Nebraska Const. Article III | Constitution of Nebraska — Article III

Publisher edition notice: This collection preserves the complete Constitution directory at the captured revision of the Legislature's official LegalDocs repository, including its source notes and annotations. Later repository revisions are captured by the daily sync.

III-1 Legislative authority; how vested; power of initiative; power of referendum.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-1

Legislative authority; how vested; power of initiative; power of referendum.

The legislative authority of the state shall be vested in a Legislature consisting of one chamber. The people reserve for themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the Legislature, which power shall be called the power of initiative. The people also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act, item, section, or part of any act passed by the Legislature, which power shall be called the power of referendum.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 1 (1875);

Amended 1912, Laws 1911, c. 223, sec. 2, p. 671;

Amended 1934, Initiative Measure No. 330;

Amended 2000, Laws 1999, LR 18CA, sec. 3.

1. Grant of power

2. Limitations on exercise of power

3. Delegation of power

4. Miscellaneous

1. Grant of power

The statutes which give the Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction over public employees are not unconstitutional. American Fed. of S., C. & M. Emp. v. Department of Public Institutions, 195 Neb. 253, 237 N.W.2d 841 (1976).

A grant of administrative authority is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Blackledge v. Richards, 194 Neb. 188, 231 N.W.2d 319 (1975).

The right of the people to exercise the initiative and referendum is specifically reserved to them. Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 143 N.W.2d 744 (1966).

The Legislature, subject only to the initiative and referendum, and constitutional inhibitions, and provided that legislation is for a public purpose, has an unlimited field within which to legislate. Power Oil Co. v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 827, 295 N.W. 805 (1941).

Right of local self-government in cities and towns existed prior to present Constitution, is vested in people of respective municipalities, and cannot be taken away by Legislature. State ex rel. Smyth, Attorney General v. Moores, 55 Neb. 480, 76 N.W. 175 (1898), overruled in Redell v. Moores, 63 Neb. 219, 88 N.W. 243 (1901).

2. Limitations on exercise of power

Under this provision, a legislature may not attempt to restrict the constitutional power of a succeeding legislature to legislate. State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 249 Neb. 589, 544 N.W.2d 344 (1996).

In the creation of a new executive department, a two-thirds majority of all members elected to the Legislature is required. State ex rel. Howard v. Marsh, 146 Neb. 750, 21 N.W.2d 503 (1946).

Restrictions and limitations of the Constitution apply with equal force to legislative proceedings under the unicameral system as they did under the bicameral system. Mekota v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 146 Neb. 370, 19 N.W.2d 633 (1945).

Constitution does not define, but limits, the powers of the Legislature; otherwise as to powers of city council under home rule charter. Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643 (1922).

The 1934 amendment to this section giving all legislative powers to the Unicameral applied to Article IV, section 15, of the Constitution so as to require all orders, resolutions, and votes of the one house Legislature to be presented to the Governor and this controlled procedure as to the 1969 resolution retroceding jurisdiction over Indian reservations. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. Village of Walthill, 334 F.Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1971).

3. Delegation of power

The power of the Legislature to create a body with power to deal with labor relations of governmental entities and departments does not depend upon Article XV, section 9, of the Nebraska Constitution, but it exists by virtue of Article III, section 1. Orleans Education Assn. v. School Dist. of Orleans, 193 Neb. 675, 229 N.W.2d 172 (1975).

Sections 79-486 and 79-4,102 do not unlawfully delegate legislative authority and are not unconstitutional. Mann v. Wayne County Board of Equalization, 186 Neb. 752, 186 N.W.2d 729 (1971).

Adoption of existing law or regulation by reference does not delegate legislative power to administrative officer to create criminal offenses. State v. Workman, 186 Neb. 467, 183 N.W.2d 911 (1971).

Nebraska Clean Waters Commission Act did not delegate legislative authority in violation of this section. State ex rel. Meyer v. Duxbury, 183 Neb. 302, 160 N.W.2d 88 (1968).

Nebraska Revenue Act of 1967 was not an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the United States. Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967).

Statute authorizing transfer of land from a nonaccredited to an accredited high school district did not violate this section. De Jonge v. School Dist. of Bloomington, 179 Neb. 539, 139 N.W.2d 296 (1966).

Legislature cannot delegate to administrative agency powers conferred solely upon Legislature. Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 175 Neb. 26, 120 N.W.2d 374 (1963).

Legislature cannot delegate its legislative power to define a criminal offense to an administrative or executive authority. Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227 (1960).

Fair Trade Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., Inc., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955).

In absence of adequate standards, delegation of rule-making power to Superintendent of Public Instruction was unconstitutional. School Dist. No. 39 of Washington County v. Decker, 159 Neb. 693, 68 N.W.2d 354 (1955).

Legislature can delegate to administrative agency power to make rules and regulations covering the details of the legislative purpose. Board of Regents v. County of Lancaster, 154 Neb. 398, 48 N.W.2d 221 (1951).

Reclamation Act did not violate this section. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation District v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.W.2d 397 (1950).

Housing authority acts granting administrative functions to city council are not unconstitutional delegation of authority. Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451 (1940).

The extraordinary session of the Legislature of 1935 was properly constituted. Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. 439, 268 N.W. 317 (1936).

The Legislature may not delegate legislative powers to an administrative board or to any outside agency such as the United States Congress. Smithberger v. Banning, 129 Neb. 651, 262 N.W. 492 (1935).

Proviso of law relating to organization of new school districts is not invalid as attempt to delegate legislative functions. Rowe v. Ray, 120 Neb. 118, 231 N.W. 689 (1930).

4. Miscellaneous

Statutory provisions authorizing initiative petitions should be construed in such a manner that the legislative power reserved in the people is effectual and should not be circumscribed by restrictive legislation or narrow and strict interpretation of the statutes pertaining to its exercise. Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018).

Act establishing Court of Industrial Relations does not violate any constitutional provision and the standards for its guidance are adequate. Orleans Education Assn. v. School Dist. of Orleans, 193 Neb. 675, 229 N.W.2d 172 (1975).

L.B. 1003, Eighty-second Legislature, First Session, sections 23-2601 to 23-2612 does not contravene this section. Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972).

Rural Cemetery District Act violated this provision of the Constitution. Anderson v. Carlson, 171 Neb. 741, 107 N.W.2d 535 (1961).

Conditions and restrictions upon former Bicameral Legislature apply to the Unicameral Legislature. State ex rel. Caldwell v. Peterson, 153 Neb. 402, 45 N.W.2d 122 (1950).

Constitution relating to referendum contemplates that actions brought under law be speedily disposed of so that elections be had at time specified. Barkley v. Pool, 102 Neb. 799, 169 N.W. 730 (1918).

Office created by Legislature may be abolished by it. State ex rel. Topping v. Houston, 94 Neb. 445, 143 N.W. 796 (1913).

III-2 First power reserved; initiative.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-2

First power reserved; initiative.

The first power reserved by the people is the initiative whereby laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments adopted by the people independently of the Legislature. This power may be invoked by petition wherein the proposed measure shall be set forth at length. If the petition be for the enactment of a law, it shall be signed by seven percent of the registered voters of the state, and if the petition be for the amendment of the Constitution, the petition therefor shall be signed by ten percent of such registered voters. In all cases the registered voters signing such petition shall be so distributed as to include five percent of the registered voters of each of two-fifths of the counties of the state, and when thus signed, the petition shall be filed with the Secretary of State who shall submit the measure thus proposed to the electors of the state at the first general election held not less than four months after such petition shall have been filed. The same measure, either in form or in essential substance, shall not be submitted to the people by initiative petition, either affirmatively or negatively, more often than once in three years. If conflicting measures submitted to the people at the same election be approved, the one receiving the highest number of affirmative votes shall thereby become law as to all conflicting provisions. The constitutional limitations as to the scope and subject matter of statutes enacted by the Legislature shall apply to those enacted by the initiative. Initiative measures shall contain only one subject. The Legislature shall not amend, repeal, modify, or impair a law enacted by the people by initiative, contemporaneously with the adoption of this initiative measure or at any time thereafter, except upon a vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the Legislature.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 1A (1912);

Adopted 1912, Laws 1911, c. 223, sec. 2, p. 671;

Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 4;

Amended 1988, Laws 1988, LR 248, sec. 1;

Amended 1998, Laws 1997, LR 32CA, sec. 1;

Amended 2004, Initiative Measure No. 418, sec. 1.

1. Single subject requirement

2. Procedure

3. Amendment by initiative

4. Miscellaneous

1. Single subject requirement

A preelection mandamus action claiming that a voter ballot initiative violates the single subject rule is a claim based on the initiative's procedural, not substantive, requirements and is thus ripe for resolution before the election. State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 142, 948 N.W.2d 244 (2020).

A voter ballot initiative violates the single subject rule when the initiative's first two subsections would enshrine a constitutional right of certain persons to produce and medicinally use cannabis, while later subsections would enshrine a constitutional right and immunity for entities to grow and sell cannabis and would regulate the role of cannabis in at least six areas of public life. State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 142, 948 N.W.2d 244 (2020).

Because the voter ballot initiative power is precious to the people, the Nebraska Supreme Court construes statutory and constitutional provisions dealing with voters' power of initiative liberally to promote the democratic process. State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 142, 948 N.W.2d 244 (2020).

Logrolling is the practice of combining dissimilar propositions into one voter ballot initiative so that voters must vote for or against the whole package, even though they only support certain of the initiative's propositions. State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 142, 948 N.W.2d 244 (2020).

The people's reserved power of the initiative and their self-imposed requirements of procedure in exercising that power are of equal constitutional significance. State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 142, 948 N.W.2d 244 (2020).

The single subject requirement may not be circumvented by selecting a general subject so broad that the rule is evaded as a meaningful constitutional check on the initiative process. State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 142, 948 N.W.2d 244 (2020).

The single subject requirement was adopted by voters to protect against voter ballot initiatives that failed to give voters an option to clearly express their policy preference. State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 142, 948 N.W.2d 244 (2020).

To meet the single subject requirement, a voter ballot initiative must satisfy the natural and necessary connection test, which examines the initiative's singleness of purpose and the relationship of other details to its general subject. An initiative's general subject is defined by its primary purpose. State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 142, 948 N.W.2d 244 (2020).

For purposes of the single subject requirement for voter initiatives under the Nebraska Constitution, the general subject is defined by its primary purpose. Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018).

The controlling consideration in determining the singleness of a subject, for purposes of the single subject requirement for voter initiatives under this provision of the Nebraska Constitution, is its singleness of purpose and relationship of the details to the general subject, not the strict necessity of any given detail to carry out the general subject. Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018).

Where the limits of a proposed law, having natural and necessary connection with each other, and, together, are a part of one general subject, the proposal is a single and not a dual proposition, and thus does not violate the single subject requirement for voter initiatives under the Nebraska Constitution. Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018).

Whether the elements of complex statutory amendments can be characterized as presenting different policy issues for purposes of the single subject requirement for voter initiatives under this provision of the Nebraska Constitution, the crux of the question is the extent of the differences and how the elements relate to the primary purpose. Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018).

The separate-vote requirement under article XVI, section 1, imposes the same requirements as the single subject requirement under this provision: A voter initiative or a legislatively proposed constitutional amendment may not contain two or more distinct subjects for voter approval in a single vote. State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, 288 Neb. 973, 853 N.W.2d 494 (2014).

The single subject test for ballot measures to change the law—whether the measure is a voter initiative or a legislatively proposed constitutional amendment—is whether the proposed law’s provisions have a natural and necessary connection with each other and together are part of one general subject. State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, 288 Neb. 973, 853 N.W.2d 494 (2014).

Under the single subject ballot requirement, the general subject of a proposed ballot measure is defined by its primary purpose. Without a unifying purpose, separate proposals in a ballot measure necessarily present independent and distinct proposals that require a separate vote. State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, 288 Neb. 973, 853 N.W.2d 494 (2014).

2. Procedure

In order to qualify for the ballot, a petition to amend Nebraska's Constitution must be signed by 10 percent of the registered voters of the state. State ex rel. Bellino v. Moore, 254 Neb. 385, 576 N.W.2d 793 (1998).

Article III, section 2, which refers to registered voters repeals the reference in article III, section 4, which refers to those voting in the preceding gubernatorial election. The number of signatures required for placement of an initiative petition on the ballot by the Nebraska Constitution is equal to 10 percent of the number of registered voters on the date the signatures are to be turned in. Duggan v. Beermann, 245 Neb. 907, 515 N.W.2d 788 (1994).

This section is satisfied by a filing on July 5 for a general election to be held November 5. State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, 183 Neb. 521, 162 N.W.2d 262 (1968).

Provision that election on initiative shall be submitted at next general election is not mandatory. If court proceedings require, election may be at subsequent general election. Barkley v. Pool, 102 Neb. 799, 169 N.W. 730 (1918).

Initiative procedure did not constitute adequate remedy to correct existing inequalities in apportionment of legislative districts. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F.Supp. 189 (D. Neb. 1962).

3. Amendment by initiative

An appellate court makes no attempt to judge the wisdom or the desirability of enacting initiative amendments. State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale, 273 Neb. 889, 734 N.W.2d 290 (2007).

The people of this state may amend their Constitution in any way they see fit, provided the amendments do not violate the federal Constitution or conflict with federal statutes or treaties. State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale, 273 Neb. 889, 734 N.W.2d 290 (2007).

In a case involving the people's amendment to this state's Constitution, the Supreme Court makes no attempt to judge the wisdom or the desirability in enacting such amendments. Duggan v. Beermann, 249 Neb. 411, 544 N.W.2d 68 (1996).

4. Miscellaneous

Provisions in a statute making it a criminal offense for a person to willfully and knowingly circulate a petition outside the county in which the person is registered to vote, and providing that signatures secured in such a manner shall not be counted, unnecessarily obstruct the people's right to participate in the initiative and referendum process and are therefore unconstitutional. A law which unnecessarily obstructs or impedes operation of the initiative and referendum process is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Stenberg v. Beermann, 240 Neb. 754, 485 N.W.2d 151 (1992).

Article III, sections 2 and 4, of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska set out some of the procedural requirements that must be met before an enactment initiated by a petition becomes a part of the statutory law of Nebraska or a part of the Nebraska Constitution. The people of Nebraska have specifically reserved the right to amend their Constitution themselves in sections 2 and 4 of article III and in article XVI, section 1, of the Nebraska Constitution. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Spire, 223 Neb. 209, 389 N.W.2d 269 (1986).

Legislature is authorized to enact laws to facilitate operation of the initiative power. State ex rel. Winter v. Swanson, 138 Neb. 597, 294 N.W. 200 (1940).

III-3 Second power reserved; referendum.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-3

Second power reserved; referendum.

The second power reserved is the referendum which may be invoked, by petition, against any act or part of an act of the Legislature, except those making appropriations for the expense of the state government or a state institution existing at the time of the passage of such act. Petitions invoking the referendum shall be signed by not less than five percent of the registered voters of the state, distributed as required for initiative petitions, and filed in the office of the Secretary of State within ninety days after the Legislature at which the act sought to be referred was passed shall have adjourned sine die or for more than ninety days. Each such petition shall set out the title of the act against which the referendum is invoked and, in addition thereto, when only a portion of the act is sought to be referred, the number of the section or sections or portion of sections of the act designating such portion. No more than one act or portion of an act of the Legislature shall be the subject of each referendum petition. When the referendum is thus invoked, the Secretary of State shall refer the same to the electors for approval or rejection at the first general election to be held not less than thirty days after the filing of such petition.

When the referendum is invoked as to any act or part of act, other than emergency acts or those for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, by petition signed by not less than ten percent of the registered voters of the state distributed as aforesaid, it shall suspend the taking effect of such act or part of act until the same has been approved by the electors of the state.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 1B (1912);

Adopted 1912, Laws 1911, c. 223, sec. 2, p. 671;

Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 4;

Amended 1988, Laws 1988, LR 248, sec. 1;

Amended 1998, Laws 1997, LR 32CA, sec. 2.

