Opinion of Advocate General Norkus delivered on 18 June 2026.###

Provisional text

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

NORKUS

delivered on 18 June 2026 (1)

Case C‑582/24 P

PB

v

Single Resolution Board

( Appeal – Civil service – Members of the temporary staff – Psychological harassment – Request for assistance – Rejection of the request – Absence of prima facie evidence – Rights of the defence – Right to be heard – Principle of impartiality – Principle of good administration – Duty of care – Responsibility )

I.      Introduction

1.        By his appeal, PB seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 26 June 2024, PB v SRB (T‑789/22, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2024:426), by which the General Court dismissed his action under Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the decision of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) of 15 February 2022 rejecting his request for assistance and, second, compensation in respect of the harm that he claims to have suffered as a result of that decision.

2.        As requested by the Court, the present Opinion will focus on the first, second, fourth and fifth limbs of the first part of the first ground of appeal, which concern the concept of objective impartiality and the principles of confidentiality and transparency in relation to a request for assistance within the meaning of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’).

3.        The present case offers the Court the opportunity to elaborate on its civil service case-law by further clarifying the scope of the principle of objective impartiality, in order to ensure its consistent and effective application in the administrative practice of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. In addition, it calls upon it to specify how that principle should be reconciled with the requirements of confidentiality and transparency applicable to the handling of requests for assistance, while respecting the procedural rights of the persons concerned and the integrity of the administrative decision-making process.

II.    Legal context

4.        Article 11a(1) of the Staff Regulations states:

‘An official shall not, in the performance of his duties and save as hereinafter provided, deal with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, he has any personal interest such as to impair his independence, and, in particular, family and financial interests.’

5.        Under Article 12a(1) and (3) of the Staff Regulations ‘officials shall refrain from any form of psychological or sexual harassment’, harassment meaning ‘any improper conduct that takes place over a period, is repetitive or systematic and involves physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts that are intentional and that may undermine the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of any person’.

6.        Article 24 of the Staff Regulations states:

‘The Union shall assist any official, in particular in proceedings against any person perpetrating threats, insulting or defamatory acts or utterances, or any attack to person or property to which he or a member of his family is subjected by reason of his position or duties.

It shall jointly and severally compensate the official for damage suffered in such cases, in so far as the official did not either intentionally or through grave negligence cause damage and has been unable to obtain compensation from the person who did cause it.’

7.        Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations provides:

‘Any person to whom these Staff Regulations apply may submit to the appointing authority a complaint against an act affecting him adversely, either where the said authority has taken a decision or where it has failed to adopt a measure prescribed by the Staff Regulations. The complaint must be lodged within three months. …’

III. Background to the dispute, the procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

A.      Background to the dispute

8.        On 1 November 2016, the appellant was recruited by the SRB as a member of the temporary staff under Article 2(f) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’) and classified in grade AD 6. He was then appointed as a lawyer in unit 01 of the SRB’s secretariat. After having successfully participated in an external recruitment procedure, he was reclassified in grade AD 7 with effect from 1 October 2017 and continued to perform his duties, first as a senior expert in policy and external relations, and then as a senior legal expert. Since then, he has not been reclassified.

9.        On 15 October 2021, considering himself the victim of psychological harassment by the Chair of the SRB, the appellant submitted a request for assistance under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, applicable to members of the temporary staff under Article 11 of the CEOS (‘the request for assistance’), to the SRB’s anti-harassment department. He alleged a pattern of behaviour that he considered constituted psychological harassment affecting his well-being and leading to a state of burnout.

10.      His complaints were centred on three main issues:

11.      First, he alleged various instances of inappropriate conduct by the Chair: offensive public remarks, repeated criticism of his professional contributions, gradual sidelining, lack of communication and failure to deliver on assurances given regarding his internal mobility. He described, inter alia, an incident that occurred at a meeting on 19 September 2018 concerning his master’s dissertation criticising the SRB’s governance, after which he was ordered to withdraw the copies circulated. He also denounced shouting in public by the Chair, the refusal to approve his internal transfer, the lack of reclassification despite his length of service and favourable recommendations, the refusal to adjust his working hours and the lack of recognition in his appraisal reports.

12.      Second, he implicated his former head of unit, now Vice-Chair of the SRB, whom he accused of having contributed to his marginalisation and lack of promotion, and of even manipulating certain internal procedures to his detriment. He believed that the Chair and Vice-Chair had acted in a concerted manner to damage his career and portray him in a negative light.

13.      Third, the appellant claimed that such behaviour was part of a broader institutional context characterised by a lack of transparency and a problematic organisational culture. He referred, inter alia, to the failure to communicate certain internal decisions, erratic staff management practices, a high rate of staff turnover, alleged threats to sick staff and the use of the reclassification system, which he described as a tool for exerting pressure.

14.      On 18 November 2021, the SRB’s plenary session suspended the delegation of powers of the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment (AECE) to the Chair for the handling of that request and entrusted those powers to a separate permanent member (‘the designated AECE’). The designated AECE then instructed the compliance department to conduct a preliminary assessment of the request.

15.      The compliance department requested clarification and evidence from the appellant and asked the human resources department and the Vice-Chair to submit observations. In its preliminary report of 31 January 2022, it concluded that there was no prima facie evidence of the alleged facts and recommended that the request be rejected without opening a formal investigation, while allowing the appellant to adduce further evidence.

16.      By decision notified to the appellant on 15 February 2022, the designated AECE, after receiving the appellant’s observations on the preliminary report, rejected the request for assistance (‘the decision at issue’), on the ground that the cumulative conditions for harassment within the meaning of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations had not been met and that sufficient evidence had not been provided.

17.      Following that decision, the appellant requested access to the file and to various documents, both on the basis of the right of access to documents and the protection of personal data. The compliance department sent him abridged versions of various exchanges, including the observations of the human resources department and the Vice-Chair in his capacity as the appellant’s former head of unit, as well as a summary of a preventive protective measure intended to limit direct contact with the Chair.

18.      On 9 May 2022, the appellant lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, applicable to members of the temporary staff pursuant to Article 46 of the CEOS (‘the complaint’). This was accompanied by additional requests for access relating, inter alia, to possible conflicts of interest, the decision-making chain and the internal exchanges that took place during the preliminary assessment. The complaint was rejected by the SRB by a decision of 6 September 2022, served on the appellant on 7 September 2022 (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’).

19.      The appellant subsequently took a leave of absence on personal grounds. In December 2022, at the end of the Chair’s term and after a new Chair took office, he was informed of the intention not to renew his contract. By decisions of 22 and 27 February 2023, he was formally notified of the end of his contract on 30 September 2023 and discharged from his duties.

B.      The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

20.      The appellant brought an action before the General Court seeking annulment of the decision at issue. In support of his claim for annulment, he raised three pleas in law alleging, first, procedural defects and an infringement of the rights of the defence; second, a breach of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, of the duty of care and the duty to provide assistance and the principle of good administration; and, third, a manifest error of assessment of the evidence presented in the request for assistance, an error in the methodology applied and a breach of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations. In support of his claim for compensation, he further alleged an infringement of the right to be heard and the rights of the defence.

21.      In the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed the action in its entirety.

C.      The procedure before the Court of Justice and the forms of order sought

22.      By his appeal, the appellant claims that the Court should:

–        set aside the judgment under appeal;

–        dispose of the case and thus annul the decision at issue and the decision rejecting the complaint;

–        order the SRB to pay compensation in the amount of EUR 50 000; and

–        order the SRB to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and before the Court of Justice.

23.      In its response, the SRB contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the appeal as inadmissible and, in any event, as entirely unfounded, and

–        order the appellant to pay the costs.

IV.    Legal analysis

A.      The grounds of appeal raised by the appellant and the scope of the assessment to be carried out

24.      By his appeal, the appellant relies on two grounds of appeal in support of his claim for annulment. The first ground of appeal, divided into two parts, concerns, on the one hand, the assessment by the judgment under appeal of the first plea raised at first instance and, on the other hand, that of the second plea submitted to the General Court. The second ground of appeal concerns the examination, by the judgment under appeal, of the third plea relied on at first instance. The appellant also puts forward a separate ground of appeal in support of his claim for compensation.

25.      As previously stated, the present Opinion will be limited to an examination of the first, second, fourth and fifth limbs of the first part of the first ground of appeal. In the interests of clarity, the analysis will be structured around the separate legal issues raised by those different limbs. In the first place, the first and second limbs will be examined, in so far as they relate to compliance with the principle of objective impartiality, (2) followed, in the second place, by the fourth and fifth limbs, relating to the principles of confidentiality (3) and transparency (4) applicable in the context of a request for assistance under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations.

26.      A separate examination is necessary since the principles of impartiality, transparency and confidentiality, although closely linked in the EU legal order, each retain their legislative autonomy. Impartiality, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), is a component of the principle of good administration. (5) Transparency – based, inter alia, on Article 15 TFEU and Article 42 of the Charter – is aimed at ensuring the openness of administrative action, while confidentiality is intended to protect legitimate interests, (6) such as the rights of the defence and the protection of personal data. Those principles also set out particular methods of application in civil service law, taking into account the specific nature of relations under the Staff Regulations. The relationship between them must be balanced, in each case, in accordance with the requirements of good administration.

