ECLI:EU:C:2026:484•Opinion of Advocate General Spielmann delivered on 11 June 2026.###
Opinion of Advocate General Spielmann delivered on 11 June 2026.###
ECLI:EU:C:2026:484Eu CjeuJun 11, 2026
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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
SPIELMANN
delivered on 11 June 2026 (1)
Case C‑831/24 [Machski] (i)
K.J.
v
P.
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku (District Court, Białystok, Poland))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Directive 2008/48/EC – Credit agreements for consumers – Obligation to provide information – Article 10(2) – Applicable penalties – Article 23 – Examination of the court’s own motion )
Introduction
1. The question referred for a preliminary ruling that is the subject of the present targeted Opinion, in accordance with the Court’s request, concerns, in essence, the interpretation of Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48/EC. (2) The Court is asked to consider whether a national court must examine of its own motion whether creditors have complied with their obligation to provide particular information pursuant to Directive 2008/48, or whether it must confine its examination solely to the infringements alleged by the consumer.
2. The request for a preliminary ruling was made by the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku (District Court, Białystok, Poland), in proceedings between K.J., a consumer, and Bank P. (‘the Bank’), concerning infringements of the obligation to include particular information in a consumer credit agreement, and the resulting consequences in terms of the repayment of sums corresponding to the interest and charges paid pursuant to that agreement.
3. This case offers the Court an opportunity to clarify its case-law on the scope of judicial review in the field of consumer protection relating to information that must be included in a credit agreement within the meaning of Directive 2008/48.
Legal framework
European Union law
4. Recital 31 of Directive 2008/48 states that ‘in order to enable the consumer to know his rights and obligations under the credit agreement, it should contain all necessary information in a clear and concise manner.’
5. Article 10 of Directive 2008/48, concerning information to be included in credit agreements, provides, in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 thereof, that credit agreements are to be drawn up on paper or another durable medium. Paragraph 2 of that Article 10 lists the items of information that must be specified in a clear and concise manner in any credit agreement. That list includes, inter alia:
‘(r) the right of early repayment, the procedure for early repayment, as well as, where applicable, information concerning the creditor’s right to compensation and the way in which that compensation will be determined’.
6. According to Article 23 of that directive, entitled ‘Penalties’, ‘Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.’
Polish law
7. The ustawa o kredycie konsumenckim (Law on Consumer Credit) of 12 May 2011, in the version in force at the time of the facts in the main proceedings (‘the Law on Consumer Credit’), (3) is intended to transpose Directive 2008/48 into Polish law.
8. Under Article 30(1)(16) of the Law on Consumer Credit, the consumer credit agreement must specify ‘the consumer’s right of early repayment and the procedure for early repayment’.
9. Under Article 45(1) of that law, ‘in the event of failure by the creditor to comply with Article 29(1), Article 30(1)(1) to (8), (10), (11), (14) to (17), Articles 31 to 33, Article 33a and Articles 36a to 36c, the consumer shall, after submitting a written declaration to the creditor, repay the credit, without interest and any other credit costs due to the creditor, within the time limit and in the manner laid down in the agreement.’
The case in the main proceedings, the questions referred and the procedure before the Court
10. On 8 February 2017, K.J. entered into a consumer credit agreement with the Bank for an amount of 133 411.29 zlotys (PLN) (approximately EUR 31 000). (4) The total amount of interest was PLN 54 730.67 (approximately EUR 13 000), (5) and K.J. undertook to repay the credit in 96 monthly instalments.
11. Section 8(1) of the credit agreement stated, in essence, that the borrower was entitled to repay all or part of the credit before the date on which the final instalment was due, and that repayment was to be effected in accordance with the borrower’s written instructions. Section 8(2) and (3) referred to the financial consequences or the consequences for the term of the agreement that might result from the exercise of the right to early repayment.