1. Suspension of legislation pending election

2. Miscellaneous

1. Suspension of legislation pending election

Upon the filing of a referendum petition appearing to have a sufficient number of signatures, operation of the legislative act is suspended so long as the verification and certification process ultimately determines that the petition had the required number of valid signatures. State v. Mata, 304 Neb. 326, 934 N.W.2d 475 (2019).

Sponsors who obtain the signatures of more than 5 percent but less than 10 percent of Nebraska's registered voters on a referendum petition are not entitled to have the contested enactment suspended pending a referendum election. Pony Lake Sch. Dist. v. State Committee for Reorg., 271 Neb. 173, 710 N.W.2d 609 (2006).

Taking effect of an emergency act is not suspended until the act has been voted upon by the electors. Read v. City of Scottsbluff, 179 Neb. 410, 138 N.W.2d 471 (1965).

Where the 10-percent signature requirement contained in this provision is not fulfilled, a referendum vote does not repeal a legislative bill retroactively so as to ameliorate the effects of the legislation while it was in effect. Haskell v. Madison Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 0001, 17 Neb. App. 669, 771 N.W.2d 156 (2009).

2. Miscellaneous

Laws 2024, LB1402, section 1, does not violate this provision because it does not make an appropriation. State ex rel. Collar v. Evnen, 317 Neb. 608, 10 N.W.3d 900 (2024).

This provision specifically reserves to the people the power of referendum and clearly defines the scope of that right and its limitations. Pony Lake Sch. Dist. v. State Committee for Reorg., 271 Neb. 173, 710 N.W.2d 609 (2006).

A funding provision in a bill providing for future contributions to a public school support trust fund is not an appropriation bill and referendum may be invoked. Lawrence v. Beermann, 192 Neb. 507, 222 N.W.2d 809 (1974).

An act of the Legislature means a particular legislative bill which has been passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor. Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 143 N.W.2d 744 (1966).

Section has reference only to state legislation, and is not applicable to municipal legislation. Carlberg v. Metcalfe, 120 Neb. 481, 234 N.W. 87 (1930).

Provisions of this section, relating to referendum, have reference to acts of the Legislature only, and not to municipal legislation. Schroeder v. Zehrung, 108 Neb. 573, 188 N.W. 237 (1922).

Federal district court would not abstain from deciding whether state banking statute was properly adopted by Nebraska Legislature where analysis of the applicable Nebraska case law left no doubt that such statute was invalid. Nebraskans for Independent Banking, Inc. v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 423 F.Supp. 519 (D. Neb. 1976).

III-4 Initiative or referendum; signatures required; veto; election returns; constitutional amendments; non-partisan ballot.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-4

Initiative or referendum; signatures required; veto; election returns; constitutional amendments; non-partisan ballot.

The whole number of votes cast for Governor at the general election next preceding the filing of an initiative or referendum petition shall be the basis on which the number of signatures to such petition shall be computed. The veto power of the Governor shall not extend to measures initiated by or referred to the people. A measure initiated shall become a law or part of the Constitution, as the case may be, when a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not less than thirty-five per cent of the total vote cast at the election at which the same was submitted, are cast in favor thereof, and shall take effect upon proclamation by the Governor which shall be made within ten days after the official canvass of such votes. The vote upon initiative and referendum measures shall be returned and canvassed in the manner prescribed for the canvass of votes for president. The method of submitting and adopting amendments to the Constitution provided by this section shall be supplementary to the method prescribed in the article of this Constitution, entitled, "Amendments" and the latter shall in no case be construed to conflict herewith. The provisions with respect to the initiative and referendum shall be self-executing, but legislation may be enacted to facilitate their operation. All propositions submitted in pursuance hereof shall be submitted in a non-partisan manner and without any indication or suggestion on the ballot that they have been approved or endorsed by any political party or organization. Only the title or proper descriptive words of measures shall be printed on the ballot and when two or more measures have the same title they shall be numbered consecutively in the order of filing with the Secretary of State and the number shall be followed by the name of the first petitioner on the corresponding petition.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 1C & 1D (1912);

Adopted 1912, Laws 1911, c. 223, sec. 2, p. 671;

Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 4.

The requirement in the first sentence of this section--that the required number of signatures be computed based on the number of votes in the last gubernatorial election--was implicitly repealed by the 1988 amendments to Article III, sections 2 and 3, which changed the references in those sections for the required number of signatures from "electors" to "registered voters." Duggan v. Beermann, 245 Neb. 907, 515 N.W.2d 788 (1994); see also Pony Lake Sch. Dist. 30 v. State Comm. for the Reorganization of Sch. Dists., 271 Neb. 173, 710 N.W.2d 609 (2006). The rule under this provision that "legislation which hampers or renders ineffective the power reserved to the people is unconstitutional" has no application outside of regulating legislation intended to facilitate the initiative or referendum procedures. Pony Lake Sch. Dist. v. State Committee for Reorg., 271 Neb. 173, 710 N.W.2d 609 (2006).

Under the constitutional provision authorizing the Legislature to enact laws which facilitate the initiative and referendum process, the Legislature may enact reasonable legislation to prevent fraud or to render intelligible the purpose of the proposed law or constitutional amendment. State ex rel. Stenberg v. Beermann, 240 Neb. 754, 485 N.W.2d 151 (1992).

Legislation may be enacted to facilitate referendum. Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 143 N.W.2d 744 (1966).

This section authorizes Legislature to enact laws to prevent fraud or to render intelligible the purpose of the proposed law or constitutional amendment. State ex rel. Winter v. Swanson, 138 Neb. 597, 294 N.W. 200 (1940).

The result of a vote upon a proposed constitutional amendment is determined by State Canvassing Board, and, if carried, becomes operative on the date of the Governor's proclamation to that effect. Swanson v. State, 132 Neb. 82, 271 N.W. 264 (1937).

An election held without affirmative constitutional or statutory authority is a nullity. Thompson v. James, 125 Neb. 350, 250 N.W. 237 (1933).

III-5 Legislative districts; apportionment; redistricting, when required.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-5

Legislative districts; apportionment; redistricting, when required.

The Legislature shall by law determine the number of members to be elected and divide the state into legislative districts. In the creation of such districts, any county that contains population sufficient to entitle it to two or more members of the Legislature shall be divided into separate and distinct legislative districts, as nearly equal in population as may be and composed of contiguous and compact territory. One member of the Legislature shall be elected from each such district. The basis of apportionment shall be the population excluding aliens, as shown by the next preceding federal census. The Legislature shall redistrict the state after each federal decennial census. In any such redistricting, county lines shall be followed whenever practicable, but other established lines may be followed at the discretion of the Legislature.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 2 (1875);

Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 5;

Amended 1934, Initiative Measure No. 330;

Amended 1962, Laws 1961, c. 246, sec. 1, p. 731;

Amended 1966, Laws 1965, c. 304, sec. 1, p. 856;

Amended 2000, Laws 1999, LR 18CA, sec. 3.

Where only two counties in the state possessed populations such that they could legally constitute unitary legislative districts and reapportionment plans were offered in the Legislature to that end, it was "practicable" to establish districts which followed the boundaries of those counties. When the population of a county is such that it can legally constitute a legislative district and it is practicable to do so, the Legislature must establish a district which follows that county's boundaries. Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583 (1992).

The part of the 1962 amendment to this section permitting the crossing of county lines in making reapportionment of legislative districts was constitutional. Carpenter v. State, 179 Neb. 628, 139 N.W.2d 541 (1966).

Changing of boundaries of city did not operate to interfere with power of Legislature to divide state into legislative districts. Buller v. City of Omaha, 164 Neb. 435, 82 N.W.2d 578 (1957).

Where grave, unreasonable and gross inequalities exist between different districts, apportionment will be held void. Rogers v. Morgan, 127 Neb. 456, 256 N.W. 1 (1934).

Legislature may only redistrict itself once every ten years. Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F.Supp. 603 (D. Neb. 1967).

Crossing of county lines in making reapportionment of legislative districts was permissible. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 253 F.Supp. 27 (D. Neb. 1966).

Portion of 1962 amendment to this section providing for not less than twenty and not more than thirty per cent weight to be given to area in making apportionment for legislative districts was unconstitutional. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 232 F.Supp. 411 (D. Neb. 1964).

Federal court would not interfere with submission to electors of 1962 amendment to this section. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F.Supp. 189 (D. Neb. 1962).

III-6 Legislature; number of members; annual sessions.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-6

Legislature; number of members; annual sessions.

The Legislature shall consist of not more than fifty members and not less than thirty members. The sessions of the Legislature shall be annual except as otherwise provided by this constitution or as may be otherwise provided by law.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 3 (1875);

Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 6;

Amended 1934, Initiative Measure No. 330;

Amended 1970, Laws 1969, c. 415, sec. 1, p. 1424.

Second 1965 reapportionment act sustained as constitutional. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 253 F.Supp. 27 (D. Neb. 1966).

Legislative act of 1965 on apportionment of Legislature was unconstitutional. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 242 F.Supp. 357 (D. Neb. 1965).

III-7 Legislators; terms; effect of redistricting; election; salary; expenses; mileage.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-7

Legislators; terms; effect of redistricting; election; salary; expenses; mileage.

At the general election to be held in November 1964, one-half the members of the Legislature, or as nearly thereto as may be practicable, shall be elected for a term of four years and the remainder for a term of two years, and thereafter all members shall be elected for a term of four years, with the manner of such election to be determined by the Legislature. When the Legislature is redistricted, the members elected prior to the redistricting shall continue in office, and the law providing for such redistricting shall where necessary specify the newly established district which they shall represent for the balance of their term. Each member shall be nominated and elected in a nonpartisan manner and without any indication on the ballot that he or she is affiliated with or endorsed by any political party or organization. Each member of the Legislature shall receive a salary of not to exceed one thousand dollars per month during the term of his or her office. In addition to his or her salary, each member shall receive an amount equal to his or her actual expenses in traveling by the most usual route once to and returning from each regular or special session of the Legislature. Members of the Legislature shall receive no pay nor perquisites other than his or her salary and expenses, and employees of the Legislature shall receive no compensation other than their salary or per diem.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 4 (1875);

Amended 1886, Laws 1885, c. 124, p. 435;

Amended 1912, Laws 1911, c. 224, sec. 1, p. 675;

Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 7;

Amended 1934, Initiative Measure No. 330;

Amended 1960, Laws 1959, c. 235, sec. 1, p. 818;

Amended 1962, Laws 1961, c. 247, sec. 1, p. 733;

Amended 1966, Laws 1965, c. 304, sec. 1, p. 856;

Amended 1968, Laws 1967, c. 323, sec. 1, p. 859;

Amended 1988, Laws 1988, LR 7, sec. 1.

LB 1129, adopted by the Nebraska Legislature on April 16, 1986, created a pension program for members of the Legislature that constitutes "pay or perquisites" and is in contravention of this portion of the Constitution, and is thus invalid and unenforceable. State ex rel. Spire v. Public Emp. Ret. Bd., 226 Neb. 176, 410 N.W.2d 463 (1987).

This constitutional provision does not prohibit reimbursement to legislators for their actual expenses of holding office. State ex rel. Douglas v. Beermann, 216 Neb. 849, 347 N.W.2d 297 (1984).

It was a practical impossibility to redistrict legislative districts without taking into consideration the staggered terms of members of Legislature required by this section. Carpenter v. State, 179 Neb. 628, 139 N.W.2d 541 (1966).

Legislator can receive for services as member of Legislature, or member of committee, only compensation provided by Constitution. In re Appeal of Wilkins, 116 Neb. 748, 219 N.W. 9 (1928).

III-8 Legislators; qualifications; one-year residence in district; removal from district, effect.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-8

Legislators; qualifications; one-year residence in district; removal from district, effect.

No person shall be eligible to the office of member of the Legislature unless on the date of the general election at which he is elected, or on the date of his appointment he is a registered voter, has attained the age of twenty-one years and has resided within the district from which he is elected for the term of one year next before his election, unless he shall have been absent on the public business of the United States or of this State. And no person elected as aforesaid shall hold his office after he shall have removed from such district.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 5 (1875);

Amended 1972, Laws 1971, LB 126, sec. 1;

Amended 1992, Initiative Measure No. 407;

Amended 1994, Initiative Measure No. 408.

The changes made to this section by Initiative 407 in 1992 and Initiative 408 in 1994 have been omitted because of the decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Duggan v. Beermann, 245 Neb. 907, 515 N.W.2d 788 (1994) and Duggan v. Beermann, 249 Neb. 411, 544 N.W.2d 68 (1996).

III-9 Legislators; disqualifications; election to other office; resignation required.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-9

Legislators; disqualifications; election to other office; resignation required.

No person holding office under the authority of the United States, or any lucrative office under the authority of this state, shall be eligible to or have a seat in the Legislature. No person elected or appointed to the Legislature shall receive any civil appointment to a state office while holding membership in the Legislature or while the Legislature is in session, and all such appointments shall be void. Except as otherwise provided by law, a member of the Legislature who is elected to any other state or local office prior to the end of his or her term in the Legislature shall resign from the Legislature prior to the commencement of the legislative session during which the term of the state or local office will begin.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 6 (1875);

Amended 1972, Laws 1972, LB 1514, sec. 1;

Amended 2000, Laws 2000, LR 6CA, sec. 1.

It was the purpose not to permit any incentive or temptation for emoluments, gains, or position, to influence members of the Legislature. In re Appeal of Wilkins, 116 Neb. 748, 219 N.W. 9 (1928).

III-10 Legislative sessions; time; quorum; rules of procedure; expulsion of members; disrespectful behavior, penalty.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-10

Legislative sessions; time; quorum; rules of procedure; expulsion of members; disrespectful behavior, penalty.

Beginning with the year 1975, regular sessions of the Legislature shall be held annually, commencing at 10 a.m. on the first Wednesday after the first Monday in January of each year. The duration of regular sessions held shall not exceed ninety legislative days in odd-numbered years unless extended by a vote of four-fifths of all members elected to the Legislature, and shall not exceed sixty legislative days in even-numbered years unless extended by a vote of four-fifths of all members elected to the Legislature. Bills and resolutions under consideration by the Legislature upon adjournment of a regular session held in an odd-numbered year may be considered at the next regular session, as if there had been no such adjournment. The Lieutenant Governor shall preside, but shall vote only when the Legislature is equally divided. A majority of the members elected to the Legislature shall constitute a quorum; the Legislature shall determine the rules of its proceedings and be the judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of its members, shall choose its own officers, including a Speaker to preside when the Lieutenant Governor shall be absent, incapacitated, or shall act as Governor. No member shall be expelled except by a vote of two-thirds of all members elected to the Legislature, and no member shall be twice expelled for the same offense. The Legislature may punish by imprisonment any person not a member thereof who shall be guilty of disrespect to the Legislature by disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence, but no such imprisonment shall extend beyond twenty-four hours at one time, unless the person shall persist in such disorderly or contemptuous behavior.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 7 (1875);

Amended 1934, Initiative Measure No. 330;

Amended 1970, Laws 1969, c. 415, sec. 1, p. 1424;

Amended 1974, Laws 1974, LB 598, sec. 1.

This section applies to all but final passage of a legislative bill. Center Bank v. Dept. of Banking & Finance, 210 Neb. 227, 313 N.W.2d 661 (1981).

Legislature may provide by its rules for reconsideration of confirmation of appointments. State ex rel. Johnson v. Hagemeister, 161 Neb. 475, 73 N.W.2d 625 (1955).

Canvass of votes for executive state officers occurs when Legislature convenes on first Tuesday in January after election. State ex rel. Caldwell v. Peterson, 153 Neb. 402, 45 N.W.2d 122 (1950).

Court will, by mandamus, compel proper officers to issue certificate of election to member elected. State ex rel. Norton v. Van Camp, 36 Neb. 91, 54 N.W. 113 (1893).

III-11 Legislative journal; vote viva voce; open doors; committee votes.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-11

Legislative journal; vote viva voce; open doors; committee votes.

