ECLI:EU:C:2025:1005

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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

SPIELMANN

delivered on 18 December 2025 (1)

Joined Cases C‑424/24 and C‑425/24

Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC),

Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI),

Procura federale presso la Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC),

Collegio di garanzia dello sport presso il Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI),

Corte federale d’appello presso la Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC) (C‑424/24)

and

Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC),

Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI) (C‑425/24)

(Requests for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio, Italy))

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Disciplinary sanction imposed pursuant to sports law – Temporary prohibition on carrying on the profession of member of the board of directors or of chief executive of a football club – National legislation precluding the power of annulment of the administrative courts by allowing only compensation for the injury caused – Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU – Effective judicial protection – Articles 45 and 56 TFEU – Freedom of movement for workers and freedom to provide services )

Introduction

1. In his general course on private international law, given at the Hague Academy of International Law, Professor François Rigaux explains that, in the sports legal order, the existence of a de facto monopoly held by the sporting authorities introduces into the adherence to the rules, laid down by those authorities, an element of coercion conferring legal force on them. The situation of persons who have opted to comply with them is comparable, in his view, to that of an ‘interplanetary traveller’ in that, ‘in order to set foot on the moon or on the planet Mars, he has to surrender to the conditions of gravity or temperature and must meet his needs for oxygen using appropriate equipment’. (2)

2. The legal force of ‘sporting’ rules means that the authority, or authorities, holding a de facto monopoly have the power to penalise infringement of those rules, primarily by means of disciplinary sanctions. That specific feature of the sports legal order lies at the heart of the present case.

3. By its requests for a preliminary ruling, the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio, Italy) asks the Court of Justice about the compatibility with EU law of certain legal provisions which govern, in Italy, the exercise of the power to impose sanctions enjoyed by sporting associations with respect to the persons falling within their sphere of competence.

4. Specifically, it is called upon to take a view on whether a judicial review that can result solely in the award of compensation for the injury caused to the persons on whom disciplinary sanctions have been imposed is consistent with the right to effective legal protection under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.

Legal framework

European Union law

5. The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Articles 45, 56, 101 and 102 TFEU are relevant in the present cases.

Italian law

The Constitution

6. Article 2 of the Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana (Italian Constitution) (‘the Constitution’) (3) states:

‘The Republic recognises and guarantees the inviolable rights of man, both as an individual and within the social groups in which one’s personality is expressed. The Republic requires that the fundamental duties of political, economic and social solidarity be fulfilled.’

7. Under the first paragraph of Article 18 of that Constitution:

‘Citizens have the right to form associations freely, without authorisation, for aims that are not forbidden to individuals by criminal law.’

8. The first paragraph of Article 24 of that Constitution provides:

‘All persons may take legal action to protect their individual rights and legitimate interests.’

9. Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 103 of that Constitution:

‘The Council of State and the other bodies of administrative justice shall have jurisdiction over legitimate interests before the public administration and, in particular matters set forth by law, also over individual rights.’

10. Under Article 113 of the Italian Constitution:

‘The judicial safeguarding of rights and legitimate interests before the courts of ordinary or administrative justice shall always be permitted against acts of the public administration.

Such judicial protection may not be excluded or limited to special types of appeal or for certain categories of decisions.

The law shall establish which judicial bodies may annul decisions taken by the public administration in the cases and with the effects provided for by the law itself.’

The Code of Administrative Procedure

11. Article 1 of the codice del processo amministrativo (Code of Administrative Procedure), approved by decreto legislativo n^o 104 (Legislative Decree No 104) (4) of 2 July 2010 sets out, in paragraph 1 thereof:

‘The administrative courts shall ensure full and effective protection, in accordance with the principles of the Constitution and of European law.’

12. Article 30 of that code provides, in paragraph 6 thereof:

‘The administrative courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any claim for compensation for damage resulting from the infringement of legitimate interests or, in the areas falling within its exclusive jurisdiction, of subjective rights.’

13. Article 133 of the Code includes inter alia paragraph 1, under which:

‘The administrative courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine, save where otherwise provided by law:

…

(z) disputes concerning decisions of the Comitato olimpico nazionale italiano [Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI)] or sports federations which are not reserved for sports judicial bodies and to the exclusion of disputes relating to financial relationships between companies, associations and athletes.’

Law No 280/2003

14. Decreto-legge n^o 220 recante disposizioni urgenti in materia di giustizia sportiva (Decree-Law No 220 on urgent provisions in the field of sports justice) (5) of 19 August 2003 was converted into law by legge n^o 280, conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge n^o 220, recante disposizioni urgenti in materia di giustizia sportiva (Law No 280 converting into law, with amendments, Decree-Law No 220 on urgent provisions in the field of sports justice) (6) of 17 October 2003 (‘Law No 280/2003’).

15. Articles 1 to 3 of Law No 280/2003 read as follows:

‘Article 1 – General principles

1. The Republic recognises and promotes the autonomy of national sports law as an expression of international sports law falling within the purview of the International Olympic Committee.

2. The relationship between sports law and the law of the Republic is governed by the principle of autonomy, except in cases … where subjective situations linked to sports law are relevant to the legal system of the Republic.

Article 2 – Autonomy of the sports law

1. In accordance with the principles laid down in Article 1, the regulation of the following matters falls within the area reserved for sports law:

(a) compliance with and the application of the regulatory, organisational and statutory provisions of national sports law and its branches in order to guarantee the integrity of sporting activities;

(b) conduct falling within the disciplinary field and the imposition and application of the related sports disciplinary sanctions.

2. In the matters referred to in paragraph 1, clubs, associations, members and affiliates shall be required, in accordance with the provisions of the statutes and regulations of the [CONI] and of the sports federations, to bring such matters before the judicial bodies established under sports law …

…

Article 3 – Rules of jurisdiction and transitional provisions

1. Once the instances of sports justice have been exhausted and without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to hear and determine matters concerning the financial relationships between clubs, associations and athletes, any other dispute concerning decisions of the [CONI] or the sports federations not reserved for the sports judicial bodies pursuant to Article 2 shall be governed by the Code of Administrative Procedure, without prejudice, in all cases, to the provisions of any arbitration clauses included in the statutes and regulations of the [CONI] and the sports federations, within the meaning of Article 2(2) …

…’

The FIGC Sports Justice Code

16. The legislation pursuant to which the sanctions at issue in the main proceedings were imposed is the codice di Giustizia Sportiva della Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (Sports Justice Code of the Italian Football Federation (FGIC) ; ‘the FIGC Sports Justice Code’). (7)

17. Under Article 2(1) of that code, the Code applies, inter alia, to ‘directors’ who carry on occupational activities in the field of sport, a category of persons to which it is common ground that ZD and MI belong.