12. On 14 March 2024, K.J. sent the Bank a letter through his lawyer entitled ‘Complaint and request for payment, together with a declaration under Article 45(1) of the Law on Consumer Credit’, in which he invoked the forfeiture of the creditor’s right to interest and other costs in respect of the credit in question, that is to say, the penalty known as the ‘free credit’ penalty provided for in that provision of the Law on Consumer Credit, on the grounds that the Bank had, inter alia, failed to comply with particular requirements to provide information set out in Article 30(1) of that law. (6)
13. By application of 10 July 2024, K.J. brought proceedings before the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku (District Court, Białystok), the referring court, seeking the application of the free credit penalty and an order requiring the Bank to pay him the sum of PLN 43 505.96 (approximately EUR 10 200), (7) corresponding to the sum of the interest and charges paid by K.J. in connection with the conclusion of the consumer credit agreement, plus statutory default interest and court costs.
14. First of all, the referring court expresses uncertainty as to the scope of the judicial review which it is required to carry out to determine the applicability of the free credit penalty provided for in Article 45 of the Law on Consumer Credit, which implements Article 23 of Directive 2008/48, on account of the Bank’s infringement of its obligation to provide information pursuant to that law. More specifically, it asks whether it must confine itself to the various infringements alleged by the consumer in his written declaration, even where those infringements are not established, or, on the contrary, whether it is required to examine of its own motion other infringements of the obligation to provide information which are capable of triggering that penalty. Thus, in the present case, K.J. has not alleged an infringement of the obligation to set out the details of the early repayment procedure. However, according to the referring court, such an infringement could be established.
15. Next, having observed that the credit agreement at issue does not specify, inter alia, who must carry out particular steps in connection with the early repayment procedure, nor the order and manner in which the steps relating to such repayment should be carried out, the referring court is uncertain how the expression ‘procedure for early repayment’ in Article 10(2)(r) of Directive 2008/48, reproduced, in essence, in Article 30(1)(16) of the Law on Consumer Credit, should be interpreted.
16. Lastly, the referring court asks, in the light of the principle of proportionality, whether the penalty provided for in Polish law, in accordance with Article 23 of Directive 2008/48, should be applied automatically, even in cases of partial infringement of the obligation laid down in Article 10(2)(r) of that directive.
17. In those circumstances, the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku (District Court, Białystok) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Should Article 23 of [Directive 2008/48] be interpreted to mean that this Directive imposes an obligation on a national court, when hearing a case in which a consumer invokes the obligation incumbent on the creditor to return any sums overpaid as a result of the consumer making use of a penalty provided for under national law, based on the right to submit to the creditor a written declaration meaning that the consumer’s obligations to pay interest on the capital and other credit costs cease, to examine ex officio whether the creditor infringed any provisions of national law other than those invoked by the consumer in the written declaration submitted to the creditor but whose infringement also entitles the consumer to make use of the aforesaid penalty?
(2) Should Article 10(2)(r) of [Directive 2008/48] be interpreted to mean that the requirement to specify in a clear manner the procedure for early repayment imposes on the creditor an obligation to draw up a description of the course of action in such a way that the consumer executing the agreement is able, without obtaining additional information from the creditor (or making additional arrangements with the latter), to establish step by step who is responsible for performing the actions involved in early repayment, how they should be performed and in what order, with a clear indication of the event that forms the final step in this procedure?
(3) Should Article 23 of [Directive 2008/48] be interpreted to mean that a failure to fulfil the obligation to specify in a clear and concise manner the procedure for early repayment within the meaning of Article 10(2)(r) of this Directive always necessitates the application of penalties against the creditor, or can the application of penalties depend on the extent to which the relevant obligation has been infringed; in particular, is a decision to refrain from applying a penalty admissible in a situation where the procedure for early repayment was not outlined in full and this did not have a detrimental impact on the consumer’s rights and obligations given the circumstances of the specific case?’
18. Written observations were submitted by K.J., the European Commission, the Polish Government and the Bank.
Assessment
19. As a preliminary point, I note that the Bank is of the view, in essence, that the first question referred, which is the subject of the present targeted Opinion, should be declared inadmissible on the ground that it refers to Article 23 of Directive 2008/48, despite the fact that it is not relevant to the content of that question.