The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings and publish them, except such parts as may require secrecy, and the yeas and nays of the members on any question shall at the desire of any one of them be entered on the journal. All votes shall be viva voce. The doors of the Legislature and of the committees of the Legislature shall be open, except when the business shall be such as ought to be kept secret. The yeas and nays of each member of any committee of the Legislature shall be recorded and published on any question in committee to advance or to indefinitely postpone any bill.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 8 (1875);

Amended 1934, Initiative Measure No. 330;

Amended 1998, Laws 1997, LR 10CA, sec. 1.

When journals of both houses of Legislature and signature of Governor each clearly show the passage of an act in a certain definite form, the undisputed mistake of an enrolling clerk will not be allowed to defeat the act. State ex rel. Ball v. Hall, 130 Neb. 18, 263 N.W. 400 (1935).

A bill duly certified as having passed both houses of the Legislature and approved by the Governor imports verity and its passage can only be overthrown by the journals of the Legislature showing affirmatively that it was not passed in manner prescribed by the Constitution. State ex rel. Loseke v. Fricke, 126 Neb. 736, 254 N.W. 409 (1934).

Electric roll call device answers constitutional requirements of "viva voce" vote in Legislature. Day v. Walker, 124 Neb. 500, 247 N.W. 350 (1933).

Procedural action by the Legislature in passing on appropriation bill is prescribed, in part, by this section. Elmen v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Neb. 141, 231 N.W. 772 (1930).

Legislative journals are the best evidence of what affirmatively appears regarding enactment of the law. Webster v. City of Hastings, 59 Neb. 563, 81 N.W. 510 (1900).

Certificate of presiding officer of branch of Legislature, that bill was duly passed, is mere prima facie evidence of that fact. Evidence may be received to ascertain whether or not bill actually passed. Webster v. City of Hastings, 56 Neb. 669, 77 N.W. 127 (1898).

It is not competent to impeach proceedings of Legislature by contradicting journals, and facts proper to be inferred from approval of Governor and adoption of bill by officers in House and Senate. In re Granger, 56 Neb. 260, 76 N.W. 588 (1898).

III-12 Legislators; terms; limitation.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-12

Legislators; terms; limitation.

(1) No person shall be eligible to serve as a member of the Legislature for four years next after the expiration of two consecutive terms regardless of the district represented.

(2) Service prior to January 1, 2001, as a member of the Legislature shall not be counted for the purpose of calculating consecutive terms in subsection (1) of this section.

(3) For the purpose of this section, service in office for more than one-half of a term shall be deemed service for a term.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 12 (2000);

Adopted 2000, Initiative Measure No. 415.

Subsection (3) of this provision operates only to determine whether an expired legislative term will count as a full term toward disqualification to seek a third consecutive term. State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale, 273 Neb. 889, 734 N.W.2d 290 (2007).

III-13 Style of bills; majority necessary to passage; yeas and nays entered on journal.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-13

Style of bills; majority necessary to passage; yeas and nays entered on journal.

The style of all bills shall be, Be it enacted by the people of the State of Nebraska, and no law shall be enacted except by bill. No bill shall be passed by the Legislature unless by the assent of a majority of all members elected and the yeas and nays on the question of final passage of any bill shall be entered upon the journal.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 10 (1875);

Amended 1912, Laws 1911, c. 223, sec. 3, p. 674;

Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 8;

Amended 1972, Laws 1971, LB 132, sec. 1.

Language requiring assent of a majority of all members elected to the Legislature before a bill can be passed means that to pass a bill on final reading, bill must have affirmative votes of a majority of all members, and a vote of the Lieutenant Governor is not effective to break a tie and pass a legislative bill on final reading. Center Bank v. Dept. of Banking & Finance, 210 Neb. 227, 313 N.W.2d 661 (1981).

Enrolled bill signed by presiding officers of both houses of Legislature and approved by Governor imports verity as to its passage. State ex rel. Loseke v. Fricke, 126 Neb. 736, 254 N.W. 409 (1934).

Electric roll call device answers constitutional requirement if it provides proper record of vote in journal. Day v. Walker, 124 Neb. 500, 247 N.W. 350 (1933).

Appropriation bill containing items in excess of budget recommendations was legally adopted by three-fifths vote of Legislature, without separate three-fifths vote on each item increased over budget proposal. Elmen v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Neb. 141, 231 N.W. 772 (1930).

This section requires an affirmative vote of a majority of all members elected to the Legislature, and not merely the majority of a quorum, in order to either enact a law or add amendments to a bill or a rescission of an affirmative act already taken. Moore v. Neece, 80 Neb. 600, 114 N.W. 767 (1908).

III-14 Bills and resolutions read by title; printing; vote for final passage; bills to contain one subject; amended section to be set forth; signing of bills.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-14

Bills and resolutions read by title; printing; vote for final passage; bills to contain one subject; amended section to be set forth; signing of bills.

Every bill and resolution shall be read by title when introduced, and a printed copy thereof provided for the use of each member. The bill and all amendments thereto shall be printed and presented before the vote is taken upon its final passage and shall be read at large unless three-fifths of all the members elected to the Legislature vote not to read the bill and all amendments at large. No vote upon the final passage of any bill shall be taken until five legislative days after its introduction nor until it has been on file for final reading and passage for at least one legislative day. No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the subject shall be clearly expressed in the title. No law shall be amended unless the new act contains the section or sections as amended and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed. The Lieutenant Governor, or the Speaker if acting as presiding officer, shall sign, in the presence of the Legislature while it is in session and capable of transacting business, all bills and resolutions passed by the Legislature.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 11 (1875);

Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 8;

Amended 1934, Initiative Measure No. 330;

Amended 1996, Laws 1995, LR 4CA, sec. 1.

1. Title to act

2. Acts containing more than one subject

3. Independent complete acts

4. Amendatory acts

5. Legislative procedure

6. Miscellaneous

1. Title to act

The Supreme Court will not strike down legislation as violative of this section if the title calls attention to the subject matter of the bill, and the portion of the bill challenged is germane to the purpose announced in the title. One does not have standing to complain that a statute is unconstitutional unless he is injuriously affected thereby. Blackledge v. Richards, 194 Neb. 188, 231 N.W.2d 319 (1975).

Purpose of the title is to describe the subject not to synopsize the contents or every conceivable consequence. Title found sufficient. Hall v. Simpson, 184 Neb. 762, 171 N.W.2d 805 (1969).

Bill providing procedure for withdrawal from area vocational technical schools did not violate this section. Chaloupka v. Area Vocational Technical School No. 2, 184 Neb. 196, 165 N.W.2d 719 (1969).

Title of act need not refer to provisions of the act being amended if the nature of the legislation contained or the nature of the changes or additions made by it are sufficiently indicated. Tom & Jerry, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 183 Neb. 410, 160 N.W.2d 232 (1968).

In enacting act increasing penalty for assault upon guard by inmate of penal institution, the title of the act did not violate this section. State v. Lovell, 181 Neb. 401, 149 N.W.2d 46 (1967).

Title to Industrial Development Act of 1961 was sufficient, and act was not broader than title. State ex rel. Meyer v. County of Lancaster, 173 Neb. 195, 113 N.W.2d 63 (1962).

Title of amendatory act must give reasonable notice of the general subject upon which it is proposed to legislate. State ex rel. Bottolfson v. School Board of Sch. Dist. No. R1 of Cedar and Dixon Counties, 170 Neb. 417, 103 N.W.2d 146 (1960).

Amendment to Installment Loan Act was broader than title and was violative of this section. Thompson v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp., 169 Neb. 377, 99 N.W.2d 761 (1959).

Title to amendatory act relating to taxation of motor vehicles was sufficient. Peterson v. Hancock, 166 Neb. 637, 90 N.W.2d 298 (1958).

Defect in title was cured by incorporation of statute in 1943 revision. Peterson v. Vasak, 162 Neb. 498, 76 N.W.2d 420 (1956).

Title to act dealing with depopulated school districts was sufficient. Schutte v. Schmitt, 162 Neb. 162, 75 N.W.2d 656 (1956).

Defect in title to legislative act was cured by adoption by Legislature of general revision act. McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., Inc., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955).

Title to Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act was good. Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620 (1952).

Where bill contains but one subject and that subject is clearly expressed in the title, constitutional requirements have been met, even though title contains duplicitous or extraneous provisions not necessary to its validity. Midwest Popcorn Co. v. Johnson, 152 Neb. 867, 43 N.W.2d 174 (1950).

Legislative act defining offense of foeticide is constitutional. Hans v. State, 147 Neb. 67, 22 N.W.2d 385 (1946).

Where title to amendatory act indicates the subject of the proposed legislation, and the provisions of the act are germane to the subject matter of the original section proposed to be changed, the act is not violative of this section. County of Dawson v. South Side Irr. Co., 146 Neb. 512, 20 N.W.2d 387 (1945).

It is not required that title be a synopsis of the act. Maher v. State, 144 Neb. 463, 13 N.W.2d 641 (1944).

If act has but one general object, no matter how broad, and contains no matter not germane thereto, and title fairly expresses the subject of the bill, it does not violate constitutional provisions. Beisner v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 445, 293 N.W. 289 (1940).

Statute defining ice cream was not vulnerable to objection act was broader than its title. State v. McCosh, 134 Neb. 780, 279 N.W. 775 (1938).

A title is not necessary to an act providing for submission of a proposed amendment to Constitution, and will be treated as null and void. Swanson v. State, 132 Neb. 82, 271 N.W. 264 (1937).

Title, "An act relating to municipal courts," is sufficient to include a section providing for eligibility of judges of such courts. Spier v. Thomas, 131 Neb. 579, 269 N.W. 61 (1936).

Act providing for payment of delinquent taxes by annual installments was not broader than title. Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. 439, 268 N.W. 317 (1936).

Act providing for adoption of managerial form of county government was broader than title. State ex rel. O'Connor v. Tusa, 130 Neb. 528, 265 N.W. 524 (1936).

In determining whether an act amending a previous act is broader than its title, court will consider the titles to both the amending and amended acts. Miller v. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 129 Neb. 757, 262 N.W. 855 (1935).

A proviso attached to an appropriation, subject of which proviso is not referred to in title of act, is invalid. State ex rel. National Surety Corp. v. Price, 129 Neb. 433, 261 N.W. 894 (1935).

Title reading, "to provide punishment for one who makes statements or representations with intent to defraud," is not broad enough to include imposition of penalty on one who does not know that statements are false but had ground to believe they were false. Joseph v. State, 128 Neb. 824, 260 N.W. 803 (1935).

Title of independent act authorizing construction of sewers and providing that owners or occupants of premises be charged for the services, and to raise money, is broad enough to include legislation authorizing issuance of bonds secured by property and revenue of sewerage system. State ex rel. City of Columbus v. Price, 127 Neb. 132, 254 N.W. 889 (1934).

Act relating to irrigation, flood control, storage of waters, and to generation, distribution, transmission, sale and purchase of electrical energy was valid. State ex rel. Loseke v. Fricke, 126 Neb. 736, 254 N.W. 409 (1934).

Act providing for erecting bridges over irrigation ditches on public roads was invalid to extent it was broader than title. State ex rel. County of Dawson v. Dawson County Irr. Co., 125 Neb. 836, 252 N.W. 320 (1934).

Where title to act provided for the regulation and licensing of traffic in tobacco, it was not unconstitutional as a revenue measure, a subject not mentioned in title. Nash-Finch Co. v. Beal, 124 Neb. 835, 248 N.W. 374 (1933).

Nepotism law was void because provisions for penalty were not embraced in title. Wayne County v. Steele, 121 Neb. 438, 237 N.W. 288 (1931).

Act providing for control and eradication of disease among domestic animals was not invalid as containing more than one subject not clearly expressed in title. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Knudtsen, 121 Neb. 270, 236 N.W. 696 (1931).

Title designating act as establishing laws relating to civil government and administration thereof was broad enough to include provisions regulating banking. Westbrook v. State, 120 Neb. 625, 234 N.W. 579 (1931).

Securities law was not invalid because provision for burden of proof as to exemptions was not specifically referred to in title. Pandolfo v. State, 120 Neb. 616, 234 N.W. 483 (1931).

Where title fairly gives expression to general subject matter, act will not be held invalid as broader than title. Mehrens v. Bauman, 120 Neb. 110, 231 N.W. 701 (1930).

Title must be such as to give reasonable notice to members of Legislature and others interested, of the general subject upon which it is proposed to legislate. Appel Mercantile Co. v. Barker, 92 Neb. 669, 138 N.W. 1133 (1912).

If general purpose of act is expressed and matter contained in body is germane thereto, title is sufficient. State ex rel. Baughn v. Ure, 91 Neb. 31, 135 N.W. 224 (1912).

Title need not be abstract of bill, but it is sufficient if title indicates subject of proposed legislation. Nebraska Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. Perkins, 61 Neb. 254, 85 N.W. 67 (1901).

Title of act is part thereof and must clearly express subject matter. State v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 60 Neb. 741, 84 N.W. 254 (1901).

Purpose is to prevent subjects of different nature from being inserted under color of amendment. State ex rel. Graham v. Tibbets, 52 Neb. 228, 71 N.W. 990 (1897).

Provisions relating to title should be liberally construed to admit insertion in act of all provisions which, though not specifically expressed in title, are comprehended within objects and purposes of act, and all provisions germane and not foreign to expressed provisions in title. Affholder v. State ex rel. McMullen, 51 Neb. 91, 70 N.W. 544 (1897).

Provision as to title applies to amendatory acts as well as complete and independent acts. West Point Water Power & Land Improvement Co. v. State ex rel. Moodie, 49 Neb. 223, 68 N.W. 507 (1896).

2. Acts containing more than one subject

Act of Legislature authorizing city of primary class to annex contiguous or adjacent lands did not violate this section. Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 182 Neb. 459, 155 N.W.2d 444 (1968).

Nebraska Revenue Act of 1967 did not violate provision that no bill shall contain more than one subject. Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967).

Title of Blanket Mill Tax Levy Act was good and act was independent legislation. Peterson v. Hancock, 155 Neb. 801, 54 N.W.2d 85 (1952).

Statute prohibiting state and federal officers and employees from being delegates to county, district, and state political conventions contained but one subject which was clearly expressed in the title. State ex rel. Baldwin v. Strain, 152 Neb. 763, 42 N.W.2d 796 (1950).

Act relating to county jails and fees of sheriffs with reference to care of prisoners therein contained but one subject and was constitutional. Dorrance v. County of Douglas, 149 Neb. 685, 32 N.W.2d 202 (1948).

Statute relating to condemnation of public utilities is not violative of constitutional requirement of single subject clearly expressed in title. City of Mitchell v. Western Public Service Co., 124 Neb. 248, 246 N.W. 484 (1933).

Intangible tax statute was not invalid as containing more than one subject. Mehrens v. Greenleaf, 119 Neb. 82, 227 N.W. 325 (1929).

Act relating to recovery on forfeited recognizance was not void as containing more than one subject not clearly expressed in title. State v. Painter, 117 Neb. 42, 219 N.W. 794 (1928).

Statute entitled "An act to amend" certain sections "and to repeal" the same as then existing, was not broader than title. Conservative Sav. & L. Assn. of Omaha v. Anderson, 116 Neb. 627, 218 N.W. 423 (1928).

Including provision for drainage of subirrigated lands in act relating to organization of irrigation district does not violate requirement that bill shall contain only one subject to be expressed in title. State ex rel. Reed v. Farmers Irr. Dist., 116 Neb. 373, 217 N.W. 607 (1928).

Provisions for raising money by taxation, issuing bonds, and eminent domain, were not beyond scope of act "defining powers and government of light, heat and power districts." Elliott v. Wille, 112 Neb. 78, 200 N.W. 347 (1924).

Provision for housing municipal court in county courthouse was not beyond scope of act "to create municipal court," etc. State ex rel. City of Omaha v. Board of County Comrs. of Douglas County, 109 Neb. 35, 189 N.W. 639 (1922).

