 506. Cited. Id., 670. Legislative provisions for financing
education violated provisions of Connecticut Constitution (Horton v. Meskill, 172 C. 615). Id. Cited. 194 C. 165; 195 C.
24. Equal rights cited. Id. Cited. 196 C. 623; 201 C. 421. Provision of collective bargaining agreement not in violation
of equal protection policy. Id., 577. Cited. 203 C. 624; 204 C. 17; Id., 746. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. 205 C. 17.
Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 27. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 495. Deprivation of fundamental consti-
tutional rights cited. Id. Cited. 207 C. 496. Special act held unconstitutional where it constitutes award of exclusive
public emolument or privilege not available to other persons and without a public purpose. 211 C. 199. Sec. 31-291 not
in violation of this section. 212 C. 427. Cited. 213 C. 13; 217 C. 164. Equal protection of laws cited. Id. Cited. Id., 404.
Equal protection provisions cited. Id. Cited. Id., 689; 228 C. 79; 229 C. 1. Equal rights provisions cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
312. Rights to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 801; 232 C. 901; Id., 902; 233 C. 437; Id., 460. Neither preamble nor
this section imposes on government an affirmative constitutional obligation to provide minimum subsistence to the poor.
Id., 557. Preserving unenumerated rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 701. Unencumbered right to shelter implicit in the term
“social compact” in Connecticut Constitution Art. I, Sec. 1 cited. Id. Cited. 234 C. 217; 235 C. 637; 238 C. 1. Equal op-
portunity to a free public education cited; fundamental right to education cited. Id. “Neither the social compact clause
nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.” Id., 389.
Social compact clause cited. Id. Cited. Id., 809. Equal protection of the laws cited. Id. Cited. 239 C. 168; Id., 708. Equal
protection cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 246; 243 C. 205. Statute that grants prosecutor discretion to recommend transfer of
some juveniles from criminal docket to juvenile docket does not violate right to equal protection of the law. 245 C. 93.
Town’s conveyance of public park land was not an exclusive public emolument. 285 C. 309. Trial court properly deter-
mined that a special act allowing plaintiff, and only plaintiff, to present his claim against the state to the Claims Com-
missioner, despite his initial untimely filing of such complaint, was unconstitutional as an exclusive public emolument.
290 C. 245. Trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction in concluding that Sec. 31-294c(d) constitutes a public
emolument in violation of section. 299 C. 800. Plaintiffs failed to establish that the educational system in this state vio-
lates the equal protection provisions of the state constitution by failing to ensure that the poorer school districts had
funding that is substantially equal to the wealthier school districts. 327 C. 650. Special act that confers an exclusive
public emolument on the defendants for which the state bears no responsibility violates the state constitution insofar as
it serves no public purpose. 347 C. 629.
Cited. 8 CA 50; 12 CA 455; 14 CA 77; 27 CA 495; judgment reversed, see 225 C. 499; 34 CA 833; 37 CA 801. Rights
to a fair cross-section jury panel cited. Id. Cited. 39 CA 384. Denial of equal protection cited. Id. Cited. 45 CA 110. Equal
protection cited. Id. A statute serves a public purpose when it benefits all state taxpayers; relevant test is not whether it
adversely affects some persons but whether it promotes a public purpose more generally. 53 CA 438. Resolution author-
izing plaintiff to commence lawsuit against the state for his alleged injuries violated provision against public emoluments
because resolution contained no declaration as to public purpose served, nor could the court discern such public purpose.
150 CA 237. Resolution passed by the General Assembly that authorizes a plaintiff, and only the plaintiff, to commence
a lawsuit against the state for alleged injuries and does not declare how it serves a public purpose violates the prohibition
against public emoluments. 152 CA 177.
Legislature may grant right of eminent domain to but one county. 5 CS 251. Applied to use of drugs to prevent
conception. 7 CS 277. Applied to right of appeal. 8 CS 75. State entered special defense questioning constitutionality
of special act giving plaintiff permission to sue state for negligence. Demurrer to defense overruled. 20 CS 496. Zoning
ordinance limiting occupancy to elderly persons did not so serve the public welfare as to be within the police power. 26
CS 127. Zoning ordinance limiting occupancy to elderly persons did not so serve public welfare as to be within police

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Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 147
power. Id. Sec. 52-159a not in violation of this section as it is a reasonable classification of persons protected pretrial. 28
CS 52. Cited. 32 CS 502; 37 CS 515; 38 CS 426; 40 CS 365; Id., 381. State regulation on Medicaid abortion funding is
unconstitutional. Id., 394. Cited. 42 CS 172; Id., 526; 43 CS 470; 44 CS 34.
Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 674, 679. Sunday law (Sec. 53-300) not a violation. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 493.
(Source of political power. Right to alter form of government.)
Sec. 2.1 All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are
founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit; and they have at all times
an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter their form of government in such manner
as they may think expedient.
1 Does not apply to aliens. 96 C. 611. Cited. 195 C. 524; 197 C. 554; 216 C. 253; 232 C. 345. Possibility alleged tak-
ing might be temporary because of favorable resolution of administrative appeal does not preclude inverse condemnation
action. 247 C. 196.
Cited. 37 CS 515.
(Right of religious liberty.)
Sec. 3.1 The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination, shall forever be free to all persons in the state; provided, that the right
hereby declared and established, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licen-
tiousness, or to justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.
1 Cited. 7 C. 77; 16 C. 516. Statute restricting solicitation of funds for religious or charitable causes upheld. 126 C.
4; but see 310 U.S. 296. A condition in a custody action that minor attend school affiliated with his religious faith does
not violate guarantee of freedom of religion. 141 C. 235. Reasonable regulation of location of churches and schools for
religious education does not violate constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. 149 C. 712. Continued confinement
in a state hospital of a dementia praecox patient who mutilated himself under influence of religious delusions held not
violation of this section. 157 C. 56. Cited. 172 C. 496; 177 C. 440; 199 C. 496. Right to freedom of religion cited. 205
C. 723. Right of religious liberty cited. 231 C. 944. Cited. 233 C. 557; 234 C. 324. Right to religious freedom cited. Id.
Cited. 234 C. 455. Free exercise of religion cited. Id. Cited. 236 C. 646. State constitutional right of religious liberty
cited. Id. Cited. 239 C. 356. Enumerated constitutional rights cited. Id. In zoning appeal, section applies to rights of
religious institutions and is not limited to rights of individuals. 285 C. 381.
Cited. 7 CA 745; 17 CA 53. Free exercise of religion clauses cited. Id.
Cited. 29 CS 407; 37 CS 515; 39 CS 142; 42 CS 256. Free exercise of religion and freedom of religion cited. Id.
(Liberty of speech and the press.)
Sec. 4. 1 Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all sub-
jects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.
1 This section and the following do not confer the right to publish matter injurious to the public morals or such as
endangers the vital interest of society. 73 C. 27–29. Cited. 27 C. 27. Of freedom of the speech and of the press in general.
73 C. 18. Statements before investigating board of city council; 64 C. 223; petition to police commissioners for removal
of officer; express malice; 66 C. 175; statements of district superintendent to board of school visitors; 81 C. 293; of pas-
tor of church in criticism of member; 85 C. 23; statements to police officer as to loss of money and suspicion of theft;
87 C. 220; of military officer to his superior as to fitness of candidate for promotion. 88 C. 247. Right of newspaper to
criticize public officer. 90 C. 98. Ordinance prohibiting making of speeches in public parks or on streets or sidewalks
without obtaining permit from chief of police, and prescribing no uniform rule to be followed in issuing permits is void.
96 C. 194. Act prohibiting publishing disloyal matter concerning the U.S. government held constitutional. Id., 607. This
section does not apply to aliens, when. Id., 614. Court’s charge on freedom of the press approved. 113 C. 580. Statute
restricting solicitation of funds for religious or charitable causes upheld. 126 C. 4; but see 310 U.S. 296. The issuance
of an injunction to restrain picketing for an unlawful purpose does not violate guarantee of free speech. 139 C. 95; 146
C. 93. Since our antiobscenity statute (Sec. 52-243) has been construed as including scienter requirement by implica-
tion, constitutionality of statute is not open to attack on ground that it lacks such a requirement. Test of whether material
can be adjudged obscene is whether, to the average person applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. Question of suppressibility under constitutional
standards is one of law. 150 C. 92. Freedom of commercial speech discussed. 192 C. 15. Commercial speech discussed.
Id., 27. Both Connecticut Constitution Art. I, Sec. 14 and this section are designed as a safeguard against acts of the state
and do not limit the private conduct of individuals or persons. Id., 48. Cited. 193 C. 612. Right of free speech cited. 197
C. 141. Until defendants have exhausted administrative remedies they cannot claim denial of right of free speech under
state constitution. 199 C. 575. Cited. 203 C. 624. Rights to free speech cited. Id. Cited. 204 C. 551; Id., 683; 205 C. 495.
Deprivation of fundamental state constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. 208 C. 146. Free expression cited. Id. Cited. 212
C. 176; 215 C. 590. Right to free speech and protection of commercial speech cited. Id. Unconstitutionally over broad
cited. Id. Freedom of the press cited; constitutional rights cited. 221 C. 166. Free speech clauses cited. 222 C. 672. Cited.
226 C. 773. Free speech clauses cited. 229 C. 10. Cited. 230 C. 525; 232 C. 65; Id., 345. Free speech provisions cited;
void for overbreadth cited; free speech and vagueness test cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 557; 234 C. 455. Right to freedom

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148 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
of speech under state constitution cited. 236 C. 781. Cited. 239 C. 356. Enumerated constitutional rights; freedom of
speech cited. Id. In order to prevail on claim that municipal ordinance violates state constitution plaintiff must identify
the specific additional expressive rights recognized under state constitution and describe how such rights are infringed
upon by the ordinance. 254 C. 799. Town ordinance restricting park access to residents and their guests violates freedom
of speech guarantee. 257 C. 318. Minimal state involvement present in private shopping mall does not constitute state
action. 270 C. 261. Speech rights may be waived by contract. 292 C. 187. Under the state constitution, employee speech
pursuant to official job duties on certain matters of significant public interest is protected from employer discipline in
a public workplace; modified balancing test in 391 U.S. 563 and 461 U.S. 138 applies to speech by a public employee
pursuant to the employee’s official duties. 319 C. 175.
Constitutionally protected free speech cited. 6 CA 407. Cited. 7 CA 418. Protected speech and conduct cited. 12
CA 258. Cited. Id., 455. Right to free speech cited. Id. Constitutionally protected speech cited. Id., 481. Free speech
guaranty cited. 18 CA 316. Constitutional guarantee of free speech cited. 25 CA 16. Cited. 27 CA 103; 32 CA 656;
judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345. Right of free speech cited. Id. Over breadth or vagueness cited. Id. Cited. 38
CA 306. Involved right to free speech cited; “fighting words” limitation cited. Id. Free speech cited. 44 CA 611. Cited.
46 CA 559. Prohibition of harassing telephone calls under Sec. 53-183(a)(3) is not unconstitutionally overbroad; the
statute prohibits purposeful harassment by use of telephone and does not prohibit speech on public concerns. 55 CA
475. Ordinance did not violate free speech guarantee as it contained no restriction on content and merely regulated size
of residential signs. 60 CA 376. Protection of citizen complaints of police misconduct from threat of defamation actions
for statements made during a quasi-judicial proceeding serves public policy of protecting free speech that furthers the
interests of a democratic society. 78 CA 549.
Private property owners rights are subordinate to rights under this section and Sec. 14 of this article. 37 CS 90. Cited.
Id., 515; 38 CS 349; 41 CS 31. Constitutional right to freedom of speech cited. Id. Opinions protection by state constitu-
tion cited. Id. Civil union legislation does not deny plaintiffs, eight same sex couples, the right of free expression and
association because civil union and marriage in Connecticut now share same benefits, protections and responsibilities
under law; Connecticut Constitution requires that there be equal protection and due process of law, not that there be
equivalent nomenclature for such protection and process. 49 CS 644.
(Prohibiting laws limiting liberty of speech or press.)
Sec. 5.1 No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of
the press.
1 A statute forbidding the publication of proposals for selling lottery tickets does not infringe the liberty of the press.
28 C. 228. State may define criminal libel and make press subject thereto. 90 C. 98. The issuance of an injunction to re-
strain picketing for an unlawful purpose does not violate guarantee of free speech. 139 C. 95; 146 C. 93. Obscenity is not
protected by this section; constitutionality of Sec. 53-243, making it a crime to possess obscene literature, upheld. Id., 78.
Since our antiobscenity statute (Sec. 53-243) has been construed as including a scienter requirement by implication, con-
stitutionality of statute is not open to attack on ground that it lacks such a requirement; the test of whether material can be
adjudged obscene is whether, to the average person applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; the question of suppressibility under constitutional
standards is one of law. 150 C. 92. Freedom of commercial speech discussed. 192 C. 15. Cited. Id., 48. Until defendants
have exhausted administrative remedies, they cannot claim denial of right of free speech under state constitution. 199
C. 575. Rights to free speech cited. Id. Cited. 203 C. 624. Rights to free speech cited. Id. Cited. 204 C. 683; 205 C. 456.
Right to free speech cited. Id. Cited. Id., 495. Deprivation of fundamental state constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. 212
C. 176; 215 C. 590. Right to free speech and protection of commercial speech; unconstitutionally overbroad cited. Id.
State right to privacy cited; plaintiff did not establish standing to assert constitutional rights of individual permit (to carry
pistols or revolvers) holders not properly before the court. 222 C. 621. Free speech clauses cited. Id., 672. Cited. 226 C.
773. Free speech clauses cited. 229 C. 10. Cited. 230 C. 525; 232 C. 345. Free speech provisions; void for overbreadth;
free speech and vagueness test cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 557. In order to prevail on claim that municipal ordinance violates
state constitution, plaintiff must identify the specific additional expressive rights recognized under state constitution and
describe how such rights are infringed upon by the ordinance. 254 C. 799. Town ordinance restricting park access to
residents and their guests violates freedom of speech guarantee. 257 C. 318. Minimal state involvement present in private
shopping mall does not constitute state action. 270 C. 261. Speech rights may be waived by contract. 292 C. 187. Under
the state constitution, employee speech pursuant to official job duties on certain matters of significant public interest is
protected from employer discipline in a public workplace; modified balancing test in 391 U.S. 563 and 461 U.S. 138
applies to speech by a public employee pursuant to the employee’s official duties. 319 C. 175.
Guarantee of freedom of speech requires that part of the breach of peace statute (Sec. 53a-181) prohibiting use of
abusive language be confined to language which constitutes “fighting” words. 1 CA 669. Protected speech and conduct
cited. 12 CA 258. Cited. Id., 455. Free speech provisions cited. Id. Cited. 32 CA 656; judgment reversed in part, see 232
C. 345. Right of free speech; overbreadth or vagueness cited. Id. Cited. 38 CA 306. Involved right to free speech; “fight-
ing words” limitation cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 559. Prohibition of harassing telephone calls under Sec. 53-183(a)(3) is
not unconstitutionally overbroad; the statute prohibits purposeful harassment by use of telephone and does not prohibit
speech on public concerns. 55 CA 475.
Applied to use of drugs to prevent conception. 7 CS 277. Discussion of protected and unprotected speech. 35 CS
587. Cited. 37 CS 90; Id., 515; 41 CS 31. Constitutional rights of freedom of press; opinions protected by state constitu-
tion cited. Id. Cited. Id., 66. Civil union legislation does not deny plaintiffs, eight same sex couples, the right of free
expression and association because civil union and marriage in Connecticut now share same benefits, protections and