20. In that regard, I would point out that, according to settled case-law, in the context of the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it. (8)
21. In the context of that cooperation, it is for the Court to provide the national court with an answer that will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it. To that end, the Court should, where necessary, reformulate the questions referred to it. It is, in that regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute. (9) The Court may also find it necessary to consider provisions of EU law which the national court has not referred to in its questions. (10)
22. In the present case, although the first question referred, as formulated, makes explicit reference only to Article 23 of Directive 2008/48 – which requires Member States to lay down effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to that directive – it must be noted that, in the grounds, the referring court also referred to the obligations to provide information set out in the provisions of the Law on Consumer Credit intended to transpose Article 10(2) of that directive into national law.
23. Thus, the question raised by the referring court in essence concerns whether, when hearing a dispute in which a consumer invokes the free credit penalty provided for in the national law intended to implement Article 23 of Directive 2008/48, in the event of an infringement of the national provisions adopted in accordance with Article 10(2) of that directive, the court must examine of its own motion whether the creditor failed to provide items of information listed in that provision other than those expressly referred to by the consumer.
24. Against that background, the referring court’s uncertainty as to the scope of its judicial review in the context of the application of the penalty provided for in Article 45 of the Law on Consumer Credit, which transposes Article 23 of Directive 2008/48 into national law, must be seen as an extension of its uncertainty concerning the review of the information to be included in credit agreements, in accordance with Article 10(2) of that directive, the infringement of which may be penalised, in accordance with national law, by the forfeiture by the creditor of the right to interest and other costs in respect of the credit in question.
25. In view of those considerations, and in the light of the case-law cited in point 21 above, I propose that the first question referred be found to be admissible and, in order to provide a useful answer to the referring court, suggest that the Court reformulate it in such a manner that it can assess whether Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48 must be interpreted as requiring a national court, hearing a dispute in which the consumer invokes the application of the penalty provided for in the national law intended to give effect to Article 23 of that directive, to examine of its own motion whether the obligation to state clearly and concisely in a credit agreement, within the meaning of that directive, the information listed in Article 10(2) of that directive, other than those in respect of which the consumer expressly alleges an infringement, has been met.
26. I am of the view that the Court’s case-law allows that question to be answered in the affirmative.
27. In the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová, (11) the Court held that Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48 must be interpreted as requiring a national court, hearing a dispute concerning claims based on a credit agreement within the meaning of that directive, to examine of its own motion whether the obligation to provide information laid down in that provision has been complied with and to establish the consequences under national law of any infringement of that obligation, provided that the penalties satisfy the requirements of Article 23 of that directive and that the principle of audi alteram partem has been complied with. (12)
28. It is true that some of the referring court’s uncertainty in that case related more specifically to the obligation set out in Article 10(2)(d) of Directive 2008/48 to inform the consumer of ‘the total amount of credit and the conditions governing the drawdown’, (13) and not to the right of early repayment or the early repayment procedure. Furthermore, the consumers were subject to insolvency proceedings and, in accordance with national rules, were restricted in respect of the incidental application they could lodge to contest the claims in question, which does not appear to be the case here. (14)
29. Moreover, in principle, EU law does not require national courts to raise of their own motion an issue concerning the infringement of provisions of EU law, where examination of that issue would oblige them to go beyond the ambit of the dispute defined by the parties themselves and rely on facts and circumstances other than those on which the party with an interest in application of those provisions has based his or her claim. The Court considers that that limitation on the power of the national court is justified by the principle that, in a civil suit, it is for the parties to take the initiative, and that, as a result, the court is able to act of its own motion only in exceptional cases where the public interest requires its intervention. (15)
30. However, first of all, I would point out that it is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law, which it relied on in the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová, that the national court is required to examine of its own motion whether there has been compliance with certain provisions of EU law in relation to the protection of consumers where, in the absence of such an examination, the objective of effective consumer protection cannot be achieved, in view in particular of the real risk that the consumer may be unaware of his or her rights or may encounter difficulties in exercising them. (16) It follows that the effective protection of certain rights that the consumer derives from EU law falls within the public interest which requires the national court to intervene of its own motion. (17)