18. Article 4 of the Code, entitled ‘Mandatory nature of general provisions’, states:

‘1. The persons referred to in Article 2 shall be obliged to comply with the Statute, the Code and the Rules of Internal Organisation of the FIGC as well as with other federal standards, and shall abide by the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity in any relationship whatsoever related to sporting activity.

2. In case of breach of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1, the sanctions laid down in Article 8(1)(a), (b), (c) and (g) and in Article 9(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g) and (h) shall be applied.

…’

19. Amongst other sanctions, Article 9 of the same code refers, in paragraph 1(f), to ‘disqualification for a period determined within the FIGC, with a possible request for extension to the [Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)].’

20. Article 31 of the FIGC Sports Justice Code, entitled ‘Infringements of an economic or managerial nature’, states, in paragraph 1 thereof:

‘The failure to produce, the alteration or the substantive or intrinsic falsification, even in part, of the documents required by the sports judicial bodies, the Commissione di Vigilanza sulle Società di Calcio Professionistiche [(Supervisory Board of Professional Football Clubs)] and the Federation’s other supervisory bodies, as well as by the bodies responsible for issuing UEFA and FIGC licences, or the supply of false, unclear or incomplete information shall constitute an administrative infringement. Any conduct seeking in one way or another to circumvent the federal regulations on management and financial matters, as well as the failure to enforce decisions of the competent federal bodies in that regard, shall also constitute an administrative infringement. Without prejudice to the application of the more severe sanctions laid down in the UEFA Licensing Regulation or of other special rules, as well as to the more severe sanctions that may be imposed on account of other acts covered by the present article, a company which commits the acts referred to in this paragraph shall be subject to a fine together with a caution.’

The dispute in the main proceedings, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court

21. ZD and MI are, respectively, a former chairman and a former member of the board of directors of the company Juventus F.C. SpA (‘Juventus’), a professional football club established in Italy.

22. The Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (Italian Football Federation; ‘the FIGC’) is an association governed by private law which has its registered office in Italy. Its purpose is to promote and regulate professional and amateur football in that Member State. It is a member of the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) and of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA).

23. For its part, the Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (Italian National Olympic Committee, ‘the CONI’) is a body governed by public law which is headquartered in Italy. According to the referring court, it is responsible for coordinating the activities of the various Italian sporting associations.

24. On 1 April 2022, the Procura federale presso la Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (Federal Prosecutor’s Office for the FIGC, Italy) (‘the Federal Prosecutor’s Office’), the body within the FIGC with jurisdiction in disciplinary proceedings, brought before the Tribunale Federale nazionale (National Federal Court for the FIGC, Italy) (‘the Federal Court’) an action directed against a number of Italian professional football clubs, including Juventus, as well as several of their directors. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office accuses, inter alia, those directors of having infringed the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity referred to in Articles 4 and 31 of the FIGC Sports Justice Code. Specifically, it claims that ZD and MI, in essence, participated in setting up a system of artificial capital gains totalling in excess of EUR 60 million by making or approving the inclusion of, in Juventus’ financial statements and balance sheets for the years 2020 and 2021, declarations falsely presenting a series of transactions disposing of players’ sports services, that is to say, player transfers, as independent transactions. According to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, they were in fact swap transactions made with the aim of evading the application of the international accounting standard applicable to such transactions and, ultimately, to declare greater profits and assets than the actual profits and assets of the clubs participating in that system.

25. By a decision of 22 April 2022, the Federal Court, the body within the FIGC responsible, inter alia, for matters relating to disciplinary sanctions, adopted a decision acquitting all the natural and legal persons concerned by the abovementioned action. (8)

26. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office appealed against that decision before the Corte federale d’appello presso la Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (Federal Court of Appeal of the FIGC, Italy) (‘the Federal Court of Appeal’).

27. By a decision of 27 May 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Federal Court. (9)

28. On 24 November 2022, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office received from the public prosecutor to the Tribunale di Torino (District Court, Turin, Italy) a copy of documents contained in the file pertaining to criminal proceedings initiated in parallel by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in relation to the facts identified in the action referred to in point 24 of this Opinion. Following their receipt, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office took the view that those documents justified bringing an action for partial revision before the Federal Court of Appeal.

29. In January 2023, the Federal Court of Appeal adopted a decision granting the action for revision brought by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. (10) By that decision, it, inter alia, imposed on ZD and MI a disciplinary sanction consisting in a prohibition on carrying on activities within the FIGC for a period of 24 months, together with a request for extension of that prohibition to UEFA and to FIFA. The prohibition, which covers, in practice, the pursuit of any professional activities in the sphere falling within the remit of the FIGC, that is to say, professional or amateur football in Italy, was subsequently extended worldwide by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee.

30. That decision was challenged, inter alia, by ZD and MI before the Collegio di Garanzia dello sport presso il Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (Sports Guarantee Board to the CONI, Italy) (‘the Sports Guarantee Board’), the supreme court in the field of sports justice.

31. By a decision of 8 May 2023, the Sports Guarantee Board dismissed the appeal lodged by ZD and that lodged by MI, whilst granting those lodged by other individuals and referring the matter back to the Federal Court of Appeal, to enable the latter to determine definitively the disciplinary sanctions to be imposed. (11)

32. On 25 May 2023, a dismissal order was made in the abovementioned criminal proceedings.

33. Subsequently, ZD and MI brought before the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio), the referring court, an action against the decisions adopted successively by the Federal Court of Appeal and by the Sports Guarantee Board, in so far as those decisions concern them.

34. In its order for reference, that court states, in the first place, that, by their respective actions, ZD and MI claim, primarily, that it should suspend and annul the disciplinary sanctions imposed on them by the Federal Court of Appeal and, in the alternative only, compensate them for the injury caused to them by those sanctions. However, pursuant to the applicable Italian legislation, as interpreted by the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy), the referring court states that it would be required to dismiss those two actions as ‘inadmissible on the ground of a lack of jurisdiction’ in so far as they seek the annulment of those disciplinary sanctions.