Where title of act refers to both relocation of county seats and county division, but body of act relates only to relocation, it is not invalid as containing two subjects. Murray v. Nelson, 107 Neb. 52, 185 N.W. 319 (1921).

Statute "relating to stealing, buying or concealing automobiles," was not invalid as containing more than one subject, although providing for rules of evidence, and for including more than one count in indictment. Birdhead v. State, 105 Neb. 296, 180 N.W. 583 (1920).

Act "to provide for county farm bureaus," was not invalid for containing more than one subject, though it contains provisions for employment and payment of county agent, duties of county board, etc. State ex rel. Hall County Farm Bureau v. Miller, 104 Neb. 838, 178 N.W. 846 (1920).

Including crime of buying or receiving stolen automobiles in act relating to larceny of motor vehicles was not more than one subject. Sandlovich v. State, 104 Neb. 169, 176 N.W. 81 (1920).

Act relating to rural school districts contained only one subject. Gauchat v. School Dist. No. 5 in Nemaha County, 101 Neb. 377, 163 N.W. 334 (1917).

Statute regulating licensing of persons practicing chiropody, chiropractic, and dentistry, was not invalid as containing more than one subject. Peet Stock Remedy Co. v. McMullen, 32 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1929).

3. Independent complete acts

If an act is complete and independent in itself it may incidentally amend, modify, or have impact upon provisions of existing statutes without violating this section. Aschenbrenner v. Nebraska P.P. Dist., 206 Neb. 157, 291 N.W.2d 720 (1980).

The independent act considered herein is not unconstitutional for failure to mention in the incidental provision for payment or exemption from payment of costs, nor for failing to refer to and repeal certain other statutes. State ex rel. Douglas v. Gradwohl, 194 Neb. 745, 235 N.W.2d 854 (1975).

L.B. 1357, Laws 1969, providing for natural resources districts was independent legislation and not violative of this section. Neeman v. Nebraska Nat. Resources Commission, 191 Neb. 672, 217 N.W.2d 166 (1974).

Act prohibiting merger of school districts in certain cases was complete and independent. Bodenstedt v. Rickers, 189 Neb. 407, 203 N.W.2d 110 (1972).

Nebraska Trust Deeds Act did not violate this section. Blair Co. v. American Savings Co., 184 Neb. 557, 169 N.W.2d 292 (1969).

Parking Authority Law was original and independent legislation and title to act was sufficient. Omaha Parking Authority v. City of Omaha, 163 Neb. 97, 77 N.W.2d 862 (1956).

Eminent domain procedure act sustained as constitutional. Jensen v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 159 Neb. 277, 66 N.W.2d 591 (1954).

Reclamation Act did not violate this section. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation District v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.W.2d 397 (1950).

General appropriation bill of 1945 sustained as constitutional. Rein v. Johnson, 149 Neb. 67, 30 N.W.2d 548 (1947).

An independent act may incorporate within itself by reference provisions of another existing act, and the effect is the same as though the statute or part adopted had been written into the adopting statute. Rocky Mountain Lines v. Cochran, 140 Neb. 378, 299 N.W. 596 (1941).

Housing authority acts of 1937 are independent and complete in themselves and hence not violative of constitutional provision. Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451 (1940).

If act is complete and independent in itself, it may amend or modify provisions of existing statutes without controverting the provisions of Constitution relating to amendments. Live Stock Nat. Bank v. Jackson, 137 Neb. 161, 288 N.W. 515 (1939); Hinman v. Temple, 133 Neb. 268, 274 N.W. 605 (1937).

Independent act, complete in itself, is not rendered amendatory because it refers to another act for procedure taken. Department of Banking v. Foe, 136 Neb. 422, 286 N.W. 264 (1939).

An independent legislative act covering the entire subject of legislation may change or repeal former enactments in conflict with new provisions. State ex rel. Kaspar v. Lehmkuhl, 127 Neb. 812, 257 N.W. 229 (1934).

Civil Administrative Code law was complete in itself, and not amendatory. Sheridan County v. Hand, 114 Neb. 813, 210 N.W. 273 (1926).

Act, complete in itself, which conflicts with prior statute but does not purport to amend it, is not invalid, but repeals earlier statute by implication. Drew v. Mumford, 114 Neb. 100, 206 N.W. 159 (1925).

Act defining and providing penalties for blackmail was complete act covering distinct crime, and not amendatory of statutes covering related offenses. McKenzie v. State, 113 Neb. 576, 204 N.W. 60 (1925).

Act relating to state mineral land leases was complete and not amendatory. Briggs v. Neville, 103 Neb. 1, 170 N.W. 188 (1918).

Mothers' Pension Law was complete and not amendatory of poor laws. Rumsey v. Saline County, 102 Neb. 302, 167 N.W. 66 (1918).

Act requiring county attorney to perform duties of coroner was complete, and its effect was to incorporate into new law the existing laws relating to duties of coroner. State ex rel. Crosby v. Moorhead, 100 Neb. 298, 159 N.W. 412 (1916).

Later act relating to verification, filing and allowance of claims against counties, being complete in itself, repealed by implication conflicting prior statute. Uttley v. Sievers, 100 Neb. 59, 158 N.W. 373 (1916).

Act providing for teaching foreign languages in schools was complete, and not amendatory of or in conflict with any prior law. State ex rel. Thayer v. School Dist. of Nebraska City, 99 Neb. 338, 156 N.W. 641 (1916).

Act to define "week" in legal notices was complete and not amendatory. In re Estate of Johnson, 98 Neb. 799, 154 N.W. 550 (1915).

Act complete in itself repeals by implication existing laws in conflict or repugnant thereto. State ex rel. Farmers State Bank of Pickrell v. Hevelone, 92 Neb. 748, 139 N.W. 636 (1913).

Mere fact that act refers to prior act by implication does not render new act amendatory if otherwise complete. Stewart v. Barton, 91 Neb. 96, 135 N.W. 381 (1912).

Provision is not violated by changes or modifications in existing statutes merely as incidental result of adopting new law covering whole subject to which it relates. De France v. Harmer, 66 Neb. 14, 92 N.W. 159 (1902).

Law relating to irrigation districts containing no reference to previous law must be construed as independent act. Bridgeport Irr. Dist. v. United States, 40 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1930).

Statute conferring additional powers on irrigation district was independent act, complete in itself, not governed by this section. New York Trust Co. v. Farmers Irr. Dist., 280 F. 785 (8th Cir. 1922).

4. Amendatory acts

The Depressant and Stimulant Drugs Act of 1967 did not violate this section. State v. Waechter, 189 Neb. 433, 203 N.W.2d 104 (1972).

L.B. 1003, Eighty-second Legislature, First Session, sections 23-2601 to 23-2612 did not violate this section since it was not amendatory. Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972).

An act which does not contain section amended but changes existing statutes in part so that changes and existing provisions result in connected piece of legislation covering same subject matter is void under this section. State v. Greenburg, 187 Neb. 149, 187 N.W.2d 751 (1971).

Cited in construing intent of the Legislature. Schurmann v. Curtiss, 183 Neb. 277, 159 N.W.2d 554 (1968).

Airport Authority Act did not violate this section. Obitz v. Airport Authority of City of Red Cloud, 181 Neb. 410, 149 N.W.2d 105 (1967).

The 1959 amendments to the act prescribing rules for administrative agencies were constitutional. Yellow Cab Co. v. Nebraska State Railway Commission, 175 Neb. 150, 120 N.W.2d 922 (1963).

The fact that legislation is cast in the form of an independent act is not controlling if in substance it is amendatory. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. County of Box Butte, 166 Neb. 603, 90 N.W.2d 72 (1958).

Inference of amendment by implication could not be made. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Jensen, 157 Neb. 22, 58 N.W.2d 582 (1953).

Legislative act providing for proceedings with reference to children born out of wedlock did not violate this section. In re Application of Rozgall, 147 Neb. 260, 23 N.W.2d 85 (1946).

Reference to sections in compilation by an amendatory act applied to constitutional parts of original act, even though portions thereof had been held unconstitutional. Sullivan v. City of Omaha, 146 Neb. 297, 19 N.W.2d 510 (1945).

Statute may adopt penalty provision of another statute without being amendatory thereof. Adams v. State, 138 Neb. 613, 294 N.W. 396 (1940).

Under prior constitutional provision, if a bill was introduced in Legislature with constitutional time limit, amendments germane to its subject may be made after expiration of such time limit. Pierson v. Faulkner, 134 Neb. 865, 279 N.W. 813 (1938).

Where an act, although purporting to be independent act complete in itself, is in fact purely amendatory of existing legislation, it is void for noncompliance with this section. State ex rel. Day v. Hall, 129 Neb. 699, 262 N.W. 850 (1935); State ex rel. Taylor v. Hall, 129 Neb. 669, 262 N.W. 835 (1935).

Statute providing for payment of delinquent taxes without interest and penalty was amendatory of existing laws and invalid because not repealing original sections. Tukey v. Douglas County, 129 Neb. 353, 261 N.W. 833 (1935).

Where title states that subject of an act is to amend one section of a former statute, the act cannot be extended to amend other sections, and where title is to repeal certain sections the bill cannot re-enact the substance of the statutes repealed in title nor amend sections so repealed. Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424, 255 N.W. 551 (1934).

Where an act, although professing to be an independent act, makes changes in existing acts by adding new provisions and mingling the new with the old so as to make of the new and the old a connected piece of legislation covering the same subject, it is within the constitutional prohibition. State ex rel. Beal v. Bauman, 126 Neb. 566, 254 N.W. 256 (1934).

Substituting complete new act authorizing counties to foreclose liens for taxes delinquent more than three years, by amendment germane to original act, was not violative of requirement that new act set out amended sections. Douglas County v. Barker Co., 125 Neb. 253, 249 N.W. 607 (1933); Commercial Savings & Loan Assn. v. Pyramid Realty Co., 121 Neb. 493, 237 N.W. 575 (1931).

Common law marriage statute was not violative of constitutional prohibitions herein. Collins v. Hoag & Rollins, 122 Neb. 805, 241 N.W. 766 (1932).

Provision appointing county treasurer agent of department of public works in collection of automobile registration fees, and providing that he should retain 5-cent fee and account therefor was germane to act which it amended. Wayne County v. Steele, 121 Neb. 438, 237 N.W. 288 (1931).

Act to determine heirship did not violate provision respecting amendments. In re Robinson Heirship, 119 Neb. 285, 228 N.W. 852 (1930).

Intangible tax statute was not violative of provision respecting amendments. Mehrens v. Greenleaf, 119 Neb. 82, 227 N.W. 325 (1929).

Where act does not cover the whole subject or general scheme of legislation, and fails to amend existing statutes, it is void. State v. Painter, 117 Neb. 42, 219 N.W. 794 (1928).

Statute purporting to amend a certain section mentioned in title, but which attempts to amend another section without reference thereto, is void. Endres v. McDonald, 115 Neb. 827, 215 N.W. 114 (1927).

Statute requiring claims for damages against utilities district to be filed within 20 days, was void because not germane to original section attempted to be amended. Day v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 115 Neb. 711, 214 N.W. 647 (1927).

Section in Bovine Tuberculosis Act was void because not germane to subject expressed in title. State ex rel. Spillman v. Heldt, 115 Neb. 435, 213 N.W. 578 (1927).

Title of amendatory act using the word "bootlegging" was not inconsistent with body of act or subject matter of section to be amended. Knothe v. State, 115 Neb. 119, 211 N.W. 619 (1926).

Act amending section of Workmen's Compensation Law was void because added words were not germane to original section. Allen v. Trester, 112 Neb. 515, 199 N.W. 841 (1924).

Where two statutes are enacted at the same session without reference to one another, but as amendments of identical sections of the statutes, the one which is the later expression of the legislative will prevails, if the two enactments are irreconcilable. State ex rel. City of Omaha v. Board of County Comrs. of Douglas County, 109 Neb. 35, 189 N.W. 639 (1922).

Act amending section of prohibition law was germane to subject of legislation. State v. Badberg, 108 Neb. 816, 189 N.W. 157 (1922).

Amendatory act relating to county high school districts was germane to subject of legislation. State ex rel. Stockwell v. Berryman, 102 Neb. 553, 167 N.W. 790 (1918).

Amendatory act providing for consolidating contiguous school districts was germane to purpose of original section providing for children in one district attending school in another. Johnson v. School Dist. No. 101 of Saunders County, 102 Neb. 347, 167 N.W. 210 (1918).

Amendatory act requiring drainage district directors to submit question of incurring expense to election was germane to original section defining directors' duties. State ex rel. Gantz v. Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Merrick County, 100 Neb. 625, 160 N.W. 997 (1916).

Act increasing limit of taxation for county building was not complete but amendatory of existing statute fixing limit, and void because it does not contain or repeal amended section. Minier v. Burt County, 95 Neb. 473, 145 N.W. 977 (1914), rehearing denied 95 Neb. 483, 145 N.W. 1104 (1914).

Section as amended should contain all that is substituted for original section and original section should be entirely repealed. State ex rel. Martin v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Oakland, 93 Neb. 1, 139 N.W. 653 (1913).

Where act amends specified section of statute, it is sufficient if the amendment is germane. State ex rel. Sch. Dist. of City of Lincoln v. Barton, 91 Neb. 357, 136 N.W. 22 (1912).

No amendatory legislation not germane to subject matter of original section can be included in act to amend particular section. Armstrong v. Mayer, 60 Neb. 423, 83 N.W. 401 (1900).

Amendatory legislation foreign to subject of original act, and not embraced in title thereof, cannot be included in amendatory act. State ex rel. Scott v. Bowen, 54 Neb. 211, 74 N.W. 615 (1898).

Act must set out in full new section and also contain repeal of old section amended. Reynolds v. State, 53 Neb. 761, 74 N.W. 330 (1898).

Referring to section of statute is sufficient in an amendatory act, but matters not germane to original section can not be included. Horkey v. Kendall, 53 Neb. 522, 73 N.W. 953 (1898).

Amendatory act is void if there is no mention of, or reference to, amended section or law. Douglas County v. Hayes, 52 Neb. 191, 71 N.W. 1023 (1897).

This section requires all parts of amended law to be included in new act and old law so amended to be repealed. State ex rel. Carey v. Cornell, 50 Neb. 526, 70 N.W. 56 (1897).

Act amending subdivision of section, and which contains subdivision so amended, does not violate Constitution. State ex rel. City Water Co. v. City of Kearney, 49 Neb. 325, 68 N.W. 533 (1896).

Where act may be construed to be either amendatory or an independent act, it will be given that construction which will sustain its constitutionality. Bridgeport Irr. Dist. v. United States, 40 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1930).

Statute relating to practice of veterinary medicine and surgery was not violative of this section. Peet Stock Remedy Co. v. McMullen, 32 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1929).

5. Legislative procedure

This provision does not demand that a bill remain uninterrupted on final reading for at least 1 legislative day immediately prior to its passage. DeCamp v. State, 256 Neb. 892, 594 N.W.2d 571 (1999).

This section, applying to legislative bills, refers to final passage. Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 143 N.W.2d 744 (1966).

Substituting an entire new bill by amendment is not unconstitutional where changes are germane; and it is not necessary that bill, if read twice before amendment, should again be placed on first and second reading. State ex rel. Davis v. Cox, 105 Neb. 75, 178 N.W. 913 (1920).

Failure of senate presiding officer to sign bill, afterwards approved by Governor, and shown on senate journal passed by constitutional majority, does not invalidate. State ex rel. Neb. State Railway Commission v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 100 Neb. 700, 161 N.W. 270 (1916).

Three readings are not required after amendments have been made following the first and second reading. State ex rel. Martin v. Ryan, 92 Neb. 636, 139 N.W. 235 (1912).

Bill not authenticated by signature of presiding officer of either branch of Legislature was void. State ex rel. McClay v. Mickey, 73 Neb. 281, 102 N.W. 679 (1905).

This section does not require three separate readings of bills as finally amended. State ex rel. First Nat. Bank of Atkinson v. Cronin, 72 Neb. 636, 101 N.W. 325 (1904).