31. Those considerations first found practical expression in the Court’s case-law recognising courts’ power, (18) and later their obligation, (19) to identify of their own motion the provisions derived from Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. (20) They have also been held to apply in the field of consumer credit law, and have led the Court to recognise that national courts have the power to examine of their own motion whether the consumer protection enshrined in Article 11(2) of Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit (21) has been complied with and the obligation to examine of their own motion whether there has been a failure to comply with the creditor’s pre-contractual obligation to assess the consumer’s creditworthiness, provided for in Article 8 of Directive 2008/48. (22)
32. The same was true where the Court held that the national court was obliged to examine of its own motion whether there had been an infringement of the obligation to inform consumers in writing of their right to cancel a contract within a period of at least seven days, pursuant to Article 4 of Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises, (23) and whether the consumer was entitled to an appropriate reduction in the price of goods established by a contract of sale in the event of a lack of conformity of those goods, in accordance with Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees. (24)
33. It must next be observed that, according to the Court, the obligation incumbent on the national court to examine of its own motion whether particular provisions of EU consumer law have been infringed is justified by the consideration that the system of protection is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both his or her bargaining power and level of knowledge. This leads to the consumer agreeing to terms drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier without being able to influence the content of those terms. (25) Such an obligation therefore exists in order for the imbalance between the consumer and the seller or supplier to be corrected by the national court by positive action unconnected with the actual parties to the contract, (26) where the national court has available to it the legal and factual elements necessary for that task. (27)
34. Moreover, the Court has already held that it is apparent from Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48, read in the light of recital 31 of that directive, that the requirement to include the information referred to in that provision in a credit agreement drawn up on paper or on another durable medium in a clear and concise manner is necessary in order to ensure that the consumer is aware of his or her rights and obligations. (28) Information, before and at the time of concluding a contract, on the terms of the contract and the consequences of concluding it is of fundamental importance for a consumer. It is, in particular, on the basis of that information that he or she decides whether he or she wishes to be bound by the terms previously drawn up by the seller or supplier. (29)
35. That requirement to include the information referred to in Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48 also contributes to attaining the objective pursued by that directive, which consists in providing, as regards consumer credit, full and mandatory harmonisation in a number of key areas, which is regarded as necessary in order to ensure that all consumers in the European Union enjoy a high and equivalent level of protection of their interests and to facilitate the emergence of a well-functioning internal market in consumer credit. (30) In the light of that objective, all the information referred to in Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48 must be incorporated into the credit agreement. (31)
36. Thus, in the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová, the Court considered that examination by a national court, of its own motion, of compliance with the requirements which flow from that directive constitutes a means both of achieving the result sought by Article 10(2) of that directive and of contributing to achieving the aim set out in recital 31 thereof. (32) It concluded from this that, since the national courts are required to ensure the effectiveness of consumer protection intended to be given by the provisions of Directive 2008/48, the role attributed to the national court by EU law in this area is not limited to a mere power to rule on the compliance with those requirements, but also consists of the obligation to examine of its own motion whether the obligation to provide information laid down in Article 10(2) of that directive has been complied with, where it has available to it the legal and factual elements necessary for that task. (33)
37. In the light of the Court’s reasoning in that judgment, (34) I am of the view that the approach that it adopted is applicable to the 22 items of information listed in Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48 and can be applied to the present case. The fact that, here, the case in the main proceedings was brought by a consumer represented by a lawyer does not justify a different conclusion, since the general issue of the scope of the national court’s duty to undertake an examination of its own motion must be settled independently of the specific circumstances of the case. (35)
Conclusion
38. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the first question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku (District Court, Białystok, Poland) as follows:
Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC
must be interpreted as requiring a national court, hearing a dispute in which the consumer invokes the application of the penalty provided for in the national law intended to give effect to Article 23 of that directive, to examine of its own motion whether the obligation to state clearly and concisely in a credit agreement, within the meaning of that directive, the information listed in Article 10(2) of that directive, other than those in respect of which the consumer expressly alleges an infringement, has been met.