B.      The alleged infringement of the principle of objective impartiality

1.      The concept of ‘impartiality’ in EU law

27.      Before embarking on a substantive examination of the grounds of the General Court’s judgment, having regard to a possible breach of the principle of impartiality, it is appropriate to recall the scope of that principle, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, in the EU legal order.

28.      It is settled case-law that the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union are required to respect the fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, which include the right to good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter. (7) That right includes, inter alia, the right of every person to have his or her affairs handled impartially. The requirement of impartiality is, in that regard, of fundamental importance in so far as it is closely linked to the principle of equal treatment, which is at the heart of the EU legal order. It aims to avoid any situation where there could be a conflict of interest on the part of officials or agents acting on behalf of the institutions and to ensure their independence and probity, as regards both their internal functioning and the image they project externally. It thus covers all circumstances that an agent must reasonably consider as being of such a nature as to be viewed by third parties as a possible source of impairment of his or her independence in the matter. (8)

29.      The Court’s case-law specifies that that requirement has two complementary dimensions. On the one hand, subjective impartiality presupposes that the member of the institution concerned may not show any bias or personal prejudice in the handling of the case. On the other hand, objective impartiality refers to the guarantees offered by the organisation and the conduct of the procedure. On that basis, the institution must provide sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias. It is not necessary to prove actual bias. It is sufficient for a legitimate doubt to arise objectively and which cannot be dispelled. (9) The assessment is carried out from the perspective of a reasonable and informed external observer, with due regard to the appearance of independence required of the procedure.

30.      It also emerges from the case-law that certain circumstances, such as prior knowledge of the facts by the persons involved in the adoption of an administrative or judicial decision, are not sufficient, in themselves, to establish a lack of impartiality. Such knowledge may be inherent in the prior or parallel performance of professional duties and does not automatically reveal bias. To find an infringement of the requirement of objective impartiality, it is necessary to establish whether, in a particular case, there is a concrete objective factor, such as a conflict of interest on the part of officials or agents acting on behalf of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, capable of giving rise to a legitimate doubt in the minds of third parties as to the impartiality of that procedure. (10) It is only where, having regard to the organisation and conduct of the procedure, such doubt cannot reasonably be dispelled that the requirement of impartiality must be regarded as having been infringed.

31.      In the light of those considerations, it is necessary to assess whether, as the appellant maintains, the General Court misconstrued the concept of objective impartiality.

2.      The alleged infringement of the principle of impartiality concerning the compliance department and the Chief Compliance Officer

32.      By the first limb of the first ground of appeal, covering paragraphs 46 to 52, 116, 117 and 176 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant alleges infringement of the principle of objective impartiality owing to a conflict of interest involving Ms B, the SRB’s Chief Compliance Officer.

(a)    Observations of the parties

33.      The appellant submits that the General Court infringed that principle by ruling out the existence of a conflict of interest involving Ms B, owing to their previous personal relationship and her knowledge of the problems he was experiencing with the SRB’s Chair, as well as his intention to file a harassment complaint. According to the appellant, that situation was capable of giving rise to a legitimate doubt as to impartiality, such that Ms B should have withdrawn from the procedure. He also complains that the General Court ruled ultra petita, that it erred in law in upholding the argument based on the possibility of contacting other members of the service, and that it adopted a circular reasoning. He further submits that the SRB failed to provide any evidence of Ms B’s impartiality, that the transmission of certain documents and the change of signatory AECE are not sufficient to dispel the doubt, and that together those factors vitiated the procedure under Article 11a of the Staff Regulations.

34.      In response, the SRB contends that the appellant failed to demonstrate the alleged confidences or the existence of an actual risk of bias, mere knowledge of the facts being insufficient to constitute an infringement of the principle of objective impartiality. It submits that the burden of proof falls on the appellant and that the line of argument regarding the failure to send documents improperly seeks to reverse that burden, without establishing how those documents could have influenced the decision at issue. The complaints relating to the protection measure referred to in paragraph 176 of the judgment under appeal, the argument adopted in paragraph 48 of that judgment and an alleged ultra petita decision are, according to the SRB, ineffective or insufficiently substantiated, there being no evidence of a conflict of interest within the compliance department.

(b)    Analysis of the judgment under appeal

(1)    The reasoning of the General Court

35.      In paragraphs 42 to 52 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court examined the appellant’s complaint that the preliminary assessment of his request for assistance had been conducted in breach of the principle of objective impartiality.

36.      The General Court began by recalling the applicable legal framework. Referring to Article 41 of the Charter, it pointed out that everyone has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially. Impartiality has a subjective component (absence of personal bias) and an objective component, which requires the institution to offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias. The assessment must be carried out from the perspective of an objective and informed third party, having regard to the actual circumstances of the case.

37.      Applying those principles, the General Court notes that, prior to the preliminary assessment, the compliance department examined whether there were any conflicts of interest, including by consulting the Head of the Legal Service. It also notes that, by decision of the SRB’s plenary session, the Chair – referred to in the request for assistance – had been excluded from the procedure, her powers as AECE having been suspended and delegated to another permanent member. Thus, according to the General Court, the accused person was not involved in making the decision on the request for assistance. The appellant also failed to demonstrate that other members of the compliance department had a specific conflict of interest.

38.      As regards the Chief Compliance Officer in particular, the General Court notes that the appellant himself had described her as a ‘friend’. However, it considers that that circumstance alone cannot establish the existence of a conflict of interest within the meaning of Article 11a of the Staff Regulations or give rise to a legitimate doubt as to her objective impartiality. It further observes that the preliminary assessment led to the recommendation to reject the request without opening an investigation, which, in its view, does not lead to the conclusion that the alleged existence of a personal relationship had benefited the appellant or impaired the objectivity of the analysis.

39.      On balance, the General Court considers that there was no concrete evidence that the preliminary assessment procedure was vitiated by a lack of objective impartiality. It therefore rejected the plea alleging infringement of that principle as regards the compliance department and the Chief Compliance Officer.

(2)    Assessment

40.      It should be noted, as a preliminary point, that the General Court preceded its analysis with a particularly structured presentation, in paragraph 45 of the judgment under appeal, of the case-law of the Court of Justice on the principle of impartiality, in which it set out details of the basis and essential characteristics of that principle in the EU legal order. It is right to draw a distinction, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, between subjective impartiality and objective impartiality, in paragraph 45 of the judgment under appeal, and specifically points out, in paragraph 46 of that judgment, that only objective impartiality is at issue in the present case.

41.      In those circumstances, the issue raised in this appeal is not an infringement of the applicable legal criterion as such, but the manner in which the General Court applied that criterion to the circumstances of the case when examining the complaints alleging conflicts of interest. In essence, the appellant submits that the participation of certain individuals in the procedure that led to the adoption of the decision at issue was such as to characterise a conflict of interest and thus give rise, from the perspective of a reasonable and informed external observer, to a legitimate doubt as to their impartiality. The individuals concerned are the Chief Compliance Officer, the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the SRB.

42.      Among the circumstances that the appellant claims could give rise to the appearance of a conflict of interest for the Chief Compliance Officer is the fact that, first, she was already aware of the appellant’s situation (11) and second, she had obtained that information as a result of their friendship. (12) Although these factors are to some degree connected, there are objective reasons why they should be considered separately.

(i)    The relevance of the prior knowledge, by the Chief Compliance Officer, of the appellant’s situation

43.      The appellant submits that the Chief Compliance Officer was aware of his situation, since he had confided in her about the difficulties he was having. In that regard, it is important to note that the General Court specifically examined that argument and found that it was the appellant himself who had informed the Chief Compliance Officer of the nature of his request for assistance. Although the General Court’s reasoning appears somewhat succinct, it is clear from the judgment under appeal that it seeks, in essence, to put the appellant’s line of argument into context by considering that the grounds capable of establishing possible bias on the part of the Chief Compliance Officer – assuming that such a bias can be established – are ultimately a personal matter for the appellant.

44.      The General Court’s line of argument cannot, prima facie, be dismissed. Indeed, if a lack of impartiality were to be inferred from the mere knowledge of a certain state of affairs, the appellant would then be able to influence the course of the administrative procedure by disqualifying participants from taking part in the procedure simply by sending them information. It cannot be accepted that a party may effectively raise doubts as to the impartiality of a body by relying on a situation that that party made a decisive contribution to, unless it can be established that, independently of that contribution, there was objectively verifiable evidence able to give rise, in the mind of an objective and informed observer, to a legitimate doubt as to the neutrality of the procedure. The General Court thus appears to implicitly criticise that notion of objective impartiality which the appellant appears to put forward.

45.      Although the General Court does not specify the doctrinal basis of that line of argument, it could, in theory, be linked either to the concept of abuse of rights or to the general principle that no one may invoke his or her own turpitude (nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans). In any event, those two principles ultimately have the same end result, in so far as they imply that a party cannot benefit legally from an irregular situation that he or she has created or to which he or she has made a decisive contribution. The exact characterisation of that reasoning is not, however, decisive in the present case, since that question is not central to the case. In practice, it is a question of determining whether prior knowledge of a fact could, in itself, constitute evidence of objective bias. The analysis should therefore focus on that more general question.