This section does not require that amendment or bills as amended, shall be read on three separate days. Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N.W. 306 (1902), affirmed on rehearing 66 Neb. 273, 96 N.W. 212 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 66 Neb. 276, 98 N.W. 1075 (1904).

Bill must be read on three separate days. State v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 60 Neb. 741, 84 N.W. 254 (1900).

6. Miscellaneous

The constitutional requirements for legislative bills do not apply to the Legislature’s proposed amendments. Thus, the “single subject” rule that applies to legislative bills under this provision does not apply to the Legislature’s proposed constitutional amendments. Such ballot measures are governed by Neb. Const. article XVI, section 1. State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, 288 Neb. 973, 853 N.W.2d 494 (2014).

Constitutionality of Municipal Ground Water Act raised, but not decided. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966).

Unconstitutionality of tax statute under this section raised but not decided. Creigh v. Larsen, 171 Neb. 317, 106 N.W.2d 187 (1960).

Provision of former primary election law requiring filing fifty days before primary by incumbent of one office seeking another was unconstitutional. Fitzgerald v. Kuppinger, 163 Neb. 286, 79 N.W.2d 547 (1956).

Installment Loan Act did not violate requirements of this section. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956).

This section does not apply to passage of city ordinances, and decisions thereunder are only valuable as analogies. Gembler v. City of Seward, 136 Neb. 196, 285 N.W. 542 (1939).

Entire act is void, where part of the act which is held unconstitutional is an inducement to the passage thereof, and is not separable. McShane v. Douglas County, 96 Neb. 664, 148 N.W. 569 (1914).

III-15 Members privileged from arrest.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-15

Members privileged from arrest.

Members of the Legislature in all cases except treason, felony or breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest during the session of the Legislature, and for fifteen days next before the commencement and after the termination thereof.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 12 (1875).

Legislature may by law provide that members are exempt from service of civil process during session. Berlet v. Weary, 67 Neb. 75, 93 N.W. 238 (1903).

Privilege of member is not privilege of the Legislature merely but of the people, and is conferred to enable him to discharge trust confided to him by constituents. State v. Elder, 31 Neb. 169, 47 N.W. 710 (1891).

III-16 Members of the Legislature and state officers; conflicts of interest; standards for.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-16

Members of the Legislature and state officers; conflicts of interest; standards for.

No member of the Legislature or any state officer shall have a conflict of interest, as defined by the Legislature, directly in any contract, with the state or any county or municipality thereof, authorized by any law enacted during the term for which he shall have been elected or appointed, or within one year after the expiration of such term. The Legislature shall prescribe standards and definitions for determining the existence of such conflicts of interest in contracts, and it shall prescribe sanctions for enforcing this section.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 13 (1875);

Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 9;

Amended 1968, Laws 1967, c. 322, sec. 1, p. 856;

Amended 1972, Laws 1972, LB 1514, sec. 1.

Legislator can receive from state only compensation provided by Constitution, for services as member of Legislature or of committee. In re Appeal of Wilkins, 116 Neb. 748, 219 N.W. 9 (1928).

If member is interested in any contract authorized by law passed during his term, this section would prevent his claiming any rights under such contract, but would not invalidate the law. Briggs v. Neville, 103 Neb. 1, 170 N.W. 188 (1918).

III-17 Impeachment; procedure.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-17

Impeachment; procedure.

The Legislature shall have the sole power of impeachment, but a majority of the members elected must concur therein. Proceedings may be initiated in either a regular session or a special session of the Legislature. Upon the adoption of a resolution of impeachment, which resolution shall give reasonable notice of the acts or omissions alleged to constitute impeachable offenses but need not conform to any particular style, a notice of an impeachment of any officer, other than a Judge of the Supreme Court, shall be forthwith served upon the Chief Justice, by the Clerk of the Legislature, who shall thereupon call a session of the Supreme Court to meet at the Capitol in an expeditious fashion after such notice to try the impeachment. A notice of an impeachment of the Chief Justice or any Judge of the Supreme Court shall be served by the Clerk of the Legislature, upon the clerk of the judicial district within which the Capitol is located, and he or she thereupon shall choose, at random, seven Judges of the District Court in the State to meet within thirty days at the Capitol, to sit as a Court to try such impeachment, which Court shall organize by electing one of its number to preside. The case against the impeached civil officer shall be brought in the name of the Legislature and shall be managed by two senators, appointed by the Legislature, who may make technical or procedural amendments to the articles of impeachment as they deem necessary. The trial shall be conducted in the manner of a civil proceeding and the impeached civil officer shall not be allowed to invoke a privilege against self-incrimination, except as otherwise applicable in a general civil case. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Court of impeachment that clear and convincing evidence exists indicating that such person is guilty of one or more impeachable offenses, but judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, profit, or trust, in this State, but the party impeached, whether convicted or acquitted, shall nevertheless be liable to prosecution and punishment according to law. No officer shall exercise his or her official duties after he or she shall have been impeached and notified thereof, until he or she shall have been acquitted.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 14 (1875);

Amended 1972, Laws 1971, LB 126, sec. 1;

Amended 1986, Laws 1986, LR 318, sec. 1.

An impeachment trial is conducted as a civil proceeding, and the standard of proof for a conviction of impeachment is clear and convincing evidence. Nebraska Legislature on behalf of State v. Hergert, 271 Neb. 976, 720 N.W.2d 372 (2006).

The Nebraska Supreme Court's role as fact finder is limited to finding whether the Legislature has shown by clear and convincing evidence that an officer is guilty of one or more impeachable offenses. Nebraska Legislature on behalf of State v. Hergert, 271 Neb. 976, 720 N.W.2d 372 (2006).

This provision limits the Nebraska Supreme Court's judgment to removal from office and disqualification to hold other state offices. This provision specifically provides that the party impeached, whether convicted or acquitted, shall nevertheless be liable to prosecution and punishment according to law. Thus, the Nebraska Constitution explicitly provides that a conviction of impeachment is not the same as a criminal conviction and that impeachment sanctions cannot rise to the level of criminal punishment. Because criminal conviction is not at stake in an impeachment proceeding, a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof is not required. Nebraska Legislature on behalf of State v. Hergert, 271 Neb. 976, 720 N.W.2d 372 (2006).

An impeachment must be tried by the Supreme Court. State v. Douglas, 217 Neb. 199, 349 N.W.2d 870 (1984).

The effect of this provision is to require the concurrence of five or more judges to convict on any count of an impeachable offense. State v. Douglas, 217 Neb. 199, 349 N.W.2d 870 (1984).

A constitutional officer can only be removed by impeachment. Laverty v. Cochran, 132 Neb. 118, 271 N.W. 354 (1936).

Only method of removing county judge is by impeachment under this section. Conroy v. Hallowell, 94 Neb. 794, 144 N.W. 895 (1913).

Impeachment is essentially criminal prosecution and accused must be proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. State v. Hastings, 37 Neb. 96, 55 N.W. 774 (1893).

Authority to present other or amended articles of impeachment rests along with Legislature, and power to impeach cannot be delegated. State v. Leese, 37 Neb. 92, 55 N.W. 798 (1893).

Power of impeachment is exclusively conferred upon the Legislature and either one of two judgments can be pronounced, removal from office or removal and disqualification to hold office. Impeachment will not lie after term of office has expired. State v. Hill, 37 Neb. 80, 55 N.W. 794 (1893).

III-18 Local or special laws prohibited.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-18

Local or special laws prohibited.

The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following cases, that is to say:

For granting divorces.

Changing the names of persons or places.

Laying out, opening altering and working roads or highways.

Vacating roads, Town plats, streets, alleys, and public grounds.

Locating or changing County seats.

Regulating County and Township offices.

Regulating the practice of Courts of Justice.

Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of Justices of the Peace, Police Magistrates and Constables.

Providing for changes of venue in civil and criminal cases.

Incorporating Cities, Towns and Villages, or changing or amending the charter of any Town, City, or Village.

Providing for the election of Officers in Townships, incorporated Towns or Cities.

Summoning or empaneling Grand or Petit Juries.

Providing for the bonding of cities, towns, precincts, school districts or other municipalities.

Providing for the management of Public Schools.

The opening and conducting of any election, or designating the place of voting.

The sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors, or others under disability.

The protection of game or fish.

Chartering or licensing ferries, or toll bridges, remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures, creating, increasing and decreasing fees, percentage or allowances of public officers, during the term for which said officers are elected or appointed.

Changing the law of descent.

Granting to any corporation, association, or individual, the right to lay down railroad tracks, or amending existing charters for such purpose.

Granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise whatever; Provided, that notwithstanding any other provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature shall have authority to separately define and classify loans and installment sales, to establish maximum rates within classifications of loans or installment sales which it establishes, and to regulate with respect thereto. In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 15 (1875);

Amended 1964, Laws 1965, (Appendix), Seventy-fourth Extraordinary Session, 1963, c. 3, sec. 1, p. 1921.

1. General

2. Classification

3. Valid legislation

4. Invalid legislation

5. Miscellaneous

1. General

Generally, a class of property owners in a certain geographic area cannot form a closed class. Dowd Grain Co. v. County of Sarpy, 291 Neb. 620, 867 N.W.2d 599 (2015).

A “closed class” refers to when a legislative body limits a law to a present condition, with no opportunity for the numbers of the class to increase. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).

A legislative act constitutes special legislation in violation of the Constitution of Nebraska if (1) it creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) it creates a permanently closed class. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).

A special legislation analysis focuses on a legislative body’s purpose in creating a challenged class and asks if there is a substantial difference of circumstances to suggest the expediency of diverse legislation; the Constitution of Nebraska’s prohibition on special legislation aims to prevent legislation that arbitrarily benefits a special class. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).

Uniformity of laws is required in order to prevent granting to any person, or class of persons, the privileges or immunities which do not belong to all persons; it is because the legislative process lacks the safeguards of due process and the tradition of impartiality which restrain the courts from using their powers to dispense special favors that such constitutional prohibitions against special legislation were enacted. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).

A legislative act constitutes special legislation if (1) it creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) it creates a permanently closed class. D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 676, 829 N.W.2d 105 (2013).

A legislative act constitutes special legislation, violative of this provision, if it (1) creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) creates a permanently closed class. City of Ralston v. Balka, 247 Neb. 773, 530 N.W.2d 594 (1995).

A legislative act can violate this provision as special legislation (1) by creating a totally arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) by creating a permanently closed class. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal., 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991).

A legislative act can violate this provision as special legislation in one of two ways: (1) by creating a totally arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification, or (2) by creating a permanently closed class. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).

In Nebraska, both equal protection and the prohibition against special legislation emanate from this provision, however the test of validity under each is different. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).

This provision concerns itself with disparate treatment in much the same manner as does the language of U.S. Const. amend. XIV, which prohibits a state from making or enforcing any law which denies any person within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws." Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566 (1989).

Prohibitions in this section are confined to specific cases mentioned, and Legislature may legislate upon any subject not therein prohibited. Stewart v. Barton, 91 Neb. 96, 135 N.W. 381 (1912).

Special privilege is right, power, franchise, immunity, or privilege granted to, or vested in, a person or class of persons to exclusion of others and in derogation of common rights. City of Plattsmouth v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 80 Neb. 460, 114 N.W. 588 (1908).

It is for Legislature to determine as to applicability of general law and propriety of special law. Weston v. Ryan, 70 Neb. 211, 97 N.W. 347 (1903).

Determination of whether act is general or special depends upon substance of act, not its form. State ex rel. Wheeler v. Stuht, 52 Neb. 209, 71 N.W. 941 (1897).

This section is not restriction upon powers of Legislature over subject involved, but rather limitation in respect to manner of exercise of power. Smiley v. MacDonald, 42 Neb. 5, 60 N.W. 355 (1894).

If law is general in terms and restricted to no particular locality, and operates equally upon all of a group of objects, it is not special law. Hunzinger v. State, 39 Neb. 653, 58 N.W. 194 (1894).

No special law can be enacted where general law can be made applicable. In re House Roll 284, 31 Neb. 505, 48 N.W. 275 (1891).

2. Classification

Legislative classifications must be real and not illusive; they cannot be based on distinctions without a substantial difference, and the distinctive treatment must bear some reasonable relation to the legitimate objectives and purposes of the legislative act. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).

The Legislature has broad discretion to make statutory classifications, but its discretion is not unlimited; the Constitution of Nebraska prohibits it from making arbitrary classifications that favor select persons or objects while excluding others that are not substantially different in circumstance in relation to an act’s purpose. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).

To be valid under the Constitution of Nebraska, a legislative classification must rest upon some reason of public policy, some substantial difference in circumstances, which would naturally suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation regarding the objects to be classified. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).

When the Legislature confers privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from many who are standing in the same relation to the privileges, without reasonable distinction or substantial difference, then the statute in question has resulted in the kind of improper discrimination prohibited by the Constitution of Nebraska. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).

A legislative body’s distinctive treatment of a class is proper if the class has some reasonable distinction from other subjects of a like general character. The distinction must bear some reasonable relation to the legitimate objectives and purposes of the legislative act. D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 676, 829 N.W.2d 105 (2013).

Legislative classifications must be real and not illusive; they cannot be based on distinctions without a substantial difference. The question is always whether the things or persons classified by the legislative act form by themselves a proper and legitimate class concerning the purpose of the act. D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 676, 829 N.W.2d 105 (2013)

To be valid, a legislative classification must be based upon some reason of public policy, some substantial difference in circumstances, that would naturally suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation regarding the objects to be classified. D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 676, 829 N.W.2d 105 (2013).

A classification separating out commercial businesses or occupations as distinct from the use by the general public is a reasonable classification. Anthony, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 283 Neb. 868, 813 N.W.2d 467 (2012).

A classification which limits the application of the law to a present condition, and leaves no room or opportunity for an increase in the numbers of the class by future growth or development, is special. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).

The term "class legislation" is a characterization of legislation in contravention of this provision. It is that which makes improper discrimination by conferring privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons standing in the same relation to the privileges, without reasonable distinction or substantial difference. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).

A legislative classification must operate uniformly on all within a class which is reasonable. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 357, 466 N.W.2d 461 (1991).

The Legislature may, for the purpose of legislating, classify persons, places, objects, or subjects, but such classification must rest upon some difference in situation or circumstance which, in reason, calls for distinctive legislation for the class. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 357, 466 N.W.2d 461 (1991).

The Legislature may classify persons under this section as long as, absent implication of a fundamental right or suspect classification, the categorization has a rational basis. Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566 (1989).

Constitution recognizes that villages and cities are separate and distinct. Hueftle v. Eustis Cemetery Assn., 171 Neb. 293, 106 N.W.2d 400 (1960).

Arbitrary classification may result in special legislation. United Community Services v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 162 Neb. 786, 77 N.W.2d 576 (1956).

Classification according to population is permitted where real and substantial differences exist. Dorrance v. County of Douglas, 149 Neb. 685, 32 N.W.2d 202 (1948).

Classification of business or property for taxation can be permitted only if classification is reasonable and the tax operates uniformly upon all members of the class. Thorin v. Burke, 146 Neb. 94, 18 N.W.2d 664 (1945).

If a law is general and operates uniformly and equally on all brought within the relation and circumstances for which it provides, it is not a local or special law in the constitutional sense. Bauer v. State Game, Forestation & Parks Commission, 138 Neb. 436, 293 N.W. 282 (1940).

Legislature may classify persons, corporations and property for purposes of legislation, but classification must rest upon real differences in situation and circumstances of members of the class relative to subject of legislation, and the law must operate uniformly on every member of class so designated. State ex rel. Taylor v. Hall, 129 Neb. 669, 262 N.W. 835 (1935).

Classification must be reasonable. Althaus v. State, 94 Neb. 780, 144 N.W. 799 (1913); Livingston Loan & Building Assn. v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200, 68 N.W. 375 (1896).

If statute operates equally upon all persons or objects of a class so constituted, it is enough. Dougherty v. Kubat, 67 Neb. 269, 93 N.W. 317 (1903).