1 Original language: French.
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.
2 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66).
3 Dz. U. of 2024, item 1497.
4 At the exchange rate applicable on 8 February 2017.
5 At the exchange rate applicable on 8 February 2017.
6 That provision implements, in essence, Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48.
7 At the exchange rate applicable on 10 July 2024.
8 See judgment of 30 April 2024, M.N. (EncroChat) (C‑670/22, EU:C:2024:372, paragraphs 64 and 65 and the case-law cited).
9 See judgment of 22 January 2026, Herchoski (C‑902/24, EU:C:2026:42, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
10 See judgment of 22 January 2026, Secab (C‑423/23, EU:C:2026:32, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
11 Judgment of 21 April 2016, Radlinger and Radlingerová (C‑377/14, ‘the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová’, EU:C:2016:283).
12 The judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraph 71 and the case-law cited, paragraph 74 and the operative part).
13 See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Radlinger and Radlingerová (C‑377/14, EU:C:2015:769, point 49).
14 See the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraph 38).
15 See judgment of 17 December 2009, Martín Martín (C‑227/08, ‘the judgment in Martín Martín’, EU:C:2009:792, paragraphs 19 and 20 and the case-law cited).
16 See, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 2007, Rampion and Godard (C‑429/05, ‘the judgment in Rampion and Godard’, EU:C:2007:575, paragraphs 61, 62 and 65 and the case-law cited); of 4 June 2015, Faber (C‑497/13, EU:C:2015:357, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited); and in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraphs 65 and 66).
17 See judgment of 14 September 2023, Tuk Tuk Travel (C‑83/22, EU:C:2023:664, paragraphs 45 to 47 and the case-law cited). See also, to that effect, the judgment in Martín Martín (paragraphs 21 to 29).
18 See judgments of 27 June 2000, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores (C‑240/98 to C‑244/98, EU:C:2000:346, paragraphs 26 and 28), and of 21 November 2002, Cofidis (C‑473/00, EU:C:2002:705, paragraph 36).
19 See, inter alia, judgments of 4 June 2009, Pannon GSM (C‑243/08, ‘the judgment in Pannon GSM’, EU:C:2009:350, paragraphs 31, 32 and 35); of 13 September 2018, Profi Credit Polska (C‑176/17, EU:C:2018:711, paragraph 42); and of 17 May 2022, Ibercaja Banco (C‑600/19, EU:C:2022:394, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited); and the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Cofidis and OPR-Finance (C‑616/18 and C‑679/18, EU:C:2019:975, point 32 and the case-law cited).
20 OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.
21 OJ 1986 L 42, p. 48. See the judgment in Rampion and Godard (paragraphs 60 to 63 and 69). Article 11(2) of Directive 87/102 (which was repealed and replaced by Directive 2008/48) was intended to entitle the consumer to redress against the creditor.
22 See judgment of 5 March 2020, OPR-Finance (C‑679/18, EU:C:2020:167, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
23 OJ 1985 L 372, p. 31. See the judgment in Martín Martín (paragraph 29), to which the Court referred in the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraph 62).
24 OJ 1999 L 171, p. 12. See judgment of 3 October 2013, Duarte Hueros (C‑32/12, EU:C:2013:637, paragraphs 39 and 43), to which the Court referred in the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraph 62). I would add that the Court has also concluded that the national court is required to examine of its own motion whether, as regards his or her classification as a consumer, a party to a contract may come within the scope of Directive 1999/44 (see judgment of 4 June 2015, Faber, C‑497/13, EU:C:2015:357, paragraph 48). While the Court has further recognised such an obligation in relation to the effective protection of the right to terminate the contract, which a consumer derives from Article 12(2) of Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC (OJ 2015 L 326, p. 1), it has subjected that examination of the national court’s own motion to certain conditions (see judgment of 14 September 2023, Tuk Tuk Travel, C‑83/22, EU:C:2023:664, paragraphs 49 to 64).