46.      Such a broad interpretation of the concept of objective bias, according to which merely having prior knowledge of a state of affairs could constitute a circumstance capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts as to the neutrality of a participant in the procedure, would, if adopted, be difficult to apply and could impose constraints on the administration, to the point of interfering with its proper functioning. There is good reason why the Court of Justice does not adopt such a broad definition of the concept of objective impartiality. As previously recalled, it is clear from its case-law that prior knowledge of the facts by those called upon to participate in the adoption of a judicial or administrative decision is not, in itself, capable of vitiating that decision with a procedural defect of lack of impartiality. (13)

47.      Such prior knowledge is sometimes inevitable in the light of a professional activity carried out previously or in parallel by the persons concerned. (14) It is therefore necessary to establish whether, in a particular case, there is an objective factor – such as a conflict of interest, on the part of officials or agents acting on behalf of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies – capable of giving rise to a legitimate doubt in the minds of third parties as to the impartiality of that procedure.

48.      That case-law appears all the more relevant in the present case since the Chief Compliance Officer of an EU agency is specifically responsible for ensuring compliance with EU law, the internal rules of the agency and the ethical standards applicable to staff and decision-making bodies. The compliance department is, as a rule, responsible for ensuring the prevention and detection of breaches of obligations under the Staff Regulations, advising the administration on ethical issues and conflicts of interest, and contributing to the implementation of internal control and good governance mechanisms. (15)

49.      In those circumstances, it is not unusual for the Chief Compliance Officer to be informed of potential failings or breaches of the Staff Regulations, such as incidents of workplace harassment. As a point of contact for requests for assistance, reports and complaints from staff, as well as for informal communications relating to compliance with professional obligations, the Chief Compliance Officer is, by nature, expected to have knowledge of the agency’s internal situations. Accordingly, in exercising such functions, the Chief Compliance Officer cannot be expected to remain in complete ignorance of allegations of harassment within the agency.

50.      It follows that the mere fact that the Chief Compliance Officer is required, by reason of her institutional responsibilities, to be aware of the situation of certain officials or agents under the Staff Regulations – including the appellant, where necessary – cannot, in itself, justify doubts as to her objective impartiality. Such a presumption would go further than is required by the guarantees of impartiality and would be incompatible with the requirements of the proper functioning of the public service. Indeed, regardless of the information that the Chief Compliance Officer may receive in a professional capacity, whether from the persons concerned or from other sources, she remains bound by the obligations of independence and probity imposed on all EU officials.

51.      Therefore, the fact that the appellant confided in the Chief Compliance Officer and she thus gained specific knowledge of his situation – inherent in the performance of her duties – cannot, in itself, give rise to reasonable doubts as to her objective impartiality.

(ii) The relevance of the alleged friendship with the Chief Compliance Officer

52.      That being the case, it cannot be excluded that, in the main proceedings, the existence of a conflict of interest might give rise to legitimate doubts as to the objective impartiality of the Chief Compliance Officer. In that respect, the appellant complains that the General Court misconstrued the scope of that requirement by failing, in essence, to take into account the friendship he allegedly had with the Chief Compliance Officer. His line of argument must be understood in the sense that it is precisely because of the special bond of trust between them that he was persuaded to confide in her about his situation.

53.      In that regard, it should be noted, in the first place, that the General Court rightly referred to Article 11a of the Staff Regulations, under which an official may not, in the performance of his or her duties, deal with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, he or she has any personal interest such as to impair his or her independence, and, in particular, family and financial interests. In the second place, the General Court pointed out that the compliance department had conducted a preliminary examination which found no evidence of any conflict of interest.

54.      In those circumstances, the General Court was, in principle, not required to conduct a more in-depth legal analysis of the extent to which the alleged friendship between the appellant and the Chief Compliance Officer, as well as the exchange of information about the appellant’s situation in the context of that close relationship, might constitute a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, it is necessary to examine the appellant’s line of argument on that point in more detail.

55.      Interpersonal relationships could, in theory, give rise to a ‘conflict of interest’ within the meaning of EU civil service law. From an examination of the relevant provisions governing the conduct of officials and other servants of the Union, it emerges that personal interests – in particular family interests, but also other private ties – might impair the independence and impartiality of such officials and servants or, at the very least, give the appearance thereof.

56.      Admittedly, none of the provisions examined expressly prohibits friendships between officials. Similarly, ‘friendship’ is not, as such, identified as a specific situation capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts as to the impartiality of the officials concerned. Nevertheless, officials are bound by a special duty of care in order to prevent any situation that could give rise to a conflict of interest, particularly when adopting decisions of a certain importance to third parties. To that end, the relevant provisions governing the conduct of officials rely on general clauses, formulated in sufficiently broad terms so as to encompass the wide range of situations liable to arise in practice.

57.      According to Article 11a of the Staff Regulations, officials and other servants are required to avoid any situation in which their personal interests could conflict with their professional obligations. Personal interests, and in particular family interests, are specifically referred to therein as being capable of generating a conflict of interest. This is not limited to cases in which an actual breach of impartiality is established, but also covers situations in which it objectively appears that the servant concerned might not perform his or her duties with the requisite level of neutrality and independence.

58.      Similar requirements stem from the various administrative codes of conduct applicable within EU institutions and bodies. Thus, the European Ombudsman’s code prohibits any conduct guided by personal or family interests. (16) The Commission’s code requires agents to act impartially, independently of any personal interest. (17) Similarly, the SRB’s code provides that its members and agents must avoid any situation that could give rise to a conflict of interest or be perceived as such, such a conflict existing particularly where private or personal interests may influence or appear to influence the impartial and objective performance of their tasks. (18)

59.      That being the case, the mere existence of interpersonal relationships – whether acquaintances, close working relationships (19) or even friendships – cannot, as such, constitute a ‘conflict of interest’. In that regard, account must be taken of the fact that officials and other servants of the Union are called upon to perform their duties in a professional setting characterised by close and often long-standing collaboration, conducive to the formation of personal ties. To take a contrary approach would be to ignore how the administration operates in practice and would risk undermining its proper functioning, given that the quality of staff relations contributes significantly to a healthy and productive work environment. By contrast, it is necessary to assess, in the light of the circumstances of each case, whether the relationship at issue could objectively give rise to legitimate doubts as to the impartiality of the person concerned.

60.      That may be the case, inter alia, where a particularly close personal bond exists  and the official concerned is called upon to rule on or participate in a decision directly affecting the person with whom he or she has that bond. Friendship may therefore constitute a relevant factor where it reveals a degree of personal closeness such that it is capable, from the perspective of a reasonable and informed third party, of impairing or, at the very least, calling into question the impartial performance of duties. (20) Evidence that a close personal relationship exists might include participation in shared activities outside the workplace or attendance at family events.

61.      Nevertheless, such a finding requires a specific individual examination. The existence of objective evidence – such as a close personal relationship combined with decision-making power or influence – should be established that could give rise to legitimate doubts in the minds of third parties as to the impartiality of the administration. In the absence of such evidence, the existence of a personal relationship or a friendship is not, in itself, sufficient to constitute a conflict of interest under EU civil service law.

62.      The question whether such a close relationship existed in the present case is a question of fact which was, in principle, for the General Court to examine in the proceedings at first instance. That approach reflects the division of jurisdiction between the EU Courts in appeal proceedings. (21) Still, there is nothing in the appellant’s line of argument to suggest that the relationship between him and the Chief Compliance Officer was particularly close or extended beyond a professional setting, such as may exist between officials or servants within any other institution, body, office or agency of the Union.

63.      In so far as the appellant submits that opinions were exchanged about the hierarchy and the problems he claims to have experienced – without any evidence to substantiate the actual existence of such exchanges – those allegations instead tend to indicate that the relationship at issue remained in a professional setting and concerned aspects typically falling within the remit of the agency’s compliance department. (22)

64.      In the absence of sufficiently concrete evidence of the existence of a conflict of interest, the General Court cannot be criticised for having misconstrued the scope of the principle of objective impartiality in the present case. It was therefore correct to examine the action solely in the light of the facts at its disposal.

(iii) The General Court’s line of argument based on the lack of impact of alleged bias

65.      An error of law in the grounds of the judgment under appeal must, in any event, be found in so far as the General Court considered, in paragraph 51 of that judgment, as evidence capable of excluding any doubt as to the independence of the Chief Compliance Officer, the fact that the compliance department had decided, following a preliminary assessment, to reject the request for assistance without opening an administrative investigation.

66.      By attaching particular importance to the nature of the decision adopted following that assessment, the General Court thus appears to have based its finding of objective impartiality on the lack of personal interest of the Chief Compliance Officer, the possibly favourable nature of her attitude towards the appellant and, ultimately, the unfavourable outcome of the procedure for him. Such reasoning may be construed as making the existence of a lack of objective impartiality contingent upon demonstrating specific bias or an actual influence on the outcome of the procedure, even though the requirement of objective impartiality is actually intended to prevent any legitimate doubt as to the neutrality of that procedure, regardless of any evidence of actual bias or the nature of the decision adopted.