35. According to the referring court, in two judgments of 7 February 2011 (12) and of 17 April 2019 (13) the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, Italy) took the view, in essence, that Articles 2 and 3 of Law No 280/2003 must be interpreted as conferring on the ‘judicial bodies established under sports law’, including the Federal Court, the Federal Court of Appeal and the Sports Guarantee Board, exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for suspension and for annulment of disciplinary sanctions imposed on natural or legal persons who are members of, or are affiliated with, the various Italian sports associations. For its part the administrative courts, have jurisdiction exclusively, pursuant to Article 133(1)(z) of the Code of Administrative Procedure, to hear and determine disputes concerning decisions of the CONI and of Italian sports associations which are not reserved for the ‘sports judicial bodies’. Such disputes include actions brought by persons on whom such disciplinary sanctions have been imposed asking those courts, once ‘[the remedies available before] the judicial bodies established under sports law have been exhausted’, to review the legality of the sanctions indirectly in order to obtain ‘equivalent judicial protection’ of their ‘subjective legal position’ as well as their ‘rights and legitimate interests’. Such protection can only take the form of financial compensation for the injury caused to those persons.

36. As is apparent from the same judgments, the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) bases that interpretation of the various provisions at issue in Law No 280/2003 and in the Code of Administrative Procedure on the finding that those provisions are the result of the ‘fair balance’ struck by the Italian legislature, in Article 1 of Law No 280/2003, between the principle of effective and full judicial protection enshrined in Articles 24, 103 and 113 of the Constitution, on the one hand, and the need to safeguard the autonomy of sports law, which is protected under Articles 2 and 18 of the Constitution, on the other hand. The judicial protection of the persons concerned is thus guaranteed effectively by ‘sports justice’, a special form of ‘associative justice’, as far as concerns legal situations, such as those arising from the imposition of disciplinary sanctions, which are relevant for the ‘sector-specific law’, that is to say, ‘sports law’, but not for the ‘general legal order’. At the same time, effective judicial protection of the ‘subjective legal position’ of those persons with respect to the ‘general legal order’ continues to be guaranteed by the administrative courts.

37. In the second place, the referring court considers it necessary to refer a question to the Court about the interpretation of EU law so that it can rule both on the admissibility of the actions brought by ZD and MI and on the merits of those actions.

38. In the third and final place, it states, in essence, that it has doubts as to the compliance of Law No 280/2003 with EU law.

39. It is in those circumstances that, in Case C‑424/24, the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘[(1)] Must EU law, and in particular Articles 6 and 19 TEU, in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [(14)] and Article 6 of the [Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (15)], in relation to the principle of effective judicial protection, be interpreted as precluding a national provision of a Member State, such as Article 2 of [Law No 280/2003], as interpreted in [national] case-law, once the instances of national sports justice have been exhausted, from excluding recourse to judicial protection that confers a power on the national court (in this case, the administrative court) to annul disciplinary sanctions in sport and their future effects, and to suspend the effect of those sanctions as an interim measure, thereby limiting the national court to awarding equivalent compensatory protection, where it appears that the disciplinary power has been exercised unlawfully?

[(2)] Must EU law, and in particular Articles 6 and 19 TEU, interpreted in the light of Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the [Charter] and Articles 6 and 7 [ECHR], be interpreted, so as to ensure observance of the principles of legality of criminal offences and penalties, of legal certainty and sufficient precision of offences, as well as of due process, as precluding a national provision, such as Article 2 of [Law No 280/2003] – as interpreted in [national] case-law – which, in accordance with the principle of autonomy of sports law as enshrined in national law and interpreted in [national] case-law, allows sports governing bodies to impose a disciplinary sanction on a sports manager prohibiting him or her from undertaking professional activities on the ground that he or she infringed a provision of the [FIGC’s] rules (Article 4(1) of the [FIGC] Sports Justice Code), which establishes, by a general clause formulated in vague terms, that all members and managers are required to observe, in addition to the by-laws and other regulations of the federation, the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity?

[(3)] Must EU law, and in particular Articles 45, 49, 56, 101 and 102 TFEU and Article 47 of the [Charter], be interpreted as precluding a national provision, such as Article 2 of [Law No 280/2003], from allowing sports bodies to impose a disciplinary sanction on a manger of a sports club operating at international level which prohibits him or her from undertaking professional activities for 24 months at national and supranational level?’

40. It is in those same circumstances that, in Case C‑425/24, the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer, in essence, the same questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

41. Written observations were lodged by ZD, MI, the CONI, the FIGC, the Italian and Portuguese Governments and the European Commission.

42. ZD, MI, the CONI, the FIGC, the Italian Government and the Commission presented oral argument at the hearing held on 17 September 2025.

Analysis

43. At the Court’s request, this Opinion will cover the first and third questions referred for a preliminary ruling only. I will begin by addressing the third question before turning to consider the first.

The third question

44. By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 45, 56, 101 and 102 TFEU (16) must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue here, allowing sports bodies to impose a disciplinary sanction on a director of a sports club which has the effect of prohibiting him or her from carrying on occupational activities for a period of 24 months at national and international level.

Admissibility

45. The Commission and the Italian government call into question the admissibility of the present reference for a preliminary ruling, (17) taking, in essence, the view that, in its questions, the referring court has failed to explain the link that it makes between the provisions of EU law which it asks to be interpreted and the national legislation applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings.

46. According to the Commission, the dispute in the main proceedings appears to lack a cross-border dimension. In its view, all the elements of that case are confined to the Italian territory and relate to disciplinary sanctions imposed on Italian directors who have an employment relationship with an Italian football club and have not exercised their right to free movement. Those sanctions consist in ‘the temporary prohibition on carrying on activities within the FIGC for a period of 24 months, together with a request for extension in the context of UEFA and FIFA’. A barrier to the free movement of the directors concerned would materialise, in the Commission’s view, only once UEFA or FIFA has granted the request submitted by the FIGC for the European or worldwide extension of the geographic scope of those sanctions.

47. It should be noted in that regard that the Court has already accepted to answer questions referred to it where, due to its subject or its nature, the national legislation at issue was capable of causing cross-border effects. (18) That is the case for the Italian legislation at issue, which provides for, among the sanctions intended to ensure compliance with its provisions, some of which canbe accompanied by with a request for extension in the context of UEFA and FIFA.

48. I therefore propose that the Court reject that objection of inadmissibility.

Substance

49. As a preliminary point, it should be observed that the national provisions forming the subject of the present question, which appear in the FIGC Sports Justice Code, govern certain aspects of the FIGC’s sanctioning activities. Enacted by the FIGC, an association governed by private law, that code was approved by the CONI. The CONI, a public body, is called upon to assess the code’s compliance with the law, the Statuto Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI Statute), (19) fundamental principles as well as the guidance provided and criteria established by the CONI National Council. (20)

50. Next, it is necessary to examine the questions relating to the compatibility of those provisions with the rules on competition (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU), in the first place, and with the rules on the free movement of workers and of services (Articles 45 and 56 TFEU), in the second place. A preliminary remark does, however, seem appropriate.