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Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 149
responsibilities under law; Connecticut Constitution requires that there be equal protection and due process of law, not
that there be equivalent nomenclature for such protection and process. 49 CS 644.
Obscenity is not protected by the language of this section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 441. Criteria for determining obscenity
discussed. Id., 442.
(Prosecutions for libel; defenses.)
Sec. 6. 1 In all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evi-
dence, and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the
direction of the court.
1 See 75 C. 232. Applies only to criminal prosecutions. 91 C. 442. In slander plea in justification must be as broad
as the charge complained of. 117 C. 601. Object of provision is to put libel cases on same footing as other criminal
prosecutions, but it does not curtail right of court to determine law to be applied by jury in rendition of general verdict
in prosecution for libel. 148 C. 208.
(Security from searches and seizures.)
Sec. 7. 1 The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions
from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize
any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
1 Evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of federal constitution inadmissible in state court. 367 U.S.
643. Applicable to search warrants only. 4 C. 118. Form of oath required to procure warrant to seize liquors. 30 C. 458.
Separate search warrant for each suspected place not required. 27 C. 455. Search for and seizure of photographs by po-
lice officers, held not to be in violation of this section. 67 C. 304, 305. Cited. 12 C. 43. Requires written charge and no-
tice, before justice of the peace can punish for contempt not committed in his presence. 75 C. 355. Right of legislature
to authorize officer to seize fishing tackle being unlawfully used without warrant; 90 C. 584; so to seize liquor unlaw-
fully kept. 29 C. 478. Policemen’s entrance into burning house and seizure of still and liquors without warrant held legal.
97 C. 545. When search of person of a suspect without warrant held valid. 101 C. 228. Reasonableness of search or
seizure is for court to determine from the circumstances. 112 C. 173. Articles offered in evidence, relevant to issue of
guilt of accused person, will not be excluded because seized in violation of this provision. 120 C. 573. Cited. 126 C. 434.
If search and seizure were incidental to lawful arrest, they were not unreasonable. 149 C. 567. Cited. Id., 572, 583, 586.
If one consents to a search of his person, possessions or living quarters, he waives his constitutional protection. 150 C.
457. Where information obtained from search prompted arrest, held state could not claim search was incidental to lawful
arrest. Id., 488. Whether a search is reasonable and the evidence seized therefore admissible is a question for the court in
light of the circumstances of the case and constitutional guarantees. 152 C. 93. Bases for finding of probable cause for
issuance of a search warrant discussed. 153 C. 8. Hearsay information from informer may enter into determination of
probable cause so long as a substantial basis is shown for crediting the hearsay. Id., 9. Search by police officer, not made
as an incident to a lawful arrest, if otherwise reasonable, could be justified under this section, and the fourth amendment
and fourteenth amendment, Sec. 1 of the U.S. Constitution only on proof that protection afforded by these provisions had
been waived. Id., 70, 71. Cited. Id., 133, see 198 C. 255; Id., 151. 3-week delay in arresting defendant not an unreason-
able seizure of his person where purpose of delay was to protect identity of undercover agent and no prejudice to defend-
ant appeared. Id., 564. Illegal arrest, under federal constitution, cannot be objected to during habeas corpus proceeding
when no timely objection is made at trial. 155 C. 627. Motion for suppression of evidence obtained by search under
warrant was properly denied where items seized were reasonably related to crime charged of rape and kidnapping; items
seized under warrant on prior circuit court arraignment not returnable because Superior Court asserted jurisdiction. 157
C. 198. Search of defendant’s car without warrant permissible when he was being arrested while seated therein for com-
mission of misdemeanor a short time before. Id., 222. Verdict and judgment of guilty reversed where arrest of defendant
for trial for perjury was based on an invalid warrant. 159 C. 96. Judge who issued search warrant is not required to cross-
examine the officers concerning the facts which they had submitted to him under oath. Id., 521. Cited. 162 C. 440. Police
have the right to stop for investigation short of arrest where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
to conclude criminal activity may be afoot. 165 C. 577. Cited. 169 C. 322; 170 C. 85. Warrantless search of motor van,
with probable cause, upheld; knowledge of entire organization imputed to police officer. 171 C. 119. Cited. 175 C. 614;
176 C. 17; Id., 75; 179 C. 46; Id., 522. Blood test constitutes a search and seizure. 180 C. 290. Court’s construction of
Sec. 54-41c(8) in accord with standards for protection of privacy. Id., 345. Cited. 181 C. 151; Id., 172; Id., 299; 183 C.
394. Unidentified informant and probable cause discussed. 185 C. 104. Any such “search” in case is lawful as incident
to a lawful arrest. 186 C. 45. Defendant was “seized” within meaning of constitutional provisions so as to invoke its
protection. Id., 287. Cited. 187 C. 647; 189 C. 228; Id., 461. Warrantless search and seizure at premises destroyed by fire
discussed. Id., 752. Cited. 190 C. 440; 191 C. 360; 193 C. 70; Id., 612; Id., 695; 194 C. 331; Id., 530; 195 C. 668; 196
C. 685. Provides more substantive protection than does the fourth amendment to the federal constitution in determination
of probable cause. 197 C. 219. Court held an illegal arrest imposes no jurisdictional barrier to a defendant’s subsequent
prosecution and overruled 153 C. 127 to the extent that it holds to the contrary. 198 C. 255. Illegal search cited. Id., 348.
Cited. 199 C. 399; Id., 718; 200 C. 82; Id., 151. Unconstitutional arrest; fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial
cited. 201 C. 559. Cited. 202 C. 385. Constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure cited. Id. Cited. 204
C. 187; Id., 259; 205 C. 298; Id., 456; Id., 560; Id., 638. Illegal searches and seizures cited. 207 C. 152. Cited. Id., 565;
209 C. 1; Id., 98; 211 C. 258; 212 C. 223; Id., 821. Unconstitutional search cited. 214 C. 752. Probable cause discussed.
215 C. 667. Good faith exception to exclusionary rule incompatible with this section of the Connecticut Constitution.
216 C. 150, see also 26 CA 423, 27 CA 291, 223 C. 902 and 225 C. 10, reversing judgment in State v. Marsala. Good

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150 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
faith exception to exclusionary rule; required suppression; costs of exclusionary rule cited. Id. Cited. Id., 172. Constitu-
tion does not authorize good faith exception to exclusionary rule. Id., 185. Cited. Id., 402; Id., 514. Search and seizure;
constitutionally protected interests in human dignity and privacy cited. Id. Cited. 217 C. 73; 218 C. 85. “Totality of cir-
cumstances” analysis of probable cause discussed. 219 C. 529. Cited. Id., 557; 220 C. 920. Illegal search and seizure
cited. 222 C. 254. Cited. Id., 910. Applicability of emergency doctrine is analyzed by de novo review of subordinate facts
found by trial court to determine justification of warrantless entry. Id., 672. State constitutional grounds; state search and
seizure clause cited. Id. Cited. 223 C. 127. Constitutional requirement of probable cause; “totality of circumstances” test
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 207; Id., 283; Id., 635; Id., 903; 224 C. 593. Constitutional rights cited. Id. Search and seizure by
police of garbage placed at curb for collection did not violate this constitutional provision. Id., 627. Constitutional right
to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures cited. Id. Cited. Id., 914; Id., 915. Held, good faith exception to exclu-
sionary rule is incompatible with Connecticut Constitution Art. I, Sec. 7, 216 C. 150; judgment of Appellate Court in 26
CA 423, 27 CA 291, 223 C. 902 reversed. 225 C. 10. Cited. Id., 55. Unconstitutional seizure cited. Id. Cited. Id., 609.
Emergency exception to warrant requirements of state constitution cited. Id. Does not entitle defendant to de novo review
of issue of probable cause. 226 C. 514. Cited. 227 C. 1; Id., 101. Unlawful, forcible detention of a person and “seizure”
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 207. Authorized search cited. Id. Warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause con-
ducted after automobile has been impounded at police station violates this section. Id., 363. Constitutional preference for
warrants cited. Id. Cited. Id., 456. Illegal arrest cited. Id., 534. Cited. 228 C. 62. Seizure and unlawful seizure cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 281; Id., 610. Chemical test on clothing constituted an unreasonable search under this article; judgment of
Appellate Court in 30 CA 164 reversed. 229 C. 10. Search and seizure warrant requirements cited. Id. Cited. Id., 125; Id.,
164. Violation of seizure rights cited. Id. Cited. 230 C. 24. Reasonable and articulable suspicion standard discussed;
canine sniff as a “search” discussed. Id., 372. Unconstitutional search cited. Id. Cited. 231 C. 43. Search and seizure;
exigent circumstances cited. Id. Cited. Id., 115. Right of privacy under state constitution cited. Id. Detention for investi-
gative purposes cited. 232 C. 455. Cited. 233 C. 557; 234 C. 903. Sec. 7 does not categorically bar the seizure of non-
threatening contraband detected through sense of touch during a lawful patdown search; judgment of Appellate Court in
37 CA 561 reversed. 236 C. 216. Unconstitutional search cited. Id. Cited. 237 C. 81. Challenge to warrantless entry;
evidence obtained in violation of rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 390. Illegal seizure cited. Id. Department regulations pertain-
ing to nonprivileged inmate telephone calls are consistent with Connecticut Constitution Art. I, Sec. 7. 238 C. 692. Pri-
vacy right to telephone calls cited. Id. Illegal, unreasonable search; unconstitutional intervening search cited. 239 C. 235.
Taking of property in violation of Connecticut Constitution cited. Id., 515. “Probable cause” and “reasonable and articu-
lable suspicion” standards discussed. 240 C. 365. Prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 489. State violated rights of search cited. Id. Cited. 241 C. 650. Violation gives rise to a private cause of action for
money damages. 244 C. 23. Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in charred wood flooring sam-
ples that had been lawfully seized from his home pursuant to a fire investigation and therefore search warrant was not
required to conduct tests on the samples. 246 C. 63. Trial court reversed; warrantless search and seizure was conducted
incident to an arrest that was lawful and evidence was incorrectly suppressed. 248 C. 183. State constitutional standard
for subfacial challenge to a warrant is the same as federal standard. 251 C. 567. Police violated defendant’s rights by
detaining defendant because his vehicle was located in an area of increased criminal activity at an early hour of the morn-
ing. Id., 636. A sobriety checkpoint operated under neutral criteria found to be constitutionally permissible in light of the
state’s significant interest in preventing motorists from driving under the influence of alcohol. 256 C. 543. Trial court
reversed; informant’s basis of knowledge giving rise to warrantless search of automobile by police does not require that
informant have firsthand visual knowledge of illegal activity; warrantless on the scene search of an automobile permitted
only because obtaining warrant would be impracticable in light of the inherent mobility of automobiles and the latent
exigency that mobility creates. 257 C. 216. Exclusionary rule did not apply in probation violation hearing in present case,
where search made pursuant to search warrant, case did not present itself as one of egregious, shocking or harassing
police misconduct, search warrant obtained after police observed defendant engaged in drug transaction, defendant did
not contest legality of that search warrant and defendant made no offer of proof that that police executing search warrant
knew he was on probation at the time. 258 C. 501. Unnecessary for court to decide whether search warrant was required
to conduct a thermal imaging scan to detect heat emanating from the artificial lighting system used to cultivate mari-
juana within commercial premises; affidavit supporting search warrant application for defendant’s commercial premises
contained sufficient other facts to establish probable cause for issuance of the warrant without the results of the thermal
imaging scan. 259 C. 94. On appeal of trial court’s dismissal of criminal count due to lack of probable cause, Supreme
Court, having jurisdiction to consider the question, determined that probable cause did exist for the arrest. 261 C. 395.
Voluntary statement not attenuated from taint of unlawful arrest and admissible based on totality of circumstances, in-
cluding passage of eleven hours between arrest and statement and the facts that defendant had been given Miranda warn-
ings twice and that unlawfulness was not purposeful or flagrant. 262 C. 179. Where anonymous tip was corroborated by
two separate observations by investigating officer, it was held that probable cause existed to search or arrest defendant
and subsequent search of defendant’s person and vehicle incident to such arrest was therefore lawful. Id., 686. Police
detained suspect without reasonable and articulable basis to suspect criminal activity had occurred or was about to occur
where defendant was detained by state trooper who had noticed vehicle parked at night in parking lot of publicly owned
athletic fields that were known for criminal activity. 267 C. 495. Both present joint occupants must consent to search of
jointly controlled property for the search to be valid. 276 C. 40. Art. I, Sec. 7 of state constitution does not embody au-
tomatic standing doctrine. 283 C. 280. Municipal police officers were entitled to qualified immunity under common law
for plaintiff’s claims that officers’ discretionary actions in removing her from dwelling in which she had valid posses-
sory interest violated her rights under this section because nothing made it apparent to officers that plaintiff would have
been subject to any harm by their actions and there was no evidence that the officers acted with any improper motive.
284 C. 502. Defendant was not in possession or control of box that was partially opened by private shipping company
employee and was later completely opened in presence of police and, therefore, defendant was not a bailee of the box;
defendant lacked standing to challenge alleged warrantless search of box. 285 C. 367. The mere presence of two uni-
formed officers, unaccompanied by any aggressive or coercive conduct, is not a show of authority that constitutes a sei-
zure; it serves law enforcement purposes for the officers to make a brief inquiry of the defendant to determine whether
assistance is required. 288 C. 836. Defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of cell phone, including