Statute must be general and uniform throughout the state, and operate alike on all persons and localities of a class reasonably constituted with reference to relations and circumstances provided for. Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N.W. 306 (1902), affirmed on rehearing 66 Neb. 273, 96 N.W. 212 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 66 Neb. 276, 98 N.W. 1075 (1904).

If law is general and uniform throughout the state, operating alike on all persons and localities of a class, it is not objectionable. Livingston Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200, 68 N.W. 375 (1896).

Classification of cities into classes and subclasses for purposes of legislation does not violate Constitution. State ex rel. Jones v. Graham, 16 Neb. 74, 19 N.W. 470 (1884).

3. Valid legislation

The prohibition in this provision against the Legislature's granting divorces is not implicated by a statutory scheme of general application to all persons seeking dissolution decrees. Dycus v. Dycus, 307 Neb. 426, 949 N.W.2d 357 (2020).

A zoning ordinance's exemption for property in a fixed geographic area was not special legislation, because it did not create a closed class nor did it create an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification. Dowd Grain Co. v. County of Sarpy, 291 Neb. 620, 867 N.W.2d 599 (2015).

The provisions of section 79-487 authorizing the transportation of nonprofit private school students on public school buses do not violate the provisions of this section in that they extend transportation benefits to nonprofit private school students on exactly the same basis and under the same regulations governing the transportation of public school students. State ex rel. Bouc v. School Dist. of City of Lincoln, 211 Neb. 731, 320 N.W.2d 472 (1982).

Section 25-222 relating to limitation of actions for professional negligence does not violate this section. Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 244 N.W.2d 201 (1976).

Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act including one year notice of claim requirements and two year limitation for bringing action held constitutional. Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 195 Neb. 703, 240 N.W.2d 339 (1976).

A bill which treats all those who exceed the fifty-five miles per hour interstate highway limit by no more than ten miles per hour, in different manner, as to fines and costs, than those in other categories is not special legislation. State ex rel. Douglas v. Gradwohl, 194 Neb. 745, 235 N.W.2d 854 (1975).

The partial exemption from taxation of classes of property specified in section 77-202.25, is not unreasonable, objectionable as discriminatory, or violative hereof. Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 (1974).

Free port law does not violate constitutional provisions for uniformity and against special privileges. Norden Laboratories, Inc. v. County Board of Equalization, 189 Neb. 437, 203 N.W.2d 152 (1973).

Cigarette Tax Act, sections 77-2602 et seq., 1971 Supp., is not void for unreasonable classification, nor is it a special law. Sandberg v. State, 188 Neb. 335, 196 N.W.2d 501 (1972).

The affected class defined in L.B. 1003, Eighty-second Legislature, First Session, sections 23-2601 to 23-2612 is valid and the act is not a local or special law. Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972).

Statute abrogating right of action against auctioneers under conditions stated does not violate this section. State Securities Co. v. Norfolk Livestock Sales Co., Inc., 187 Neb. 446, 191 N.W.2d 614 (1971).

Statute authorizing transfer of land for school purposes was not void as special legislation. Kaup v. Sweet, 187 Neb. 226, 188 N.W.2d 891 (1971).

Law prohibiting usury defenses by corporation not violative of this section. Snyder v. Woxo, Inc., 185 Neb. 545, 177 N.W.2d 281 (1970).

Prohibiting retailer from accepting credit for purchase of beer from wholesaler while permitting acceptance of credit on purchase of liquor is constitutional. Tom & Jerry, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 183 Neb. 410, 160 N.W.2d 232 (1968).

Act of Legislature authorizing cities of primary class to annex contiguous or adjacent lands was not local or special law. Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 182 Neb. 459, 155 N.W.2d 444 (1968).

The 1964 amendment to this section was designed and intended to authorize legislation regulating installment sales. Engelmeyer v. Murphy, 180 Neb. 295, 142 N.W.2d 342 (1966).

Act regulating the profession of engineers and architects sustained as constitutional against claim of discrimination in classification. State ex rel. Meyer v. Knutson, 178 Neb. 375, 133 N.W.2d 577 (1965).

State Employees Retirement Act did not constitute an unreasonable classification and was not unconstitutional as special legislation. Gossman v. State Employees Retirement System, 177 Neb. 326, 129 N.W.2d 97 (1964).

Statute authorizing transfer of land for school purposes was not special legislation in violation of this section. McDonald v. Rentfrow, 176 Neb. 796, 127 N.W.2d 480 (1964).

Statute providing for limited access to interstate highway was not special legislation. Fougeron v. County of Seward, 174 Neb. 753, 119 N.W.2d 298 (1963).

Brand Inspection Act is not special legislation within meaning of this section. Satterfield v. State, 172 Neb. 275, 109 N.W.2d 415 (1961).

Statute providing for sewer use charge in metropolitan cities did not violate this section. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 609, 107 N.W.2d 397 (1961).

Parking Authority Law did not violate constitutional prohibition against special legislation. Omaha Parking Authority v. City of Omaha, 163 Neb. 97, 77 N.W.2d 862 (1956).

Installment Loan Act was not a local or special law regulating interest on money. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956).

A statute which becomes operative within thirty days from the date it takes effect as to existing counties in the class, but specifies no machinery by which it shall become immediately operative in counties subsequently entering the class, is not violative of this section. Midwest Popcorn Co. v. Johnson, 152 Neb. 867, 43 N.W.2d 174 (1950).

Statute providing for appointment of district judges as appraisers in condemnation proceeding is reasonable and not inimical to this section. May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W.2d 448 (1945).

Requirement that candidate for office of member of State Railway Commission be not less than thirty years of age does not violate this section. State ex rel. Quinn v. Marsh, 141 Neb. 436, 3 N.W.2d 892 (1942).

Act creating Nebraska Advertising Commission did not violate this section. Power Oil Co. v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 827, 295 N.W. 805 (1941).

Acts creating housing authorities was not special legislation. Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451 (1940).

Penalties for nonpayment of taxes are punitive in their nature and their remission by Legislature is not forbidden as arbitrary class legislation. Tukey v. Douglas County, 133 Neb. 732, 277 N.W. 57 (1938).

Statute providing for condemnation of public utilities is not special act regulating courts prohibited hereunder. City of Mitchell v. Western Public Service Co., 124 Neb. 248, 246 N.W. 484 (1933).

Statute providing venue of actions was not in violation of this section. Schwarting v. Ogram, 123 Neb. 76, 242 N.W. 273 (1932).

Act according priority to classes of claims in bank receiverships was not violative of prohibition against special and class legislation. State ex rel. Sorensen v. First State Bank of Alliance, 122 Neb. 510, 240 N.W. 750 (1932); State ex rel. Sorensen v. First State Bank of Alliance, 122 Neb. 502, 240 N.W. 747 (1932).

Law permitting fencing with gates across highway was not unconstitutional as class, local, or special legislation. McFadden v. Denter, 118 Neb. 38, 223 N.W. 462 (1929).

Law relating to testing cattle for tuberculosis does not violate provision forbidding special law where general law applicable. State ex rel. Spillman v. Wallace, 117 Neb. 588, 221 N.W. 712 (1928).

Law adding ministers to classes exempted from Railroad Anti-Pass Law was not special legislation. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 112 Neb. 248, 199 N.W. 534 (1924).

Law requiring Board of Regents to manufacture and sell hog cholera serum, at cost, to farmers and swine growers, was valid. Fisher v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 108 Neb. 666, 189 N.W. 161 (1922).

Law authorizing counties of 150,000 or more to issue bonds and levy tax to rebuild courthouse destroyed by fire or riot was valid. Cunningham v. Douglas County, 104 Neb. 405, 177 N.W. 742 (1920).

Law restricting number of candidates appearing on ballot at primary election for delegates to constitutional convention was valid. Baker v. Moorhead, 103 Neb. 811, 174 N.W. 430 (1919).

Law relating to state mineral land leases was valid. Briggs v. Neville, 103 Neb. 1, 170 N.W. 188 (1918).

Prohibiting saloons within two and one half miles of military posts is valid. Rushart v. Crippen, 99 Neb. 682, 157 N.W. 611 (1916).

Law fixing maximum rate of interest and brokerage fee for money lenders was valid. Althaus v. State, 99 Neb. 465, 156 N.W. 1038 (1916).

Law permitting teaching of foreign languages in schools was valid. State ex rel. Thayer v. School Dist. of Nebraska City, 99 Neb. 338, 156 N.W. 641 (1916).

Law regulating hours of service for firemen, but excepting chief and assistant chief was valid. State ex rel. Rea v. City Council of Lincoln, 98 Neb. 634, 154 N.W. 217 (1915).

Law authorizing county board to pay for bridge material, though claim had previously been adjudged invalid in court, was valid. Gibson v. Sherman County, 97 Neb. 79, 149 N.W. 107 (1914).

Act regulating practice of medicine was valid. Mathews v. Hedlund, 82 Neb. 825, 119 N.W. 17 (1908).

Act prohibiting common labor on Sunday was valid. In re Caldwell, 82 Neb. 544, 118 N.W. 133 (1908).

Act relating to taxation of building and loan associations as a class was valid. Nebraska Central Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County, 78 Neb. 472, 111 N.W. 147 (1907).

Act providing for election of city officers on particular day was valid. State ex rel. Pentzer v. Malone, 74 Neb. 645, 105 N.W. 893 (1905).

Act giving irrigation companies right to prior appropriation in water, does not contravene Constitution prohibiting special privileges. Farmers Canal Co. v. Frank, 72 Neb. 136, 100 N.W. 286 (1904).

Act regulating hours of employment of females in manufacturing and mechanical establishments was valid. Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N.W. 421 (1902).

Act providing for Tax Commissioner in city of specified class was valid. State ex rel. Prout v. Aitken, 62 Neb. 428, 87 N.W. 153 (1901).

General law, though affecting but single county, is not for that reason void as special legislation. State ex rel. Douglas County v. Frank, 61 Neb. 679, 85 N.W. 956 (1901).

Permitting prosecution by information in one county and indictment in another is valid. Dinsmore v. State, 61 Neb. 418, 85 N.W. 445 (1901).

Act providing for recovery of attorney's fees to be treated as costs in action against fire insurance company was valid. Insurance Co. of North America v. Bachler, 44 Neb. 549, 62 N.W. 911 (1895).

Ordinance granting exclusive contract for removal of garbage was valid. Coombs v. MacDonald, 43 Neb. 632, 62 N.W. 41 (1895).

Statute allowing reasonable attorney's fee to plaintiff, to be taxed as costs, in suit on insurance policy covering real property was valid. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U.S. 301 (1903).

Statute relative to practice of veterinary medicine and surgery was not discriminatory hereunder. Peet Stock Remedy Co. v. McMullen, 32 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1929).

Cedar Rust Law was not special legislation. Upton v. Felton, 4 F.Supp. 585 (D. Neb. 1932).

4. Invalid legislation

The amendment of anti-attachment statutes to allow a civil judgment to attach to the distributed retirement assets of State Patrol officers and other public employees who had committed six specified crimes constituted special legislation in violation of the Constitution of Nebraska. The Legislature’s attempt to create very limited exceptions to an absolute privilege from attachment of a public employee’s retirement assets resulted in a law that benefited only a select group of victims and arbitrarily protected public employees who were convicted of comparably serious crimes, yet retained an absolute privilege from attachment of their retirement assets because their crimes were not included in the amendment. J.M. v. Hobbs, 288 Neb. 546, 849 N.W.2d 480 (2014).

Act providing for the reimbursement of funds to depositors of failed industrial loan and investment companies violated this provision. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).

Section 60-1701 contains classifications and exceptions which are unreasonable, arbitrary, and unrelated to the public interest, and is therefore unconstitutional and void in violation of this section. State v. Edmunds, 211 Neb. 380, 318 N.W.2d 859 (1982).

Provisions of legislation creating the Local Government Revenue Fund were unconstitutional because classifications created by the act were arbitrary and unreasonable closed classifications in that they prevented a county from moving from one classification to another and the legislation was, therefore, a special law as to each of the state's counties. State ex rel. Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W.2d 181 (1980).

An act which permits public grants to students, which must be used in private institutions in this state, is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 219 N.W.2d 726 (1974).

To hold that city of first class without home rule charter may be annexed but one with home rule charter could not be dissolved would violate this section. City of Millard v. City of Omaha, 185 Neb. 617, 177 N.W.2d 576 (1970).

Act which fixed value of agricultural income-producing machinery and equipment as those used by taxpayer in determining federal income tax violated this section. State ex rel. Meyer v. McNeil, 185 Neb. 586, 177 N.W.2d 596 (1970).

Cited legislation violated this section by creating permanently closed class and by being totally arbitrary and unreasonable in method of classification. City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 175 N.W.2d 74 (1970).

Amendment extending time for appeal under section 77-510, R.R.S.1943, after appeal time had expired violated this section. In re Valuation and Equalization, 182 Neb. 621, 156 N.W.2d 728 (1968).

Provisions of Grid System Act constituted a grant of special privileges and an unlawful splitting of a class, and was unconstitutional. Wittler v. Baumgartner, 180 Neb. 446, 144 N.W.2d 62 (1966).

Penalty for failure to return property for taxation was special law in violation of this section. Bachus v. Swanson, 179 Neb. 1, 136 N.W.2d 189 (1965).

Legislative Bill 16 of 1963 Special Session violated this section and was unconstitutional in its entirety. Kometscher v. Wade, 177 Neb. 299, 128 N.W.2d 781 (1964).

Statute changing penalty relating to agreements for sale of personal property upon an installment basis held to be special legislation in violation of this section. Davis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 176 Neb. 865, 127 N.W.2d 907 (1964).

Designation of retail installment sales contracts as a class, in fixing maximum interest permitted to be charged, was special legislation inhibited by this section. Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W.2d 844 (1963).

Installment Sales Act of 1959 was unconstitutional because it fixed different interest rates on automobiles according to age. Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963).

Amendment to Installment Loan Act creating four classes as to which different penalties were applicable was violative of this section. Thompson v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp., 169 Neb. 377, 99 N.W.2d 761 (1959).

Statute requiring reporting of property in warehouse for taxation and excepting household goods was violative of this section. United States Cold Storage Corp. v. Stolinski, 168 Neb. 513, 96 N.W.2d 408 (1959).

Legislature cannot create liability on part of state for fraud of its officers, and waive statute of limitations for benefit of few within a class. Bordy v. State, 142 Neb. 714, 7 N.W.2d 632 (1943).

Where legislation is of state wide concern, a legislative act applying to part of cities within designated class and not applying to other cities within the same class having a home rule charter violates this section. Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942).

An act of Legislature attempting to waive sovereignty of the state and create liability on state's part in favor of an individual for negligence of state's servants and agents is a special law in contravention of this section. Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 279 N.W. 482 (1938).

Act providing for annual tax on fire insurance companies based on gross premiums received by each for insurance written within state was invalid because it did not operate equally and uniformly upon all members of class. Continental Ins. Co. v. Smrha, 131 Neb. 791, 270 N.W. 122 (1936).

Act extending time in which to pay taxes was invalid as based on arbitrary classification. Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. 439, 268 N.W. 317 (1936).

Act exempting irrigation companies from building bridges over ditches crossing public roads was discriminatory and void. State ex rel. County of Dawson v. Dawson County Irr. Co., 125 Neb. 836, 252 N.W. 320 (1934).

Law authorizing counties of more than 150,000 to use portion of gas tax to retire highway construction bonds was invalid, as special legislation. State ex rel. Cone v. Bauman, 120 Neb. 77, 231 N.W. 693 (1930).

Statute purporting to validate proceedings to form light and power districts was invalid as special legislation. Anderson v. Lehmkuhl, 119 Neb. 451, 229 N.W. 773 (1930).

Law regulating public dances on Sunday, but excepting metropolitan cities from its operation, was invalid special legislation. Galloway v. Wolfe, 117 Neb. 824, 223 N.W. 1 (1929).