51. According to settled case-law, sporting activities are governed by EU law where they constitute an economic activity. As the Court has recently stated, only specific rules which were adopted solely on non-economic grounds and which relate to questions of interest solely to sport per se must be regarded as being extraneous to any economic activity. (21) Clearly, rules on the economic management of a professional sports club such as those at issue here do not fall into that category and therefore do not fall outside the scope of EU law.

52. With regard to Article 101 TFEU, the referring court seems to entertain doubts as to whether the decisions taken by associations governed by private law which organise football competitions, such as the decision imposing the sanction at issue, are to be regarded as ‘decisions by associations of undertakings’ and therefore come under the prohibition laid down in that provision.

53. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in order to be caught by that prohibition, an agreement, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice must both be capable of affecting trade between Member States and have ‘as its object or effect’ the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. (22) Accordingly, only where those two conditions are met can Article 101 TFEU be found to have been infringed.

54. However, even assuming that the national legislation at issue does constitute a ‘decision by an association of undertakings’, it is by no means apparent from the documents before the Court that restrictions of competition, by object or effect, could ensue from that legislation and from the sanctions which may be imposed under it.

55. That legislation in fact concerns the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against natural persons such as the directors of football clubs. However, there is nothing in the documents in the case to suggest that the imposition of such sanctions can decide, as a knock-on effect, the relegation of the football club at which the sanctioned directors carried on their occupational activities. In view of that fact, it cannot be concluded that the legislation may distort competition between undertakings.

56. As for Article 102 TFEU, that provision prohibits the abuse by one or more undertakings of its/their dominant position within the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Its purpose is thus to prevent competition from being restricted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, by sanctioning the conduct of undertakings in a dominant position which restricts or hinders competition on the merits and is thus likely to cause direct or indirect harm to consumers. (23)

57. In the present case, even accepting that the FIGC and the CONI can be regarded as ‘undertakings’ within the meaning of competition law, it is unclear to me in which market they hold a dominant position and could abuse that position by exercising their power to impose sanctions on the directors of football clubs.

58. Therefore, the alleged absence of substantive criteria which are transparent, clear and precise governing the exercise of that power to impose sanctions, upon which the applicants in the main proceedings rely, does not pose, in any event, any issue in the light of Article 102 TFEU. (24)

59. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU do not therefore, in my view, preclude national legislation such as that at issue here.

60. With regard to the rules on free movement contained in the FEU Treaty, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, all the provisions of the FEU Treaty relating to the freedom of movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by EU nationals of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the European Union, and preclude measures which might place EU nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State. (25) Consequently, Article 45 TFEU precludes any national measure which is liable to impede or render less advantageous the exercise by EU nationals of the fundamental freedom guaranteed by that article. The same legal criterion applies in relation to the freedom to provide services, as provided for in Article 56 TFEU. (26)

61. In that regard, I note that the disciplinary sanctions provided for in the FIGC Sports Justice Code and imposed inter alia on the directors of the Italian professional football clubs are liable to prevent those directors from accepting offers of employment with other European football clubs or from acting as service providers in respect of those same clubs. In those circumstances, there appears to be no question that there is a barrier to the free movement of the sanctioned directors within the meaning of Articles 45 and 56 TFEU.

62. According to settled case-law, such a barrier may, however, be permitted if it is proved, first, that the adoption of the measures concerned is justified by a legitimate objective in the public interest and, second, that they comply with the principle of proportionality. (27)

63. The following should be stated at this juncture as regards the existence of a legitimate objective in the public interest.

64. It is clear from the documents in the case that Article 4 of the FIGC Sports Justice Code sets out the obligation to observe the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity in any relationship connected with sporting activities, failing which sanctions laid down, inter alia, in Article 9 of that code may be imposed.

65. The first of those provisions thus covers conduct undermining the principles of honest participation in sporting competitions and, therefore, of equal treatment of the clubs involved.

66. Conduct such as that of the applicants in the main proceedings (28) allows the club to which they belong to obtain an unlawful economic advantage as compared with the other clubs participating in the same competitions. That conduct thus undermines the level playing field for participation in such competitions by the clubs involved. The sanction mechanism laid down in the national legislation at issue therefore seeks to ensure that sporting competitions are conducted honestly and fairly in conditions undistorted by fraud.

67. For my part, I am persuaded that such an objective can be invoked to justify the adoption of the legislation at issue, especially since the Court has recently acknowledged that ‘the objective consisting in ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions is a legitimate objective in the public interest that may be pursued by a sporting association’. (29)

68. As for the question whether the national legislation at issue is capable of guaranteeing that that objective is achieved and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it, it should be noted that the case-law of the Court draws attention to the fact that the discretion enjoyed by the bodies empowered to impose sanctions must not be exercised arbitrarily. It follows, inter alia, from that case-law that associations, such as the FIGC, are entitled to provide that sanctions are to be imposed in the event of a breach of the rules laid down in their Sports Justice Code, where those rules and the sanctions intended to ensure compliance therewith are justified by a legitimate objective in the public interest. However, according to the Court, such sanctions can be accepted only on condition that they are determined within a framework of criteria that are transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate. That last requirement means, inter alia, that the particular circumstances of the case are taken into account when the amount and the duration of the sanctions are fixed. Such criteria must, moreover, be capable of being the subject of effective judicial review. (30)

69. It is for the referring court to verify whether the legislation at issue is capable of guaranteeing the objective of ensuring that sporting competitions are conducted honestly and fairly and whether it does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

70. I would, however, point out that Articles 12 to 18 of the FIGC Sports Justice Code, which appear in Section II of that code entitled ‘Application of sanctions’, could be regarded as establishing the framework for the power to impose sanctions at issue in a manner consistent with the requirements laid down in the abovementioned case-law.

71. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court answer the third question to the effect that Articles 45 and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that in the present cases, allowing sports bodies to impose a disciplinary sanction on a director of a sports club, prohibiting him or her from carrying on occupational activities for a period of 24 months at the national and international level, provided that that legislation and the sanctions intended to ensure compliance are justified by the pursuit of a legitimate objective in the public interest and those sanctions are determined within a framework of criteria that are transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate. Similarly, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU do not preclude such national legislation.

