ECLI:EU:C:2026:519

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Eighth Chamber)

25 June 2026 (*)

( Appeal – Civil Service – Open Competition EPSO/AD/380/19 – Competition for the recruitment of administrators in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries – Repetition of written tests – Decision not to include the appellant’s name on the reserve list – Principle of equal treatment )

In Case C‑622/24 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 20 September 2024,

VT, represented by M. Velardo, avocate,

appellant,

the other party to the proceedings being:

European Commission, represented by L. Hohenecker and S. Romoli, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

THE COURT (Eighth Chamber),

composed of S. Rodin, acting as President of the Eighth Chamber, N. Piçarra and N. Fenger (Rapporteur), Judges,

Advocate General: N. Emiliou,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 15 January 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By his appeal, VT seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 10 July 2024, VT v Commission (T‑216/23, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2024:465), by which that court dismissed VT’s action seeking the annulment of the decision of 15 July 2022 by which the selection board for Open Competition EPSO/AD/380/19 decided, after review, not to include his name on the reserve list for the recruitment of administrators at grade AD 7 in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries.

Background to the dispute

2 On 5 December 2019, the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) published, in the Official Journal of the European Union, the notice of open competition based on qualifications and tests EPSO/AD/380/19, for the recruitment of administrators (AD 7/AD 9) in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries (OJ 2019, C 409 A, p. 1), with a view to establishing two reserve lists, one for grade AD 7 administrators and one for grade AD 9 administrators.

3 The appellant took part in that competition and, after passing the ‘multiple choice question’ tests and the selection based on qualifications (Talent Screener), took part in the assessment centre tests.

4 The written assessment centre tests, that is to say, the case study and the ‘written test in the field’, took place, for the first time, on 9 September 2021.

5 By letter of 4 October 2021, EPSO informed the candidates that, because of the technical problems that arose during the first session of the written tests, it had been decided that all the candidates who had taken part in the written tests of 9 September 2021 would be offered two options, namely (i) to retain the results of the written tests from the first session or (ii) to take part in a second session while renouncing the results of the initial tests.

6 The second session of the written tests took place on 10 November 2021. The appellant chose not to participate in that second session.

7 On 5 May 2022, EPSO notified the appellant of the selection board’s decision not to include his name on the AD 7 reserve list, on the ground that he was not among the candidates who had obtained the highest marks in the assessment centre tests.

8 By decision of 15 July 2022 addressed to the appellant, the selection board rejected his request for a review of the decision not to include his name on the reserve list.

9 On 10 October 2022, the appellant lodged a complaint, under the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, against the decision not to include his name on the reserve list and against the decision rejecting his request for review. The European Commission did not respond explicitly to that complaint.

The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

10 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 23 April 2023, the appellant brought an action for annulment of the decision of 15 July 2022, as referred to in paragraph 8 of the present judgment.

11 By the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed the action in its entirety.

Forms of order sought by the parties

12 By his appeal, the appellant claims that the Court should:

– set aside the judgment under appeal;

– uphold the actions at first and at second instance; and

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

13 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the appeal; and

– order the appellant to pay the costs.

The appeal

14 In support of his appeal, the appellant puts forward two grounds, alleging, first, infringement of the principle of equal treatment and, second, infringement of the notice of competition as regards the assessment of candidates’ competencies.

The first ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

15 This ground is divided into two parts.

16 By the first part of his first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that, in paragraphs 107 to 112 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court undermined the principle of equal treatment by validating the possibility – offered to all the candidates irrespective of the technical difficulties actually encountered by them – of taking part in new written tests.

17 By the second part of his first ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law, in paragraphs 113 to 117 of the judgment under appeal, by failing to find that there had been an infringement of the principle of equal treatment on account of the fact that, first, the candidates who took part in the second and third sessions of the written tests benefited from a significantly longer preparation period than those who took part in the first session, and, second, the subject of the note which those candidates were required to write at each of the three sessions of the written tests was different, without regard being had for the degree of difficulty of those tests.

18 In particular, as regards, in the context of the second part of this ground, the written test in the field, the appellant submits, in the first place, that the scenario on which that test – which initially took place on 9 September 2021 – was based had been published in August 2021. He deduces from this that the candidates who took part in that test during the second session – held on 10 November 2021 – which was also based on that same scenario, would have had a significantly longer period of time to prepare for it.

19 However, the General Court held, in paragraph 117 of the judgment under appeal, that such an organisational arrangement was not liable to infringe the principle of equal treatment, since there was nothing to suggest that the selection board intended to limit the time available to candidates to familiarise themselves with that scenario.

20 The appellant is of the view that that conclusion is vitiated by an error of law, since the time needed to familiarise oneself with the scenario is, by its very nature, one of the objective conditions capable of affecting compliance with the principle of equal treatment.

21 He also claims that, in assessing whether there was any unlawful conduct, the General Court incorrectly relied on the decisions of the selection board, whereas it should have referred exclusively to the notice of competition, which constitutes the framework for the lawfulness of the procedure. In that regard, the appellant submits that the notice of competition expressly provided for compliance with the principle of equal treatment, meaning that the tests were to take place under the same conditions for all candidates. Yet that did not happen in the present case, since some candidates had a longer period of time to familiarise themselves with the scenario on which the written test in the field was based.