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Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 151
his subscriber number, however search and seizure by New York town’s police was valid under automobile exception to
warrant requirement; where search was made by New York town’s police, there was no evidence that Norwalk police
intended to violate Connecticut Constitution by circuitous and indirect methods, and it was clear that New York town’s
police were not acting as agents for Norwalk police, therefore, legality of search must be determined under New York
constitutional law. 295 C. 707. Police officers were justified in concluding that an emergency situation existed within
residence that necessitated a warrantless entry to search for possible victims given defendant’s history with weapons and
drugs, his extreme attempt to avoid arrest and his lack of any apparent connection with house or its residents. Id., 785.
When the police are familiar with the informant and his credibility has been established, and the police are able to cor-
roborate several aspects of a tip by personal observation, the fact that the tip did not state the informant’s basis of knowl-
edge does not preclude the officers from having a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity warranting an
investigative stop. 297 C. 1. State constitution does not provide increased protection beyond the federal constitution with
respect to nontraffic-related questioning and requests for consent to search automobile during routine traffic stops. 298
C. 209. Transfer of defendant’s personal effects from New York City police to New Haven police without a search war-
rant did not violate defendant’s right to be secure from unreasonable searches or seizures when New York City police
lawfully seized the items and the subsequent seizure by New Haven police did not involve a greater intrusion into defend-
ant’s privacy interests than the initial one. 304 C. 383. Defendant’s Internet conversation expressing interest in and re-
questing pornographic image of children establishes probable cause to support the issuance of warrant to search defend-
ant’s residence for evidence of the crime of possession of child pornography. 308 C. 678. It is reasonable and permissible
for officers to briefly detain a suspect’s companion incident to the lawful stop of the suspect when the officers reasonably
believe that the suspect presents a threat to their safety. 313 C. 1. Warrantless recording of a telephone conversation that
has the consent of one party to the conversation, but not defendant’s consent, does not violate the prohibition on unrea-
sonable searches and seizures because defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such telephone
conversation. 318 C. 699. This section does not afford greater protection than the fourth amendment to the federal con-
stitution regarding the issue of an administrative search warrant during an ex parte proceeding; an adversarial hearing is
not required prior to the issuance of a judicial order authorizing an administrative search; a property owner or occupant
is not constitutionally required to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard in court before judicial authorization for
an administrative search may be granted. 322 C. 80. Defendant was seized no later than when one of the police officers
commanded him to stop and such seizure was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activ-
ity to justify a warrantless seizure. 323 C. 34. A canine sniff directed toward a home, whether freestanding or part of a
multitenant structure, is a search under this section and requires a warrant issued upon a court’s finding of probable
cause. 324 C. 80. Granting of motion for testing pursuant to Sec. 54-102a based solely on finding that defendant has been
charged with offense enumerated in a statute that proscribes a sexual act violates defendant’s right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches under this section, and before ordering such testing, a court must first make a finding that such testing
would provide useful, practical information to victim that cannot reasonably be obtained otherwise. 339 C. 528. A war-
rantless canine sniff of the exterior door to a motel room by the police for the purpose of detecting the presence of illegal
drugs inside the room violates article first, section 7 of the state constitution because its use for that purpose constitutes
a search subject to the warrant requirement of that state constitutional provision. 340 C. 619.
Cited. 3 CA 359. Constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure cited. 5 CA 586. Right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure cited. 6 CA 124. Cited. Id., 394. Warrantless search under state constitution cited. Id.
Cited. 7 CA 46. Investigative stop; seizure and search and seizure cited. Id. Standard for measurement of probable cause
more strict than that used under federal constitution. Id., 354. Cited. Id., 550; 8 CA 13; Id., 125; 10 CA 7. Defective
warrant cited. Id., 103. Cited. Id., 217. “Sensible threshold” standard discussed; search and seizure cited. Id., 561. Cited.
11 CA 11; 13 CA 69; Id., 139. Unreasonable warrantless search cited. Id., 413. Cited. 14 CA 134. Unreasonable search-
es and seizures cited. Id. Fourth amendment and state constitutional rights cited. Id., 574. Evidence obtained pursuant to
objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is admissible. Id., 605. Search violated
rights cited. 15 CA 161. Cited. Id., 416. Right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures cited. Id. Cited. Id., 519.
Denial of motion to suppress cited. Id., 539. Cited. Id., 589; 16 CA 223. Exigent circumstances discussed. 17 CA 142.
Unreasonable warrantless searches of private property cited. Id. Cited. Id., 556; Id., 635. Granting of motion to suppress
on state constitutional grounds cited. Id. Prohibition of unreasonable warrantless searches cited. 18 CA 32. Cited. Id.,
104. Unconstitutional entry cited. Id. Cited. Id., 423; Id., 658; judgment reversed, see 216 C. 185. Prohibition on unrea-
sonable searches and seizures cited. Id., 694. Cited. 19 CA 265. Constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches
and seizures cited. Id., 296. Good faith exception to exclusionary rule cited. Id., 478; judgment reversed, see 216 C. 150,
see also 26 CA 423, 27 CA 291, 223 C. 902 and 225 C. 10, reversing judgment in State v. Marsala. Cited. Id., 594. Right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures cited. 20 CA 168; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 667. Constitutional
questions not properly raised at a nonadjudicatory preliminary hearing. Id., 321. Unconstitutionally seized; illegal entry
and search cited. Id. Cited. Id., 336. State constitution cited. Id. Cited. 21 CA 162. Warrantless search cited. Id., 506.
Cited. 22 CA 10; Id., 40. Good faith exception to exclusionary rule discussed. Id., 62. Cited. Id., 118; 23 CA 50. No
unreasonable search and seizure cited. Id. Failure to suppress evidence in violation of state constitutional rights cited. Id.,
602. Warrantless search per se unreasonable cited. 24 CA 259. Illegal seizure cited. Id., 300. Right against unreasonable
searches and seizures cited. Id., 347. Unconditional plea under Alford doctrine constitutes waiver of right to challenge
constitutionality of arrest and subsequent search. Id., 408. Illegal search and seizure; right not be arrested without prob-
able cause cited. Id. Attenuation of taint discussed. 25 CA 282. State constitutional claim cited. Id. “Totality of circum-
stances” test discussed. Id., 428. Exclusionary rule and “totality of circumstances” cited. Id. State constitution construed
to allow warrantless searches incident to lawful arrests. Id., 575. Cited. 26 CA 423, see also 27 CA 291, 223 C. 902 and
225 C. 10, reversing judgment in State v. Marsala. Cited. Id., 481; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494. Cited. Id., 667.
Seizure and detention in violation of constitutional rights cited. 27 CA 49. Cited. Id., 128. Does not protect defendant
from warrantless search of garbage left in public place for disposal; “totality of circumstances” analysis discussed. Id.,
248. Search and seizure cited. Id. Cited. Id., 307; Id., 370. “Exigent circumstances” discussed in connection with war-
rantless searches and seizures. Id., 403. Cited. Id., 741. Warrantless search per se unreasonable cited. Id. Cited. 28 CA
508. Violation of fundamental right cited. Id. “Probable cause” and existence of “exigent circumstances” and inevitable

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152 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
discovery exception to exclusion rule discussed. 29 CA 207. Search violative of Connecticut Constitution cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 843. Unreasonable searches and seizures cited. Id. Cited. 30 CA 164; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10. Illegal
search and seizure; expectation of privacy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 249. Connecticut Constitution requires “inadvertence” for
plain view seizure cited. Id. Cited. Id., 550; Id., 712. Evidence seized in violation of constitutional rights; searches and
seizures cited. 31 CA 178. Cited. Id., 443. Constitutes search under state constitution cited. Id. Cited. Id., 548. State
constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. 32 CA 84. Rights to be free from unreasonable searches cited. Id. Cited. Id., 267;
Id., 402. Freedom from unreasonable search and seizure; fundamental constitutional right to liberty cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
505. Not seized within meaning of state constitution cited. Id. Cited. 33 CA 409. Constitutional rights violation cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 590; 34 CA 492; 35 CA 279; Id., 781. Illegal arrest under state constitution cited. 36 CA 161. Cited. Id., 401.
Illegal arrest and right to fair trial; unconstitutional arrest and seizure cited. Id. Cited. Id., 488; 37 CA 40. Motion to
suppress evidence cited. Id. Cited. Id., 276. Provisions of Sec. 7 do not permit expansions recognized under the federal
constitution. 37 CA 561; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 216. Cited. 38 CA 29; Id., 588; Id., 750; 39 CA 11. Right to be
free of unreasonable searches and seizures cited. Id. Cited. Id., 224; Id., 369; Id., 579. Constitutionality of search of de-
fendant’s pockets cited. Id. Cited. 40 CA 420; Id., 544; Id., 762. Custodial arrest cited. Id. Entry of insurance company
agents in defendant’s business premises does not constitute illegal search under constitutional provisions. Id., 789. Cited.
41 CA 772. Rights against unreasonable seizures; inevitable discovery doctrine cited. Id. Cited. 42 CA 1. Warrantless
and illegal searches, constitutional prohibitions in stop and seizure and “plain feel” doctrine cited. 43 CA 448. Warrant-
less search cited. 44 CA 6. Unlawful seizure cited. 45 CA 148. Cited. Id., 679; Id., 804. Unreasonable search and seizure
cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 350. “Totality of the circumstances” test discussed; because probable cause for warrantless arrest
was established based on Aguilar-Spinelli factors, trial court improperly introduced a second level of review under the
“totality of the circumstances” analysis. 47 CA 424. Search in violation of state constitution; constitutional protections
against unwarranted search and seizure cited. Id. Franks analysis applied under the federal constitution to challenge the
veracity of statements made in a warrant affidavit also applies under the state constitution. Id., 706. Voluntary consent to
warrantless search or entry into a house discussed; police investigator’s statement that he would “apply for a warrant”
was not inherently coercive when viewed as one factor in the totality of circumstances and was not sufficient to render
consent to warrantless search involuntary. 49 CA 738. Entry into premises by police in community caretaking role to
protect or preserve human life deemed a reasonable search. 50 CA 77. Urinalysis found to be a reasonable condition of
defendant’s probation and suppression of evidence related thereto held to be improper. Id., 187. Police may detain an
individual for investigative purposes if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in or
about to engage in criminal activity. 56 CA 181. Detention at roadside sobriety checkpoint conducted pursuant to prac-
tice embodying neutral criteria did not constitute an unreasonable seizure. Id., 252. Provides same protection as fourth
amendment. 57 CA 202. Whether state constitution embraces the principle of automatic standing with regard to defend-
ant seeking to suppress evidence as the fruit of an illegal search remains an open but important question. Id., 396. Drugs
were properly seized after officer’s plain view of defendant’s disposal of the drugs in a garbage can in a public area. 58
CA 136. Officer’s suspicion that vehicle occupant was a prostitute did not constitute valid reason for search and subse-
quent arrest. Id., 267. Evidence sufficient to constitute probable cause to arrest defendant and therefore search of defend-
ant and vehicle incident to that arrest was permissible even though search preceded arrest. 59 CA 272. “Reasonable and
articulable suspicion that person is engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity” warranted by specific and identi-
fiable facts. 62 CA 376. Motion to suppress properly denied despite scrivener’s error in affidavit for search warrant since
the affidavit presented a substantial factual basis for magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause existed to issue warrant
and warrant itself was accurate as to place and persons to which it applied. 63 CA 263. Weapons and narcotics were
properly seized in search incident to a lawful arrest notwithstanding that such items were seized from beneath a floor-
board in a closet while defendant was handcuffed and four feet away from the closet. Id., 476. Court concluded that de-
fendant’s fenced backyard and driveway of his single family, private home constitute the constitutionally protected cur-
tilage of his house and that defendant therefore had an expectation of privacy in the fenced area equal to that of the house
itself. 64 CA 93. Defendant’s constitutional rights not violated by seizure of items in defendant’s apartment that were in
officers’ plain view when officers entered the apartment to arrest defendant pursuant to an arrest warrant. 70 CA 160.
Investigatory stop by extraterritorial police officer did not violate defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable search-
es and seizures; a seizure may be constitutionally reasonable even if it is not specifically authorized by statute. Id., 297.
Trial court’s determination that evidence established that victim and defendant lived together in the apartment and that
victim, as an occupant, was lawfully entitled to give police permission to search her home and seize items from it to be
used in prosecution of defendant, that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to items in the apartment
and that victim voluntarily consented to the search when she signed the consent to search form and that there was no
indication that her will was overborne or that her consent was the result of promises, force, threats or other coercion was
not clearly erroneous, and its denial of defendant’s motion to suppress was legally correct and supported by the facts. Id.,
594. Reiterated previous holdings that even if there was no probable cause for arrest, police officer could detain indi-
vidual based on reasonable suspicion and totality of evidence, even if defendant wore different clothing than suspect. 74
CA 248. Warrantless search of defendant’s person was incident to lawful arrest for possession of narcotics with intent to
sell, for which there was probable cause for the arrest, independent of search of the premises. Id., 693. Corroborated
information from informant, detective’s independent observations of three drug transactions and crack cocaine found in
plain view clearly established probable cause to search and arrest. 81 CA 361. Terry stop of defendant and resulting
admission of evidence was permissible because of the circumstances including defendant’s apparent use of force to enter
a building that was prone to drug activity, apparent commission of criminal trespass and inability to present key or name
those he was visiting. 83 CA 377. Police action of moving defendant three hundred feet from residence for security
reasons and purpose of a show-up identification that provided probable cause for arrest was permissible investigative
detention and not impermissible arrest. 85 CA 329. Because police officer’s initial encounter with defendant was to assist
him as a distressed motorist, officer’s conduct did not constitute illegal seizure, except that a seizure under these facts
later arose once additional cruisers arrived at which time a reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have felt
free to leave; defendant’s erratic behavior including jumping into vehicle and trying to drive off, nervous demeanor and
rocking back and forth, and inability to produce license or registration, provided reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity, that is, of presence of contraband in vehicle. Id., 356. Reaffirmed previous holdings that police must

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Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 153
have specific, articulable facts for search and seizure, such as unusual conduct; size and manner of clothing are not
criminal behavior. Id., 755. Terry stop was not more intrusive than necessary to complete the investigation for which the
stop was made. 87 CA 464. Since decision by police to detain defendant was predicated on reasonable and articulable
suspicion that defendant was involved in drug activity and likely was transporting drugs in his vehicle at the time in light
of information given by informant and their own independent observations of defendant, it was constitutionally permis-
sible for police to stop defendant and further investigate whether he was transporting narcotics at that time. 89 CA 241.
Trial court properly granted motion to suppress evidence that was fruit of the poisonous tree; police officer who con-
ducted investigatory stop did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop–
defendant had not been operating his vehicle in an erratic or illegal manner, police officer cited no facts to indicate that
defendant was operating his vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or that he was otherwise engaged in,
or about to engage in, criminal behavior, and such officer had a suspicion that defendant wanted to avoid her but lacked
a specific and articulable basis necessary to conclude reasonably that an investigatory stop was justified. 95 CA 616.
Under totality of circumstances test, officer had no probable cause to arrest defendant for operating a motor vehicle un-
der the influence of drugs. 96 CA 515. Seizure occurs where police, driving patrol car, approach and park behind sus-
pect’s vehicle, are dressed in police uniforms, carry guns and approach vehicle on both sides. 99 CA 413. Evidence of
cash recovered from car of defendant at arrest scene without a warrant was admissible even though defendant had not
reached for weapons or to destroy evidence. 108 CA 533. A person is seized when his freedom of movement is restrained
by physical force or show of authority, and the key consideration is whether, in view of all the circumstances, a reason-
able person would have believed he was not free to leave, under objective standard focusing on reasonable person’s
probable reaction to officer’s conduct, and in present case, defendant was under seizure once officer had approached his
vehicle and asked him to produce his documents. 113 CA 250. In light of the totality of circumstances, including officer’s
experience, information available to officer and rational inferences derived from such information, officer had a particu-
larized and objective basis for suspecting defendant was involved in criminal activity and therefore investigatory stop
was reasonable and 15 minute detention while officer further investigated suspected crime was appropriate under the
circumstances. 120 CA 497. Warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment was not unreasonable where consent of de-
fendant was implied from his conduct, and consent of his wife was not also required. Id., 512. In light of the detailed
information provided by the informant, which was corroborated by the police, the informant’s basis of knowledge re-
garding the information and the fact that the officer had worked with the informant in the past, there was probable cause
to believe that contraband would be found in defendant’s vehicle and search of defendant’s vehicle was constitutionally
permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 125 CA 17. Defendant was seized when police
officers displayed their badges and stated “come to the vehicle”, but seizure was not unconstitutional because the interest
in the police officers’ safety during investigatory stop outweighed defendant’s personal liberty interest in not being in-
convenienced, as the risk was significant and the incremental intrusion was minimal. 129 CA 109; judgment affirmed,
see 313 C. 1. Subpoena issued by prosecutor for access to defendant’s medical records was reasonable because court
properly balanced needs of the state with privacy interests of defendant, gave defendant an opportunity to raise objec-
tions, and limited disclosure of records. Id., 239. Apparent authority doctrine does not violate right of state citizens to be
free from unreasonable searches; under apparent authority doctrine, warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment was not
unreasonable where girlfriend of defendant told police she lived in the apartment and invited police into the apartment
and defendant did not object. Id., 777; judgment affirmed, see 312 C. 574. No reasonable expectation of privacy in open
attic space of 3-story rooming house. 139 CA 116; judgment affirmed, see 311 C. 507. 11-day gap between execution of
search warrant and last purchase of illegal drugs in protracted series of drug transactions not so unreasonable as to defeat
probable cause of warrant on grounds facts were stale. 144 CA 308; judgment affirmed, see 319 C. 218. Right of privacy
is personal to party seeking to invoke it and cannot be left to court’s speculation, and any expectation of privacy of de-
fendant in evidence consisting of victim’s clothing was legitimately breached once police lawfully took possession of it
with ex-wife’s consent. 153 CA 296. Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy on public walkway
outside door to motel room, thus case is distinguishable from State v. Kono, 324 C. 80, and canine sniff conducted from
such walkway did not require warrant. 185 CA 308; judgment reversed, see 340 C. 619.
A search and seizure which, though warrantless, is consented to is not within the exclusionary rule but mere acquies-
cence in and peaceful submission to the demands of the searching officers is not to be construed as consent; defendant’s
application for an order to return articles illegally seized was denied. 22 CS 41. Cited. Id., 323, 510. Search and seizure
may lawfully be made without warrant when incident to a legal arrest and may, under appropriate circumstances, include
premises under immediate control of person arrested. 24 CS 22. Even though evidence was obtained as result of illegal
search and seizure, defendant was not entitled to motion to suppress the evidence in advance of trial. Id., 36. That part of
Sec. 6-70 attempting to empower coroner with unlimited access to private citizen’s home held violative of this section.
25 CS 153. Search not unreasonable when incident to arrest for possession of burglars’ tools. Id., 217. Arrest for minor
traffic violation did not justify search of car without a warrant; if stolen goods were in plain sight, search might have
been justified. Id., 229. Where sample of blood was taken from defendant when he was unconscious in a hospital and
could not give his consent, without a search warrant and not as incident to a lawful arrest, such taking was in violation
of his constitutional rights. 26 CS 41. Cited. 28 CS 239. Affidavit of officer seeking arrest warrant was not insufficient
where he did not specifically vouch for trustworthiness of informants who were victims of car theft conspiracy. Id., 252.
Where affidavits and warrant correctly set forth defendant’s middle and last name, date of birth, physical description and
address, the arrest was valid and the search based on it. Id., 325. Cited. 30 CS 94. Warrant, based upon affidavit lacking
credibility and reliable references, void. Id., 584. Physical examination of properly arrested criminal defendant is not an
unreasonable search and seizure. 32 CS 306. Substantially similar to fourth amendment to U.S. Constitution; warrant-
less searches, particularly incident to arrest, discussed; permissible scope of search; purpose of exclusionary rule. 33 CS
129. Cited. 37 CS 515; Id., 901; 38 CS 570. Noncompliance with “knock and announce” rule and standing to challenge
search discussed. 40 CS 20. Cited. Id., 498; Id., 547. Seizure within meaning of federal and state constitutions cited. 40
CS 306. Cited. 43 CS 441; 44 CS 223.