The first question

72. By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 19 TEU, in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, (31) must be interpreted as precluding a national rule which limits the judicial review of disciplinary sanctions, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, by national bodies which satisfy the requirements attached to the status of ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of EU law, to an indirect review capable, in the event of illegality, of entailing exclusively the award of financial compensation to those persons on whom those disciplinary sanctions were imposed, thereby excluding the possibility of the court having jurisdiction annulling such disciplinary sanctions and granting, where appropriate, interim measures to the persons concerned.

Admissibility

73. The Italian Government argues that the present question is inadmissible due to the imminent exhaustion of the prohibition resulting from the decisions taken by the national sports judicial bodies. More precisely, that government notes, on the one hand, that the applicants to the main proceedings were sentenced to a prohibition for a period of 24 months, and, on the other hand, that that sanction was imposed by the Federal Court of Appeal in a decision on 20 January 2023, being immediately enforceable. The prohibition at issue was then to have expired on 20 January 2025, a date by which the preliminary ruling would likely not yet have been given. Therefore, the annulment would not have any real benefit for the applicants to the main proceedings, since the effects which they were intending to remove through an action for annulment would have already ended.

74. It is true that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the justification for references for a preliminary ruling is not the formulation of consultative opinions on general or hypothetical questions, but the inherent need for an effective solution to a dispute. Therefore, according to the Court, if it turned out that the applicants to the main proceedings had actually lost their interest in continuing to pursue the annulment of the decisions at issue, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling would no longer be relevant to the solution of the cases before the referring court and the Court would have to declare that there is no need to adjudicate in this case. (32)

75. However, I do not think that that is the case in this instance. Indeed, I note that, during the hearing, the applicants in the main proceedings specified that a potential annulment of the decision at issue by the referring court would allow them to protect their non-material interest in erasing or minimising the repercussions of the disciplinary sanctions on their reputation.

Substance

76. It must be observed at the outset that that question concerns certain provisions of Law No 280/2003, which sets out the fundamental principles governing the relationship between sports law and the national legal order.

77. The legal framework established by that legislation, as interpreted in Italian constitutional case-law, may be summarised as follows.

78. A ‘fair balance’ has been struck in the legislation between the principle of effective judicial protection and the rights of the defence enshrined in the Constitution, on the one hand, and the principle of the ‘autonomy of sports law’ arising from Articles 2 and 18 of the Constitution, on the other. That balancing act takes the form of a ‘reserved field of jurisdiction’ for the judicial bodies established within Italian sporting associations and the CONI, under which those bodies alone have jurisdiction to annul disciplinary sanctions such as those at issue in the main proceedings. However, the administrative courts retain jurisdiction, after the three tiers of sports justice have been exhausted, to award financial compensation to the persons concerned in the event that such disciplinary sanctions are unlawful.

79. In its written observations, the Italian Government contends that that legal framework lays down an essential characteristic of its ‘national identity’ within the meaning of Article 4 TEU. Given that remark, I consider it necessary to revisit the relevant case-law. (33)

– The relationship between Article 4(2) TEU and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU

80. Article 4(2) TEU provides inter alia that the Union is to respect the national identities of the Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional.

81. The terms of the relationship between that article and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU were expressly defined in the judgments in Hungary v Parliament and Council (34) and Commission v Poland (Independence and private life of judges). (35)

82. In those judgments, the Court stated that there is no ground for maintaining that the requirements arising, as conditions for both access to and participation in the European Union, from respect for values and principles such as the rule of law, effective judicial protection and judicial independence, enshrined in Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, are capable of affecting the national identity of a Member State, within the meaning of Article 4(2) TEU. Therefore, the latter provision, which must be read taking into account the provisions, of the same rank, inter alia Articles 2 and 19 TEU, cannot exempt Member States from the obligation to comply with the requirements arising from those provisions. Thus, even though, pursuant to Article 4(2) TEU, the European Union respects the national identities of the Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, such that those States enjoy a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of the rule of law, it in no way follows that that obligation as to the result to be achieved may vary from one Member State to another. Whilst they have separate national identities, which the European Union respects, the Member States must adhere to a concept of “the rule of law” which they share, as a value common to their own constitutional traditions, and which they have undertaken to respect at all times. It follows that, in choosing their respective constitutional model, the Member States are required to comply with the requirements arising from Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, as interpreted by the Court. (36)

83. Ultimately, it is the principle of the primacy of EU law which prevents the adoption of an interpretation that allows Member States to rely on rules of national law, even of a constitutional order, in order to frustrate the application of provisions of EU law. It is for the Court, in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction to interpret EU law, to clarify the scope of the principle of the primacy of EU law in the light of the relevant provisions of EU law, with the result that that scope cannot turn on the interpretation of provisions of national law or on the interpretation of provisions of EU law by a national court, such as the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court), which is at odds with that of the Court. (37)

84. Thus, while the Italian Republic is undoubtedly entitled to provide for an autonomous judicial system to allow national sporting associations to protect their prerogatives vis-à-vis the public authorities, the normative form taken by such a system cannot, however, undermine the right to effective judicial protection.

85. Before considering whether that right is infringed here, I should make a few preliminary remarks about the content of the protection afforded to individuals by the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.

– The scope of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU

86. In the judgment in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, (38) the Court stated that the principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is a general principle of EU law which is reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter. That finding led the Court to clarify, first, that the latter provision must be ‘duly taken into consideration’ for the purpose of interpreting the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (39) and, secondly, that the obligation imposed on Member States in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU to provide a system of remedies sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU law corresponds to the right to an effective remedy guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter. (40)

87. Thus, Article 47 of the Charter was deployed to define the substantive content of the obligation arising from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in three respects. First, from an organic point of view, that obligation means that the bodies which may interpret or apply EU law must meet the requirements attached to the status of ‘court or tribunal’, such as those of independence, impartiality and a ‘tribunal previously established by law’. (41) Secondly, in procedural terms, the obligation means that the various guarantees relating to a ‘fair trial’ must be observed before those bodies. (42) Thirdly, as for the scope of the judicial review, it is apparent from the judgment in Royal Football Club Seraing, (43) given after the closure of the written part of the procedure in the present cases and the subject of intense discussion at the hearing, that the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter presupposes that the bodies are capable of carrying out an effective judicial review of the acts, measures or behaviour alleged to have infringed the rights or freedoms of an individual. In that judgment, the Court also defined the requirements which must be satisfied by that judicial review to be regarded as effective. (44) Those requirements have some bearing on the answer that should be given to the present question referred for a preliminary ruling.