67.      Indeed, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the requirement of objective impartiality is intended to prevent any legitimate doubt as to the absence of bias in the handling of a case. The assessment of compliance with that requirement does not depend on evidence of actual bias or on the demonstration of a specific personal interest on the part of the persons required to take part in the procedure. (23) It consists solely of determining whether objectively verifiable circumstances are such as to give rise, in the mind of an objective and informed observer, to a legitimate doubt as to the neutrality of the examination. In the same vein, the impartiality of a procedure cannot be assessed in the light of its outcome, the fact that a decision is favourable or unfavourable to the person concerned being, as such, irrelevant in that regard.

68.      It follows that the General Court cannot, in principle, rule out the existence of a legitimate doubt as to objective impartiality on the sole ground that the person concerned has no personal interest in the outcome of the procedure or that the decision adopted is not favourable to him or her. Such an approach would risk unduly reducing the scope of the principle of objective impartiality by equating it with the mere absence of a personal conflict of interest or proven bias, even though that principle also seeks to maintain the confidence that individuals must be able to have in the neutrality of administrative procedures. (24)

69.      Nevertheless, the finding of such a defect in the grounds of the judgment under appeal is not sufficient justification, in the present case, for that judgment to be set aside. It is clear from an overall reading of the judgment that the General Court did not confine itself to noting the absence of personal interest or actual influence on the outcome of the procedure, but examined all the pertinent facts of the case in order to determine whether they were capable of giving rise to a legitimate doubt as to the objective impartiality of the procedure. It took into consideration, inter alia, the origin of the Chief Compliance Officer’s knowledge of the facts, the absence of her involvement in the decision-making that led to the adoption of the decision at issue, and the institutional safeguards put in place by the SRB.

70.      In those circumstances, even though certain elements of the grounds contained in paragraph 51 of the judgment under appeal may be construed as establishing an excessively close link between the absence of personal interest or the outcome of the procedure and the existence of objective impartiality, the fact remains that the General Court ultimately carried out an overall assessment of the facts of the case in accordance with the requirements of EU law. Accordingly, the defect observed in the grounds cannot be considered capable of vitiating the judgment under appeal with an error of law justifying its annulment.

71.      It follows that the first limb of the first ground of appeal must be rejected.

3.      The alleged infringement of the principle of impartiality due to the hierarchical position of the Chair and Vice-Chair

72.      By the second limb of the first ground of appeal, covering paragraphs 54 to 68, 70 to 72, 75, 76, 79 and 81 to 84 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant relies on several infringements of the requirement of impartiality in the handling of the request for assistance.

(a)    Observations of the parties

73.      In that regard, the appellant submits that a subordinate may not take part in the examination of a complaint against a superior, owing to the risk of pressure or retaliation that could compromise his or her impartiality. According to the appellant, the General Court erred in ruling out the possibility that the SRB’s Chair could influence the other directors, including the designated AECE, as well as other staff members, and made the same error as regards the role of the Vice-Chair. In the alternative, he relies on a distortion of the facts, arguing that the Vice-Chair had been able to influence the examination of his request, contrary to the General Court’s finding.

74.      The SRB submits that no general presumption of bias may be inferred merely from a hierarchical link between a subordinate and a superior who is the subject of a complaint. The existence of a conflict of interest must be specifically established on the basis of detailed evidence demonstrating an actual risk of breach of impartiality, which the appellant failed to do. Further, as regards the alleged distortion of the facts in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant did not advance any specific argument proving that it was real.

(b)    Analysis of the judgment under appeal

(1)    The reasoning of the General Court

75.      In paragraphs 54 to 68 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court examines the complaint that objective impartiality was compromised owing to the hierarchical subordination of the participants to the Chair, against whom the complaint was made. It notes that the decision at issue was not adopted by the Chair, but by the designated AECE, following a formal decision of the SRB in plenary session suspending the Chair’s powers to handle the request for assistance. The General Court analyses the applicable institutional framework, in particular Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, (25) and points out that the Chair has no powers to appoint or dismiss the other permanent members of the SRB. The designated AECE therefore exercised his jurisdiction on the basis of a collegial decision and not because he was personally subordinate to the Chair. It concludes from this that the mere existence of an abstract hierarchical link is not sufficient to raise a legitimate doubt as to objective impartiality, in the absence of specific evidence establishing an actual influence on the procedure.

76.      In paragraphs 69 to 84 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court examines the role of the Vice-Chair, also referred to in some of the allegations and heard during the preliminary assessment. It recalls that the obligation to provide assistance requires the administration to seriously examine the alleged facts and may involve the hearing of persons who could have relevant information, including those implicated. The General Court notes that the Vice-Chair did not participate in the decision on the request for assistance and that he no longer exercised direct supervisory authority over the appellant at the time of the assessment. His hearing concerned facts he knew about as the former head of unit or by reason of his position within the SRB.

77.      The General Court considers that a mere fear of retaliation or the existence of a previous hierarchical relationship is not sufficient, on its own, to establish a lack of objective impartiality. It points out that there is no concrete evidence that the Chair had influenced the Vice-Chair or that the Vice-Chair had played a decisive role in the decision at issue. It further notes that some of the information in the file, in particular the Vice-Chair’s endorsement of several of the appellant’s mobility requests in his appraisal report, are at odds with the allegation of concerted behaviour intended to undermine the appellant. The General Court thus concludes that the appellant failed to establish the existence of a legitimate doubt as to the objective impartiality of the participants concerned and rejects the plea on those various points.

(2)    Assessment

(i)    The role of the Chair

78.      By his arguments, the appellant alleges that the General Court erred in law in that it did not find an infringement of the requirement of objective impartiality, even though the persons implicated in the harassment complaint held the most senior hierarchical positions within the SRB. By that complaint, the appellant alleges, in essence, structural deficiencies in the agency’s organisation, which, in his view, did not adequately ensure compliance with the requirements of impartiality and independence.

79.      His line of argument thus amounts, in essence, to claiming that a presumption of bias must be recognised in the context of administrative organisations characterised by a distinct hierarchical structure. However, such an approach, which seeks to make the hierarchical position of the persons concerned a decisive factor in establishing a lack of objective impartiality, cannot be accepted. As will be explained below, it is incompatible with the notion of objective impartiality adopted in EU law, which requires the identification of concrete and objectively verifiable evidence capable of giving rise to a legitimate doubt as to the neutrality of the procedure.

80.      As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the principle of impartiality requires the administration to handle the requests submitted to it with sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to the absence of bias. (26) Impartiality has a subjective component, relating to the absence of personal bias, and an objective component, which requires an assessment of whether, regardless of the individual conduct of the persons concerned, the organisation of the procedure and the distribution of roles are likely to inspire confidence and exclude any reasonable suspicion of bias. It follows that the examination must be based on objectively verifiable evidence, assessed from the perspective of an objective and informed observer, and that it does not require, as such, proof of actual bias.

81.      Applied to the position of the SRB’s Chair in the agency’s organisational chart, this analytical framework leads to the conclusion that the mere fact that a person occupies a senior hierarchical position, or that he or she is the head of the institution, is not sufficient, in itself, to establish an infringement of the principle of objective impartiality. Such an argument would be tantamount to a presumption of structural bias whenever a complaint is made against a management authority, which would be incompatible with the normal functioning of any administration and would render meaningless the obligation, referred to in the case-law, to identify specific circumstances capable of giving rise to a legitimate doubt. (27) Thus, the existence of a hierarchical link is only relevant with regard to objective impartiality if it is accompanied by objective indications of influence, dependence or interest from which it may be concluded that the persons responsible for the examination did not, in practice, have the necessary distance for a neutral handling of the case.

82.      From that perspective, it should be examined whether, regardless of her position, the Chair was directly or indirectly involved in handling the request for assistance or whether she was still able to influence the parties involved. In that regard, the most significant circumstance is that, for the handling of the request for assistance, the Chair’s AECE powers were suspended by a formal decision of the SRB in plenary session and transferred to a designated AECE. Such a measure is precisely intended to neutralise the risk that the accused person will be, even partially, ‘judge in his or her own case’. (28) This is a particularly important institutional safeguard in principle, since it involves a functional separation between the person referred to in the complaint and the authority required to rule on it. (29)

83.      Next, it is necessary to examine whether that formal guarantee was sufficient in view of the requirement of objective impartiality or whether it can be presumed that a legitimate doubt existed on the basis of other evidence in the file. The insufficiency could result, for example, from retaining an effective power of supervision over the persons in charge of the investigation, discussions of the merits of the case, instructions, pressures or signals, whether formal or informal, that are objectively perceptible. However, in the absence of specific verifiable evidence to that effect, the mere continuation of the Chair’s institutional authority over the organisation in general is not sufficient to establish that the procedure failed to offer sufficient safeguards. Objective impartiality does not require the absence of any hierarchy within the administration, but the absence of any involvement or influence that could reasonably cast doubt on the neutrality of the examination.