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154 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
Properly conducted search incidental to lawful arrest not illegal though made without warrant. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 231.
Under circumstances, officers’ failure to announce their purpose before forcible entry did not constitute an unlawful sei-
zure. Id., 247. Unsigned and undated search warrant is fatally defective, invalid and void and confers no authority to act
thereunder. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 641, 644. Search of defendant under Sec. 54-33b was carried out as provided by the statute
and these provisions are reasonable, not unreasonable. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 637. Affidavit in support of a search warrant of
premises used for pool selling sufficient to support issuance of warrant where underlying circumstances, reasons for reli-
ability of informant and personal observations of betting transactions were sworn to by affidavit. Id., 669.
(Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions. What cases bailable. Speedy trial.
Due process. Excessive bail or fines. Presentment of grand jury, when necessary.)
Sec. 8. 1 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by
himself and by counsel; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process to obtain
witnesses in his behalf; to be released on bail upon sufficient security, except in capital
offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption great; and in all prosecutions
by indictment or information, to a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury. No person
shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall excessive bail be required nor excessive
fines imposed. No person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death
or life imprisonment, unless on a presentment or an indictment of a grand jury, except
in the armed forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public
danger.
1 Amended by Article XVII., and Article XXIX., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
A potential juror’s employment as a police officer, standing alone, is not a ground to remove that juror under a
principal challenge, however, if a defendant establishes that under the circumstances of a particular case, the specific
relationship between the challenged juror and the investigating authority is of so close a nature that it is likely to produce,
consciously or unconsciously, bias on the part of the juror, then the court should grant defendant’s motion to remove
that juror under a principal challenge. 323 C. 654. Defendant’s conditional and equivocal inquiry that reasonably can be
construed as a request for counsel requires an officer, under State v. Purcell, 331 C. 318, to stop the interview and clarify
whether the defendant desired the presence of counsel or, alternatively, to terminate the interview altogether. 340 C. 167.
(Right of personal liberty.)
Sec. 9.1 No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly
warranted by law.
1 Law penalizing the keeping of a place where it is “reputed” that liquors are unlawfully sold upheld. 47 C. 550.
Original juvenile court act made no provision for detaining a child or admitting it to bail pending an appeal. Held, un-
constitutional to detain a child pending an appeal from judgment of a juvenile court. 99 C. 92. Arrest without a warrant.
115 C. 283; 131 C. 231. Does not require trial within territorial subdivision in which offense was committed. 129 C. 572.
Illegal arrest and detention does not automatically render inadmissible confessions made after the arrest or during the
period of detention. 150 C. 169. Imposition of consecutive life sentences for two second degree murders not in violation
of this section. 152 C. 602. Cited. Id. Rule of evidence applicable at time of petitioner’s trial decides admissibility of any
evidence obtained during illegal arrest of petitioner used therein and cannot be disturbed by subsequent habeas corpus
action. 155 C. 316. Cited. 177 C. 677; 179 C. 46; 181 C. 151; 185 C. 63; Id., 402; 187 C. 109; 189 C. 550; 192 C. 704;
193 C. 270; 194 C. 416; 195 C. 421; 198 C. 92. Court held “an illegal arrest imposes no jurisdictional barrier to a defend-
ant’s subsequent prosecution” and overruled 153 C. 127 to the extent that it holds to the contrary. Id., 255. Cited. 199 C.
399; 200 C. 453. Unconstitutional arrest; fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial, cited. 201 C. 559. Cited. Id.,
675; 202 C. 509; 205 C. 638; 212 C. 820. Due process guarantees provided by section held to encompass protection
against double jeopardy; double jeopardy principles in same trial in contrast with subsequent prosecutions discussed.
213 C. 74. Double jeopardy cited. Id. Investigatory detention without probable cause can pass constitutional muster. 216
C. 172. Challenge to admissibility of evidence cited. Id. Guaranteeing due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 402, see also 234
C. 301; Id., 678. Right to counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Right to fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
699; 217 C. 498; 223 C. 635; 224 C. 627; Id., 915; 225 C. 450. Rights and provisions for due process cited. Id. Cited.
227 C. 363; Id., 534; 228 C. 62; Id., 393; Id., 582. Protection against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. 229 C. 10; Id., 125.
Right not to be compelled to participate in police investigatory procedure unless clearly warranted by law cited. Id.
Cited. 230 C. 183. State due process clauses cited; due process clauses implied by prohibiting cruel and unusual punish-
ment cited. Id. Cited. 231 C. 43; Id., 545; 232 C. 345. Due process provisions cited; vague in violation of due process
cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 557; Id., 813; 234 C. 683; 235 C. 206. Cruel and unusual punishment impliedly prohibited cited.

Article FIRST Original 1965 text and publisher annotations; retained historical context.

Id. Cited. 236 C. 189; Id., 216; 237 C. 81. Seizures cited. Id. Cited. Id., 390. Illegal seizure without probable cause cited.
Id. Cited. 238 C. 389. Prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment derived from due process clauses of state con-
stitution cited. Id. Due process clauses cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 317. Double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 489. State vio-
lated rights of search cited. Id. Cited. 241 C. 322; 242 C. 125; Id., 296. Prohibition against double jeopardy cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 345. Prohibitions against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 648. Violation gives rise to a private cause of
action for money damages. 244 C. 23. Police violated defendant’s rights by detaining defendant because his vehicle was

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Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 155
located in an area of increased criminal activity at an early hour of the morning. 251 C. 636. Section does not require
municipal ordinances that restrict personal liberty to be authorized by either statutory or common law authority in order
to be valid. 254 C. 799. Where the cause of a declared mistrial, the conflict between trier of fact presiding over both mo-
tion to suppress and trial itself, was brought to the attention of the court prior to trial, there was no surprise warranting
declaration of a mistrial based on manifest necessity and, therefore, subsequent reprosecution would constitute double
jeopardy. 255 C. 186. Court balanced interests of the state in keeping intoxicated drivers off the road and defendant’s
interest in being free from unreasonable police detention while driving a car and found that a brief investigatory deten-
tion at a sobriety checkpoint that is planned and operated under neutral criteria is consistent with constitutional due
process provisions. 256 C. 543. Re double jeopardy claim, defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that his convic-
tion with regard to different injuries arose out of the same act. 260 C. 93. In considering death sentence, application of
reasonable doubt standard to measuring balance between aggravating and mitigating factors is not constitutionally re-
quired. 266 C. 171. Police detained suspect without reasonable and articulable basis to suspect criminal activity had
occurred or was about to occur where defendant was detained by state trooper who had noticed vehicle parked at night
in parking lot of publicly owned athletic fields that were known for criminal activity. 267 C. 495. Municipal police offic-
ers were entitled to qualified immunity under common law for plaintiff’s claims that officers’ discretionary actions in
removing her from dwelling in which she had a valid possessory interest violated her rights under this section because
nothing made it apparent to officers that plaintiff would have been subject to any harm by their actions and there was no
evidence that officers acted with any improper motive. 284 C. 502. The mere presence of two uniformed officers, unac-
companied by any aggressive or coercive conduct, is not a show of authority that constitutes a seizure; it serves law en-
forcement purposes for the officers to make a brief inquiry of the defendant to determine whether assistance is required.
288 C. 836. Resentencing did not violate double jeopardy where defendant challenged legality of sentences and not va-
lidity of conviction, and trial court was free to refashion entire sentence for each crime within confines of the original
sentencing package as long as the entire sentence had not been fully served. 292 C. 417. Defendant’s rights were not
violated because there was manifest necessity to declare a mistrial on basis of totality of the circumstances when pros-
ecutor unexpectedly became seriously ill during complex trial and no other prosecutor could have assumed duties within
time constraints of existing jurors. 295 C. 1. When the police are familiar with the informant and his credibility has been
established, and the police are able to corroborate several aspects of a tip by personal observation, the fact that the tip did
not state the informant’s basis of knowledge does not preclude the officers from having a reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal activity warranting an investigative stop. 297 C. 1. Section does not mandate that custodial inter-
rogation, advisement of Miranda rights and any resulting statements of defendant be recorded. 298 C. 537. The phrase
“clearly warranted by law” contemplates a requirement that the legal prerequisites for imposing a particular punishment
be definitively established before punishment is imposed; it does not speak to the question of what those prerequisites
shall be. 303 C. 71. Death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; holdings in 230 C. 183 and 238 C.
389 reaffirmed. Id. It is not a violation for the sole aggravating factor found by the jury re a capital felony, namely, mur-
der committed for pecuniary gain under Sec. 53a-46a(i)(6), to duplicate an element of the underlying crime of capital
felony by murder for hire under Sec. 53a-54b(2). 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1. It is reasonable and permissible for offic-
ers to briefly detain a suspect’s companion incident to the lawful stop of the suspect when the officers reasonably believe
that the suspect presents a threat to their safety. 313 C. 1. Cruel and unusual punishments are prohibited under the due
process provisions; the death penalty as imposed following the enactment of P.A. 12-5 repealing the death penalty only
for those felonies committed on or after April 25, 2012, is so out of step with contemporary standards of decency as to
violate the ban on excessive and disproportionate punishment; the prospective abolition of the death penalty also violates
the due process provisions because it no longer serves any legitimate penological purpose. 318 C. 1. Defendant was
seized no later than when one of the police officers commanded him to stop and such seizure was not supported by a
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a warrantless seizure. 323 C. 34. Parole eligibility
under Sec. 54-125a(f) is an adequate remedy for a violation under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, thus re-sentencing
is not required for punishments that include parole eligibility. 333 C. 378.
Cited. 4 CA 514; 9 CA 147. Right to be free of double jeopardy is necessary to due process guaranteed by this section.
15 CA 749. Cited. 16 CA 358; 19 CA 594; 22 CA 10; 23 CA 431; 24 CA 195. Double jeopardy in Connecticut Constitu-
tion discussed. 25 CA 243. Prohibition against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 282; 27 CA 128; 28 CA 708; 30 CA
606; 31 CA 548. State constitution rights cited. Id. Cited. 33 CA 143. Double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 590; 34 CA
751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211. Held to encompass protection against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. 35 CA
431. Double jeopardy provisions cited. Id. Cited. 37 CA 228. Right to be informed of nature and cause of criminal charge
cited. Id. Due process and personal liberty guarantees provided by this section encompass protection against double jeop-
ardy. Id., 276. Cited. Id., 338; Id., 404; Id., 722. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id. Cited. 38 CA 643. Double jeopardy
cited; due process cited. Id. Double jeopardy provisions cited. Id., 661. Cited. Id., 750; 39 CA 11. Right to be free of un-
reasonable searches and seizures cited. Id. Cited. Id., 63; Id., 455; 40 CA 387; Id., 420; Id., 762. Custodial arrests cited.
Id. Cited. 41 CA 255. Right to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 751. Right not to be twice put in jeopardy cited; double
jeopardy rights cited. Id. Cited. 42 CA 264; Id., 640. Prohibition against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. 43 CA 142.
Prohibition against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 176. Violation of Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
252; 44 CA 6. Due process rights cited; greater protection against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 231. Prohibitions
against double jeopardy cited. 45 CA 369. Cited. Id., 658; Id., 679; 46 CA 734. State constitution does not afford greater
double jeopardy protection than federal constitution. 48 CA 71. Defendant did not raise double jeopardy claim arising
from transfer from Superior Court for juvenile matters to Superior Court as an adult at any time before the appeal process,
so claim is waived. 51 CA 117. Brief detention at roadside sobriety checkpoint did not violate defendant’s due process
rights. 56 CA 252. Defendant not deprived of right to fair trial by prosecutor’s questions during cross-examination and
comments during closing arguments and by jury instructions concerning state’s burden of proof on element of intent and
the effect of defendant’s intoxication in determining whether state proved the requisite intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
59 CA 207. Defendant’s analysis under section clearly inapplicable to defendant’s due process claim re establishment of
violation of probation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or, in the alternative, proof by clear and convincing evidence
in a revocation of probation hearing as such hearing clearly complied with provisions of section. 61 CA 99.

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156 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
“Reasonable and articulable suspicion that person is engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity” warranted by
specific and identifiable facts. 62 CA 376. Jury instruction in which the phrases “reasonable doubt” and “the benefit of
the doubt” are included does not suggest that jury could only acquit in a close case if it could give defendant “the benefit
of the doubt” and therefore does not impinge on defendant’s right to due process. Id., 625. Although court did not hold
an evidentiary hearing before ordering defendant to wear leg shackles, defendant’s right to fair trial before an impartial
jury was not infringed since court detailed for the record its justification for ordering the use of restraints. 63 CA 386.
Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress confession he gave to the police and various seized burglary
tools; defendant’s confession was sufficiently attenuated from his initial detention to be purged of any possible taint or
illegality and the burglary tools were found on the ground in plain view of police officers who were conducting a proper
surveillance of defendant. 67 CA 634. Investigatory stop by extraterritorial police officer did not violate defendant’s right
of personal liberty where police officer’s investigation was limited to requesting defendant’s license, registration and
insurance information before turning over the investigation to the correct municipal officers. 70 CA 297. Reiterated
previous holdings that even if there was no probable cause for arrest, police officer could detain individual based on
reasonable suspicion and totality of evidence, even if defendant wore different clothing than suspect. 74 CA 248. De-
fendant’s conviction of two counts of robbery in the first degree did not violate constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy; with regard to each offense, state had to prove a different purpose–for robbery of elderly husband, that defend-
ant’s purpose in using force on him was to overcome his resistance to the taking of property or to its retention after the
taking, and for robbery of elderly wife, that the force used on her husband was for purpose of compelling her to deliver
up the property; under Blockburger test, defendant may be convicted of two offenses arising out of same criminal inci-
dent if each crime contains an element not found in the other, double jeopardy not violated; since robbery is a crime
against the person, and there were multiple victims, legislature intended multiple punishments. Id., 545. Trial court vio-
lated defendant’s right against double jeopardy by improperly sentencing him on three counts of conspiracy arising from
single agreement and on both possession of narcotics count and possession of narcotics with intent to sell counts; a single
agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and thus several conspiracies because it contemplates violation of
several statutes rather than one; double jeopardy precludes sentencing defendant for possession and possession with in-
tent to sell when violations resulted from same act or transaction, because possession is a lesser offense included in of-
fense of possession with intent to sell; trial court should have merged such convictions. Id., 580. Police action of moving
defendant three hundred feet from residence for security reasons and purpose of a show-up identification that provided
probable cause for arrest was permissible investigative detention and not impermissible arrest. 85 CA 329. Because po-
lice officer’s initial encounter with defendant was to assist him as a distressed motorist, officer’s conduct did not consti-
tute illegal seizure, except that a seizure under these facts later arose once additional cruisers arrived at which time a
reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have felt free to leave. Id., 356. Defendant’s erratic behavior includ-
ing jumping into vehicle and trying to drive off, nervous demeanor and rocking back and forth, and inability to produce
license or registration provided reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, that is, of presence of contra-
band in vehicle. Id. Reaffirmed previous holdings that police must have specific, articulable facts for search and seizure,
such as unusual conduct. Size and manner of clothing are not criminal behavior. Id., 755. No right to counsel at sum-
mary contempt proceedings because, although criminal in nature, such proceedings concern offenses against court as an
organ of public justice and not violations of criminal law. 88 CA 599. Trial court properly granted motion to suppress
evidence that was fruit of the poisonous tree; police officer who conducted investigatory stop did not have a reasonable
and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop–defendant had not been operating his vehicle in an er-
ratic or illegal manner, police officer cited no facts to indicate that defendant was operating his vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or that he was otherwise engaged in, or about to engage in, criminal behavior, and such
officer had a suspicion that the defendant wanted to avoid her but lacked a specific and articulable basis necessary to
conclude reasonably that an investigatory stop was justified. 95 CA 616. Conviction of trespassing in first degree under
Sec. 53a-107(a)(2) and criminal violation of protective order under Sec. 53a-223(a) did not violate constitutional protec-
tion against double jeopardy because legislature intended multiple punishments for offense of trespassing in violation of
a protective order. 97 CA 72. A person is seized when his freedom of movement is restrained by physical force or show
of authority, and the key consideration is whether, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have be-
lieved he was not free to leave, under objective standard focusing on reasonable person’s probable reaction to officer’s
conduct, and in present case, defendant was under seizure once officer had approached his vehicle and asked him to
produce his documents. 113 CA 250. Under Sec. 14-149(a), defendant’s convictions on multiple counts of violations
arising out of a single vehicle violated defendant’s right against multiple punishments for the same offense. Id., 541. In
light of the totality of circumstances including officer’s experience, information available to officer and rational infer-
ences derived from such information, officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting defendant was in-
volved in criminal activity and therefore investigatory stop was reasonable and fifteen minute detention while officer
further investigated suspected crime was appropriate under the circumstances. 120 CA 497. Conviction of both criminal
possession of a firearm under Sec. 53a-217(a)(3)(A) and criminal violation of a protective order under Sec. 53a-223(a)
does not constitute double jeopardy. 122 CA 399; judgment affirmed, see 307 C. 1. Section, when read in conjunction
with Art. I, Sec. 13, does not create an ex post facto clause in Connecticut Constitution. 127 CA 336. Convictions for
manslaughter in the first degree and carrying a dangerous weapon do not violate double jeopardy because manslaughter
in the first degree does not require use of or carrying a dangerous weapon and carrying a dangerous weapon does not
require the intent element that first degree manslaughter mandates. 131 CA 528. Sentences for murder and felony murder
were ancillary to capital felony conviction, thus the convictions for murder and felony murder must be vacated. 145 CA
494; judgment affirmed, see 317 C. 741. Parole eligibility hearing under Sec. 54-125a(f) is a constitutionally adequate
remedy for sentences that were imposed in violation of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455; resentencing not required.
167 CA 744. Defendant’s felony offender classifications and resulting enhanced sentences do not violate the due process
guarantee that encompasses protection against double jeopardy because his conduct relating to his conviction of robbery
in the first degree is temporally and substantively distinct from his conduct relating to his conviction of attempt to escape
from custody, and because robbery in the first degree and attempt to escape from custody are conceptually separate and
distinct offenses that do not share any similar elements and both offenses require proof of facts the other does not. 173
CA 119; judgment affirmed in part, see 330 C. 793. Mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration

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Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 157
imposed on juvenile homicide offender not violative of constitutional requirements because subsequent enactment of
Sec. 54-125a(f) rendered offender eligible for parole. 177 CA 242. Trial court improperly denied the defendant’s motion
to correct an illegal sentence because his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated as (1) the offenses of man-
slaughter in the first degree under Sec. 53a-55(a)(1) and risk of injury to a child under Sec. 53-21 arose from the same
actions and constituted the same offense, (2) the offense of risk of injury to a child, as charged, is a lesser included of-
fense of manslaughter in the first degree, and (3) there is no authority that would support the conclusion that the legisla-
ture intended to specifically authorize multiple punishments under the statutes in question. 197 CA 302; judgment re-
versed, see 340 C. 425.
An arrest by a police officer without a warrant is ground for an action for false imprisonment unless the arrest is
authorized by Sec. 6-49. 22 CS 311. Original arrest of defendant on charge of assault being valid, subsequent proceed-
ings upon victim’s death charging defendant with murder could be based on this arrest and were not invalidated by later
issuance of invalid bench warrant. 26 CS 207. Cited. 28 CS 257. Right of self-expression in hair styling is constitution-
ally protected right of privacy and plaintiff allowed an injunction against defendants excluding him from school. Id.,
375. Cited. 30 CS 584; 37 CS 515; 41 CS 356. The Blockburger analysis should apply because United States v. Dixon,
509 U.S. 688, overruled Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, which utilized the “same conduct” test, and therefore subse-
quent prosecution for operating under the influence after defendant had paid fine for a speeding infraction arising from
the same incident is not barred by the double jeopardy clause. 47 CS 258. Department of Correction’s classification of
petitioner as sexual offender despite the fact that petitioner had been acquitted of sexual assault charges is clearly unwar-
ranted by law. 49 CS 416.
Arrest without warrant pursuant to Sec. 6-49 not unlawful merely because pursuit of defendant by police officer
was interrupted when defendant temporarily succeeded in eluding officer. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 42. A curfew to contain a
riot imposed by mayor of New Haven under special laws empowering this action, held constitutional. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct.
22. Search of defendant pursuant to Sec. 54-33b and subsequent arrest constitutional. Id., 637. However forceful and
persuasive the arguments may be compelling a determination that the Connecticut disorderly conduct statute, Sec. 53-
175 is unconstitutional as containing no ascertainable standard of quiet, the circuit court should leave such a decision to
higher courts. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 73, 77.
(Right of redress for injuries.)
Sec. 10.1 All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
1 Liquors kept by an agent of the owner to sell or exchange in violation of law are a nuisance, and the owner cannot
maintain replevin for them when levied upon, as property of the agent, by one of his creditors. 49 C. 166. Law imposing
liability on railroad company for injuries caused by fire from its locomotives, is not in violation of this clause. 54 C. 455.
Nor is the grade crossing law. 58 C. 536. Duty of court to direct a verdict for the defendant, when. 66 C. 241; 91 C. 442.
Cited. 72 C. 528. No person can take redress for injury into his own hands. 88 C. 368. Courts should see that no judgment
is rendered against one who has had no opportunity to be heard; 67 C. 9; and has power to prevent fraudulent advantage
being gained by legal process. 68 C. 472. Discretion of court as to continuing action. 69 C. 186; 75 C. 308; Id., 314; 78
C. 654; 79 C. 380; 81 C. 474. Law creating taxing district within a city held valid. 104 C. 200. When foreign receiver
may bring action in this state. Id., 670. Guarantees to every litigant right to introduce all proper evidence; failure to admit
evidence held error under this section. 107 C. 457. Right to have workmen’s compensation determined by act in effect at
time of injury is a vested right. 112 C. 130, 142. Validating acts of 1929 ineffective to impair vested right to common-law
cause of action for personal injuries caused by negligence, which was never suspended by the guest statute. Id., 145.
Special act validating a deficient notice to city of defective sidewalk held constitutional. 124 C. 183. Common control
provision of unemployment compensation act is valid. 128 C. 213. “Injury” means one violative of established law; no
action by child for alienation of mother’s affections. 134 C. 163. Retroactive statute impairing vested rights held uncon-
stitutional. 136 C. 127. Amendments to unemployment compensation act did not impair vested right. 137 C. 129. Non-
resident plaintiff may bring suit for support. Id., 404. Zoning ordinance prohibiting sale or display of new or used cars in
any open lot in any zone is an unwarranted interference with the constitutional right to carry on a lawful business. Id.,
701. Neither the federal government nor the state is under any constitutional obligation to allow a deduction for a tax
imposed by the other. 141 C. 257. Does not require that taxation be equal and uniform. Id., 266. Same as federal consti-
tution’s due process clause. 142 C. 699. Substantially same as the fourteenth amendment to U.S. Constitution. 143 C. 9.
Cited. Id., 698. Word “injury” means a legal injury, that is, one violative of established law of which a court can prop-
erly take cognizance. 144 C. 155. A permit to sell liquor is a matter of privilege and not of right. By engaging in the
liquor business the permittee assumes the risk of a variety of situations which could impose liability on him. It is not an
unconstitutional exercise of the police power for a permittee who sells in violation of the law to be prevented from de-
fending on the ground that the particular drink which he sold did not cause or contribute to the buyer’s intoxication. Id.,
241. “Injury” means an injury which is violative of established law of which a court can properly take cognizance. 145
C. 196. Depreciation of neighborhood because of housing project not such an injury as covered by this section. Id. Ordi-
nance licensing and regulating trailer and mobile home parks held constitutional except for two provisions. 146 C. 720.
Does not guarantee any particular form of procedure at a public hearing but circumstances govern each case. 147 C. 321.
Providing of school transportation to nonprofit private schools by towns under Sec. 10-281 held constitutional. Id., 374.
Substantially the same as due process clause of the federal constitution. Id. Provision in municipal building code which
prohibited the repair of any building of nonfireproof construction within the inner fire limits of the city after it had been
damaged to the extent of fifty per cent of the cost of replacing the original building, held not to violate due process. Id.,
602. Building code made no provision for a hearing before issuance of a condemnation and demolition order, held not to
violate due process as aggrieved person could appeal to review board and to the courts. Id. Regulations imposed on a

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158 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
lawful business cannot exceed what is reasonably necessary to accomplish their purpose. 148 C. 481. Question of con-
stitutionality of statute (Sec. 17-273a) concerning return of indigent person to state of origin not determined as stipulated
facts held inadequate. 149 C. 216. An act found to serve a public purpose is not rendered unconstitutional by the fact that
it might incidentally benefit particular industries or lending institutions. 150 C. 333. Cited. Id., 336, footnote. Where
change of zone deprived plaintiffs of any worthwhile rights or benefits in their land, defendant’s action in changing the
zone was unreasonable and confiscatory and therefore in violation of this section. 151 C. 314. Compensation for taking;
section does not apply where injury is only consequential and there has been no physical taking of land or any interest in
it and no physical invasion of it. 152 C. 688. Court cannot strike down as unconstitutional a legislative enactment
merely because it contains technical words the exact meaning of which is not evident, without explanation, to other
persons disassociated from the technical field. 153 C. 465. Cited. Id., 574. Due process does not guarantee any particular
form of state procedure. Due regard must be had to nature of proceeding and individual right affected by it and Sec.
8-127 affords sufficient due process for determination of redevelopment area. 156 C. 521. Has substantially same mean-
ing as the due process clause of amendment XIV of federal constitution. Id. Applicant for readmission to the bar under
circumstances where testimony of chairman of committee on recommendations had testified for his disbarment should
have opportunity to cross-examine as right of due process of law. 157 C. 67. Exclusion of public except press and parents
of parties from courtroom during testimony of female plaintiff as to acts of rape by defendant held properly ordered by
trial court. Id., 198. Procedure for condemnation under the urban redevelopment statutes is not unconstitutional as violat-
ing this section. 159 C. 116. Sec. 7-433c, while imposing a financial obligation on towns, is in the interest of public
safety, hence, it does not deprive town of property without due process of law. 168 C. 84. Mechanic’s lien as a taking of
property without due process. Id., 371. Right of redress for actionable injury not restricted by no-fault insurance law. 169
C. 267. Cited. Id., 267; 170 C. 155. Section 12 of article I of the constitution of 1818, now this section, does not require
taxation to be equal and uniform. 174 C. 556. Cited. 176 C. 409; Id., 563; Id., 613; 177 C. 78. Application of antitrust act
to contract entered into prior to the effective date of the act does not violate plaintiff’s rights under this section. Id., 218.
Cited. Id., 295; 178 C. 393; 180 C. 11; Id., 153. Sec. 52-325 concerning lis pendens is unconstitutional for failure to
provide notice to proper owners and an opportunity for a hearing to challenge the lis pendens. Id., 501. Unconstitutional-
ity of Sec. 52-325 became moot upon entry of judgment of strict foreclosure. 181 C. 141. Party accorded right of appel-
late review is entitled to full and unhampered exercise of that right, otherwise party is deprived of due process. Id., 296.
Cited. 183 C. 552; 184 C. 75; Id., 483; 185 C. 88; 188 C. 98; Id., 336. Sec. 52-325 as amended by P.A. 81-8 meets
minimum requirements of procedural due process. 189 C. 471. Cited. Id., 550; Id., 727; 191 C. 110; Id., 514; 192 C. 150;
Id., 539; Id., 704; 193 C. 59. Imposition of academic sanctions for nonattendance discussed. Id., 93. Cited. Id., 157.
Denial of due process cited. Id. Due process clauses of state and federal constitutions require that on subject to a sig-
nificant deprivation of liberty or property must be accorded adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Id., 180. Cited. Id., 589. Whether delay in civil jury trial is unconstitutional under this section; separation of powers;
nonjusticiability of issue discussed. Id., 670. Cited. 194 C. 52. Right to due process cited. Id. Claims of appellate delay
arise under this constitutional guaranty. Id., 510. Cited. Id., 601. Due process rights cited. Id.; 195 C. 276. Tax on net
income of unincorporated businesses and an added fourth base of taxation to the corporate business tax held to be con-
stitutional. Id., 284. Due process clause of the Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id.,
326. Due process cited. Id., 405. Cited. Id., 534. Due process cited. Id.; Id., 543; Id., 558. State constitutional grounds
cited. Id., 682. Indigent defendants in state-supported paternity actions have constitutional right under both the federal
and state constitutions to court-appointed counsel at state expense; due process consideration discussed. 196 C. 403. Due
process right to state-appointed counsel cited. Id. Paternity defendant’s right to court-appointed counsel depends upon
defendant’s indigency. Id., 413. Constitutional entitlement to court-appointed counsel cited. Id. Constitutional right to
substantive due process cited. Id., 440. “The twin headstones of due process analysis under the minimum contracts
doctrine are foreseeability and fairness.” 197 C. 34. Due process cited. Id., 141. Due process clause cited. 198 C. 229.
Due process right cited. Id., 498. Due process cited; judgment of appellate court in 2 CA 36 reversed in part and case
remanded with direction that judgment of trial court be reinstated. 199 C. 70. Defendant’s constitutional rights cited; due
process cited. Id., 287. Due process cited. Id., 368. Sec. 52-434(a)(4) interpreted to require consent to referral therefore
also held constitutional. Id., 496. Due process cited. Id. Sec. 52-434(a)(4) not void for vagueness. Id., 518. Due process
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 618. Due process cited. Id. Cited. 200 C. 115. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 376. Constitutional
right to due process cited. Id. Denial of due process cited. Id., 489. Sec. 52-577a is constitutional under this article. Id.,
562. Does not protect right to redress unless “one suffers a recognizable injury”. Id., 676. Application of “clear and
convincing evidence” and “fair preponderance of the evidence” standards of proof discussed; state due process clause,
cited. 201 C. 229. Due process cited. Id., 577; Id., 700. Supreme court adopted appellate court holding that plaintiff not
deprived of due process by written hearsay evidence admitted by board of fire commissioners; due process cited. 202 C.
28. Cited. Id., 252; Id., 429. Deprivation of state constitutional rights cited. Id. Due process provision cited. 203 C. 14.
Cited. Id., 63. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 109; Id. 156; Id., 246. Rights to due process of law and constitutional
rights cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 525. Cited. 204 C. 17. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 399. Deprivation of due
process cited. Id., 639. Due process cited. Id., 760; 205 C. 178. “... has been viewed as a limitation upon the legislature’s
ability to abolish common law and statutory rights ...” existing in 1818 when constitutional provision was adopted. Id.,
219. Cited. Id., 495. Deprivation of fundamental state constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 542. Tenure is a protected
property right under federal and state constitutions; due process, cited. 206 C. 113. Constitutional principles of due
process cited. Id., 125. Constitutional requirements of due process cited. Id., 608. Constitutional rights to due process
cited. 207 C. 59. Due process; violation and deprivation of constitutional rights, cited. Id., 346. Cited. Id., 496; Id., 518;
Id., 599. Access to the courts cited. Id. Due process deprivations cited. Id., 743. Due process cited. 208 C. 1; Id., 13. Due
process rights cited. Id., 21. Cited. Id., 267. Connecticut Constitution cited; due process cited. Id. Due process violation
cited. Id., 492. Due process cited. Id., 576. Cited. 209 C. 59. Due process cited. Id. State constitutional rights cited. Id.,
679. Procedural due process cited. 210 C. 697. Procedural due process cited. Id. “... does not ensure that a plaintiff may
obtain satisfaction of multiple judgments for the same injury”. 211 C. 67. Due process cited. Id., 508. Cited. Id., 662; 212
C. 83. Disparate treatment violates constitutional provision. Id. Access to courts provisional. Id. Cited. Id., 311. Denial
of due process cited. Id., 441; Id., 710. Due process cited. 213 C. 136. Cited. Id., 282. Due process clauses cited. 214 C.
256. Cited. Id., 801. Due process rights cited. Id., 407. Right to due process cited. 215 C. 82. Cited; procedural