88. I recall that the case which gave rise to that judgment concerned national rules conferring on the arbitral awards issued by a court of a third State (the Court of Arbitration for Sport) the authority of res judicata inter partes within the territory of a Member State and, as a result of that authority, probative value in the relations between the parties to the dispute and third parties. However, since the consistency of those awards with EU law was not first reviewed by a court authorised to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, the question arose whether such national rules complied with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in the light of Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter.

89. The crux of the reasoning developed by the Court in its answer is summarised in the following three points. (45)

90. The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU does not require a direct legal remedy allowing individuals to call into question such arbitral awards, provided that, in the national judicial system, it is possible for the individuals concerned to obtain, indirectly, effective judicial review of those awards, thereby ensuring respect for the rights and freedoms guaranteed to those individuals by EU law. (46)

91. To be effective, that judicial review does not necessarily have to cover all questions of law and of fact that are relevant for resolving the cases in which those awards were made, rather it may legitimately be limited in nature. In any event, the courts concerned must be able to verify whether such awards are consistent with the principles and provisions which form part of EU public policy and which are relevant to the dispute concerned, such as the freedom of movement for workers and the freedom to provide services enshrined, respectively, in Articles 45 and 56 TFEU. (47)

92. In addition, if they consider those same awards to be inconsistent with those principles and provisions, those courts must also be able to draw, within the framework of their respective powers and in accordance with the applicable national provisions, all the appropriate legal conclusions where such an inconsistency is found to exist. (48) In particular, where an infringement of the freedoms of movement is at issue, those courts must be able not only to find that that infringement exists and to order damages for the harm caused to the individuals concerned, but also to annul the decision vitiated by such an infringement. (49) That power must necessarily be accompanied by the power to grant interim measures which ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to be given on the substance on the case, including where those same courts make a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court and stay the proceedings pending the reply of the Court. (50)

93. Contrary to what the Italian Government argued at the hearing in the present cases, the judgment given by the Court in joined cases Cairo Network is incapable of introducing an exception to those principles.

94. Let me explain. According to that government, it is apparent from the judgment in Cairo Network that, while the effectiveness of the judicial review generally presupposes that the national court has the power to annul all the adverse consequences of an act or of conduct adopted in breach of EU law, the grant of mere financial compensation may be justified where, as is the case here, such annulment could undermine a public interest.

95. The disciplinary sanctions at issue, imposed on natural persons, are linked to the imposition of penalty points to the standing of the football club which employed those persons, in the context of the first-division Italian national football championship (Serie A). If it had been possible to ask the national court to annul or vary those sanctions, or even simply to suspend them temporarily, uncertainty as to the final standings in that championship would have persisted for a period of time incompatible with the requirement to determine the national teams which qualified for European competitions. Such a situation would be manifestly prejudicial to the continuity of the Italian football championship.

96. In that connection, I feel bound to recall the following. It is indeed true that, in the judgment in Cairo Network, the Court concluded that the limitation of the powers of the national court with jurisdiction to hear actions against acts relating to the allocation of rights to use radio frequencies to the award of financial compensation did not necessarily mean that the judicial review carried out by that court was not effective. (51) The fact remains however that, unlike in the present cases, that judgment was given in an area governed by secondary EU law, specifically by the Electronic Communications Directive (52) and Decision (EU) 2017/899 on the use of the 470-790 MHz frequency band in the Union. (53)

97. That is not an insignificant factor. According to the Court, the possibility of national courts annulling those acts risked impeding the reconfiguration of the 700 MHz frequency band required by Decision 2017/899, thereby undermining the proper functioning of 5G in the European Union. (54)

98. I infer from the foregoing that providing simply for the possibility of awarding financial compensation, to the exclusion of the possibility of annulling the act vitiated by illegality, is justified where such annulment would risk undermining one of the objectives of the relevant EU legislation, which is not the case here.

– Conclusion on the first question

99. It therefore follows that disciplinary sanctions, such as those in the present cases, must be the subject of a review, even an indirect review, by bodies satisfying the requirements attached to the status of ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of EU law. That review must consider the compatibility of those sanctions with the principles and provisions which form part of EU public policy and entail, in cases of illegality, the annulment of the sanctions.

100. In the light of the foregoing, I suggest the Court answer the first question to the effect that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which limits the review of the legality of disciplinary sanctions, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, by ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, to an indirect review capable, in case of illegality, of entailing solely the award of financial compensation to the persons on whom those sanctions were imposed. Those courts or tribunals must be able to annul such sanctions and grant, where appropriate, interim measures which ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to be given on the substance on the case. (55)

101. I would like to make clear that the answer which I propose is based on the premiss that the review by the Italian administrative courts is the only review carried out by ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law on the legality of the sports disciplinary sanctions. If, however, one of the judicial bodies established under Italian sports law, which conducts reviews of legality the effectiveness of which is not called into question here, satisfied all the requirements attached to the status of ‘court or tribunal’, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU could not be found to have been infringed. (56)

102. It therefore appears to me appropriate to devote some consideration to that issue of the status of judicial bodies established under Italian sports law as ‘courts or tribunals’.

– The status of judicial bodies established under Italian sports law as ‘courts or tribunals’

103. In accordance with settled case-law since the judgment in Vaassen-Göbbels, (57) the status of ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU assumes that certain conditions are met, such as the legal origin of the body, its permanence, the compulsory nature of its jurisdiction, the adversarial nature of its procedure, the application by that body of the rules of law and its independence. (58)

104. The requirement of independence has an external aspect and an internal aspect. The latter is linked to the concept of ‘impartiality’ and seeks to ensure a level playing field for the parties to the proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the subject matter of those proceedings. (59) It is specifically the impartiality of the judicial bodies established under Italian sports law which, in my view, ought to be the subject of a thorough examination by the referring court.