84.      The same considerations apply to complaints arising from an alleged ‘climate’ of dependency or a fear of retaliation. Such an argument may, in theory, fall under objective impartiality, but it must be supported by concrete evidence in order to assess the reality and intensity of the alleged climate of unease. Otherwise, it remains a general hypothesis and is not sufficient to establish that, in the mind of an objective and informed observer, the institutional safeguards put in place were inadequate. (30) In particular, where the decision-making authority has been entrusted to a designated AECE with his or her own powers and a separate legal basis, the existence of an abstract hierarchical dependence cannot be equated with an absence of independence, according to the principle of objective impartiality.

85.      It follows that, since the Chair was formally excluded from the decision, the authority to decide on the request for assistance was transferred to a designated AECE. There is no concrete evidence that the Chair had a direct or indirect influence on the preliminary examination or on the decision at issue, since the circumstance relating to the hierarchical position held by the Chair within the SRB cannot, in itself, justify a finding of infringement of the principle of objective impartiality. In those circumstances, the complaint alleging lack of objective impartiality due to the Chair’s institutional role cannot succeed, in the absence of objectively verifiable circumstances capable of giving rise to a legitimate doubt as to the neutrality of the procedure.

86.      The General Court was right to take those elements into account in the grounds of the judgment under appeal. It noted in particular that the SRB had taken all the necessary measures to ensure that the designated AECE – and not the Chair – was called upon to decide on the appellant’s request for assistance. While it acknowledged the potential difficulties inherent in the agency’s hierarchical structure, it nevertheless duly took account of the measures implemented by the administration in order to avoid any risk, or any appearance, of undue influence. In those circumstances, it should be found that the General Court did not err in law by finding that no infringement of the principle of objective impartiality may be recognised in the present case.

(ii) The role of the Vice-Chair

87.      The appellant’s arguments relating to the role of the Vice-Chair of the SRB should be examined separately. In that regard, the appellant submits, in essence, that the involvement of the Vice-Chair in the preliminary assessment of his request for assistance could raise a legitimate doubt as to the impartiality of the procedure, since he held a senior hierarchical position within the agency and was, in some respects, concerned by the alleged facts. However, that line of argument essentially applies to the Vice-Chair the reasoning previously relied on with regard to the Chair, by postulating that the mere senior hierarchical position of a person called upon to submit observations in an internal procedure would be sufficient to raise a doubt as to the impartiality of that procedure.

88.      The mere fact that a person in a senior position is invited to submit observations in the context of the examination of a request for assistance cannot, as such, be treated as equivalent to participation in decision-making or to a decisive influence on the outcome of the procedure. Indeed, in the context of a preliminary assessment to assess the existence of prima facie evidence of harassment, it may be necessary for the administration to gather information from different individuals able to shed light on the circumstances of the case, including those accused by the appellant. Such an approach stems from the duty to examine the request for assistance seriously and expeditiously and cannot be interpreted as revealing, in itself, an absence of objective impartiality. (31)

89.      Nevertheless, it must be ascertained whether the involvement of the Vice-Chair was capable of giving rise, from the perspective of an objective and informed observer, to a legitimate doubt as to the neutrality of the procedure. In that regard, it is important to note that the Vice-Chair was not the competent authority to rule on the request for assistance and that he did not participate in the adoption of the decision at issue. His involvement was limited to providing, as the appellant’s former supervisor, information requested by the compliance department during the preliminary assessment. In the absence of precise and verifiable elements proving that he influenced the final decision of the designated AECE or the direction taken by the procedure, the mere fact that he was invited to submit observations is not sufficient to constitute a lack of objective impartiality.

90.      That conclusion is all the more compelling because objective impartiality cannot be assessed on the basis of a general presumption that any person belonging to the hierarchy of an institution would, as a matter of principle, lack the independence necessary to provide pertinent information in an internal administrative investigation. To accept such a presumption would be tantamount to paralysing the normal functioning of the administration and preventing it from gathering the evidence necessary to establish the facts. In the absence of specific circumstances demonstrating the existence of a personal interest, a direct involvement in the alleged facts or an influence on the final decision, the Vice-Chair’s participation purely as a source of information during the investigation phase cannot be regarded as capable of giving rise to a legitimate doubt as to the impartiality of the procedure.

91.      It follows that the General Court did not err in law by considering that the Vice-Chair’s involvement in the preliminary assessment of the request for assistance did not infringe the principle of objective impartiality. Since the Vice-Chair did not exercise any decision-making power and was not involved in the adoption of the decision at issue, and since there is no concrete evidence of undue influence on the conduct of the procedure, the circumstances relied on by the appellant are not capable of giving rise, in the mind of an objective and informed observer, to a legitimate doubt as to the neutrality of the examination of his request for assistance.

92.      It follows from the foregoing that the second limb of the first ground of appeal must be dismissed.

C.      The alleged breach of the transparency obligation

93.      By the fourth limb of the first ground of appeal, covering paragraphs 99, 102, 104, 106 and 108 to 110 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant alleges a breach of the transparency obligation, owing to the refusal to send him certain documents.

1.      The concept of ‘transparency’ in EU law

94.      The principle of transparency is a corollary of the principle of good administration. That principle, which guides the action of the EU administration, takes various forms. Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter expressly grants everyone the right to have access to his or her file. In procedures under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, the requirement of transparency must be understood in combination with the right to be heard and the adversarial principle, which are also components of the principle of good administration. (32) According to settled case-law, the right to be heard implies, when a procedure is opened in relation to allegations of harassment on the basis of Articles 12a and 24 of the Staff Regulations, that any person whose interests are capable of being affected by a decision of the administration is put in a position to effectively make known his or her views on the evidence on which the administration intends to base its decision. (33)

95.      From that point of view, access to the file and to the relevant information allowing the person concerned to effectively submit his or her observations must be granted not only to the person referred to in the request for assistance, but also to the person who submitted the request for assistance. Furthermore, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the right to be heard, that access must be ensured from the pre-litigation stage of the procedure. (34) It is in the light of those considerations that the complaint raised by the appellant must be examined.

2.      Observations of the parties

96.      The appellant submits that the General Court erred in law by holding, in paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal, that he was not entitled to request a copy of the mandate by which his head of unit was authorised to sign the decision rejecting the complaint. In addition, the fact that that person was made aware of the complaint demonstrated a breach of confidentiality in the handling of the request for assistance. The appellant further notes that, given the particularly sensitive nature of the case, the decision at issue should have been adopted, by way of exception, by a panel of three directors of the SRB and that the appeal against their decision should have been referred to a body external to that agency for consideration. According to the appellant, the General Court failed to consider the argument relating to the SRB’s lack of impartiality and wrongly confined itself, in paragraphs 145 to 156 of the judgment under appeal, to assessing whether confidentiality had been breached by examining whether any retaliatory measures had been taken.

97.      In the first place, the SRB contends that its obligation, established by the case-law, to send the appellant information on the procedure for examining the request for assistance only applies to witness statements. In the second place, the appellant does not allege any error of law concerning paragraphs 104 and 108 of the judgment under appeal. As a consequence, the present limb is not well founded in that regard. In the third place, the SRB notes that the appellant merely challenges the order in which the General Court dealt with his arguments and fails to explain how the facts that occurred after the decision at issue could affect its legality. In the fourth place, the SRB argues that the assertion, contained in the appeal, that ‘all SRB staff are under the Chair’s authority’ does not mean that the appellant questioned the impartiality of his new head of unit.

3.      Analysis of the judgment under appeal

(a)    The reasoning of the General Court

98.      The General Court dismissed the complaint alleging lack of transparency and irregularities in the adoption of the decision rejecting the complaint. It notes, in the first place, that the appellant failed to establish the existence of a legal obligation requiring the SRB to send him the delegations of power relied on. In that regard, the right of access to information in a procedure of that type is limited to the material necessary for the effective exercise of procedural rights, including the right to be heard. The appellant had been informed of the decision of 18 November 2021 by which the SRB had suspended the Chair’s powers concerning the request for assistance and had transferred them to another authority. In those circumstances, the failure to send other documents relating to internal delegations cannot be regarded as an infringement of the principle of transparency.

99.      In the second place, the General Court examines the argument that the decision rejecting the complaint was signed incorrectly by the appellant’s new head of unit. It notes that, under the applicable legal framework, the AECE’s powers belong in principle to the SRB’s plenary session, which delegates them to the Chair and may sub-delegate them. In the present case, the complaint was examined by three SRB members appointed in accordance with the relevant internal rules, which precluded any irregularity as to the authority competent to hear that complaint. Furthermore, the decision was signed by the head of the secretariat solely for formal authentication purposes, in accordance with the internal rules on signing the SRB’s decisions.

100. Accordingly, the General Court concludes that neither the failure to send the delegations of power nor the methods of signature of the decision rejecting the complaint cast doubt on the legality of the procedure or the competence of the authority that heard the complaint. The evidence relied on by the appellant is therefore not such as to demonstrate a breach of the transparency requirements or the applicable procedural rules, so that the complaint must be rejected.

(b)    Assessment

101. As regards the alleged infringement of the principle of transparency relied on by the appellant, it should be noted, as a preliminary point, that the General Court held that the appellant did not have a right of access to the document attesting to the involvement of his new head of unit in the procedure for reviewing his complaint, including the document containing the signature of the decision rejecting the opening of an investigation.