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Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 159
safeguards cited. Id., 162. Cited. Id., 435. Procedural due process rights cited; constitutional deprivations cited. Id., 450.
Due process cited. Id., 469. Constitutional rights to due process cited. Id., 474. Substantive due process cited. Id., 590.
Violation of due process rights cited. Id., 616. Rights to due process of law cited. Id., 675. Cited. 216 C. 1. Rights to due
process cited. Id. Violation of constitutional rights cited. Id. Does not independently create right to attorney’s fees. Id.,
85. Right to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 127. Due process cited. Id.; Id., 541; Id., 563. Unconstitutionally vague
cited. 217 C. 1. Deprivation of fundamental right or of a fair trial cited. Id., 24. Application of constitutional claims in
summary process cases discussed. Id., 313. Due process cited. Id. Rights to due process; unconstitutionally vague and
over broad cited. Id., 404. Rights to due process and unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 435. Void for vagueness cited.
Id., 447. Rights to due process cited. Id., 490. Violation of due process clauses cited. 218 C. 144. Denial of due process
cited. Id., 181. Cited. Id., 531. Does not require de novo review by trial court of factual findings by arbitrators. Id., 646.
Rights to due process and access to the courts cited. Id. Claims constituting general attack on validity of regulation
should be presented by way of declaratory judgment action. Id., 737. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id. Unconstitu-
tional deprivation of right to bring actions that existed at common law discussed. 219 C. 179. Due process cited. Id. 620.
Due process rights cited. Id., 657; Id., 703. Rights to due process and a fair hearing cited. 220 C. 86. Due process cited.
Id., 192. Cited. Id., 225. Violation of due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 285. Due process violation cited. Id., 455. Cited.
Id., 527. Due process cited. Id.; Id., 689; Id., 739. Due process cited; constitutional rights cited. Id., 812. Due process of
law cited. Id., 901. Due process rights cited. 221 C. 217. Cited. Id., 768. Due process cited. Id., 903. Due process rights
cited; right to fair hearing cited. 222 C. 98. Plaintiff did not meet burden that regulation at issue was impermissibly vague
as applied to facts of case. Id., 607. Impermissibly vague, unconstitutionally vague cited. Id. State right to privacy cited;
plaintiff did not establish standing to assert constitutional rights of individual permit (to carry pistols or revolvers) hold-
ers not properly before the court. Id., 621. Unconstitutionally vague cited; due process protections cited. Id., 784. Due
process rights of parties whose property rights are to be affected cited. 223 C. 68. Right to due process cited. Id., 492.
Due process cited. 224 C. 263. Rights to due process cited. 225 C. 499. Due process rights cited. Id., 528. Due process
requires a hearing to provide opportunity to present evidence; judgment of appellate court in 27 CA 755 reversed. Id.,
757. Constitutional protection and due process right cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id., 804. Due process cited. 226
C. 1; Id., 105. Cited. Id., 282; Id., 314. State due process cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id., 418. Cited. Id., 475.
Open courts provision of state constitution cited. Id. Requirements of due process cited. Id., 757. Cited. Id., 773. Fa-
cially unconstitutional, principles of due process cited. Id. Due process of law cited. Id., 812. Due process rights cited.
227 C. 71. Cited. Id., 363. Home rule provision cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 545. Due process rights cited. Id., 748;
228 C. 95. Due process of law cited. Id., 630. Rights to due process cited; right to cross-examine cited. Id., 651. Rights
to due process cited. Id., 766. Cited. 229 C. 256. Due process cited. Id., 627. Procedural due process cited. Id., 771. Due
process of law cited. Id., 801. Cited. 230 C. 335; Id., 351. Denial of notice and opportunity to be heard cited. Id., 459.
Violation of due process rights cited. Id., 641. Right to fair notice and due process cited. Id., 668. Due process cited. Id.,
698. Right to due process cited; fundamental constitutional rights to liberty and property cited. Id., 828. Cited. Id., 914.
Constitutional rights and due process cited. 231 C. 308. Cited. Id., 328; Id., 918; Id., 919. Due process of law cited. 232
C. 27. Due process cited. Id., 91; Id., 172. Due process of law cited. Id., 758. Cited. Id., 901; Id., 902; 233 C. 153. Pro-
cedural due process of law cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id., 198. Cited. Id., 251. Denial of due process rights cited.
Id., 296. Section incorporates no governmental obligation to provide minimum subsistence. Id., 557. Constitutionally
incorporating preexisting rights cited; due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 701. Due process principles cited; affirmative
governmental obligations to provide shelter as a constitutionally incorporated right under this section cited. Id. Presump-
tion of legitimacy in certain instances rebuttable by putative father; judgment of appellate court in 34 CA 129 reversed.
234 C. 51. Constitutional right and due process interest cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 194. Procedural due process
cited. Id., 221. Rights to due process cited. 235 C. 693. Due process cited. Id., 865. Cited. 236 C. 1. Due process rights
cited. Id., 625. Due process cited. Id., 681. Deprivation of due process cited. 237 C. 1. Right to due process cited. Id.,
272. Due process rights cited. Id., 679. Cited. 238 C. 1. Rights to due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 216. Cited.
Id., 692. Right to access to courts cited. Id. Rights to due process cited. 239 C. 144. Due process cited. Id., 168. Rights
to due process cited. Id., 449. Substantive due process cited. Id., 574. Due process clauses cited. Id., 708. Due process
rights cited. 240 C. 671. Rights to due process cited. Id., 799. Due process concerns cited. 241 C. 24. Cited. Id., 269. Due
process rights cited. Id. Article does not guarantee a right to a state constitutional damages claim based on pre-1818
common law action for rights akin to those protected under Secs. 7 and 8 of Art. I. 244 C. 23. Procedures of Sec. 31-
349c(a) do not meet minimal due process requirements under fourteenth amendment to federal constitution and Art. I,
Secs. 8 and 10 of Connecticut Constitution. At a minimum, parties to workers’ compensation claim seeking transfer to
Second Injury Fund must have opportunity to review evidence presented to medical panel and panel’s findings prior to
its decision. Identity of panel members must be disclosed with opportunity for parties to object. Parties must have op-
portunity to present their evidence and arguments to panel, panel must have at least one member who is an expert in field
of medicine applicable to claimant’s injuries, and there must be some level of review by commissioner to insure applica-
tion by panel of appropriate legal standards and opportunity for correction of clearly erroneous factual findings (see also
257 C. 520; 257 C. 527). 257 C. 481. Heart and hypertension benefits paid under Sec. 7-433c are special compensation
and not workers’ compensation for purposes of reimbursement from special injury fund pursuant to Sec. 31-306(a)(2)(A)
and such a result does not deny municipal employers a protected property interest without due process of law. 269 C.
763. It is not a violation for the sole aggravating factor found by the jury re a capital felony, namely, murder committed
for pecuniary gain under Sec. 53a-46a(i)(6), to duplicate an element of the underlying crime of capital felony by murder
for hire under Sec. 53a-54b(2). 305 C. 101. In the absence of improper state action, the admission of identification evi-
dence implicates due process principles only when the evidence is so extremely unreliable that its admission would de-
prive defendant of his right to a fair trial. 312 C. 687. Retroactive application of amended civil action statute of limita-
tions, Sec. 52-577d, to revive an otherwise time barred claim does not violate defendant’s substantive due process rights;
court has never recognized a vested right in the lapsing of a statute of limitations; state constitution does not provide
greater protection to defendant’s interest in the lapse of a statute of limitations than is afforded under federal constitution;
however, retroactive application of statute that would extend a lapsed criminal statute of limitations would violate the ex
post facto clause of the federal constitution. 317 C. 357. Plaintiff estate in the case of a workers’ compensation claim is
neither a natural person nor an artificial person and is therefore not entitled to the protections of this article. 323 C. 26.

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160 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
Petitioner failed to establish that there exists a fundamental right to an in person termination of parental rights trial. 343
C. 642.
Judgment of appellate court in 2 CA 36 reversed in part, see 199 C. 70. Due process cited. Id. Under certain circum-
stances a court has jurisdiction to review administrative action although there is no statutory procedure for an appeal. 2
CA 43. Constitutional claims concerning due process cited. Id. Interview of minor child by judge in absence of parents
and their counsel where objected to by a party determined to be a violation of that party’s due process rights. Id., 132.
Cited. Id., 196; Id., 362. Due process clause cited. Id., 363. Cited. Id., 449. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 689. Due
process rights cited. Id. Cited. 3 CA 118. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id.; Id., 184. Due process cited. Id. Due process
rights cited. Id., 322. Procedural due process cited. Id., 404. State due process cited. Id., 432. Due process cited; right to
due process was fulfilled by a full, trial-type evidentiary hearing held before impartial hearing panel, procedure selected
pursuant to Sec. 10-151. 4 CA 1. Constitutional right to be free from state deprivation of property without due process
of law cited. Id., 209. Due process rights cited. Id., 216. Cited. Id., 307. Due process rights cited; void for vagueness
cited. Id. Due process considerations with uniform administrative procedures act provisions discussed. Id., 359. Due
process cited. Id.; Id., 464. Fair trial cited. Id., 669. Cited. 5 CA 369. Due process cited. Id.; Id., 520; Id., 649. Funda-
mental rights to a fair trial cited. 6 CA 143. Due process cited. Id., 229. Zoning regulations seeking to terminate a valid
nonconforming use after a grace period held unconstitutional. Id., 237. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 301; Id., 471; 7
CA 164; Id., 639. Due process cited; constitutional rights cited. Id. Unconstitutionally void for vagueness cited. 8 CA
407. Due process; fair hearing, cited. Id., 508. Due process rights cited. Id., 656. Due process principles cited. 9 CA 260.
Denial of due process cited. Id., 396. Due process rights cited. Id., 514. Constitutionally defective notice of public hear-
ing cited. Id., 538. Due process rights cited. Id., 608. Deprivation of property without due process cited. 10 CA 80. Void
for vagueness; due process, cited. Id., 86. Denial of due process cited. Id., 90. Due process cited. Id., 201; Id., 292. Cited.
Id., 347. Constitutional right to due process cited. Id. Due process clauses cited. Id., 428. Due process cited. 11 CA 332.
Deprivation of due process cited. Id., 693. Cited. 12 CA 190. Right to due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 435.
Due process rights cited. Id., 455. Right to due process cited. 13 CA 91. Constitutional right to due process cited. Id.,
114. Violation of due process rights cited. Id., 400. Deprivation of property without due process cited. Id., 632. Due
process; fundamental constitutional right and fair trial, cited. 14 CA 296. Due process violation cited. Id., 413. Due
process cited. Id., 487. Bill of attainder and ex post facto law cited. 15 CA 342. Cited. Id., 569. Due process cited. Id.
Due process rights cited. Id., 738. Constitutional principles of due process cited. 16 CA 619. Due process cited. 17 CA
4; Id., 13; Id., 166. Due process clauses cited. 18 CA 254. Due process cited. Id., 393. Due process rights cited. Id., 488.
Cited. Id., 515. Due process rights cited. 19 CA 20. Cited. Id., 402. Due process rights cited. Id., 505; Id., 588; 20 CA
51; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 450. Right to due process cited. Id., 425. Due process cited. Id., 638. Rights of due
process cited. Id., 705. Cited. 21 CA 40. Due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard cited. Id. Con-
stitutional challenges and issues and deprivation of constitutional right cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 489; 22 CA 4;
Id., 181; Id., 193; Id., 396; Id., 591. Right to due process cited. 23 CA 207. Due process requirements cited. Id., 287. Due
process violation cited. Id., 410; Id., 499. Due process rights cited. 24 CA 377; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 233.
Minimum due process standards cited. Id., 662; judgment of appellate court in Dragon v. Connecticut Medical Examin-
ing Board reversed, see 223 C. 618. Due process cited. 25 CA 164. In civil proceedings certain misconduct by itself does
not infringe on constitutional right to fair trial; probable prejudice standard applies. Id., 217. Constitutional right to fair
trial cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id., 536. Rights to due process cited. Id., 586; judgment of appellate court in In
re Valerie D. reversed, see 223 C. 492. Due process and right to fair trial cited. Id., 741. Due process cited. 26 CA 564;
27 CA 142. Cited. Id., 195. Due process rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 530. Deprivation of due process cited. Id., 543. Right
to due process cited. Id., 614, 615; judgment of appellate court in Nelseco Navigation Co. v. Department of Liquor Con-
trol reversed, see 226 C. 418. Currently accepted standards of procedural due process cited. Id., 755, 760; judgment of
appellate court in Housing Authority v. Lamothe reversed, see 225 C. 757. Cited. Id., 769; judgment of appellate court in
Matza v. Matza reversed, see 226 C. 166. Right to due process cited. Id. Procedural due process cited. 28 CA 536. Im-
permissibly vague and unconstitutional cited. 29 CA 1. Due process rights cited. Id., 48. Due process clauses cited. Id.,
105. Due process cited. Id., 112. Constitutional right to fair trial cited. Id., 181. Due process cited. Id., 378; Id., 463.
Cited. 30 CA 594. Due process rights cited. Id., 742. Cited. 31 CA 12; Id., 400. Deprivation of state constitutional rights
to due process cited. Id. Arbitrary determination of child’s best interest cited. Id. Vagueness and impermissibly vague
cited. Id., 674. Due process rights, procedures employed under state and federal constitutions cited. Id., 690. Due process
right to be heard cited. Id., 761. Due process cited. Id., 819. Due process and fair procedure cited. 32 CA 56. Due process
rights cited. Id., 147. Cited. Id., 187. Right to due process cited. Id., 280; Id., 340. Unconstitutional and void cited; due
process of law cited. Id., 384. Due process afforded where opportunity to present argument in support of claim is either
oral or written. Id., 395. Due process rights cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 465. Denial of due process cited. Id., 515.
Due process right cited. 33 CA 632. Due process of law cited. Id., 727. Constitutional due process of law cited. 34 CA
343. Due process rights cited. Id., 352. Cited. Id., 395; Id., 521. Due process of law cited; service of process and violation
of due process cited. Id., 634. Due process cited. Id., 673. Due process right cited. Id., 772. Due process rights cited. 35
CA 160; Id., 421; Id., 594. Due process cited. Id., 599. Rights to procedural due process cited. 36 CA 298. Due process
rights cited. Id., 597. Due process cited. Id., 635; judgment reversed, see 636 C. 330. Denial of due process cited. Id.,
670. Due process cited. 37 CA 100. Deprivation of due process cited. Id., 515. Not a taking of property without due
process of law cited. Id., 835. Due process cited. 38 CA 198; Id., 240; Id., 263; Id., 506. Cited. Id., 685. Access to courts
and due process cited. Id. Due process cited. 39 CA 253. Cited. Id., 280; Id., 289. Due process cited. Id., 429. Cited. Id.,
674. Rights to due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 684; 40 CA 278. Right to due process cited. Id., 458. Due
process cited. Id., 501. Cited. 41 CA 238. Right to due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 382; Id., 866; 42 CA 318.
Deprivation of due process cited. Id., 480. Constitutional rights as a tenured teacher cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague
cited. Id., 631. Right to due process cited. Id., 803. Due process cited. 43 CA 39. Right to due process cited. Id., 227.
Substantive and procedural due process cited; violation of Connecticut Constitution cited. Id., 654. Cited. Id., 659. Due
process cited; constitutional right to cross-examination cited. Id. Due process cited. 44 CA 99. Due process rights cited.
Id., 179; Id., 370; Id., 759. Due process of law cited. 45 CA 89. Cited. Id., 707. Due process cited. Id. Rights to due
process cited. Id., 712. Due process grounds cited. 46 CA 150. Requirements of due process cited. Id., 182. Cited. Id., 559.