22 In the second place, according to the appellant, the General Court made an error of law in finding, in paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal, that the difference as regards the subject of the note which candidates were required to write at each of the three sessions of the written tests was sufficient to ensure compliance with the principle of equal treatment. Indeed, only a consistent level of difficulty in the tests set for candidates during different sessions can ensure that the risk of infringement of that principle is minimised.

23 According to the Commission, far from explaining how, in the light of the findings of fact set out in paragraphs 116 and 117 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of the principle of equal treatment, the appellant is in fact seeking to call into question the assessment of the facts made by that court. That is apparent, in particular, from the passages in the appeal in which the existence of a ‘significant advantage’ allegedly conferred on candidates who participated in several sessions of the written tests is reasserted, even though the General Court concluded that there was no such advantage. Consequently, this part of the appeal should be dismissed as inadmissible.

24 In addition, the Commission submits that the appellant’s argument that, in paragraph 117 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law by relying on the selection board’s decisions in order to assess whether there was any unlawful conduct, whereas it should have referred exclusively to the notice of competition, must be rejected as inadmissible, since it constitutes a new complaint.

25 In the alternative, the Commission observes that, as regards the alleged ‘less complex’ nature of the second and third sessions of the written tests, the appellant merely claims that the test scenario was, in any event, known and maintains that the General Court incorrectly held, in paragraph 117 of the judgment under appeal, that the time available to candidates to prepare for that scenario was irrelevant.

26 However, the Commission states that the appellant failed to explain how paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court ruled on the two written tests consisting of the case study and the written test in the field, is vitiated by an error of law.

Findings of the Court

– Admissibility

27 As regards the first plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission, as summarised in paragraph 23 of the present judgment, it must be stated that the appellant does not call into question the assessment of the facts made by the General Court, which does not constitute, save where the facts are distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2025, Glonatech v REA, C‑114/24 P, EU:C:2025:520, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited). Indeed, by arguing that the General Court incorrectly held that the additional preparation time available to the candidates who took part in the test held during the second session of the written tests on 10 November 2021 was not capable of giving rise to an infringement of the principle of equal treatment, on the sole ground that the selection board had not intended to limit that preparation time, the appellant is in fact alleging an error of law vitiating the General Court’s reasoning. It follows that that plea of inadmissibility must be rejected.

28 As regards the second plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission, as referred to in paragraph 24 of the present judgment, it should be noted that the appellant’s argument, in so far as it refers to the notice of competition, merely supports the complaint alleging that the General Court infringed the principle of equal treatment by failing to verify that the tests were conducted under the same conditions for all candidates. As a result, that plea of inadmissibility cannot be upheld.

– Substance

29 With regard to the second part of the first ground of appeal, which it is appropriate to examine first of all, it should first be noted that the principle of equal treatment, as laid down in Article 20 of the Charter, is a general principle of EU law, which requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. A difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, if the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment concerned (judgment of 30 November 2023, MG v EIB, C‑173/22 P, EU:C:2023:932, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

30 Second, it is true that the selection board enjoys a broad discretion with regard to the arrangements for, and detailed content of, the tests held as part of the competition, provided that the equal treatment of candidates and the objectivity of the selection from among them made by the selection board are ensured (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 March 1988, Goossens and Others v Commission, 228/86, EU:C:1988:172, paragraph 14). Subject to the same proviso, the EU institutions also have a broad discretion to put in place measures to remedy irregularities that have affected the conduct of a competition, such as new written tests for candidates who were affected by the irregularities in the initial written tests.

31 That being said, the principle of equal treatment requires that all candidates in a competition be subject to equivalent tests under equivalent conditions, so that those tests present substantially the same degree of difficulty for all candidates (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 March 1988, Goossens and Others v Commission, 228/86, EU:C:1988:172, paragraphs 14 and 15). It follows that the selection board is required to limit the risk of inequality of opportunity to that which is generally inherent in any examination (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 March 1988, Sergio and Others v Commission, 64/86, 71/86 to 73/86 and 78/86, EU:C:1988:119, paragraph 27). Such a requirement also applies where the selection board for a competition is faced with irregularities or errors occurring in the course of an open competition which it is for the selection board to remedy.

32 In paragraph 117 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that the fact that the candidates who took part, in particular, in the second session of the written tests had had a greater period of time in which to familiarise themselves with the scenario of the written test in the field did not permit the inference that they enjoyed a significant advantage over candidates who took part only in the first session, since there was nothing to suggest that the selection board intended to limit the time available to the candidates to familiarise themselves with that scenario.

33 However, by finding that the candidates who took part in the second session of the written tests did not have a significant advantage, and accordingly by implicitly finding that those tests were of the same degree of difficulty for all candidates, on the sole ground that the selection board had not intended to limit the time available to the candidates in the open competition in question to familiarise themselves with the scenario, the General Court erred in law.