102. In that regard, the General Court, in paragraphs 98 to 105 of the judgment under appeal, first of all examined the appellant’s arguments relating to the signing of the decision rejecting the complaint and the failure to send him various internal documents relating to the delegations of power. It noted, inter alia, in paragraph 106 of that judgment, that the decision on the complaint was to be adopted by the AECE and that, in accordance with the legal framework applicable to the SRB, that competence was reserved to the plenary session. Second, the General Court found, in paragraphs 107 to 109 of that judgment, that the Chair had merely delegated the authentication of the decision to the head of the secretariat, who was also the appellant’s head of unit, and that the latter’s signature was purely formal in nature, without entailing a transfer of decision-making authority. In those circumstances, it held, in paragraph 110 of the judgment under appeal, that those factors did not amount to a procedural irregularity and rejected the appellant’s arguments.

103. Although that finding does not, as such, disclose an error of law, the question nevertheless arises of whether the General Court interpreted the scope of the right of access in an overly restrictive manner by limiting it to certain categories of documents. Thus, in paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court states that the appellant has failed to establish that the administration had a legal obligation to disclose information beyond what is recognised by the case-law. However, the case-law relied on cannot be construed as establishing an exhaustive list of documents that may be disclosed. Indeed, the Court of Justice has held that the person who lodged a harassment complaint must receive a summary, at the very least, of the statements made by the person accused and of the statements of the witnesses heard, in order to be able effectively to submit his or her observations before the administration takes a decision. Such a summary must, if necessary, be disclosed while respecting the principle of confidentiality. (35)

104. The use of the expression ‘at the very least’ makes it clear that the items mentioned are a procedural minimum and not an exhaustive list of the information or documents that may be sent to the complainant. By using that expression, the Court of Justice sought to emphasise that the complainant must be able to acquaint himself or herself with certain information or certain documents on which the administration might base a decision adversely affecting him or her. This also applies at the pre-litigation stage of a request for assistance and may include any witness statements, the disclosure of which must, however, take place in accordance with the principle of confidentiality.

105. That case-law stems from the right to be heard, which is a general principle of EU law enshrined in Article 41(2) of the Charter. It is settled case-law that the person concerned must have the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his or her interests adversely. (36) In that respect, the complainant must be able to submit observations on the relevant aspects of the case and be heard, possibly on several occasions, in particular in so far as the competent authority is carrying out an assessment of his or her behaviour. (37)

106. In those circumstances, it was for the General Court to examine whether the document that the appellant requested access to was, under Article 41(2) of the Charter, of such a nature as to enable him to effectively submit his observations during the procedure and before a decision affecting him was taken. Such an examination consists of assessing, on the one hand, whether access to that document seemed necessary or, at the very least, useful to allow the appellant to effectively make his views known on the aspects liable to form the basis of the administration’s decision. On the other hand, it involves checking whether that access should take place at a stage of the procedure that still allows the person concerned to effectively exercise his or her right to be heard – that is to say, before the adoption of the decision that might affect his or her interests. Thus, the General Court’s finding had to be based, on the one hand, on a functional criterion, related to the relevance of the document for the effective exercise of the right to be heard, and, on the other hand, on a temporal criterion, related to the stage of the procedure at which that access had to be guaranteed.

107. Irrespective of any clarification that the Court could be called upon to provide in that regard in its judgment, if necessary by substituting the grounds, it seems unlikely that such a clarification could call into question the General Court’s finding that the appellant has no right of access to the delegations of power at issue, especially since it is unclear what specific interest the appellant could obtain from accessing those documents.

108. Indeed, both in his application at first instance and in his appeal, the appellant maintains that access to those delegations of power was necessary in order, first, to determine the legality of the exercise of the administration’s powers and, second, to ensure that no one with a potential conflict of interest was involved in the procedure relating to the handling of his request for assistance. However, as I will explain below, those arguments are unpersuasive.

109. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, as is clear from the abovementioned case-law, the administration has a degree of discretion in implementing the right of access of the official concerned, both with regard to the information that must be disclosed to him or her and to the practical arrangements for its disclosure. In exercising that discretion, the administration must take into account, on the one hand, the presumed interest of the official and, on the other hand, the confidentiality interests of third parties. (38) It is for the EU Courts to determine, in their judicial review, whether the administration exercised that discretion correctly. In the present case, the General Court discharged that obligation by setting out in detail the legal bases that the administration had relied upon, as well as the documents that had been disclosed to the appellant.

110. In doing so, the General Court rejected the appellant’s argument that irregularities vitiated the decision-making process. In that regard, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the appellant does not mention, in his written observations, which specific irregularities the agency is alleged to have committed. On the other hand, it should be noted that the reservations he expresses bear little relation to the actual subject matter of the dispute, namely the allegations of harassment directed against certain specific members of staff, but concern a subsequent administrative procedure. In those circumstances, it seems doubtful that access to those delegations of power could be of value in supporting the allegations of harassment made by the appellant.

111. In so far as the appellant submits that access to the delegations of power would, in a sense, prevent possible conflicts of interest, it should be noted that the General Court rightly considered in its judgment that, first, the compliance department had already been instructed to identify potential conflicts of interest and that, second, both the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the SRB, against whom the request for assistance was made, had been excluded from the decision-making processes concerning the appellant. As noted in the present Opinion, those measures were intended precisely to avoid any risk – or any appearance – of undue influence. (39) They were therefore such as to meet the appellant’s need to have his request for assistance handled impartially.

112. Lastly, it should be recalled that EU law requires the adoption of measures in the event that objective factors give rise to legitimate doubts as to the impartiality of the administration. By contrast, simple distrust or fear of retaliation are not, in themselves, sufficient to justify such a requirement in the absence of concrete evidence that could call into question its objective impartiality.

113. Indeed, the requirement of impartiality cannot be interpreted as an obligation for the administration to take preventive measures in response to mere subjective apprehensions, since there is no objectively verifiable information that could raise a legitimate doubt, in the mind of an objective and informed observer, as to the neutrality of the procedure. (40) A contrary interpretation would raise virtually insurmountable difficulties for the administration, in so far as the legality of the proceedings would then risk depending on the purely subjective perceptions of the parties to the proceedings.

114. In the present case, the appellant merely expressed a general distrust of the agency’s administration, without identifying the persons against whom he had reservations or describing the actual circumstances that might substantiate them. In those circumstances, it must be considered that there was no objective information that justified the recognition of a right of access to the delegations of power at issue. I therefore concur, in essence, with the General Court’s conclusion that the appellant had no right of access to those documents.

115. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the fourth limb of the first ground of appeal, in so far as it alleges infringement of the principle of transparency, must be rejected.

D.      The alleged breach of the confidentiality requirement

116. By the fifth limb of the first ground of appeal, covering paragraphs 115 to 118, 124 to 126, 134, 135, 137 to 141, 142 to 144, 149 to 153, 155 and 156 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant alleges infringement of the provisions guaranteeing the confidential handling of a complaint.

1.      The concept of ‘confidentiality’ in EU law

117. Several provisions of EU civil service law, such as Article 339 TFEU or Articles 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations, impose specific confidentiality obligations in the interest of the smooth running of the service. Moreover, the duty of confidentiality takes various forms depending on the area concerned and must be balanced with other requirements of EU law that may come into conflict with it, in particular the principle of transparency, the protection of personal data and respect for the rights of the defence. Like other principles of EU administrative law, that duty has been clarified by the case-law of the EU Courts, which have defined both its scope and its limits.

118. In the context of an administrative procedure, the principle of confidentiality generally means that the information gathered during the investigation is sent only to persons whose involvement appears necessary for the handling of the case and is not disclosed unless strictly required for investigation and decision-making purposes. Such a requirement is intended to ensure the protection of the legitimate interests of the persons concerned and to preserve the integrity of the administrative decision-making process. Those considerations are of particular importance in the handling of requests for assistance under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations. Thus, when a request for assistance is based on allegations of psychological harassment, the obligation to provide assistance implies, inter alia, that the administration must examine the request seriously, expeditiously and with due regard for confidentiality, while informing the person concerned of the action to be taken. (41)

2.      Observations of the parties

119. The appellant submits that the General Court failed to have regard to the rules ensuring the confidential handling of his request for assistance. He argues that there was a security breach in so far as the SRB had not sufficiently limited the dissemination of his complaint and his personal data to a small number of people, which had adversely affected him. He challenges the General Court’s analysis that he could not effectively rely on a breach of data protection because he had failed to demonstrate a specific infringement of his rights and freedoms or refer the matter to the European Data Protection Supervisor.

120. He also criticises the General Court for a contradiction in the reasoning in so far as it states that confidentiality was maintained with respect to the Chair, on the ground that she was not involved as AECE, while acknowledging that the Vice-Chair, when questioned during the preliminary assessment, was aware of certain aspects of the complaint. According to the appellant, that disclosure amounts precisely to a breach of confidentiality and reveals an error of law in the assessment made in paragraphs 123 to 135 of the judgment under appeal. Lastly, he submits that his argument relating to the use of a functional mailbox was not properly considered, even though it related to the alleged conflict of interest of the Chief Compliance Officer and the obligation to limit the disclosure of the complaint.