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Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 161
Defendant’s analysis under section clearly inapplicable to defendant’s due process claim re establishment of violation of
probation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or, in the alternative, proof by clear and convincing evidence in a revoca-
tion of probation hearing as such hearing clearly complied with provisions of section. 61 CA 99. Repose section of Sec.
52-584 does not violate open courts provision of Art. I, Sec. 10. 66 CA 518. Section curtails legislature’s power to un-
duly restrict a right that existed at common law prior to adoption of constitution in 1818. 85 CA 15. Although court incor-
rectly interjected itself into the proceedings by terminating the evidentiary hearing before plaintiff had completed pres-
entation of his case-in-chief, plaintiff had full opportunity to testify and plaintiff’s counsel examined defendant at length
on direct examination and thus was not denied a meaningful opportunity to present evidence or to cross-examine defend-
ant and therefore the court did not violate plaintiff’s due process rights. 89 CA 210. Plaintiff could not prevail on her
claims that trial court deprived her of due process by finding her in contempt for acts that had occurred subsequent to and
had not been pleaded in defendant’s motion for contempt and plaintiff could not complain that she was not on notice and
that trial court improperly terminated the contempt hearing without affording plaintiff an opportunity to defend herself
thus denying her due process and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 94 CA 306. Plaintiff could not prevail on his
claims that his right to due process was violated when he was suspended without pay and without a hearing from Febru-
ary 18, 1993, through his July 12, 2001, acquittal; there was an independent finding of probable cause that provided
sufficient protection against an improper suspension and although there was appreciable delay from plaintiff’s arrest on
felony charges and suspension until his acquittal, delay did not constitute a violation of his due process rights, and be-
cause he was suspended without pay from the time that he requested reinstatement until his disciplinary hearing; al-
though there was a ten-month delay from the time of his acquittal until the time hearing was held, delay did not violate
plaintiff’s due process rights. Id., 445. Where defendant was neither forced to exercise nor prevented from exercising the
right to testify, defendant who invoked privilege against self-incrimination during trial dissolving marriage was not de-
prived of property without due process when court denied motion to continue dissolution trial until after completion of
criminal proceeding. 115 CA 521. Delay of several months during divorce proceeding did not violate due process. 121
CA 451. Right to pursue judicial remedy is not abridged by requirement under Sec. 52-190a to obtain letter from similar
health care provider in medical malpractice action because requirement is merely a procedural limitation that neither
eliminates nor unreasonably burdens plaintiff’s right to legal recourse. 132 CA 68. Due process rights not violated when
court decided motion to strike substitute complaint without deciding motion to strike original complaint; due process
rights also not violated when court ignored conflict of interest issues raised in memoranda in opposition to motion to
strike and allowed defendants to present a speaking motion. 144 CA 79. Sec. 31-296 procedural safeguards, postdepriva-
tion remedies and public interest in providing speedy, effective, inexpensive method for determining workers’ compensa-
tion claims are sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. Id., 413. Sec. 52-584 re statute of repose does not violate
open courts provision. 154 CA 1. Violation of procedural due process when attorney was not given adequate notice of
and time to prepare for disciplinary hearing in which court found him in wilful violation of its orders and ordered attor-
ney suspended from the practice of law for twenty days. 166 CA 557. Plaintiff was denied, at a properly noticed eviden-
tiary hearing, the opportunity to present his own evidence, to cross examine the court-appointed therapist and for ade-
quate time to review the report on which the court relied in violation of his right to due process of law. 187 CA 795.
Trial court violated respondent’s due process rights by conducting a hearing without providing alternative means for
respondent to participate or rescheduling hearing to a future date where respondent’s participation could be secured
while respondent was incarcerated in another state prison that did not provide for inmates to participate in court proceed-
ings virtually. 223 CA 571.
A physician has no vested or constitutional right to practice in a hospital. 21 CS 55. Cited. 24 CS 298; 28 CS 257.
Exclusion of aliens from grand jury service under Sec. 54-45 did not violate defendant’s rights since citizenship require-
ment bears rational relation to demands of jury service. 35 CS 98. Cited. 36 CS 108. No violation of due process where
the breach of a landlord’s covenant may not be raised in an action for possession and tenant limited to separate suit for
damages. 37 CS 579. Cited. Id., 723; Id., 745; 38 CS 70. Notice provision of Sec. 8-28, by publication, complies with
requirement of due process, where right of appeal is extended to a large class of people. Id., 590. Cited. 39 CS 264. Due
process cited. Id. Right to court-appointed counsel where indigent defendant is faced with civil contempt proceeding to
enforce child support orders applied in instant case. 40 CS 111. Procedural due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 208. Rights
of due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 361. Cited. Id., 365; Id., 381. Due process cited. Id. State regulation on
Medicaid abortion funding unconstitutional; due process rights and privacy rights, cited. Id., 394. Constitutional issue of
procedural due process cited. 41 CS 14. Cited. Id., 31; Id., 48. Right to trial by impartial jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 130.
State constitutional issue cited. Id. Due process requirement cited. Id., 196. Due process cited. Id., 376. Due process and
denial of cross-examination of defendant’s experts cited. 42 CS 57. Due process cited. Id., 144. Cited. Id., 439. Right to
due process cited. Id. Lis pendens statute(s) Sec. 52-325 et seq., provide(s) for immediate post deprivation hearing and
are thus constitutional. Id., 241. Deprivation of property without due process of law cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague
probable cause standard cited. Id. Due process requirements cited. Id., 323. Cited. Id., 460. Due process cited. Id. Due
process of law cited. Id., 526. Due process cited. 43 CS 13; Id., 91. Due process of law cited. Id., 108. Cited. Id., 222.
Right to procedural due process cited. Id., 386. Due process cited. Id., 457. Due process safeguard and protections cited.
44 CS 53. Due process cited. Id., 121. Cited. Id., 223; Id., 297. Due process cited. Id. Due process of law cited. Id., 361.
Violation of due process cited. Id., 472. Termination of a person’s job because a close relative of the person sought legal
recourse from the employer violates public policy. 48 CS 636. Public service company’s due process rights were not
violated by expedited process to determine need for interim rate decrease under Sec. 16-19(g). 51 CS 307. Plaintiffs
failed to establish that their damages action for denial of a land use permit constituted a damages action for the violation
of a quasi-constitutional right that existed at common law in Connecticut prior to 1818 that was incorporated in section.
Id., 636.
Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 455. Defendant’s conviction under section 19-242 of selling toilet preparations and drug sun-
dries at less than wholesale price reversed, since this section, as applied to these facts, is price-fixing legislation and as
such is violative of due process provisions of federal and state constitutions. Id., 491. Beneficiary of welfare assistance
has no vested right to aid and therefore no property in assistance subject to constitutional protection. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 449.

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Welfare regulations providing limits on cash surrender value of life insurance policies of beneficiaries of aid to depend-
ent children found not arbitrary and not a denial of equal protection of laws. Id., 453, 454. Requirement that tenant give
bond on appeal of summary process action not unconstitutional as to indigent tenants. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 282. However
forceful and persuasive the arguments may be compelling a determination that the Connecticut disorderly conduct stat-
ute, Sec. 53-175, is unconstitutional as containing no ascertainable standard of quiet, the circuit court should leave such
a decision to higher courts. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 73, 77.
(Right of private property.)
Sec. 11. 1 The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation therefor.
1 Right to take private property. A city authorized to aid a railroad may lay a tax for that purpose; 15 C. 501; such au-
thority is valid. 41 C. 234. But the state cannot raise money by taxation to pay a pension to civil war veterans. 85 C. 344.
Taking the property of an inhabitant of a town under an execution against it is valid. 16 C. 381; 121 U.S. 121. Liquors
illegally kept may be forfeited. 25 C. 286. Taxation is not the taking of private property without compensation; 23 C. 189;
32 C. 130; nor is imposition of liability on a railroad company for fires; 54 C. 459; nor a requirement that physicians re-
port infectious diseases. 56 C. 225. A franchise may be taken. 17 C. 462; 81 C. 62. A town cannot authorize owner of cat-
tle to pasture them on highway in front of another’s premises. 28 C. 169. Resolution authorizing trustees to sell property
and invest proceeds for all concerned is valid. 44 C. 116. Of right in general, see 69 C. 435. State can authorize town to
take; 81 C. 62; quaere, whether it can for United States. 75 C. 319. Grant of power to private person must clearly appear.
69 C. 668; 75 C. 387; 87 C. 199. Power to take “adjacent land” includes what. 83 C. 137. Right to compensation does not
extend to damages due to exercise of police power. 86 C. 561; 95 C. 364. Power extends to all property. 77 C. 421; 86 C.
151; Id., 361. Property already devoted to public use can be taken for another only by clear authority. 72 C. 301; 77 C.
83; 86 C. 151; see 84 C. 522. Stock of a corporation may be taken; 77 C. 421; 78 C. 1; 203 U.S. 372; so mortgage rights;
76 C. 581; waters of a stream for sewage purposes. 69 C. 668; 72 C. 551; 76 C. 436. Rights of riparian proprietor. 69 C.
682. Property may be taken for a temporary purpose. 75 C. 387; 76 C. 446. Limitations in general statutes may apply
to special charter. 72 C. 687; see 86 C. 166. Prior unlawful entry will not prevent taking. 86 C. 36. Zoning law upheld.
95 C. 364; see 104 C. 616, 637; 110 C. 92, 130. Statute forbidding bathing in tributary to reservoir, even as to riparian
owners, upheld. 123 C. 492. Depreciation of neighborhood because of erection of housing project not within purview
of section. 145 C. 196. Power of eminent domain and police power distinguished. 146 C. 650. Zoning regulations did
no more than offer assurance of measure of supervision by responsible public authority over conditions affecting public
health, safety and general welfare, and consequently were proper exercise of police power. 149 C. 712. Where change of
zone deprived plaintiffs of any worthwhile rights or benefits in their land, defendant’s action in changing the zone was
unreasonable and confiscatory and therefore in violation of this section. 151 C. 314. Trial court properly considered in its
valuation the possibility of recovering remediation costs from successor company of the former owner. 272 C. 14. Trial
court properly considered availability of state economic development grant funds in calculating property’s fair market
value. Id. Generally, under principles of inverse condemnation, property owner may seek compensation in an eminent
domain proceeding for pretaking damages caused by the condemnor. 276 C. 426.
Public use; necessity, and its determination. Taking for a railroad is for a public use; 21 C. 305; 72 C. 488; 77 C.
417; so for a telephone. 90 C. 179. Land cannot be taken simply to improve a landscape. 60 C. 292; but see 95 C. 365.
But license may be exacted for advertising on private land. 90 C. 663. Whether use is public is a question for the courts;
taking to establish harbor lines is for such use. 60 C. 291. If property is ultimately to go to benefit private person, it is
not taken for public use. 75 C. 92. Limitation to public use may be found in charter restrictions of municipality to which
power is granted. 87 C. 200. Public use defined; construction of reservoirs to equalize flow of stream where one branch
is taken for city water supply; Id., 204; 89 C. 671; see 241 U.S. 649; grant to private educational institution; 87 C. 421; to
cemeteries. Id., 428. Delegating power; conclusiveness of legislative act as to public use and necessity; 69 C. 435; 72 C.
488; 76 C. 436; 77 C. 421; 85 C. 350; 86 C. 151; 87 C. 193; Id., 428; 203 U.S. 372; necessity must be reasonable. 86 C.
361. Power to authorize condemnation implies power to do so conditionally. 70 C. 626. Grant of power to build specific
railroad determines necessity. 74 C. 662. Approval of taking larger piece will not cover taking of smaller. 83 C. 603.
Economic development projects created and implemented pursuant to chapter 132 that have public economic benefits of
creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues and contributing to urban revitalization satisfy the public use clause.
Exercise of eminent domain power is unreasonable, in violation of public use clause, if the facts and circumstances of
the particular case reveal that the taking specifically is intended to benefit a private party. Delegation of eminent domain
power to private persons rather than public officials is not unconstitutional where a public purpose is thereby advanced
and where the benefit of the property taken is considered to be available to the general public. Determination of what
property is necessary to be taken in any given case in order to effectuate the public purpose is, under our constitution,
a matter for the exercise of legislative power. When legislature delegates the making of that determination to another
agency, the decision of that agency is conclusive. Agency’s decision, however, is open to judicial review only to discover
if it was unreasonable or in bad faith or was an abuse of the power conferred. 268 C. 1.
Compensation; taking. Raising abutments to railroad bridge so as to obstruct entrance to abutting property is not a
taking. 21 C. 309; 66 C. 225. Damages once paid for raising causeway cover future changes. 29 C. 536. City may order
railroad bridge to be widened without compensation, when. 32 C. 234. Injury to abutting property by railroad embank-
ment not a taking; 42 C. 195; nor injury due to excavating or filling highway; 44 C. 250; nor is compelling railroad to
pay portion of expense of bridge over highway; 60 C. 10; nor is change of grade in highway; 29 C. 536; 68 C. 79; 77 C.
438; 86 C. 566; nor consequential injuries due to improvement of navigation; 9 C. 442; nor consequential damages
generally. 21 C. 320. New ferry may be chartered without compensation to old one, when. 30 C. 39; see 10 How. 511.
Meaning of taking. 54 C. 297; 69 C. 435; 72 C. 302; 82 C. 51; 85 C. 237. Forbidding further use of cemetery is not a
taking. 62 C. 392. Discontinuing highway; interfering with access to land. 66 C. 225; 75 C. 348; 77 C. 438. Additional
servitude in street by stream, or street railway; 26 C. 259; 67 C. 197; 69 C. 146; 70 C. 610; 85 C. 401; temporary location;