105. Thus, given the context surrounding the cases in the main proceedings, such an examination should not disregard the legal framework for analysis in the case Ali Riza and Others v. Türkiye (60) resulting from the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). (61)

106. It should be recalled that the case which gave rise to that judgment had its origin in actions lodged before the Arbitration Committee of the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) against decisions adopted against football players or referees by the Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC) and the Disciplinary Committee of that federation respectively. After observing that the members of the Arbitration Committee were appointed by the TFF’s Board of Directors, which was itself fully appointed by the congress of that same federation, and that the Board of Directors enjoyed broad discretion in exercising its power of appointment, the European Court of Human Rights examined, first, whether sufficient safeguards were in place to ensure that the members of the Arbitration Committee performed their duties shielded from external pressures and, secondly, whether the Arbitration Committee was composed of members who could be regarded as independent and impartial vis-à-vis the professional organisations involved in such proceedings. (62)

107. On the first point, the European Court of Human Rights took the view that the members of the Arbitration Committee were not immune from pressures, in particular from the Board of Directors, on account of the existence of a number of ‘strong organisational and structural ties’ between those two entities, giving an indication as to the ‘significant level of influence that the Board of Directors enjoys over the functioning of the Arbitration Committee’. (63) In support of that finding, the European Court of Human Rights relied on the following factors. First, even though the members of that committee enjoyed security of tenure, the term of their office corresponded to that of the members of the Board of Directors. Secondly, the members of the Arbitration Committee were entitled to receive remuneration as well as the reimbursement of their travel expenses and an accommodation allowance, the amounts of which were determined by the Board of Directors. Thirdly, no specific procedure was provided for in cases where the independence or impartiality of a member of the Arbitration Committee is challenged by the parties.

108. As for the second point, the European Court of Human Rights noted that the majority of both the TFF’s Board of Directors and its Congress was made up of representatives of the football clubs, the latter being inevitably involved in certain disputes falling within the remit of the Arbitration Committee.

109. It should be recalled that, under the Italian legislation at issue, the adoption of disciplinary sanctions imposed by the FIGC and the CONI falls within the competence of two intra-federal bodies (the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal) and an extra-federal body (the Sports Guarantee Board).

110. With regard to the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal, the power to appoint their members rests with the Consiglio federale (Federal Council), (64) and the exercise of that power appears to be governed exclusively by the criterion of ‘specific competence and experience acquired in sports law’. (65) The risk of the members of those bodies being exposed to pressures from the Federal Council could be accentuated by the fact that their term of office is the same as that of the members of the Federal Council (four years, renewable twice) and that the Commissione federale di garanzia (Federal Guarantee Board), (66) which is also appointed by the Federal Council, has the power to remove them, inter alia ‘on compelling grounds of expediency’. (67)

111. As regards the composition of the Federal Council, 14 of its 20 members are elected by the various national football leagues, (68) which in turn are made up of the football clubs, whose directors may, as is the case here, be involved in proceedings before the abovementioned intra-federal bodies.

112. As for the Sports Guarantee Board, the appointment of its members is reserved for the National Council of the CONI. (69) Their term of office (four years) is the same as that of the members of the National Council. (70) The National Council also appoints the members of the Commissione di garanzia degli organi di giustizia, di controllo e di tutela dell’etica sportiva (Guarantee Board of the judicial, review and sports ethics bodies), which has the power to remove members of the Sports Guarantee Board. (71) The composition of the National Council is marked by the presence of the chairpersons of the national sports federations, and a majority of votes within that body must be made up of votes cast by such persons. (72)

113. It is for the referring court to verify, in the light, inter alia, of the factors set out above, whether one of the judicial bodies established under Italian sports law constitutes a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of EU law. If so, the system of sports justice conceived by the Italian legislature, taken as a whole, would not be incompatible with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.

Conclusion

114. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court answer as follows the first and third questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio, Italy):

(1) The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which limits the review of the legality of disciplinary sanctions, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, by ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, to an indirect review capable, in case of illegality, of entailing solely the award of financial compensation to the persons on whom those sanctions were imposed. Those courts or tribunals must be able to annul such sanctions and grant, where appropriate, interim measures which ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to given on the substance on the case.

(2) Articles 45 and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that in the present cases, allowing sports bodies to impose a disciplinary sanction on a director of a sports club, prohibiting him or her from carrying on occupational activities for 24 months at the national and international level, provided that that legislation and the sanctions intended to ensure compliance are justified by the pursuit of a legitimate objective in the public interest and those sanctions are determined within a framework of criteria that are transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate. Similarly, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU do not preclude such national legislation.

1 Original language: French.

2 Rigaux, F., ‘Les situations juridiques individuelles dans un système de relativité générale. Cours général de droit international privé’, The Hague Academy Collected Courses Online, Brill, Nijhoff, Vol. 213, 1989, p. 67.

3 GURI No 298 of 27 December 1947.

4 GURI No 156 of 7 July 2010, p. 1.

5 GURI No 192 of 20 August 2003, p. 4.

6 GURI No 243 of 18 October 2003, p. 4.

7 Approved by the Giunta Nazionale del CONI (National Council of the CONI), in accordance with Article 7(5)(l) of the Statuto CONI (CONI Statute), by Resolution No 258 of 11 June 2019.

8 Decision No 0128/TFNSD-2021-222.

9 Decision No 0089/CFA-2021-2022.

10 Decision No 0063/CFA2022-2023, delivered on 20 January 2023 and lodged on 30 January 2023.

11 Decision No 40/2023.

12 Judgment No 49/2011 (GURI No 8 of 16 February 2011, IT:COST:2011:49).

13 Judgment No 160/2019 (GURI No 27 of 3 July 2019, IT:COST:2019:160).

14 ‘The Charter’.

15 Signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (ECHR).

16 The referring court also refers to Article 49 TFEU, on freedom of establishment. However, the Court should reformulate that question without including that provision, since leadership roles within a football club do not seem to me to fall under, due to their special nature, activities carried out on a stable and continuous basis from the establishment in the Member State of destination. See judgment of 7 September 2022, Cilevičs and Others (C‑391/20, EU:C:2022:638, paragraph 54).

17 While, in the Commission’s written observations, that objection of inadmissibility seemed to refer to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling, the Commission indicated at the hearing that that objection actually refers to the third question.

18 See, by way of illustration, judgment of 18 July 2013, Citroën Belux (C‑265/12, EU:C:2013:498, paragraphs 32 and 33).

19 Amended by the Consiglio Nazionale (CONI National Council) on 21 November 2023, by Resolution No 1745, approved by decree by the Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (President of the Council of Ministers) on 20 December 2023.

20 See Article 7(5)(l) of the CONI Statute.

21 See judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company (C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 84; ‘the judgment in European Superleague’). That is the case, in particular, of those on the exclusion of foreign players from the composition of teams participating in competitions between teams representing their country or the determination of ranking criteria used to select the athletes participating individually in competitions.

22 See judgment of 6 December 2017, Coty Germany (C‑230/16, EU:C:2017:941, paragraph 22).

23 See judgment of 25 February 2025, Alphabet and Others (C‑233/23, EU:C:2025:110, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

24 See judgment in European Superleague (paragraphs 131 to 135).

25 See judgment of 16 November 2023, Commission v Netherlands (Transfer of the value of pension rights) (C‑459/22, EU:C:2023:878, paragraph 29).