25 See, inter alia, the judgment in Pannon GSM (paragraph 22 and the case-law cited), and judgment of 1 October 2015, ERSTE Bank Hungary (C‑32/14, EU:C:2015:637, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited), to which the Court refers in the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraph 63).
26 See, inter alia, judgments of 27 February 2014, Pohotovosť (C‑470/12, EU:C:2014:101, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited), to which the Court refers in the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraphs 53 and 67), and judgment of 14 December 2023, Getin Noble Bank (Limitation period for actions for restitution) (C‑28/22, EU:C:2023:992, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
27 See, to that effect, inter alia, the judgment in Pannon GSM (paragraphs 32 and 35); and judgment of 1 October 2015, ERSTE Bank Hungary (C‑32/14, EU:C:2015:637, paragraphs 39 to 41 and the case-law cited), to which the Court refers in the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraph 52), and judgment of 13 March 2025, APS Beta Bulgaria and Agentsia za kontrol na prosrocheni zadalzhenia (C‑337/23, EU:C:2025:183, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
28 See judgment of 21 December 2023, BMW Bank and Others (C‑38/21, C‑47/21 and C‑232/21, EU:C:2023:1014, paragraph 233 and the case-law cited).
29 See the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraph 64 and the case-law cited), and judgment of 30 October 2025, Mercedes-Benz Bank and Volkswagen Bank (C‑143/23, EU:C:2025:837, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited). More specifically, the Court has previously had occasion to state the importance of including in a credit agreement the annual percentage rate of charge, referred to in Article 10(2)(g) of Directive 2008/48 (see order of 16 November 2010, Pohotovosť, C‑76/10, EU:C:2010:685, paragraph 77; judgments of 9 November 2016, Home Credit Slovakia, C‑42/15, ‘the judgment in Home Credit Slovakia’, EU:C:2016:842, paragraph 68; of 21 March 2024, Profi Credit Bulgaria (Services ancillary to a credit agreement), C‑714/22, EU:C:2024:263, paragraph 53; and of 13 March 2025, APS Beta Bulgaria and Agentsia za kontrol na prosrocheni zadalzhenia, C‑337/23, EU:C:2025:183, paragraph 98), and the number and frequency of payments, in accordance with Article 10(2)(h) of that directive, and, where applicable, a statement that notarial fees will be payable and the sureties and insurance required, as provided for in Article 10(2)(n) and (o) of that directive (see the judgment in Home Credit Slovakia (paragraph 70)).
30 See the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraph 61); the judgment in Home Credit Slovakia (paragraphs 31 and 32 and the case-law cited); and judgments of 21 March 2024, Profi Credit Bulgaria (Services ancillary to a credit agreement) (C‑714/22, EU:C:2024:263, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited), and of 13 February 2025, Lexitor (C‑472/23, EU:C:2025:89, paragraph 28).
31 See, to that effect, the judgment in Home Credit Slovakia (paragraph 33).
32 See the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraph 68).
33 See the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová (paragraph 70 and the case-law cited, and paragraph 74).
34 In that regard, I note that the Court has frequently referred to the principles laid down in the judgment in Radlinger and Radlingerová in other circumstances (see order of 28 November 2018, PKO Bank Polski, C‑632/17, EU:C:2018:963, paragraphs 50 to 53; and judgments of 7 November 2019, Profi Credit Polska, C‑419/18 and C‑483/18, EU:C:2019:930, paragraph 59, and of 5 March 2020, OPR-Finance, C‑679/18, EU:C:2020:167, paragraph 23).
35 See, by analogy, judgment of 11 March 2020, Lintner (C‑511/17, EU:C:2020:188, paragraph 40), which refers to the judgment in Rampion and Godard (paragraphs 62 and 65).
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