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Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 163
75 C. 343; 76 C. 311; 77 C. 431; layout of street over railroad; 72 C. 225; crossing of stream by street railway; 70 C. 610;
cutting new channel in navigable waters; Id., 685; 71 C. 65; discharge of sewage in stream. 72 C. 550. Reasonable use
of highway for building materials is not a taking. 75 C. 343. As to construction of sewer in street, see 69 C. 171. Land is
not taken till proceedings begun; effect of prior unlawful entry. 75 C. 239; 86 C. 36. Compensation must be made. 14 C.
152; 17 C. 59; 41 C. 93. A town cannot be deprived of a ferry without it. 17 C. 91. As to necessity of prepayment of
damage. 19 C. 151; 49 C. 402; 54 C. 297; 70 C. 628; 77 C. 431; 95 C. 6, 229. A statute not providing for compensation
is invalid. 69 C. 155; 72 C. 551; 75 C. 343; 95 C. 6. That taking is under order of public utilities commission does not
obviate necessity of payment. 81 C. 581. Condemnation of “the waters” of a stream. 69 C. 461. What constitutes just
compensation; provision for payment of past damages; annual payment. 76 C. 435. Consent to taking as waiving dam-
ages. 80 C. 124; 90 C. 179. Costs of litigation; past damage. 75 C. 238. Rule of damages where part of, or an easement
in, land is taken. 81 C. 581. Appointment by legislature of special commission to fix compensation. 85 C. 498. Damages
for temporary occupation of highway by railroad; 77 C. 431; for taking toll-bridge. 82 C. 460. Taking of land by city
situated in another town upheld though town was not a party; right to tax not property but attribute of sovereignty. 101
C. 195. Compensation not required where state makes reasonable regulations under police power. 116 C. 458. Land-
owner is entitled to judicial review of action of appraisers in condemnation. 117 C. 237. Right of landowner for dam-
ages for change of highway grade is created by legislative authority and is not within the requirement of this provision.
Id., 501. Assessment of sum in excess of actual benefits from public improvement violates this provision. 127 C. 617.
State must pay compensation for taking land of municipality if held in proprietary capacity, but not if in governmental
capacity. 129 C. 109–112. Whether taking of land held by municipality for restricted use falls within this constitutional
provision, quaere. Id., 114. No compensation for depreciation unless some property is taken. Id., 477. Entitled to com-
pensation for destruction of oyster bed by construction of sewer outfall. 131 C. 533. Just compensation for land taken
includes interest on the amount of damages from the date the taking is complete. 134 C. 226. Temporary shutting off by
the state of all access to plaintiff’s gas station was merely an exercise of state’s right under its easement over plaintiff’s
property, and there was no taking in the constitutional sense. 135 C. 78. Cited. Id., 687. Mere delegation of authority to
condemn is a sufficient declaration that use is public. 138 C. 582. Private property may be condemned for parking motor
vehicles when public is served by taking vehicles from streets to relieve traffic congestion. 140 C. 8. Cited. 141 C. 135.
Establishment of encroachment line by water resources commission not an unconstitutional taking of property for public
use without compensation. 146 C. 650. “Taken” means exclusion of owner from his private use and possession and ac-
tual assumption of exclusive possession for public purposes by condemnor. 148 C. 47. Law intends condemnee be put in
as good pecuniary condition by just compensation as if property had not been taken. Just compensation is ordinarily, but
not necessarily, market value of property taken. 150 C. 530. Section does not apply where injury is only consequential
and there has been no physical taking of land or any interest in it and no physical invasion of it. 152 C. 688. Change of
zone from industrial to residential, reasonable under circumstances, did not constitute taking of property without just
compensation although appellant was disadvantaged economically. 155 C. 310. Cited. Id., 318. Zoning commission’s
refusal to change zonal classification of plaintiff’s property to that use recommended in merely advisory opinion con-
cerning town plan of development was not a taking without just compensation as property still is usable for residence
under its present zoning. 156 C. 99. “Taken” means generally exclusion of owner from his private use and possession and
assumption of use and possession for public purpose by authority exercising right of eminent domain. Id., 131. Just
compensation means full equivalent in money for property taken and includes interest on award from date of taking to
date of payment by state. Id., 416. Just compensation is the value of the property taken considered with reference to the
uses for which it is then adapted. 159 C. 407. The issue before the referee was the fair value of the subject property. The
referee correctly concluded that evidence relating to the administrative procedure by means of which the commissioner’s
assessment was arrived at was irrelevant. Id., 443. Cited. 163 C. 214. Referee, in determining the damages, should have
awarded an amount sufficient to replace all that was taken and not just the portion of the parkland condemned. 165 C.
768. Doctrine of sovereign immunity not available to the state as a defense to claims under this section. 167 C. 334.
Doctrine of sovereign immunity to suit does not apply to actions seeking nothing more than a declaration of rights in
taking of property. Id. State’s substantial interference with plaintiff’s right to use and enjoyment of property constitutes
a taking hereunder. Id. Definition of “taken.” 169 C. 195. Even absent an actual physical appropriation, property is taken
in constitutional sense when it cannot be utilized by condemnee for any reasonable and proper purpose or when eco-
nomic utilization of it is, for all practical purposes, destroyed. 171 C. 257. Cited. 172 C. 427; 175 C. 576; 178 C. 579;
179 C. 293; 180 C. 11. Merely because the total value of the property has decreased does not justify a conclusion that
there has been an unconstitutional taking. Id., 692. Cited. 185 C. 145; 186 C. 490; 188 C. 336. Where face of record in-
dicated that facts in complaint did not amount to unconstitutional taking, a claimed jurisdictional defect (sovereign im-
munity) required dismissal of the complaint. 190 C. 622. Determination of interest in condemnation proceedings is a fact
of just compensation. 192 C. 377. Cited. 200 C. 151. Unconstitutional taking without compensation. Id. Cited. 208 C.
146. Due process cited. Id. Cited. 209 C. 480; Id., 724. Unconstitutional taking cited. Id. Cited. 211 C. 382; 214 C. 225.
Constitutional right to just compensation cited. 215 C. 437. Taking of property without compensation cited. Id., 616.
Cited. 216 C. 320. Unconstitutional and confiscatory cited. Id. “Taking” cited. Id. Taking property without just compen-
sation cited. 217 C. 447. Cited. Id., 588. Taking of property without just compensation cited. 218 C. 737. Unconstitu-
tional taking without just compensation cited. 219 C. 51. Burden of demonstrating finality not met. Id., 404. Unconsti-
tutional taking of property without compensation, “taking”, “confiscation” cited. Id. Unconstitutional deprivation of any
reasonable use of land was confiscatory cited. 220 C. 584. Taking of property without just compensation cited. Id., 914.
Cited. 221 C. 736. Unconstitutional “taking” and sovereign immunity discussed. 222 C. 280. Taking of property without
just compensation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 402; 224 C. 124. Unconstitutional taking, taking issue, unreasonable taking cited.
Id. Taking of property without just compensation cited. 227 C. 71. Unconstitutional taking of property without compen-
sation cited. 228 C. 187. Cited. Id., 785. Unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation cited. Id. Cited.
229 C. 247. Constitutional “taking” cited. 230 C. 140. Cited. 231 C. 418. Due process of law cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 557;
234 C. 221. Taking claim cited; deprivation of property without just compensation cited. Id. Municipal traffic regulation
prohibiting vehicular traffic on city street for three hours each weekday from approximately May through October did
not constitute taking of plaintiffs’ property for which they were entitled to just compensation, plaintiffs having failed to
establish a causal relationship between the street closing and any decline in the value of their properties or any loss in

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164 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
rental income. 244 C. 206. Plaintiff failed to prove adverse effect on property value from airline overflights where trial
court found that the market had already adjusted the value of the property, taking into account such flights prior to plain-
tiff’s purchase of property. 249 C. 138. Re properties on opposite sides of a river intended for use as bridge abutments,
trial court’s findings re the properties’ highest and best use was not adequately supported by the record since it was only
speculative that an entity other than the state would use the land for such purpose. 255 C. 529. Evidence of environmen-
tal contamination and remediation cost is relevant to valuation of real property taken by eminent domain and admissible
in a condemnation proceeding. 256 C. 813. Connecticut law on inverse condemnation requires total destruction of prop-
erty’s economic value or substantial destruction of an owner’s ability to use or enjoy property and party was not deprived
of all reasonable and proper use of property and had introduced no evidence that property could not be marketed for
highest and best use. 284 C. 55. In inverse condemnation claim, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that zoning regulations
and board’s refusal to issue variance deprived plaintiff of viable use of property since plaintiff was free to maintain cur-
rent use as water well, despite high radon levels in raw water, because no final action had occurred barring current use
and no evidence was offered re safety of water at point of residential use. 287 C. 282. Trial court should have dismissed
state employee’s claim of unconstitutional taking of group health insurance stock brought under a “group as a whole”
theory; trial court properly dismissed constructive trust and resulting trust claims. 296 C. 186. Plaintiffs did not have a
vested property interest in unclaimed deposits attributable to the period from December 1, 2008, through March 31,
2009, and, accordingly, the provision in P.A. 09-1 that all unclaimed deposits accruing during that period must be paid
to the state does not rise to the level of an unconstitutional taking of property. 309 C. 810. Inverse condemnation of
rental property occurred when taking of adjacent parking lot by eminent domain resulted in more than an eighty per cent
diminution of the rental property’s value, substantially destroying the use of the rental property. 326 C. 139.
Deprivation of property without just compensation cited. 3 CA 531, 535. Cited. 4 CA 271; 11 CA 439. Unconstitu-
tional taking of property without just compensation cited. 18 CA 69. Cited. 20 CA 148. Taking without just compensa-
tion cited. 23 CA 115. Unlawful taking, practical confiscation, unconstitutional taking without compensation cited. Id.,
379; decision reversed, see 219 C. 404. Taking without just compensation cited; illegal taking cited. Id., 441. Cited. 24
CA 708. Unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation cited. Id. Unconstitutional taking cited. Id., 841.
Cited. 25 CA 137. Unconstitutional taking and taking without just compensation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 468. Unconstitu-
tional taking of property without just compensation cited. 27 CA 297. Unconstitutional taking of property cited. 28 CA
262. Unconstitutional taking cited. 36 CA 98. Cited. 40 CA 75. Taking without just compensation cited. Id. Cited. 43
CA 606. Procedural and substantive due process claims cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 514. Takings clause cited. Id. Takings
clause of state constitution cited. Id., 721. Inverse condemnation not precluded where property has not been stripped of
all physical use for a purpose permitted by zoning. 51 CA 262.
Necessary implication that property of no person shall be taken for private use regardless of any procedure for com-
pensation. Meaning of public use discussed. Constitutionality of chapter 913 discussed. 24 CS 328. Zoning restrictions

Article FIRST Original 1965 text and publisher annotations; retained historical context.

applicable only to gasoline filling stations not unconstitutional as applicable to a class. 26 CS 475. Provision for cash
contribution in lieu of land requirement in regulations for subdivision plan, where moneys are not collected for direct
benefit of subdivision, held a tax and unconstitutional. 27 CS 78. Plaintiff failed to prove that regulation of defendant
zoning commission requiring a distance of 1,500 feet between gasoline station sites deprived him of his property rights.
Id., 363. Cited. 31 CS 216. Expectancy of employment is not a recognized property interest and challenge of constitu-
tional validity of New Haven police commissioner’s discretion in making appointments of supernumerary policemen by
candidate denied. Id., 362. Cited. 34 CS 52. As lessee’s option to purchase constitutes a right in property, lessee cannot
be divested of it through the medium of condemnation without just compensation. Lessee Texaco entitled to judgment
for excess of total award above optioned purchase price. Id., 194. Cited. 35 CS 303; 37 CS 515. Just compensation
cited. 38 CS 24. Continued possession of rental property by the state without authorization from landlord, without statu-
tory authority and without resorting to eminent domain, after lease has expired, amounts to unconstitutional taking of
property. 40 CS 171. Recovery for fair value of use and occupancy of property constitutionally condemned should be
denied when condemnee’s property taken without his knowledge. Id., 202. Cited. 41 CS 196. Provisions requiring just
compensation cited. Id. Unconstitutional taking of property cited. 42 CS 256. Evidence of environmental contamination
should be excluded in eminent domain valuation proceeding. 46 CS 355. Takings clause; standard for determining value
of property that is partially taken and for determining damages discussed. Id. Requirement in Sec. 22a-245a(d) that
deposit initiators pay outstanding bottle deposit balance to the state for the period from December 1, 2008, to March 31,
2009, is a taking without compensation. 51 CS 425. Sovereign immunity is not available as a defense to claims for just
compensation under section. Id., 636.
(Writ of habeas corpus.)
Sec. 12. 1 The privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless,
when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it; nor in any case,
but by the legislature.
1 The clause de suspension of the writ of habeas corpus has no reference to a reasonable delay occasioned in the dis-
position of the case. 33 C. 329. In habeas corpus proceedings, granting bail pending appeal, if proper at all, is discretion-
ary. 78 C. 155. Where defendant had been represented by a special public defender who failed to proceed with his appeal
on the grounds that he could not do so conscientiously and the court denied his motion for appointment of other counsel,
his rights have been violated under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
there was no error in habeas corpus proceeding directing that he be discharged from prison unless, at his further request,
counsel is appointed and the necessary extensions of time to perfect appeal are granted. 152 C. 501. In same case, plain-
tiff cannot demand that other counsel be appointed if new counsel also concludes that there is no substantial error which
he can assign on appeal. Id. Where on habeas corpus it has properly been determined that a right of appeal required by
the federal constitution has been denied, any rule restricting an appeal because of lapse of time is inapplicable. Id. Cited.

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Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 165
180 C. 153; 188 C. 98; 196 C. 309; 223 C. 834; 233 C. 557. To obtain habeas relief on the basis of a freestanding claim of
actual innocence requires affirmative evidence that petitioners did not commit the crimes of which they were convicted,
not simply the discrediting of evidence on which the conviction rested. 301 C. 544.
Dismissal of petition for writ of habeas corpus upheld. 49 CA 31. Two-prong test for claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel in petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id., 52. Mere allegation of a constitutional right is insufficient to meet
initial hurdle of proving an abuse of discretion when habeas court has denied certification to appeal. Id., 75. Two-pronged
test for petitioner to obtain appellate review of dismissal of petition for habeas corpus. 51 CA 305. In appeal of judgment
dismissing petition for habeas corpus, petitioner’s claim that trial and appellate counsels provided ineffective assistance
is reviewed under a two-pronged test. Id., 615. Test for proving whether dismissal of petition for writ of habeas corpus
was an abuse of discretion discussed. 57 CA 307. Where court found that habeas corpus petitioner failed to prove that
his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that said counsel had not represented
conflicting interests, therefore not denying defendant his due process rights, it was held that the habeas court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing petition for certification to appeal denial of the writ. 61 CA 347.
(No attainder.)
Sec. 13.1 No person shall be attainted of treason or felony, by the legislature.
1 Cited. 155 C. 318; 233 C. 557. Ban on assault weapons, Secs. 53-202a–53-202k, is not a bill of attainder. 234 C.
455. Prohibition against bill of attainder cited. Id.
Cited. 34 CA 557. Bills of attainder cited. Id. Cited. 43 CA 176. Violation of Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Sec-
tion, when read in conjunction with Art. I, Sec. 9, does not create an ex post facto clause in Connecticut Constitution.
127 CA 336.
(Right to assemble and petition.)
Sec. 14.1 The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their
common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for
redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.
1 Cited. 155 C. 318. Court held defendant had no duty to adopt the specific language requested in preparing petitions
for circulation either under provisions of city charter or state statutes. 184 C. 410. Both Connecticut Constitution Art.
I, Sec. 4 and this section are designed as a safeguard against acts of the state and do not limit the private conduct of
individuals or persons. 192 C. 48. Right of petition cited. 197 C. 141. Cited. 204 C. 287; Id., 683; 205 C. 495. Depriva-
tion of fundamental state constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. 219 C. 657; 232 C. 345; 233 C. 557; 234 C. 455; Id., 513;
239 C. 356. Enumerated constitutional rights cited. Id. In order to prevail on claim that municipal ordinance violates
state constitution plaintiff must identify the specific additional expressive rights recognized under state constitution and
describe how such rights are infringed upon by the ordinance. 254 C. 799. Town ordinance restricting park access to
residents and their guests violates freedom of assembly guarantee. 257 C. 318. Minimal state involvement present in
private shopping mall does not constitute state action. 270 C. 261. Under the state constitution, employee speech pursu-
ant to official job duties on certain matters of significant public interest is protected from employer discipline in a public
workplace; modified balancing test in 391 U.S. 563 and 461 U.S. 138 applies to speech by a public employee pursuant
to the employee’s official duties. 319 C. 175.
Cited. 38 CA 306. Involved right to free speech cited; “fighting words” limitation cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 559. Court
will not review freedom of association claim that was not preserved at trial and does not meet the third prong of the State
v. Golding test. 47 CA 149.
Private property owners rights are subordinated to rights under this section and Sec. 4 of this article. 37 CS 90. Cited.
Id., 515. Civil union legislation does not deny plaintiffs, eight same sex couples, the right of free expression and associa-
tion because civil union and marriage in Connecticut now share same benefits, protections and responsibilities under
law; Connecticut Constitution requires that there be equal protection and due process of law, not that there be equivalent
nomenclature for such protection and process. 49 CS 644.
(Right to bear arms.)
Sec. 15.1 Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.
1 Cited. 179 C. 516; 205 C. 456; 209 C. 322. Plaintiffs did not establish standing to assert constitutional rights of
individual permit holders not properly before court. 222 C. 621. Right to keep and bear arms cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 557.
Ban on assault weapons, Secs. 53-202a–53-202k, does not violate principles of right to bear arms. 234 C. 455. Right to
bear arms cited. Id. Cited. 242 C. 211. Right to bear arms cited. Id.
Cited. 15 CA 161. Right to bear arms cited. Id.; Id., 342. Court’s instructions on the “combat by agreement” exception
to self defense did not violate defendant’s right to carry a firearm. 84 CA 551.
Cited. 36 CS 108.
(Military power subordinate to civil.)
Sec. 16. The military shall, in all cases, and at all times, be in strict subordination
to the civil power.

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166 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. III
(Quartering of soldiers.)
Sec. 17. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
(No hereditary emoluments.)
Sec. 18. No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or
conferred in this state.
(Trial by jury.)
Sec. 19.1 The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.
1 Amended by Article IV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Equal protection. No segregation or discrimination.)
Sec. 20. 1 No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected
to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political
rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.
1 Amended by Article V., and Article XXI., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.