121. The SRB replied that the appellant had failed to identify any specific error of law in the General Court’s reasoning and merely challenged the way in which the General Court had structured its analysis. It submits that the appellant proceeds on the basis of an incorrect premiss in asserting that the General Court had relied on the failure to demonstrate a breach of personal data or prior referral to the EDPS as conditions for the rejection of the compensation claim. The SRB agrees with the General Court’s points regarding the respective involvement of the Chair and Vice-Chair in the handling of the request for assistance and claims that their participation did not undermine the confidentiality of the procedure. Lastly, it points out that, according to the General Court, the decision at issue was based solely on the absence of prima facie evidence of the alleged harassment and not on considerations related to the confidential handling of the file, such that no alleged breach would have been decisive for the outcome of the procedure.

3.      Analysis of the judgment under appeal

(a)    The reasoning of the General Court

122. First, the General Court rejected the appellant’s arguments concerning the SRB’s refusal to disclose certain documents as part of an access to documents procedure. It held that that material concerned facts subsequent to the contested decision and came under a separate procedure based on Regulation No 1049/2001. (42) In any event, it found that the appellant had already had access to the essential information in the file, having been sent, inter alia, the preliminary report and the statements of the Vice-Chair and the human resources department, on which the examination of his request for assistance was based.

123. Second, the General Court examined the complaints alleging a breach of the confidential handling of the request for assistance. It recalled that the applicable internal rules ensure that such procedures remain confidential, while noting that the evidence relied on by the appellant did not demonstrate the improper disclosure of information. In particular, the Vice-Chair’s participation in the preliminary assessment did not, in itself, amount to a breach of confidentiality, since the decision at issue was not based solely on his statements, but also on those of the human resources department, and his hearing was justified by the circumstances of the case.

124. Lastly, the General Court considered that the material put forward to demonstrate that the Chair had knowledge of the complaint was based on mere conjecture and was not supported by any concrete evidence. It also rejected the arguments based on the use of a functional mailbox or on alleged consequences of the complaint in the procedure for non-renewal of the appellant’s contract. In those circumstances, it concluded that the appellant had not provided any evidence of a breach of the confidential handling of the request for assistance and that the decision at issue was based solely on the absence of prima facie evidence of the alleged harassment.

(b)    Assessment

125. As regards the appellant’s argument that the consultation of the SRB’s Vice-Chair during the preliminary assessment of his request for assistance constituted a breach of confidentiality, it should be noted at the outset that the requirement of confidentiality surrounding the handling of a complaint lodged on the basis of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations is essentially intended to ensure that information relating to the complaint is not disseminated beyond what is necessary for the handling of the complaint.

126. That requirement has a twofold objective: on the one hand, to protect the person who lodged the complaint from the risks of unnecessary disclosure of sensitive information; and, on the other hand, to protect the rights and reputation of the persons accused until the alleged facts have been proven. However, that requirement cannot be interpreted as requiring absolute confidentiality of the procedure, which would prevent the administration from disclosing certain aspects of the complaint to persons whose involvement appears necessary for a correct assessment of the circumstances of the case. (43)

127. It should also be recalled that, in implementing Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, the administration enjoys a broad discretion regarding the measures to be adopted and the appropriate means to ensure the protection of the official concerned. (44) It is thus for the administration to determine, in the light of the circumstances of each case, the steps necessary to verify the alleged facts and to assess whether an administrative investigation should be opened. The exercise of that discretion remains, however, subject to review by the EU Courts, which are responsible for verifying that the administration has not committed a manifest error of assessment or disregarded the applicable procedural safeguards.

128. Moreover, the requirement of confidentiality surrounding the examination of a request for assistance is merely a corollary of the duty of care, which the administration is bound by in its relations with officials, and which stems from the requirements of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter. That duty dictates that the administration, when taking a decision on the situation of an official, is required to take into consideration all the elements that could influence its decision and, in so doing, must consider not only the interest of the service, but also the interest of the official in question. (45) To that end, it is incumbent on it to gather all the relevant information. (46)

129. The case-law of the Court of Justice relating to Article 24 of the Staff Regulations specifies, in that regard, that where serious accusations are made against an official in carrying out his or her duties which could undermine his professional integrity, first, the administration is required to take all necessary steps to establish whether the accusations are well founded. If those accusations prove to be unfounded, it should reject them and do everything possible to restore the good name of the official wrongly accused. (47) The fulfilment of those obligations necessarily implies that the administration may carry out the necessary checks and collect the relevant information from persons able to shed light on the circumstances of the case.

130. In that context, it is possible that some of the persons concerned by the complaint may be consulted in order to provide explanations or information on the alleged facts. Such a consultation may be a normal measure of inquiry and, as such, cannot be considered incompatible with the requirement of confidentiality, provided that the disclosure of information relating to the complaint remains limited to what is strictly necessary for the purposes of the investigation.

131. However, a clear distinction should be drawn between two situations. On the one hand, the consultation of a person able to provide relevant information during the preliminary examination of a complaint falls within the normal prerogatives of the administration in investigating the case. On the other hand, a breach of the obligation of confidentiality could be found if the administration disclosed information about the complaint to persons whose involvement is not necessary for the handling of the case or if such disclosure resulted in excessive dissemination of the sensitive information contained in the complaint. Similarly, a difficulty could arise if the person referred to in the complaint was called upon to participate in the decision-making process concerning him or her or if he or she was able to exert an influence on the outcome of the procedure.

132. In the present case, it is apparent from the General Court’s findings that the SRB’s Vice-Chair was heard solely to obtain information during the preliminary assessment of the request for assistance. The General Court also noted, in paragraphs 74, 75 and 135 of the judgment under appeal, that both the Chair and Vice-Chair of the SRB, against whom the request for assistance was directed, had been excluded from the decision-making process relating to the handling of that request. In addition, organisational measures had been adopted to prevent any risk of undue influence in the conduct of the procedure. In those circumstances, it is apparent that the consultation of the Vice-Chair forms part of the measures of inquiry necessary for the examination of the complaint and that it cannot, as such, be regarded as amounting to a breach of the obligation of confidentiality.

133. The appellant’s argument is thus based on the idea that any disclosure of information about the complaint to a person mentioned in it would, as a matter of principle, undermine the confidentiality of the procedure. However, such a notion would be tantamount to imposing an obligation of absolute confidentiality on the administration, which is at odds with the inherent requirements of the investigation of a request for assistance. EU law does not impose such a notion of confidentiality. It only requires that the disclosure of information be limited to what is necessary for the handling of the complaint and that the persons referred to in it not be placed in a situation that would enable them to influence the final decision.

134. In those circumstances, merely consulting the Vice-Chair during the preliminary assessment cannot be equated with a breach of confidentiality in the handling of the request for assistance. In the absence of evidence demonstrating that the complaint was disseminated beyond what was necessary for the investigation or that the persons accused exerted an influence on the decision-making process, it is not apparent that the requirement of confidentiality was breached.

135. Consequently, the fifth limb of the first ground of appeal must be rejected in so far as the appellant complains that the General Court misconstrued the scope of the requirement of confidentiality.

V.      Conclusion

136. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court reject the first, second, fourth and fifth limbs of the first part of the first ground of appeal.

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1      Original language: French.

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2      See point 27 et seq. of the present Opinion.

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3      See point 93 et seq. of the present Opinion.

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4      See point 116 et seq. of the present Opinion.

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5      Mader, O., EU Civil Service Law: A Practitioner’s Guide, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2024, p. 26; Pilorge-Vrancken, J. and Gervasoni, S., Le droit de la fonction publique de l’Union européenne, Bruylant, Brussels, 2017, p. 162.

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6      See, with regard to the principle of transparency, judgment of 18 July 2017, Commission v Breyer (C‑213/15 P, EU:C:2017:563, paragraph 50 et seq.) and, with regard to the principle of confidentiality, order of 3 April 2000, Germany v Parliament and Council (C‑376/98, EU:C:2000:181, paragraph 10 et seq.).

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7      See judgments of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863, paragraph 51), and of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5, paragraph 44).

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8      See judgments of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863, paragraph 53), and of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5, paragraph 46).

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9      See judgments of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863, paragraph 54), and of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5, paragraph 47).

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10      See judgments of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863, paragraph 55), and of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5, paragraph 48).

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11      See point 43 et seq. of the present Opinion.

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12      See point 52 et seq. of the present Opinion.

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13      See point 30 of the present Opinion.

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14      See point 106 of the Opinion of Advocate General Pikamäe in Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:497).

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15      According to a European Parliament study, entitled ‘EU Agencies and Conflicts of Interest’ (2020), EU agencies have established, as part of their governance systems, structured internal mechanisms to ensure compliance with EU law. In exercising the organisational autonomy conferred on them by their founding regulations, they adopt internal rules and policies adapted to their structure, including policies on conflicts of interest, procedures for the declaration and examination of interests, whistleblowing mechanisms and internal control instruments. Those policies, incorporated into frameworks for risk management and good administration, are part of the agencies’ institutional architecture and are designed to ensure the legality, integrity and transparency of their activities.