34 Indeed, the General Court was required to examine whether the additional time which the candidates who had taken part in that second session had had in order to acquaint themselves with the scenario of the written test was, objectively, that is to say, independently of the intention of the selection board, such as to confer on them a significant advantage over candidates who participated only in the first session of those tests, with the corollary being a risk of inequality of opportunity going beyond that generally inherent in any competition.

35 As a result, the second part of the first ground of appeal must be upheld and the judgment under appeal must be set aside, without it being necessary to examine either the complaint alleging an error of law committed by the General Court in paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal or the first part of that first ground of appeal and the second ground of appeal.

The action before the General Court

36 Under the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, if the appeal is well founded and the Court of Justice has set aside the decision of the General Court, the Court of Justice may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits, or refer the case back to the General Court for judgment.

37 In the present case, in the light in particular of the fact that the appellant’s action before the General Court was based on pleas that were the subject of an exchange of arguments before the General Court, the examination of which did not require any further measure of organisation of procedure or inquiry to be taken in the case, the Court of Justice considers that the state of the proceedings is such that it may give final judgment in the matter and that it should do so (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 March 2026, VP v Cedefop, C‑209/24 P, EU:C:2026:186, paragraph 71).

38 Since the second part of the first ground of appeal has been upheld and that part was directed against the General Court’s response to the second plea in law, it is necessary to examine the second argument raised by the appellant before the General Court in support of his second plea, alleging that EPSO organised a second session and a third session of written tests which were less difficult than those of the first session.

39 As stated in paragraph 4 of the present judgment, the written assessment centre tests, including the written test in the field, first took place on 9 September 2021. The second session of written tests took place, as indicated in paragraph 6 of the present judgment, on 10 November 2021, and the appellant chose not to take part. It is apparent from paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal that, during that second session, the written test in the field was based, in part, on the same scenario as that published on EPSO’s website prior to the first session of the written tests, with the result that that scenario was known in advance to the candidates.

40 It follows that the candidates who took part in the second session of the written tests benefitted, as compared to the appellant, from an additional period of more than two months in which to familiarise themselves with the same pre-published scenario.

41 That significantly longer preparation time for the same scenario, necessarily combined with a certain degree of insight, acquired during the first session, into how that scenario was likely to be used, is such as to give rise, as the Advocate General noted in point 67 of his Opinion, to a significant difference in the conditions under which, in particular, the candidates in each of the first two sessions of the written tests took part in the written test in the field.

42 Such a difference in treatment, first, infringes the principle of equal treatment which, as was pointed out in paragraph 31 of the present judgment, requires all candidates in a competition to be subject to equivalent tests under equivalent conditions, so that those tests present substantially the same degree of difficulty for all candidates, and, second, is such as to vitiate the outcome of the competition, since the selection board in that competition did not adopt any measures intended to limit the risk of inequality of opportunity between, on the one hand, candidates who took part only in the first session of the written test in the field and, on the other hand, those who also took part in the second session of that test.

43 In that regard, it should be noted, as the Advocate General observed in point 68 of his Opinion, that a less restrictive alternative solution, capable of remedying that situation, could have consisted, inter alia, in publishing a new scenario with an equivalent degree of difficulty.

44 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the Court of Justice has held that, where there is no perfect equivalence between tests in competitions organised at two different sites, it cannot be ruled out that the selection board may have recourse to a compensation mechanism by applying a corrective factor when assessing the tests, provided that that compensation mechanism is based on objective criteria capable of restoring equality between the candidates (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 1983, Detti v Court of Justice, 144/82, EU:C:1983:211, paragraphs 29 and 30).

45 It follows that the decision of 15 July 2022, by which the selection board for Open Competition EPSO/AD/380/19 decided, after review, not to include the appellant’s name on the reserve list for the recruitment of administrators at grade AD 7 in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries is vitiated by illegality.

46 Consequently, the second argument raised by the appellant before the General Court in support of his second plea in law must be declared well founded and the decision of 15 July 2022 must be annulled, in accordance with the form of order sought to that effect before the General Court.

Costs

47 Pursuant to Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is well founded and the Court itself gives final judgment in the case, the Court is to make a decision as to costs.

48 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

49 In the present case, since the Commission has been unsuccessful both in the appeal and the proceedings at first instance, and since the appellant applied for the Commission to be ordered to pay the costs, the Commission must be ordered, in addition to bearing its own costs, to pay all the costs incurred by the appellant in relation to those two sets of proceedings.

On those grounds, the Court (Eighth Chamber) hereby:

1. Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 10 July 2024, VT v Commission (T‑216/23, EU:T:2024:465);

2. Annuls the decision of 15 July 2022, by which the selection board for Open Competition EPSO/AD/380/19 decided, after review, not to include VT’s name on the reserve list for the recruitment of administrators at grade AD 7 in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries;

3. Orders the European Commission, in addition to bearing its own costs, to pay all of the costs incurred by VT both in the proceedings at first instance and in the appeal proceedings.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: Italian.

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