Proviso authorizing irrigation districts under certain circumstances, to require landowners to construct and maintain laterals and supervise water distribution, was prohibited special legislation. State ex rel. Campbell v. Gering Irr. Dist., 114 Neb. 329, 207 N.W. 525 (1926).

Law imposing liability on counties for destruction of personal property of officers in public buildings by riotous mobs, was void. Court intimates that it would also be void as special legislation. Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 191 N.W. 337 (1922).

Classification of counties for purpose of relocating county seats, if not general and cannot be applied to all counties, is void as special legislation. State ex rel. Conkling v. Kelso, 92 Neb. 628, 139 N.W. 226 (1912).

Statute operating upon county of specified population for particular year was void as special legislation. State v. Scott, 70 Neb. 685, 100 N.W. 812 (1904).

Act fixing day's work at eight hours for labor but exempting farmers or domestic labor, was void as special legislation. Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 59 N.W. 362 (1894).

5. Miscellaneous

A court may review the legislative history of a statute or ordinance when considering a special legislation challenge. D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 676, 829 N.W.2d 105 (2013).

Requiring registration of mobile homes and assessing a reasonable fee to defray cost of registration and inspection, if any, does not violate constitutional provision requiring uniform and proportionate taxation of personal property. Gates v. Howell, 204 Neb. 256, 282 N.W.2d 22 (1979).

Claim of unconstitutionality of city ordinance regulating labor relations as special law raised but not decided. Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 131 N.W.2d 609 (1964).

Power to regulate interest on money may not be done by local or special law. State Securities Co. v. Ley, 177 Neb. 251, 128 N.W.2d 766 (1964).

Waiver or remission of penalties by a local or special law is prohibited. Creigh v. Larsen, 171 Neb. 317, 106 N.W.2d 187 (1960).

State may enjoin threatened diversion of realty from its original use where it was granted by state to a church for religious purposes. State ex rel. Hunter v. Home Savings & Loan Assn., 137 Neb. 231, 288 N.W. 691 (1939).

Regulation of Nebraska Liquor Control Commission providing that opening and closing hours for sale of beer in rural districts shall be same as those fixed by ordinance in nearest incorporated city or village was valid. Griffin v. Gass, 133 Neb. 56, 274 N.W. 193 (1937).

Refusal of State Railway Commission to grant authority to operate motor buses to a second common carrier in Omaha was not inhibited by this section. Furstenberg v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 132 Neb. 562, 272 N.W. 756 (1937).

III-19 Compensation; increase when; extra compensation to public officers and contractors prohibited; retirement benefits; adjustment.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-19

Compensation; increase when; extra compensation to public officers and contractors prohibited; retirement benefits; adjustment.

The Legislature shall never grant any extra compensation to any public officer, agent, or servant after the services have been rendered nor to any contractor after the contract has been entered into, except that retirement benefits of retired public officers and employees may be adjusted to reflect changes in the cost of living and wage levels that have occurred subsequent to the date of retirement.

The compensation of any public officer, including any officer whose compensation is fixed by the Legislature, shall not be increased or diminished during his or her term of office, except that when there are members elected or appointed to the Legislature or the judiciary, or officers elected or appointed to a board or commission having more than one member, and the terms of such members commence and end at different times, the compensation of all members of the Legislature, of the judiciary, or of such board or commission may be increased or diminished at the beginning of the full term of any member thereof.

Nothing in this section shall prevent local governing bodies from reviewing and adjusting vested pension benefits periodically as prescribed by ordinance.

The surviving spouse of any retired public officer, agent, or servant, who has retired under a pension plan or system, shall be considered as having pensionable status and shall be entitled to the same benefits which may, at any time, be provided for or available to spouses of other public officers, agents, or servants who have retired under such pension plan or system at a later date, and such benefits shall not be prohibited by the restrictions of this section or of Article XIII, section 3 of the Constitution of Nebraska.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 16 (1875);

Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 10;

Amended 1952, Laws 1951, c. 159, sec. 1, p. 634;

Amended 1968, Laws 1967, c. 322, sec. 1, p. 856;

Amended 1972, Laws 1972, LB 1414, sec. 1;

Amended 1978, Laws 1978, LB 739, sec. 1;

Amended 2000, Laws 2000, LR 291CA, sec. 1.

1. Salary increase

2. Extra compensation

3. Miscellaneous

1. Salary increase

A resolution of a county board fixing the salaries of elected county officers at an amount plus an annual adjustment for changes in the cost of living as determined by an independent federal agency, does not violate this Article and section of the Nebraska Constitution. Shepoka v. Knopik, 201 Neb. 780, 272 N.W.2d 364 (1978).

Laws 1971, L.B. 743, was not effective as to compensation for county attorney whose term had started before it was adopted. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Holscher, 193 Neb. 729, 230 N.W.2d 75 (1975).

Act creating State Employees Retirement System did not violate this section. Gossman v. State Employees Retirement System, 177 Neb. 326, 129 N.W.2d 97 (1964).

Salary of executive officer could not be increased during term. State ex rel. Laughlin v. Johnson, 156 Neb. 671, 57 N.W.2d 531 (1953).

Increase or decrease in compensation resulting from a change in population is not prohibited by this section. Hamilton v. Foster, 155 Neb. 89, 50 N.W.2d 542 (1951).

Increase in salaries of county commissioners during their term of office was prohibited by this section. Ramsey v. County of Gage, 153 Neb. 24, 43 N.W.2d 593 (1950).

Legislature has authority to increase salary of officer during term whose compensation has not previously been fixed by legislative enactment. State ex rel. Johnson v. Marsh, 149 Neb. 1, 29 N.W.2d 799 (1947).

Statute providing for garnishment of officers and employees of state and its subdivisions does not violate provision prohibiting increase or diminution of compensation of public officers during term of office. Department of Banking v. Foe, 136 Neb. 422, 286 N.W. 264 (1939).

Action of a county board in determining population of a county as a basis for determining salaries of county officers, without notice and opportunity to such officers to be heard was void. Shambaugh v. Buffalo County, 133 Neb. 46, 274 N.W. 207 (1937).

Salary of any public officer, whether fixed by Constitution or statute, cannot be diminished during term. State ex rel. Day v. Hall, 129 Neb. 699, 262 N.W. 850 (1935); State ex rel. Taylor v. Hall, 129 Neb. 669, 262 N.W. 835 (1935).

Salary of officer created by Constitution could not be diminished during his term. State ex rel. Randall v. Hall, 125 Neb. 236, 249 N.W. 756 (1933).

2. Extra compensation

When the services for which compensation is granted are rendered prior to the date on which the terms of compensation are determined, the benefits awarded are not compensation but are a gratuity, and the payment of such benefits violates this provision. It follows that when the services for which compensation is paid are rendered after the date on which the terms of compensation are established, the benefits awarded are not a gratuity, and the payment of such benefits does not violate this provision. City of Omaha v. City of Elkhorn, 276 Neb. 70, 752 N.W.2d 137 (2008).

The prohibition contained in this section of the Nebraska Constitution is not applicable to the compensation paid to a jailer, even if the duties of jailer are performed by the sheriff. State ex rel. Landanger v. Madison County, 213 Neb. 33, 327 N.W.2d 93 (1982).

Law authorizing payment to county treasurer of 25 cent fee for each applicant for motor vehicle operator's license was not void as increasing salary. Mehrens v. Bauman, 120 Neb. 110, 231 N.W. 701 (1930).

Legislator can receive from state for services as member, or member of committee, only compensation provided by Constitution. In re Appeal of Wilkins, 116 Neb. 748, 219 N.W. 9 (1928).

Pension granted to firemen in municipality is not gratuity nor extra compensation within Constitution. State ex rel. Haberlan v. Love, 89 Neb. 149, 131 N.W. 196 (1911).

3. Miscellaneous

Prohibition against a gratuity of compensation after services rendered applies both to the state and all political subdivisions thereof. Retired City Gov. Emp. Club of Omaha v. City of Omaha Emp. Ret. Sys., 199 Neb. 507, 260 N.W.2d 472 (1977).

Judges of the district court of this state are members of a court within meaning of this section. Garrotto v. McManus, 185 Neb. 644, 177 N.W.2d 570 (1970).

Deduction from salary for retirement pay during existing term of judge was violation of this section. Wilson v. Marsh, 162 Neb. 237, 75 N.W.2d 723 (1956).

Office of police judge is constitutional office within this section, and period of an officer holding over, together with regular term, constitutes one term. State ex rel. Gordon v. Moores, 61 Neb. 9, 84 N.W. 399 (1900).

Before 1920 amendment this section applied alone to those officers whose offices were created by the Constitution and did not apply to office of county commissioner. Douglas County v. Timme, 32 Neb. 272, 49 N.W. 266 (1891).

III-20 Salt springs, coal, oil, minerals; alienation prohibited.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-20

Salt springs, coal, oil, minerals; alienation prohibited.

The salt springs, coal, oil, minerals, or other natural resources on or contained in the land belonging to the state shall never be alienated; but provision may be made by law for the leasing or development of the same.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 17 (1875);

Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, No. 11.

Phrase all mineral rights in challenged statute held declaratory of this section. State ex rel. Belker v. Board of Educational Lands & Funds, 184 Neb. 621, 171 N.W.2d 156 (1969).

Prohibition against alienation of mineral rights in state educational lands did not apply to sale made prior to 1920. Stoller v. State, 171 Neb. 93, 105 N.W.2d 852 (1960).

Object of this section was not to prevent alienation of salt springs where brine yield is of no commercial value and state may convey with reservation that springs shall belong to state if they become commercially valuable. State ex rel. Central Realty & Investment Co. v. McMullen, 119 Neb. 739, 230 N.W. 677 (1930).

Board of Educational Lands and Funds has no jurisdiction over disposal of saline lands. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Neville, 102 Neb. 817, 170 N.W. 176 (1918); McMurtry v. Engelhardt, 5 Neb. Unof. 271, 98 N.W. 40 (1904).

III-21 Donation of state lands prohibited; when.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-21

Donation of state lands prohibited; when.

Lands under control of the State shall never be donated to railroad companies, private corporations or individuals.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 18 (1875).

Industrial Development Act of 1961 was sustained as constitutional under constitutional amendment notwithstanding this section. State ex rel. Meyer v. County of Lancaster, 173 Neb. 195, 113 N.W.2d 63 (1962).

III-22 Appropriations for state; deficiencies; bills for pay of members and officials.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-22

Appropriations for state; deficiencies; bills for pay of members and officials.

Each Legislature shall make appropriations for the expenses of the Government. And whenever it is deemed necessary to make further appropriations for deficiencies, the same shall require a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to the Legislature. Bills making appropriations for the pay of members and officers of the Legislature, and for the salaries of the officers of the Government, shall contain no provision on any other subject.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 19 (1875);

Amended 1972, Laws 1971, LB 139, sec. 1.

1. Necessity of appropriation

2. Subject of appropriation

3. Continuing appropriation

4. Miscellaneous

1. Necessity of appropriation

Before a state warrant may issue, there must have been an appropriation made by the Legislature for its payment. Fischer v. Marsh, 113 Neb. 153, 202 N.W. 422 (1925).

Appropriation for one biennium cannot be used to supply deficiency of preceding biennium. State ex rel. Western Bridge & Construction Co. v. Marsh, 111 Neb. 185, 196 N.W. 130 (1923).

It is not essential that money be actually drawn during fiscal year, but expenses must have been actually incurred during the period for which appropriation was made. State ex rel. Ledwith v. Brian, 84 Neb. 30, 120 N.W. 916 (1909).

No appropriation will lapse before the end of the first fiscal quarter after adjournment of Legislature unless specifically otherwise directed by act making appropriation. State ex rel. Dales v. Moore, 36 Neb. 579, 54 N.W. 866 (1893).

Unless otherwise limited, the appropriation extends to the end of the first fiscal quarter after the adjournment of the next session of the Legislature. State ex rel. Bullock Mfg. Co. v. Babcock, 22 Neb. 33, 33 N.W. 709 (1887).

2. Subject of appropriation

Sections 77-202.25 to 77-202.33 do not constitute an appropriation and are not violative hereof. Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 (1974).

Imposition of maximum expenditures for personal services on annual basis constitutional. State ex rel. Meyer v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Neb. 490, 176 N.W.2d 920 (1970).

Act which allowed pledging of fees and charges received by the commission beyond the biennium violated this section. State ex rel. Meyer v. Duxbury, 183 Neb. 302, 160 N.W.2d 88 (1968).

Act which pledged future receipts of fees for permits and licenses to hunt, trap, and fish for payment of bonds violated this section. State ex rel. Meyer v. Steen, 183 Neb. 297, 160 N.W.2d 164 (1968).

Bills appropriating salaries for state officers cannot contain provisions on any other subject. This limitation applies to all officers of the state government. State ex rel. Hibbard v. Cornell, 60 Neb. 276, 83 N.W. 72 (1900).

3. Continuing appropriation

Continuing legislative appropriations are prohibited. Rein v. Johnson 149 Neb. 67, 30 N.W.2d 548 (1947).

Warrants may be drawn on special fund originally established as a continuing appropriation without subsequent biennial appropriation. State ex rel. Ridgell v. Hall, 99 Neb. 89, 155 N.W. 228 (1915), affirmed on rehearing 99 Neb. 95, 156 N.W. 16 (1916), overruled in Rein v. Johnson, 149 Neb. 67, 30 N.W.2d 548 (1947).

An appropriation under this section cannot be made to continue for a longer period than the biennium. State ex rel. Norfolk Beet-Sugar Co. v. Moore, 50 Neb. 88, 69 N.W. 373 (1896).

4. Miscellaneous

Attempt to appropriate funds was not an inducing element to passage of remainder of Tax Appraisal Board Act. Midwest Popcorn Co. v. Johnson, 152 Neb. 867, 43 N.W.2d 174 (1950).

Excess of gasoline inspection fees paid without protest or demand for refund, lapsed after each biennium, and after having lapsed, court is without power to determine directly the question of their excessiveness. Power Oil Co. v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 827, 295 N.W. 805 (1941).

III-23 Repealed 1972. Laws 1972, LB 302, sec. 1.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-23

Repealed 1972. Laws 1972, LB 302, sec. 1.

III-24 Games of chance, lotteries, and gift enterprises; restrictions; use of state lottery proceeds; parimutuel wagering on horseraces; bingo games; laws relating to games of chance, applicability.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-24

Games of chance, lotteries, and gift enterprises; restrictions; use of state lottery proceeds; parimutuel wagering on horseraces; bingo games; laws relating to games of chance, applicability.

(1) Except as provided in this section, the Legislature shall not authorize any game of chance or any lottery or gift enterprise when the consideration for a chance to participate involves the payment of money for the purchase of property, services, or a chance or admission ticket or requires an expenditure of substantial effort or time.

(2) The Legislature may authorize and regulate a state lottery pursuant to subsection (3) of this section and other lotteries, raffles, and gift enterprises which are intended solely as business promotions or the proceeds of which are to be used solely for charitable or community betterment purposes without profit to the promoter of such lotteries, raffles, or gift enterprises.

(3)(a) The Legislature may establish a lottery to be operated and regulated by the State of Nebraska. The proceeds of the lottery shall be appropriated by the Legislature for the costs of establishing and maintaining the lottery and for the following purposes, as directed by the Legislature:

(i) The first five hundred thousand dollars after the payment of prizes and operating expenses shall be transferred to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund;

(ii) Forty-four and one-half percent of the money remaining after the payment of prizes and operating expenses and the initial transfer to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund shall be transferred to the Nebraska Environmental Trust Fund to be used as provided in the Nebraska Environmental Trust Act;

(iii) Forty-four and one-half percent of the money remaining after the payment of prizes and operating expenses and the initial transfer to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund shall be used for education as the Legislature may direct;

(iv) Ten percent of the money remaining after the payment of prizes and operating expenses and the initial transfer to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund shall be transferred to the Nebraska State Fair Board if the most populous city within the county in which the fair is located provides matching funds equivalent to ten percent of the funds available for transfer. Such matching funds may be obtained from the city and any other private or public entity, except that no portion of such matching funds shall be provided by the state. If the Nebraska State Fair ceases operations, ten percent of the money remaining after the payment of prizes and operating expenses and the initial transfer to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund shall be transferred to the General Fund; and

(v) One percent of the money remaining after the payment of prizes and operating expenses and the initial transfer to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund shall be transferred to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund.