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16      According to Article 8 (‘Impartiality and independence’) of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, drawn up by the European Ombudsman and approved by resolution of the Parliament during its plenary session of 6 September 2001 (OJ 2002 C 72 E, p. 331), the requirement of impartiality requires the official to abstain ‘from any arbitrary action adversely affecting members of the public, as well as from any preferential treatment on any grounds whatsoever’. That code requires that the conduct of the official is never to be guided by ‘personal, family, or national interest or by political pressure’. The official must also not ‘take part in a decision in which he or she, or any close member of his or her family, has a financial interest’.

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17      The Code of Good Administrative Behaviour for Staff of the European Commission in their relations with the public (OJ 2000 L 267, p. 63) reads: ‘Staff shall always act objectively and impartially, in the [interest of the Union] and for the public good. They shall act independently within the framework of the policy fixed by the Commission and their conduct shall never be guided by personal or national interest or political pressure.’

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18      Paragraph 2 of Article 2 (‘Basic principles’) of the SRB’s Code of Conduct requires members of the Board, permanent observers, alternates and observers to observe the highest standards of ethical conduct and to act with honesty, independence and impartiality, regardless of self-interest. In addition, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 9 (‘Conflicts of interest’) of that code, those persons must avoid any situation which could give rise to a conflict of interest, which arises where private or personal interests may influence or appear to influence the impartial and objective performance of their tasks (see decision of the SRB of 24 June 2020 adopting the Code of Conduct, SRB/PS/2020/16, available on its website).

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19      See, in that regard, order of 13 June 2006, Mancini v Commission (C‑172/05 P, EU:C:2006:393, paragraph 33), in which the Court of Justice confirmed the General Court’s assessment that, when examining whether there is a conflict of interest, the existence of a professional relationship between an official and a third party cannot, in principle, mean that the official’s independence is or appears to be impaired when that official is called upon to decide on a matter in which that third party is involved.

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20      See, in that regard, order of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal of 25 February 2014, García Dominguez v Commission (F‑155/12, EU:F:2014:24, paragraph 37), from which it emerges that the existence of a friendship could, in principle, give rise to a conflict of interest where there is a ‘direct link’ between the persons concerned. Nevertheless, the mere fact that two people are ‘friends’ on a social network such as Facebook does not necessarily mean that there is a friendship, in the usual sense of the word, between them. Such a connection may simply reflect the wish of the persons concerned to exchange information on topics of general or professional interest and does not necessarily imply the existence of a close personal link between them.

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21      It follows from Article 256 TFEU and from the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that an appeal is to be limited to points of law. The General Court thus alone has jurisdiction to establish and assess the relevant facts and to evaluate the evidence. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the rules in relation to the taking of evidence have been observed, the assessment of the facts and the evidence is for the General Court alone and does not constitute, save in the case of their distortion, a question of law subject to review by the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal (see judgment of 26 February 2026, Martinair Holland v Commission, C‑386/22 P, EU:C:2026:131, paragraph 57).

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22      See point 49 et seq. of the present Opinion.

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23      Specifically, the Court of Justice has held that, in order to show that the organisation of an administrative procedure does not ensure sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias, it is not necessary to prove ‘lack of impartiality’. Rather, it is sufficient for a ‘legitimate doubt’ to arise which cannot be dispelled (see judgments of 27 March 2019, August Wolff and Remedia v Commission, C‑680/16 P, EU:C:2019:257, paragraph 37; of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ, C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863, paragraph 54; and of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop, C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5, paragraph 47).

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24      As noted by Advocate General Pikamäe in his Opinion in Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:497, points 108 and 109), the burden of proof relating to the existence of a legitimate doubt as to possible bias cannot be considered excessively onerous, since case-law does not require that a lack of impartiality be positively established. It is sufficient instead for a legitimate doubt as to possible bias to arise which cannot be dispelled. Similarly, when an infringement of the requirement of objective impartiality is found, it is no longer necessary to examine whether the condition relating to subjective impartiality is also met.

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25      Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1).

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26      See judgments of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863, paragraph 54), and of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5, paragraph 47).

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27      See judgment of 11 July 2013, Ziegler v Commission (C‑439/11 P, EU:C:2013:513, paragraph 158), in which the Court held that the fact that two Commission departments belong to the same organisational structure cannot, of itself, call into question that institution’s impartiality, since those departments necessarily form part of the structure, to which they belong. It follows that the internal structure of an institution cannot, as such, present a risk to impartiality. On the contrary, the existence of such a risk must be supported by concrete evidence.

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28      The maxim nemo iudex in causa sua (‘no one may be judge in his or her own case’) is one of the oldest expressions of the principle of impartiality. Derived from the Roman legal tradition, it is based on the idea that a decision-maker cannot rule in a case in which he or she has a personal interest capable of impairing – or appearing to impair – his or her independent judgment. This principle originates, inter alia, from the rules on iudex suspectus contained in the Corpus iuris civilis (Digest, D. 5,1,17, and Code of Justinian, C. 3,5). Passed down in canon law and then incorporated into European legal traditions, that maxim has gradually become established as a general principle of law, now considered an essential component of the right to a fair trial and the right to good administration. It seeks not only to prevent any actual bias, but to maintain confidence in the decision-making institution by ensuring that justice is delivered and appears objectively impartial (see Vermeule, A., ‘Contra nemo iudex in sua causa: The limits of impartiality’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 122, No 2, 2012, p. 384).

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29      See Opinion of Advocate General Ćapeta in Vivacom Bulgaria (C‑369/23, EU:C:2024:612, point 51), concerning the possibility of reducing the risk of bias by providing that an entity separate from that which is the subject of the claim for damages has jurisdiction to decide such a claim.

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30      As regards the alleged fears linked to the participation of a certain judge in a formation of the court, it should be noted that both the EU Courts and the European Court of Human Rights examine whether the apprehensions expressed by the parties to the dispute can be considered as objectively justified (see judgments of 2 October 2025, WV v EEAS, C‑243/24 P, EU:C:2025:742, paragraphs 53 to 61; of 19 June 2015, Z v Court of Justice, T‑88/13 P, EU:T:2015:393, paragraphs 57 and 73; and judgment of the ECtHR of 23 April 2015, Morice v. France, CE:ECHR:2015:0423JUD002936910, §§ 79 to 91).

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31      See point 128 et seq. of the present Opinion.

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32      For an analysis of the relationship between Article 41 and Articles 42 and 47 of the Charter, see Craig, P., ‘Article 41 – The Right to Good Administration’, in Peers, S., Hervey, T., Kenner, J. and Ward, A. (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2021, p. 1127.

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33      See judgments of 4 April 2019, OZ v EIB (C‑558/17 P, EU:C:2019:289, paragraph 58), and of 25 June 2020, HF v Parliament (C‑570/18 P, EU:C:2020:490, paragraph 59).

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34      See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in OZ v EIB (C‑558/17 P, EU:C:2018:930, points 49 to 51).

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35      Judgment of 25 June 2020, HF v Parliament (C‑570/18 P, EU:C:2020:490, paragraph 60).

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36      See, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2012, M. (C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).

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37      See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in OZ v EIB (C‑558/17 P, EU:C:2018:930, point 53).

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38      See judgment of 25 June 2020, HF v Parliament (C‑570/18 P, EU:C:2020:490, paragraphs 57 to 66).

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39      See points 85 and 89 of the present Opinion.

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40      The European Court of Human Rights has held that in deciding whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular judge lacks impartiality, the standpoint of the accused is important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be held objectively justified (see ECtHR, 21 December 2000, Wettstein v. Switzerland, CE:ECHR:2000:1221JUD003395896, § 44, and ECtHR, 7 August 1996, Ferrantelli and Santangelo v. Italy, CE:ECHR:1996:0807JUD001987492, § 58).

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41      See judgments of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament (T‑570/16, EU:T:2017:283, paragraph 47), and of 22 March 2023, Colombani v EEAS (T‑113/22, EU:T:2023:154, paragraph 35).

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42      Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).

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43      As stated by Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in his Opinion in HF v Parliament (C‑570/18 P, EU:C:2020:44, point 66), confidentiality does not mean a ‘right to secrecy’, but must be ensured taking into account other legitimate interests.

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44      See, to that effect, judgment of 14 February 1990, Schneemann and Others v Commission (C‑137/88, EU:C:1990:69, paragraph 9); of 12 July 2011, Commission v Q (T‑80/09 P, EU:T:2011:347, paragraph 86); and of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament (T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 99).

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45      See judgment of 28 May 1980, Kuhner v Commission (33/79 and 75/79, EU:C:1980:139, paragraph 22).

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46      Livolsi, T. and Schiano, R., Statut de la fonction publique de l'Union européenne: commentaire article par article (edited by Perillo, E. and Giacobbo-Peyronnel, V.), Brussels, 2017, p. 178. The duty of care requires the administration to gather all relevant information, including that relating to the interest of the official concerned, before taking a decision affecting him or her. The duty of care thus appears to be one of the components of the principle of good administration, which requires the appointing authority to take fully informed decisions, without which it would be difficult to conceive how these could be properly reasoned.

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47      See judgment of 18 October 1976, N. v Commission (128/75, EU:C:1976:139, paragraph 10).