26 See judgment of 12 September 2013, Konstantinides (C‑475/11, EU:C:2013:542, paragraph 44).

27 See judgment of 4 October 2024, FIFA (C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 95; ‘the judgment in FIFA’.)

28 See point 24 of this Opinion.

29 See judgment in FIFA (paragraphs 100 and 101).

30 See judgments in European Superleague (paragraph 257) and in FIFA (paragraph 111).

31 Article 6 TEU is a general provision which is irrelevant for the purpose of analysing those questions (see judgment of 11 September 2025, Cairo Network and Others (C‑764/23 to C‑766/23, EU:C:2025:691, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited; ‘the judgment in Cairo Network’)).

32 See, inter alia, judgment of 22 June 2023, État belge (Circumstances subsequent to a return decision) (C‑711/21 and C‑712/21, EU:C:2023:503, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

33 For an even more comprehensive reminder of that case-law, see my Opinion in Commission v Poland (Ultra vires review of the Court’s case-law – Primacy of EU law) (C‑448/23, EU:C:2025:165, points 61 to 69).

34 Judgment of 16 February 2022 (C‑156/21, EU:C:2022:97; ‘the judgment in Hungary v Parliament and Council’).

35 Judgment of 5 June 2023 (C‑204/21, EU:C:2023:442; ‘the judgment in Commission v Poland’).

36 Judgments in Hungary v Parliament and Council (paragraphs 233 and 234) and in Commission v Poland (paragraphs 72 to 74).

37 See judgment in Commission v Poland (paragraphs 77 to 79).

38 Judgment of 27 February 2018 (C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 35).

39 See judgment of 2 March 2021, A.B. and Others (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court – Actions) (C‑824/18, EU:C:2021:153, paragraph 143).

40 See judgment of 20 April 2021, Repubblika (C‑896/19, EU:C:2021:311, paragraph 45).

41 See judgments of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 36); of 21 December 2023, Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (Continued holding of a judicial office) (C‑718/21, EU:C:2023:1015, paragraph 58); and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others (C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 55).

42 See, inter alia, judgment of 28 November 2024, PT (Agreement concluded between the prosecutor and the perpetrator of an offence) (C‑432/22, EU:C:2024:987, paragraph 70). See also, in this regard, the Opinion which I recently delivered in Sociedad Civil Catalana (C‑523/24, EU:C:2025:889, points 112 to 121).

43 Judgment of 1 August 2025 (C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 75; ‘the judgment in Royal Football Club Seraing’).

44 Judgment in Royal Football Club Seraing (paragraph 86).

45 As is apparent from that judgment, that line of reasoning follows in the wake of the judgment of 21 December 2023, International Skating Union v Commission (C‑124/21 P, EU:C:2023:1012).

46 Judgment in Royal Football Club Seraing (paragraphs 76 and 100).

47 Judgment in Royal Football Club Seraing (paragraphs 84 and 85).

48 Judgment in Royal Football Club Seraing (paragraph 103).

49 Judgment in Royal Football Club Seraing (paragraph 104).

50 Judgment in Royal Football Club Seraing (paragraph 105).

51 Judgment in Cairo Network (paragraph 83).

52 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33).

53 Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 (OJ 2017 L 138, p. 131).

54 Judgment in Cairo Network (paragraphs 75 and 78).

55 At the hearing, the CONI asserted that the revocation of decisions of judicial bodies established under Italian sports law, as provided for in Article 63 of the Sports Justice Code of CONI, allows the party which has obtained a finding of illegality of a disciplinary sanction by an administrative court to make those bodies conform on that point to the judgment of that court. Even if proven, that element does not seem to me to be sufficient to exclude the incompatibility of the national provisions at issue with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter.

56 In such a situation, the review could at the very most consider whether the national rules governing the procedural arrangements for an existing legal remedy respect the conditions of equivalence and effectiveness inherent in Article 47 of the Charter. See judgment of 21 December 2021, Randstad Italia (C‑497/20, EU:C:2021:1037), which I examined in my Opinion in AW ‘T’ (C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:270, points 47 to 50).

57 Judgment of 30 June 1966 (61/65, EU:C:1966:39).

58 See, most recently, judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others (C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

59 See judgment of 21 January 2020, Banco de Santander (C‑274/14, EU:C:2020:17, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

60 ECtHR, 28 January 2020, Ali Riza and Others v. Türkiye (CE:ECHR:2020:0128JUD003022610).

61 It should be borne in mind that Article 52(3) of the Charter states that, in so far as the Charter contains rights corresponding to rights guaranteed under the ECHR, the rights under the Charter have the same meaning and scope as the meaning and scope conferred on the rights under the ECHR. As is apparent from the explanations relating to Article 47 of the Charter, the second paragraph of that article corresponds to Article 6(1) ECHR. The Court must, accordingly, ensure that its interpretation of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter ensures a level of protection which does not disregard that guaranteed by Article 6(1) ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR (see judgment of 15 July 2021, Commission v Poland (Disciplinary regime for judges) (C‑791/19, EU:C:2021:596, paragraph 165 and the case-law cited)).

62 See ECtHR, 28 January 2020, Ali Riza and Others v. Türkiye (CE:ECHR:2020:0128JUD003022610, §§ 209 and 217).

63 ECtHR, 28 January 2020, Ali Riza and Others v. Türkiye (CE:ECHR:2020:0128JUD003022610, § 216).

64 See Article 27(3) of the Statuto della FIGC (FIGC Statute), approved by the CONI National Council, by Resolution No 479 of 20 November 2024.

65 See Article 35(1) of the FIGC Statute.

66 The Federal Guarantee Board is a body primarily responsible for determining whether the members of the Federal Court and of the Federal Court of Appeal satisfy the necessary conditions to perform such duties (see Article 5(3) of the Codice di Giustizia Sportiva CONI (CONI Sports Justice Code), by Resolution No 1538, National Council of 9 November 2015, approved by decreto Presidenza Consiglio dei Ministri (Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers) on 16 December 2015).

67 See Article 5(3) of the CONI Sports Justice Code and Article 34 of the FIGC Statute.

68 See Article 26 of the FIGC Statute.

69 See Article 6(4)(11) of the CONI Statute.

70 See Article 5(2) and Article 12a(7) of the CONI Statute.

71 See Article 13b(3) of the CONI Statute.

72 See Article 6(3) of the CONI Statute.

Opinion of Advocate General Spielmann delivered on 18 December 2025.###

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