(b) No lottery game shall be conducted as part of the lottery unless the type of game has been approved by a majority of the members of the Legislature.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit (a) the enactment of laws providing for the licensing and regulation of wagering on the results of horseraces, wherever run, either within or outside of the state, by the parimutuel method, when such wagering is conducted by licensees within a licensed racetrack enclosure or (b) the enactment of laws providing for the licensing and regulation of bingo games conducted by nonprofit associations which have been in existence for a period of five years immediately preceding the application for license, except that bingo games cannot be conducted by agents or lessees of such associations on a percentage basis.

(5) This section shall not apply to any law which is enacted contemporaneously with the adoption of this subsection or at any time thereafter and which provides for the licensing, authorization, regulation, or taxation of all forms of games of chance when such games of chance are conducted by authorized gaming operators within a licensed racetrack enclosure.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 21 (1875);

Amended 1934, Initiative Measure No. 332;

Amended 1958, Initiative Measure No. 302;

Amended 1962, Laws 1961, c. 248, sec. 1, p. 735;

Amended 1968, Laws 1967, c. 307, sec. 1, p. 832;

Amended 1988, Laws 1988, LR 15, sec. 1;

Amended 1992, Laws 1991, LR 24CA, sec. 1;

Amended 2004, Laws 2004, LR 209CA, sec. 1;

Amended 2020, Initiative Measure No. 429.

Nebraska Environmental Trust Act, see section 81-15,167.

This provision plainly requires that parimutuel wagering on horses must be conducted by an entity licensed to do so and must be conducted by licensees at a racetrack enclosure which is licensed to operate horse races. Wagering that occurs in a detached facility, one that is by definition outside a licensed racetrack enclosure, cannot logically occur within a licensed racetrack enclosure as required by this provision. State ex rel. Stenberg v. Douglas Racing Corp., 246 Neb. 901, 524 N.W.2d 61 (1994).

Free replays are things of value and when obtained on a gambling device constitute property. State ex rel. Spire v. Strawberries, Inc., 239 Neb. 1, 473 N.W.2d 428 (1991).

"Proceeds" means net proceeds and "promoter" means only the person or organization legally responsible for operating a lottery, not each employee thereof. State v. City Betterment Corp., 197 Neb. 575, 250 N.W.2d 601 (1977).

Where registration was required to participate in drawing for prize, the element of consideration was present to constitute a lottery. State ex rel. Line v. Grant, 162 Neb. 210, 75 N.W.2d 611 (1956).

Pinball machine was prohibited as game of chance. Baedaro v. Caldwell, 156 Neb. 489, 56 N.W.2d 706 (1953).

III-25 Incidental expenses of state officers; specific appropriations always necessary; warrants for money.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-25

Incidental expenses of state officers; specific appropriations always necessary; warrants for money.

No allowance shall be made for the incidental expenses of any state officer except the same be made by general appropriation and upon an account specifying each item. No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by law, and on the presentation of a warrant issued as the Legislature may direct, and no money shall be diverted from any appropriation made for any purpose or taken from any fund whatever by resolution.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 22 (1875);

Amended 1964, Laws 1963, c. 302, sec. 2(1), p. 894.

1. General appropriation for incidental expenses

2. Specific appropriation

3. Miscellaneous

1. General appropriation for incidental expenses

Funds in state treasury which may be used in payment of claims against state may be withdrawn only pursuant to appropriation by Legislature. Fischer v. Marsh, 113 Neb. 153, 202 N.W. 422 (1925); State ex rel. Pearson v. Cornell, 54 Neb. 647, 75 N.W. 25 (1898); State ex rel. Graham v. Babcock, 18 Neb. 221, 24 N.W. 683 (1885).

State cannot use appropriation for one biennium to meet deficiency for preceding biennium. State ex rel. Western Bridge & Construction Co. v. Marsh, 111 Neb. 185, 196 N.W. 130 (1923).

Appropriation to pay expenses of State Board of Education was sufficient to include appropriation for salary of secretary. State ex rel. Ludden v. Barton, 88 Neb. 576, 130 N.W. 260 (1911).

Appropriations for incidental expenses of state officer in general appropriation must specify each item for which appropriation is made. State ex rel. James v. Babcock, 22 Neb. 38, 33 N.W. 711 (1887).

A specific appropriation is one expressly providing funds for particular purpose. There can be no implied appropriation under the Constitution. State ex rel. Cline v. Wallichs, 15 Neb. 609, 20 N.W. 110 (1884).

Under an appropriation for current expenses of state government, no money may be drawn for expenses of returning prisoners to penitentiary. State ex rel. Nobes v. Wallichs, 15 Neb. 457, 19 N.W. 641 (1884).

2. Specific appropriation

Act itself is sufficient appropriation, at least for current biennium, for expenditure of fees and charges to carry on work of commission. State ex rel. Meyer v. Duxbury, 183 Neb. 302, 160 N.W.2d 88 (1968).

Act providing for refunding of excess grain inspection fees was not in conflict herewith. Bollen v. Price, 129 Neb. 342, 261 N.W. 689 (1935).

Subsequent appropriation of money raised by previous special tax levy amounts to specific appropriation of entire fund. State ex rel. Ledwith v. Searle, 79 Neb. 111, 112 N.W. 380 (1907).

Specific appropriations for salaries of officers fixed by Constitution are not necessary. Weston v. Herdman, 64 Neb. 24, 89 N.W. 384 (1902).

Money paid into the treasury by the state cannot be credited by bookkeeping and thus deducted from the proper charge. It requires specific appropriation to transfer the fund. Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Weston, 63 Neb. 764, 89 N.W. 253 (1902).

Under general act providing bounty for sugar manufacturers, but carrying no specific appropriation, no such bounty payment can be made. State ex rel. Norfolk Beet-Sugar Co. v. Moore, 50 Neb. 88, 69 N.W. 373 (1896).

Where the Legislature has made a specific appropriation for a special purpose, it is no part of the auditor's duty to inquire as to the justice of such appropriation. State ex rel. Sayre v. Moore, 40 Neb. 854, 59 N.W. 755 (1894).

3. Miscellaneous

Sections 77-202.25 to 77-202.33 do not constitute an appropriation and are not violative hereof. Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 (1974).

This section prevents the diversion of money from any appropriation or the taking thereof from any fund by legislative resolution as distinguished from legislative act. Rein v. Johnson, 149 Neb. 67, 30 N.W.2d 548 (1947).

Noncompliance with this section by Nebraska State Board of Agriculture disclosed that it was not public governmental agency. Crete Mills v. Nebraska State Board of Agriculture, 132 Neb. 244, 271 N.W. 684 (1937).

This section has no reference to any provision which the Legislature might see fit to make regarding custody or investment of money in treasury while waiting disbursement. State v. Hill, 47 Neb. 456, 66 N.W. 541 (1896).

Money may be drawn from the treasury only on vouchers which shall be presented to auditor that he may see that claim is one for which appropriation has been made. State ex rel. Garneau v. Moore, 37 Neb. 507, 55 N.W. 1078 (1893), 56 N.W. 154 (1893).

When appropriation provides for rewards and fees for capture of escaped convicts, etc., no warrant can be drawn to pay sheriff for conveying offenders to reform schools. State ex rel. Ensign v. Wallichs, 12 Neb. 407, 11 N.W. 860 (1882).

III-26 Privilege of members.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-26

Privilege of members.

No member of the Legislature shall be liable in any civil or criminal action whatever for words spoken in debate.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 23 (1875).

III-27 Acts take effect after three months; emergency bills; session laws.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-27

Acts take effect after three months; emergency bills; session laws.

No act shall take effect until three calendar months after the adjournment of the session at which it passed, unless in case of emergency, which is expressed in the preamble or body of the act, the Legislature shall by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected otherwise direct. All laws shall be published within sixty days after the adjournment of each session and distributed among the several counties in such manner as the Legislature may provide.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 24 (1875);

Amended 1972, Laws 1971, LB 126, sec. 1;

Amended 1998, Laws 1997, LR 17CA, sec. 1.

1. Without emergency clause

2. With emergency clause

3. Miscellaneous

1. Without emergency clause

Without an emergency clause, a legislative act takes effect three calendar months after adjournment of Legislature. Summerville v. North Platte Valley Weather Control Dist., 170 Neb. 46, 101 N.W.2d 748 (1960).

While act passed without emergency clause takes effect three calendar months after adjournment of session, operation of act can be postponed to a later date. Wilson v. Marsh, 162 Neb. 237, 75 N.W.2d 723 (1956).

Statute without emergency clause does not become operative until three calendar months after adjournment of the Legislature which enacted it. Bainter v. Appel, 124 Neb. 40, 245 N.W. 16 (1932).

Following clause of act "this act shall take effect on and after its passage and approval" does not express an emergency. State v. Pacific Express Co., 80 Neb. 823, 115 N.W. 619 (1908).

Act containing no emergency clause does not become operative until after three calendar months from adjournment of Legislature. State ex rel. City Water Co. v. City of Kearney, 49 Neb. 325, 68 N.W. 533 (1896).

2. With emergency clause

An act adopted with an emergency clause by vote of two-thirds of all members elected to the Legislature and vetoed by the Governor becomes effective when passed over the veto by vote of three-fifths of the members elected. Sandberg v. State, 188 Neb. 335, 196 N.W.2d 501 (1972).

An act of the Legislature stating an emergency, without stating the nature thereof, is sufficient. Read v. City of Scottsbluff, 179 Neb. 410, 138 N.W.2d 471 (1965).

When a statute passes with an emergency clause in computing the time it takes effect, the day of its passage is excluded, and it goes into effect the next day. Wilson & Company, Inc. v. Otoe County et al., 140 Neb. 518, 300 N.W. 415 (1941).

Where two acts are companion laws and must be construed together, the fact that one has an emergency clause does not operate to put companion law into effect prior to date set by Constitution. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Albers, 126 Neb. 329, 253 N.W. 429 (1934).

3. Miscellaneous

This provision provides the only restriction on the Legislature's power to determine the effective date of its enactments. Pony Lake Sch. Dist. v. State Committee for Reorg., 271 Neb. 173, 710 N.W.2d 609 (2006).

Right of referendum extends to emergency acts of Legislature. Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 143 N.W.2d 744 (1966).

Interest on forbearance of money computed at the legal rate on date claim arose. Wheaton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 Neb. 583, 259 N.W. 753 (1935).

Automobile guest law does not affect a cause of action arising after Legislature adjourned but before law took effect. Roh v. Opocensky, 125 Neb. 551, 251 N.W. 102 (1933).

Act may specifically provide for separate provisions taking effect at different dates. State ex rel. Wheeler v. Stuht, 52 Neb. 209, 71 N.W. 941 (1897).

Term "calendar month" denotes period terminating with day of succeeding month, numerically corresponding to day of its beginning, less one. McGinn v. State, 46 Neb. 427, 65 N.W. 46 (1895).

Legislative act may provide that it shall not apply until expiration of terms of incumbent officers. Hopkins v. Scott, 38 Neb. 661, 57 N.W. 391 (1894).

III-28 Repealed 1934. Initiative Measure No. 330.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-28

Repealed 1934. Initiative Measure No. 330.

III-29 Legislative authority in emergencies due to enemy attack upon United States.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-29

Legislative authority in emergencies due to enemy attack upon United States.

(1). In order to insure continuity of state and local governmental operations in periods of emergency resulting from enemy attack upon the United States, or the imminent threat thereof, the Legislature shall have the power and the immediate duty, notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary in this Constitution, to provide by law for:

(a) The prompt and temporary succession to the powers and duties of all public offices, of whatever nature and whether filled by election or appointment, the incumbents of which, after an attack, may be or become unavailable or unable to carry on the powers and duties of such offices;

(b) The convening of the Legislature into general or extraordinary session, upon or without call by the Governor, during or after a war or enemy caused disaster occurring in the United States; and, with respect to any such emergency session, the suspension or temporary change of the provisions of this Constitution or of general law relating to the length and purposes of any legislative session or prescribing the specific proportion or number of legislators whose presence or vote is necessary to constitute a quorum or to accomplish any legislative act or function;

(c) The selection and changing from time to time of a temporary state seat of government, of temporary county seats, and of temporary seats of government for other political subdivisions; to be used if made necessary by enemy attack or imminent threat thereof;

(d) The determination, selection, reproduction, preservation, and dispersal of public records necessary to the continuity of governmental operations in the event of enemy attack or imminent threat thereof; and

(e) Such other measures and procedures as may be necessary and proper for insuring the continuity of governmental operations in the event of enemy attack or imminent threat thereof.

(2). In the exercise of the powers hereinbefore conferred, the Legislature shall in all respects conform to the requirements of this Constitution except to the extent that, in the judgment of the Legislature, so to do would be impracticable or would admit of undue delay.

Neb. Const. art. III, sec. 29 (1960);

Adopted 1960, Laws 1959, c. 234, sec. 1, p. 815.

III-30 Legislature to pass necessary laws.

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska

III-30

Legislature to pass necessary laws.

The Legislature shall pass all laws necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this constitution.

Neb. Const. art. XVI, sec. 20 (1875);

Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, art. XVII, sec. 6;

Neb. Const. art. XVII, sec. 6 (1997);

Amended 1998, Laws 1997, LR 17CA, sec. 2.

Legislative power governing the rights and duties of persons is conferred entirely on the elected legislative body. Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 175 Neb. 26, 120 N.W.2d 374 (1963).

Legislature must provide standards for distribution of school funds. School Dist. No. 39 of Washington County v. Decker, 159 Neb. 693, 68 N.W.2d 354 (1955).

Constitution of Nebraska — Article III

III-1 Legislative authority; how vested; power of initiative; power of referendum.

III-2 First power reserved; initiative.

III-3 Second power reserved; referendum.

III-4 Initiative or referendum; signatures required; veto; election returns; constitutional amendments; non-partisan ballot.

III-5 Legislative districts; apportionment; redistricting, when required.

III-6 Legislature; number of members; annual sessions.

III-7 Legislators; terms; effect of redistricting; election; salary; expenses; mileage.

III-8 Legislators; qualifications; one-year residence in district; removal from district, effect.

III-9 Legislators; disqualifications; election to other office; resignation required.

III-10 Legislative sessions; time; quorum; rules of procedure; expulsion of members; disrespectful behavior, penalty.

III-11 Legislative journal; vote viva voce; open doors; committee votes.

III-12 Legislators; terms; limitation.

III-13 Style of bills; majority necessary to passage; yeas and nays entered on journal.

III-14 Bills and resolutions read by title; printing; vote for final passage; bills to contain one subject; amended section to be set forth; signing of bills.

III-15 Members privileged from arrest.

III-16 Members of the Legislature and state officers; conflicts of interest; standards for.

III-17 Impeachment; procedure.

III-18 Local or special laws prohibited.

III-19 Compensation; increase when; extra compensation to public officers and contractors prohibited; retirement benefits; adjustment.

III-20 Salt springs, coal, oil, minerals; alienation prohibited.

III-21 Donation of state lands prohibited; when.

III-22 Appropriations for state; deficiencies; bills for pay of members and officials.

III-23 Repealed 1972. Laws 1972, LB 302, sec. 1.

III-24 Games of chance, lotteries, and gift enterprises; restrictions; use of state lottery proceeds; parimutuel wagering on horseraces; bingo games; laws relating to games of chance, applicability.

III-25 Incidental expenses of state officers; specific appropriations always necessary; warrants for money.

III-26 Privilege of members.

III-27 Acts take effect after three months; emergency bills; session laws.

III-28 Repealed 1934. Initiative Measure No. 330.

III-29 Legislative authority in emergencies due to enemy attack upon United States.

III-30 Legislature to pass necessary laws.

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort