ECLI:EU:C:2026:522

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Eighth Chamber)

25 June 2026 (*)

( Appeal – Civil Service – Open Competition EPSO/AD/380/19 – Competition for the recruitment of administrators in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries – Repetition of written tests – Decision not to include the appellants’ names on the reserve list – Principle of equal treatment – Principle of correspondence between the administrative complaint and the judicial action – Action for annulment )

In Case C‑623/24 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 20 September 2024,

UJ,

UL,

UN,

UP,

US,

UT,

UU,

UV,

represented by M. Velardo, avocate,

appellants,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

UM,

UO,

UQ,

UR,

UW,

applicants at first instance,

European Commission, represented by G. Gattinara and G. Niddam, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

THE COURT (Eighth Chamber),

composed of S. Rodin, acting as President of the Eighth Chamber, N. Piçarra and N. Fenger (Rapporteur), Judges,

Advocate General: N. Emiliou,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 15 January 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By their appeal, UJ, UL, UN, UP, US, UT, UU and UV (together ‘the appellants’) seek to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 10 July 2024, UJ and Others v Commission (T‑120/23, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2024:464), by which that court dismissed their action seeking the annulment of the decisions of 5 May 2022 by which the selection board for Open Competition EPSO/AD/380/19 decided not to include their names on the reserve list for the recruitment of administrators at grade AD 7 in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries.

Legal context

2 The first paragraph of Article 27 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) states:

‘Recruitment shall be directed to securing for the institution the services of officials of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity, recruited on the broadest possible geographical basis from among nationals of Member States of the [European] Union. …’

3 Article 90 of those regulations provides:

‘1. Any person to whom these Staff Regulations apply may submit to the appointing authority, a request that it take a decision relating to him. The authority shall notify the person concerned of its reasoned decision within four months from the date on which the request was made. If at the end of that period no reply to the request has been received, this shall be deemed to constitute an implied decision rejecting it, against which a complaint may be lodged in accordance with the following paragraph.

2. Any person to whom these Staff Regulations apply may submit to the appointing authority a complaint against an act affecting him adversely, either where the said authority has taken a decision or where it has failed to adopt a measure prescribed by the Staff Regulations. …

…’

4 Article 91 of the Staff Regulations provides:

‘1. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in any dispute between the Union and any person to whom these Staff Regulations apply regarding the legality of an act affecting such person adversely within the meaning of Article 90(2). In disputes of a financial character, the Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction.

2. An appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union shall lie only if:

– the appointing authority has previously had a complaint submitted to it pursuant to Article 90(2) within the period prescribed therein, and

– the complaint has been rejected by express decision or by implied decision.

…’

Background to the dispute

5 On 5 December 2019, the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) published, in the Official Journal of the European Union, the notice of open competition based on qualifications and tests EPSO/AD/380/19, for the recruitment of administrators (AD 7/AD 9) in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries (OJ 2019, C 409 A, p. 1), with a view to establishing two reserve lists, one for grade AD 7 administrators and one for grade AD 9 administrators.

6 The appellants took part in that competition and, after passing the ‘multiple choice question’ tests and the selection based on qualifications (Talent Screener), took part in the assessment centre tests.

7 The written assessment centre tests, that is to say, the case study and the ‘written test in the field’, took place, for the first time, on 9 September 2021.

8 By letter of 4 October 2021, EPSO informed the candidates that, because of the technical problems that arose during the first session of the written tests, it had been decided that all the candidates who had taken part in the written tests of 9 September 2021 would be offered two options, namely (i) to retain the results of the written tests from the first session or (ii) to take part in a second session while renouncing the results of the initial tests.

9 The second session of the written tests took place on 10 November 2021. UJ, UL, UP, UU and UV chose to participate in that second session, while UN, US and UT did not take part therein.

10 After the second session of the written tests, the selection board allowed eight candidates who had participated in that session to sit once again the case study, the written test in the field or both of those tests on account of the technical difficulties which those candidates had encountered during that session. In particular, it allowed UJ, who had informed EPSO on 10 November 2021 that she had not been able to connect, within the time allowed, in order to take the tests of the second session, to sit both of the tests in question again.

11 The third session of the written tests took place on 10 December 2021. UJ chose to take part in that third session and sat the two tests in question.

12 On 5 May 2022, EPSO notified each of the appellants individually of the selection board’s decision not to include their names on the AD 7 reserve list, on the ground, in essence, that they were not among the candidates who had obtained the highest marks in the assessment centre tests. In addition, as regards UT, the selection board considered that he had not obtained the minimum marks required to pass those tests.

13 By decisions of 15 July 2022 addressed to UJ and to UL, the selection board rejected their requests for a review of the decisions not to include their names on the reserve list.

14 On 5 August 2022, the appellants jointly lodged a complaint, under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, against the decisions not to include their names on the reserve list and, as regards UJ and UL, against the decisions rejecting their request for review.

15 On 13 March 2023, the Appointing Authority sent each appellant an individual decision rejecting the complaint referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment.

The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

16 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 5 March 2023, the appellants brought an action seeking the annulment of the decisions of 5 May 2022, by which the selection board for Open Competition EPSO/AD/380/19 had decided not to include their names on the reserve list for the recruitment of administrators at grade AD 7 in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries. They also sought the annulment of the decisions of 15 July 2022 rejecting the requests of UJ and of UL to review the decisions not to include their names on the reserve list.

17 The General Court dismissed the action in its entirety.

Forms of order sought by the parties

18 By their appeal, the appellants claim that the Court should:

– set aside the judgment under appeal;

– uphold the actions at first and at second instance; and

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

19 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the appeal; and

– order the appellants to pay the costs.

The appeal

20 In support of their appeal, the appellants put forward two grounds, the first alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment and the second alleging an error of law in the interpretation of the principle of correspondence between the administrative complaint and the judicial action. For the sake of completeness, they allege infringement of the notice of competition as regards the assessment of the candidates’ competencies.

The first ground of appeal

The first part of the first ground of appeal

– Arguments of the parties

21 By the first part of their first ground of appeal, concerning paragraphs 103 to 109 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants claim that the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of the principle of equal treatment, as it applies to competitions, in that it failed to find that there had been an infringement of that principle even though the selection board did not adopt all the measures necessary to limit the risk of inequality of opportunity to that which is generally inherent in any examination.

22 In that regard, they note that, of the grade AD 7 candidates who brought the present appeal, only five of them took part in the written tests a second time, and only one candidate took part in them a third time, whereas three other candidates retained the result they obtained during the first session of those tests.

23 The appellants claim that the General Court itself endorsed, in paragraphs 107 and 108 of the judgment under appeal, a measure which resulted in candidates in different situations being treated the same, whether they took part in the written tests once, twice, or even three times, in the absence of any objective justification. Indeed, it follows from paragraphs 107 and 108 of the judgment under appeal that not all candidates were in the same situation and that some of them, having encountered no technical problems, or only minor difficulties in the written tests with no significant impact on their results, were nevertheless permitted to sit those tests again.

24 In essence, the appellants claim that the principle of equal treatment was infringed in so far as the Commission did not limit the risk that candidates who had not encountered any difficulties, but were merely dissatisfied with their performance during the tests, would take part in the second and third sessions of the written tests. In that regard, they note that no individual, case-by-case verification of the severity and reality of the difficulties encountered was carried out. As a result, different situations were treated in the same way, without this being objectively justified either by the aim of the competition procedure, which is to select the candidates best suited to performing the duties in question, or by the first paragraph of Article 27 of the Staff Regulations, according to which ‘recruitment shall be directed to securing for the institution the services of officials of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity …’.

25 The Commission submits, as a preliminary point, that only a failure to reduce, within reasonable limits, the risk of unequal treatment as regards the opportunities offered to candidates is capable of resulting in an infringement of the principle of equal treatment in competitions. In that regard, it points out that selection boards enjoy a broad discretion as regards, first, the content of the tests, their organisation and the testing procedures and, second, the assessment of the tests, as well as, where appropriate, whether it is appropriate to adopt a corrective measure.

26 The Commission states, first of all, that, in paragraph 108 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court, by a finding of fact which is outside the scope of the Court of Justice’s review in the context of the appeal, held that, having regard to the scale and diversity of the technical problems encountered, the possibility - offered to all the candidates - of repeating the written tests constituted a measure which was ‘difficult to avoid’ and in line with a legitimate aim in the public interest. According to the Commission, the appellants do not put forward any argument that, first, makes it possible to understand how giving candidates the choice to take part in the second session of the written tests was such as to put them at a disadvantage individually and, second, demonstrates that the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of the principle of equal treatment.

27 Next, the Commission considers that, on account of the diffuse and varied nature of the technical disruptions encountered, it would have been impossible to ascertain the extent of those disruptions and the precise consequences for each candidate. It adds that, even assuming that certain candidates did not suffer any disadvantages and nevertheless chose to take part in the second session of the written tests, taking such a decision would have had the sole effect of placing them back in competition with the other candidates who, for their part, had encountered such disadvantages during the first session. In that case, both during the first and second sessions of the written tests, the candidates would have taken part in the tests under the same conditions, namely by competing with other candidates also admitted by the selection board to take part in those tests. There would therefore have been no inequality in the opportunities offered to the candidates.

28 Lastly, as regards the third session of the written tests, the Commission maintains that the reports submitted to EPSO by the candidates who requested the repetition of the written tests were properly examined by the selection board and by EPSO. Accordingly, the appellants’ argument that the difference in treatment at issue results from an alleged failure to confirm the technical problems encountered is manifestly unfounded.

– Findings of the Court

29 The first part of the first ground of appeal raises the question of whether the fact that the Commission offered a second chance to sit the written tests to all the candidates who took part in those tests, whether they had encountered technical problems during them or not, is such as to constitute an infringement of the principle of equal treatment.

30 In the first place, it must be borne in mind that that principle, as laid down in Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, is a general principle of EU law, which requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. A difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, if the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment concerned (judgment of 30 November 2023, MG v EIB, C‑173/22 P, EU:C:2023:932, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

31 In the second place, it is true that the selection board enjoys a broad discretion with regard to the arrangements for, and detailed content of, the tests held as part of the competition, provided that the equal treatment of candidates and the objectivity of the choice from among them made by the selection board are ensured (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 March 1988, Goossens and Others v Commission, 228/86, EU:C:1988:172, paragraph 14). Subject to the same proviso, the EU institutions also have a broad discretion to put in place measures to remedy irregularities that have affected the conduct of a competition, such as new written tests for candidates who were affected by the irregularities in the initial written tests.

32 That being said, the principle of equal treatment requires that all candidates in a competition be subject to equivalent tests under equivalent conditions, so that those tests present substantially the same degree of difficulty for all candidates (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 March 1988, Goossens and Others v Commission, 228/86, EU:C:1988:172, paragraphs 14 and 15). It follows that the selection board is required to limit the risk of inequality of opportunity to that which is generally inherent in any examination (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 March 1988, Sergio and Others v Commission, 64/86, 71/86 to 73/86 and 78/86, EU:C:1988:119, paragraph 27). Such a requirement also applies where the selection board for a competition is faced with irregularities or errors occurring in the course of an open competition which it is for the selection board to remedy.

33 In that regard, the General Court found, in paragraph 107 of the judgment under appeal, that, in the present case, in view of the scale of the technical problems and the very large number of candidates concerned, the selection board had not infringed the principle of equal treatment by offering all the candidates who participated in the first session of the written tests the opportunity to take part in a new session of tests, even though not all the candidates had reported the technical problems which had arisen during that session. In paragraph 108 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that the difference in treatment resulting from that solution was difficult to avoid, given the scale and diversity of the technical problems encountered. It also took the view, in that paragraph 108 of the judgment under appeal, that that solution had the advantage of ensuring, in line with a legitimate aim in the public interest, that all candidates who had faced problems or disruptions could benefit from a new session, without treating candidates who were satisfied with the conduct of their written tests and therefore had not asked to re-sit them less well than candidates who were dissatisfied with the conditions under which those tests had taken place and who had chosen to take part in a new session.

34 However, the fact of offering all the candidates who took part in the first session of the written tests the opportunity to take those tests a second time meant that candidates who had in no way, or only to a negligible extent, been affected by the technical problems during the written tests were given a second chance of participating in those tests and, as the case may be, of remedying unsatisfactory performance, as compared to other candidates who had faced serious technical problems which were not attributable to them and which seriously compromised their chances of passing those tests.

35 Thus, the latter ultimately had only one real opportunity to compete, whereas the former benefited from the advantage of a second chance, together with the option of choosing whether or not to sit the written tests again.

36 The result of this is a difference in treatment between the candidates, which the General Court indeed acknowledged in paragraph 108 of the judgment under appeal, but which it considered to be difficult to avoid.

37 It is therefore necessary to examine whether that difference in treatment is capable of being justified by a legitimate aim and whether it is proportionate to the aim pursued.

38 While it is common ground that the measure at issue seeks to remedy the irregularities which affected the first session of the written tests and pursues, on that basis, a legitimate aim, the fact remains that it cannot be regarded as proportionate in relation to that aim.

39 Indeed, as the Advocate General stated, in essence, in points 47 and 49 of his Opinion, given that the Commission could have invalidated the first session and organised a new session open to all candidates, thereby avoiding conferring on certain candidates the advantage of benefiting from a second chance together with the option of choosing whether or not to participate again in the written tests, the solution adopted by the Commission went beyond what was necessary to achieve the objective of remedying the irregularities resulting from substantial technical problems that affected the first session of the written tests and restoring the undistorted conditions of the competition. On the contrary, that solution had the effect of distorting those conditions by creating a new inequality between candidates who had faced serious technical problems which were not attributable to them and those who had not faced such problems, which thus went beyond the risk of inequality of opportunity that is generally inherent in any competition.

40 It follows that the General Court erred in law in finding, in paragraph 109 of the judgment under appeal, that the selection board had not infringed the principle of equal treatment by allowing all the candidates who took part in the first session of the written tests to take part in a second session.

41 As regards the appellants’ arguments concerning the third session of the written tests, they must be rejected as irrelevant in the light of the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal referred to in the first part of the first ground of appeal, which do not relate to that session.

42 Furthermore, as is apparent from the foregoing considerations, the unequal treatment resulting from the possibility offered to all candidates to participate again in the written tests, at the very least, in principle, placed candidates who had been seriously affected by the technical failures and who, as a result, had no real choice but to take part in those tests again, at a disadvantage. By contrast, as regards the candidates who chose not to take part again in the written tests, it is not disputed that, as the General Court observed in paragraph 108 of the judgment under appeal, it may reasonably be presumed that they were satisfied with the conduct of those tests. Consequently, those candidates cannot be regarded as coming within the category of candidates seriously affected by the technical failures in question.

43 It is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that an official or a member of staff is not entitled to act in the interests of the law or of the institutions and may put forward, in support of an action, only such claims as relate to him or her personally (judgment of 25 March 2021, Alvarez y Bejarano and Others v Commission, C‑517/19 P and C‑518/19 P, EU:C:2021:240, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited).

44 Consequently, the appellants who chose not to take part in the second session of the written tests, namely UN, US and UT, cannot, here, claim to have a personal interest in relying on an error of law committed by the General Court relating to the alleged infringement of the principle of equal treatment.

45 As regards the candidates who, like UJ, UL, UP, UU and UV, reported, as noted in paragraph 103 of the judgment under appeal, that they had encountered technical difficulties at the first session and participated in the second session – candidates in respect of whom it cannot be ruled out that serious difficulties were faced – it must be held, in the light of the considerations set out in paragraph 42 of the present judgment, that the error of law committed by the General Court is such as to have affected them. Those candidates therefore have an interest in relying on such an error of law.

46 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the first part of the first ground of appeal must be upheld in respect of UJ, UL, UP, UU and UV and must be rejected in respect of the remaining appellants.

The second part of the first ground of appeal

– Arguments of the parties

47 By the second part of their first ground of appeal, concerning paragraphs 110 to 114 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants, as regards the written test in the field, while agreeing with the General Court’s finding in paragraph 111 of the judgment under appeal, claim, first, that the scenario on which that test – which initially took place on 9 September 2021 – was based had been published in August 2021. They deduce from this that the candidates who took part in that test during the second session – held on 10 November 2021 – which was also based on that same scenario, would have had a significantly longer period of time to prepare for it.

48 However, the General Court held, in paragraph 114 of the judgment under appeal, that such an organisational arrangement was not liable to infringe the principle of equal treatment, since there was nothing to suggest that the selection board intended to limit the time available to candidates to familiarise themselves with that scenario.

49 The appellants are of the view that that conclusion is vitiated by an error of law, since the time needed to familiarise oneself with the scenario is, by its very nature, one of the objective conditions capable of affecting compliance with the principle of equal treatment.

50 They also claim that, in assessing whether there was any unlawful conduct, the General Court incorrectly relied on the decisions of the selection board, whereas it should have referred exclusively to the notice of competition, which constitutes the framework for the lawfulness of the procedure. In that regard, the appellants submit that the notice of competition expressly provided for compliance with the principle of equal treatment, meaning that the tests were to take place under the same conditions for all candidates. Yet that did not happen in the present case, since some candidates had a longer period of time to familiarise themselves with the scenario on which the written test in the field was based.

51 In the second place, according to the appellants, the General Court made an error of law in finding, in paragraph 113 of the judgment under appeal, that the difference as regards the subject of the note which candidates were required to write at each of the three sessions of the written tests was sufficient to ensure compliance with the principle of equal treatment. Indeed, only a consistent level of difficulty in the tests set for candidates during different sessions can ensure that the risk of infringement of that principle is minimised.

52 According to the Commission, far from explaining how, in the light of the findings of fact set out in paragraphs 113 and 114 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of the principle of equal treatment, the appellants are in fact seeking to call into question the assessment of the facts made by that court. That is apparent, in particular, from the passages in the appeal in which the existence of a ‘significant advantage’ allegedly conferred on candidates who participated in several sessions of the written tests is reasserted, even though the General Court concluded that there was no such advantage. Consequently, this part of the appeal should be dismissed as inadmissible.

53 On the substance, the Commission observes that, as regards the alleged ‘less complex’ nature of the second and third sessions of the written tests, the appellants merely claim that the test scenario was, in any event, known and maintains that the General Court incorrectly held, in paragraph 114 of the judgment under appeal, that the time available to candidates to prepare for that scenario was irrelevant.

54 However, the Commission states that the appellants failed to explain how paragraph 113 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court ruled on the two written tests consisting of the case study and the written test in the field, is vitiated by an error of law.

– Findings of the Court

55 As regards the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission, as summarised in paragraph 52 of the present judgment, it must be stated that the appellants do not call into question the assessment of the facts made by the General Court, which does not constitute, save where the facts are distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2025, Glonatech v REA, C‑114/24 P, EU:C:2025:520, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited). Indeed, by arguing that the General Court incorrectly held that the additional preparation time available to the candidates who took part in the test held during the second session of the written tests on 10 November 2021 was not capable of giving rise to an infringement of the principle of equal treatment, on the sole ground that the selection board had not intended to limit that preparation time, the appellants are in fact alleging an error of law vitiating the General Court’s reasoning. It follows that that plea of inadmissibility must be rejected.

56 On the substance, it should be noted that, in paragraph 114 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that the fact that the candidates who took part, in particular, in the second session of the written tests had had a greater period of time in which to familiarise themselves with the scenario of the written test in the field did not permit the inference that they enjoyed a significant advantage over candidates who took part only in the first session, since there was nothing to suggest that the selection board intended to limit the time available to the candidates to familiarise themselves with that scenario.

57 However, by finding that the candidates who took part in the second session of the written tests did not have a significant advantage, and accordingly by implicitly finding that those tests were of the same degree of difficulty for all candidates, on the sole ground that the selection board had not intended to limit the time available to the candidates in the open competition in question to familiarise themselves with the scenario, the General Court erred in law.

58 Indeed, the General Court was required to examine whether the additional time which the candidates who had taken part in that second session had had in order to acquaint themselves with the scenario of the written test was, objectively, that is to say, independently of the intention of the selection board, such as to confer on them a significant advantage over candidates who participated only in the first session of those tests, with the corollary being a risk of inequality of opportunity going beyond that generally inherent in any competition.

59 As the General Court held in paragraph 111 of the judgment under appeal, a point not contested by the appellants, only candidates who did not take part in the second session of the written tests have an interest in arguing that that session was less difficult than the first session. That finding is, moreover, supported by the preceding paragraph of the present judgment. Consequently, only those candidates may be permitted to rely on an error of law committed by the General Court in that regard.

60 Whilst the candidates concerned, in this instance, are UN, US and UT, it should, however, be noted that, as mentioned in paragraph 12 of the present judgment, UT was not included on the AD 7 reserve list on the ground that he had not obtained the minimum marks required to pass the assessment centre tests.

61 Since the unequal treatment alleged here concerns an advantage unduly conferred on candidates who obtained the required minimum marks and who participated in the second session of the written tests, as compared with those who also obtained such marks, but who did not take part in that second session, it cannot have an unfavourable effect on a candidate such as UT, who did not obtain those minimum marks.

62 It follows that UT cannot establish a personal interest in relying on such unequal treatment.

63 Consequently, without it being necessary to examine the complaint alleging an error of law committed by the General Court in paragraph 113 of the judgment under appeal, the second part of the first ground of appeal must be upheld in so far as it concerns UN and US, and rejected in so far as it concerns the other appellants.

The third part of the first ground of appeal

– Arguments of the parties

64 By the third part of their first ground of appeal, relating to paragraphs 119 to 122 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants, in particular UT, submit that their complaint that the organisation of a third session of written tests infringed the principle of equal treatment, raised at first instance, should have been assessed in the light of the case-law arising from the judgment of 27 October 1976, Prais v Council (130/75, EU:C:1976:142), which requires the tests to take place on the same day, in order to ensure that candidates are subject to the same conditions. Yet that did not happen in the present case, since some candidates took part in the written tests on three occasions, on different dates.

65 Contrary to what the General Court held in paragraph 120 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants are of the view that all the candidates were disadvantaged by that method of organising the competition, albeit for different reasons.

66 In that regard, the Commission notes, first, that the case-law arising from the judgment of 27 October 1976, Prais v Council (130/75, EU:C:1976:142) is not relevant in the present case, given that the case giving rise to that judgment concerned the situation of a candidate who had requested to take the written tests on a different date for personal reasons. By contrast, in the present case, the selection board was required to remedy technical problems encountered by a large number of candidates during the written tests.

67 Second, it submits that, in the absence of any details as to who among the appellants might have been disadvantaged by the organisation of the third session of the written tests, which were not provided either in the action at first instance or in the present appeal, the appellants’ argument that certain candidates enjoyed a significant advantage is manifestly unfounded.

– Findings of the Court

68 In paragraphs 119 to 122 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court examined and rejected the appellants’ complaint, finding that the fact that, unlike the candidates who participated in the second session of the written tests, those who took part in the third session of those tests had the opportunity to participate in the case study, in the written test in the field, or in both of those tests, is not contrary to the principle of equal treatment.

69 Although it is not apparent from those paragraphs of the judgment under appeal that the appellants claimed at first instance that, by organising the written tests on three occasions instead of organising them on the same day, the selection board had infringed the principle of equal treatment, the fact remains that the Commission did not plead the inadmissibility of the third part of the first ground of appeal.

70 Thus, in the present case and in any event, it is appropriate to examine the substance of that third part.

71 In that regard, while it is true that, according to the case-law arising from the judgment of 27 October 1976, Prais v Council (130/75, EU:C:1976:142, paragraphs 13 and 14), the principle of equal treatment means that tests must take place under the same conditions for all candidates and that, as regards written tests, the need to compare the candidates’ performance requires those tests to be the same for all candidates, it being of particular importance that those written tests take place on the same date for all candidates, the fact remains that the occurrence of irregularities or errors affecting the conduct of a competition is capable of justifying the repetition of the tests (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 1983, Detti v Court of Justice, 144/82, EU:C:1983:211, paragraph 29).

72 As the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 85 of his Opinion, although simultaneous written testing is, generally, the most appropriate way of ensuring uniform conditions for all candidates, that cannot, however, be established as an absolute rule. Indeed, an interpretation to the contrary would preclude the adoption of corrective measures following disruptions, particularly disruptions of a technical nature, and the organisation of new tests for the benefit of certain candidates where the decision to exclude those candidates from a competition has been annulled by the EU Courts.

73 Therefore, contrary to what the appellants assert, the principle of equal treatment does not require that all written tests necessarily take place on the same day. As already noted in paragraph 31 of the present judgment, the EU institutions have a broad discretion to put in place measures to remedy irregularities that have affected the conduct of a competition, such as new written tests for the candidates who were affected by the irregularities in the initial written tests, provided that compliance with the principle of equal treatment of all the candidates and the objectivity of the selection from among them made by the selection board are ensured.

74 However, in the absence of any specific argument seeking to demonstrate that all the appellants were disadvantaged by the organisation of the third session of the written tests, it does not appear that the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraph 119 of the judgment under appeal, that the fact that the candidates who participated in that third session had the opportunity to take part in the case study or in the written test in the field or in both of those tests was not contrary to the principle of equal treatment.

75 It follows that the third part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

The second ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

76 By their second ground of appeal, concerning paragraphs 149, 206 and 207 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law in declaring inadmissible, in paragraph 207 of the judgment under appeal, their plea alleging infringement of the notice of competition, since it applied the principle of correspondence between the administrative complaint and the judicial action with excessive rigour, thereby infringing the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

77 In that regard, they note that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the principle of correspondence is justified by the very purpose of the pre-litigation procedure, which is to enable the administration to review its decision and, where appropriate, to reach a non-judicial resolution of disputes between officials or other servants and the administration, classified as an ‘amicable settlement’. To that end, it would certainly be necessary for the appointing authority to be in a position to ascertain in sufficient detail the grounds of complaint raised by the person concerned in respect of the contested decision. However, the fact remains that amicable settlement is largely facilitated by the absence of excessive legal formalism in the context of that pre-litigation procedure.

78 According to the appellants, it is generally appropriate to adopt the approach set out in paragraphs 109 to 122 of the judgment of 1 July 2010, Mandt v Parliament (F‑45/07, EU:F:2010:72), according to which the principle of correspondence between the administrative complaint and the judicial action can apply only where the judicial action alters either the relief sought in the complaint or its cause of action, and the concept of ‘cause of action’ must be understood in a broad sense.

79 In the present case, the error of law committed by the General Court in the context of the interpretation of the principle of correspondence is all the more obvious since the Commission did not respond to the complaint which the appellants lodged with it.

80 The Commission contends that the appellants dispute, in essence, the very obligation to set out the grounds of complaint in the context of an administrative complaint under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations. In its view, since candidates in a competition procedure are persons ‘to whom the Staff Regulations apply’, within the meaning of Articles 90 and 91 thereof, they were required to indicate, in the context of that complaint, the grounds of complaint which were subsequently the subject of the fifth plea raised before the General Court, failing which that plea would be inadmissible.

81 In so far as concerns the reference to the judgment of 1 July 2010, Mandt v Parliament (F‑45/07, EU:F:2010:72), the Commission submits that the General Court, ruling as a court of second instance in civil service matters, has already rejected the interpretation adopted by the Civil Service Tribunal, after finding it to be incorrect in paragraphs 70 to 80 of the judgment of 25 October 2013, Commission v Moschonaki (T‑476/11 P, EU:T:2013:557).

82 As regards the right to effective judicial protection, the Commission considers that it cannot justify a broad interpretation of the conditions of admissibility laid down by other provisions of primary law such as, here, Article 270 TFEU. It adds that the appellants’ argument that, in the event of an implied rejection of a complaint, that complaint could not properly fulfil its function of encouraging an amicable settlement of the dispute between the staff member and the institution is also unfounded. Indeed, the nature of the reply to the complaint, whether express or implied, is irrelevant to the possibility of reaching such an amicable settlement.

83 In any event, the Commission is of the view that the General Court did not ‘arbitrarily broaden the interpretation of the rule of correspondence to include also the case of failure to reply to the complaint, before the action was brought’, since it is common ground that in the present case the Appointing Authority expressly replied to the appellants’ complaint.

Findings of the Court

84 It should be borne in mind that, where the person concerned submits a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, instead of bringing an action directly before the General Court, he or she is required to comply with all the procedural requirements governing the prior complaint procedure which he or she has chosen (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 May 1986, Rihoux and Others v Commission, 52/85, EU:C:1986:199, paragraph 11).

85 Since the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure, under Article 91 of the Staff Regulations, is to enable an amicable settlement of disputes between officials or other servants and the administration, that objective can be achieved only if the appointing authority is in a position to know, in sufficient detail, the complaints made by the persons concerned with regard to the contested decision (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 May 1986, Rihoux and Others v Commission, 52/85, EU:C:1986:199, paragraph 12, and of 14 March 1989, del Amo Martinez v Parliament, 133/88, EU:C:1989:124, paragraph 9).

86 In actions brought on the basis of Article 270 TFEU, the forms of order sought before the General Court can have only the same subject matter as the claims set out in the complaint and can contain only heads of claim based on the same cause of action as those relied on in the complaint. The submissions and arguments made to the Court in support of those heads of claim need not necessarily appear in the complaint, but must be closely linked to it (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 1989, del Amo Martinez v Parliament, 133/88, EU:C:1989:124, paragraph 10 and the case-law cited).

87 If consistency between the administrative complaint and the judicial action were not required, those who lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against a decision of a selection board would be accorded rights superior to the rights recognised for those who chose to bring an action directly before the General Court against such a decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 May 1986, Rihoux and Others v Commission, 52/85, EU:C:1986:199, paragraph 11).

88 It is true that, on account of the informal nature of the pre-litigation procedure and the fact that those concerned are generally acting without the assistance of a lawyer at that stage, the administration must not interpret the complaints restrictively but must, on the contrary, examine them with an open mind (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 1989, del Amo Martinez v Parliament, 133/88, EU:C:1989:124, paragraph 11).

89 However, in paragraph 206 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found that the appellants’ complaint did not contain any ground of complaint relating to the assessment of candidates’ ability to manage a team in respect of the candidates for the posts of administrator at grade AD 7 or any ground of complaint closely linked to the fifth plea raised before the General Court, alleging that that ability had, wrongly, been assessed in respect of candidates for the posts of administrator at grade AD 7.

90 Therefore, the General Court did not err when it held, in paragraph 207 of the judgment under appeal, that the principle of correspondence between the administrative complaint and the judicial action cannot be regarded as having been observed.

91 The fact that the Commission did not reply to the complaint lodged with it by the appellants is, as the Advocate General observed in point 103 of his Opinion, irrelevant in that regard and cannot alter the content of the principle of correspondence, since such a failure to reply is deemed to constitute an implied decision rejecting the complaint.

92 Consequently, the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

93 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the appeal must be upheld with regard to all the appellants, with the exception of UT, and the judgment under appeal must therefore be set aside in so far as it concerns UJ, UL, UN, UP, US, UU and UV.

The action before the General Court

94 Under the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, if the appeal is well founded and the Court of Justice has set aside the decision of the General Court, the Court of Justice may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits, or refer the case back to the General Court for judgment.

95 In the present case, in the light in particular of the fact that the appellants’ action before the General Court was based on pleas that were the subject of an exchange of arguments before the General Court, the examination of which did not require any further measure of organisation of procedure or inquiry to be taken in the case, the Court of Justice considers that the state of the proceedings, as brought by UJ, UL, UN, UP, US, UU and UV, is such that it may give final judgment in the matter and that it should do so (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 March 2026, VP v Cedefop, C‑209/24 P, EU:C:2026:186, paragraph 71).

96 As regards UJ, UL, UP, UU and UV, it follows from the reasons set out in the context of the first part of the first ground of appeal and, in particular, from paragraphs 36, 42 and 45 of the present judgment that the first argument of the second plea in law raised before the General Court, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment owing to the fact that all the candidates were offered the opportunity to participate again in the written tests, must be upheld.

97 As a result, the decisions of 5 May 2022 by which the selection board for Open Competition EPSO/AD/380/19 decided not to include the names of these appellants on the reserve list for the recruitment of administrators at grade AD 7 in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries, which were the subject of their action for annulment before the General Court, must be annulled. The same is true of the decisions of 15 July 2022, by which that same selection board rejected the requests of UJ and UL to review the decisions of 5 May 2022 not to include their names on that reserve list.

98 As regards UN and US, as stated in paragraph 7 of the present judgment, the written assessment centre tests, including the written test in the field, first took place on 9 September 2021. The second session of written tests took place, as indicated in paragraph 9 of the present judgment, on 10 November 2021, and UN and US chose not to take part therein. It is apparent from paragraph 113 of the judgment under appeal that, during that second session, the written test in the field was based, in part, on the same scenario as that published on EPSO’s website prior to the first session of the written tests, with the result that that scenario was known in advance to the candidates.

99 It follows that the candidates who took part in the second session of the written tests benefited, as compared to UN and US, from an additional period of more than two months in which to familiarise themselves with the same pre-published scenario.

100 That significantly longer preparation time for the same scenario, necessarily combined with a certain degree of insight, acquired during the first session, into how that scenario was likely to be used, is such as to give rise, as the Advocate General noted in point 67 of his Opinion, to a significant difference in the conditions under which, in particular, the candidates in each of the first two sessions of the written tests took part in the written test in the field.

101 Such a difference in treatment, first, infringes the principle of equal treatment which, as was pointed out in paragraph 32 of the present judgment, requires all candidates in a competition to be subject to equivalent tests under equivalent conditions, so that those tests present substantially the same degree of difficulty for all candidates, and, second, is such as to vitiate the outcome of the competition, since the selection board in that competition did not adopt any measures intended to limit the risk of inequality of opportunity between, on the one hand, candidates who took part only in the first session of the written test in the field and, on the other hand, those who also took part in the second session of that test.

102 In that regard, it should be noted, as the Advocate General observed in point 68 of his Opinion, that a less restrictive alternative solution, capable of remedying that situation, could have consisted, inter alia, in publishing a new scenario with an equivalent degree of difficulty.

103 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the Court of Justice has held that, where there is no perfect equivalence between tests in competitions organised at two different sites, it cannot be ruled out that the selection board may have recourse to a compensation mechanism by applying a corrective factor when assessing the tests, provided that that compensation mechanism is based on objective criteria capable of restoring equality between the candidates (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 1983, Detti v Court of Justice, 144/82, EU:C:1983:211, paragraphs 29 and 30).

104 It follows that the decisions of 5 May 2022 by which the selection board for Open Competition EPSO/AD/380/19 decided not to include the names of UN and US on the reserve list for the recruitment of administrators at grade AD 7 in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries are vitiated by illegality.

105 Consequently, the second argument raised by the appellants before the General Court in support of their second plea in law must be declared well founded and the decisions of 5 May 2022 must be annulled, in accordance with the form of order sought to that effect before the General Court.

Costs

106 Pursuant to Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is well founded and the Court itself gives final judgment in the case, the Court is to make a decision as to costs.

107 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

108 In the present case, since the Commission has been unsuccessful in so far as concerns UJ, UL, UN, UP, US, UU and UV, both in the proceedings at first instance and in the appeal, and since those appellants applied for the Commission to be ordered to pay the costs, the Commission must be ordered to pay, in addition to bearing its own costs, all the costs incurred by UJ, UL, UN, UP, US, UU and UV in relation to those two sets of proceedings.

109 Since UT has been unsuccessful and the Commission applied for costs, UT must be ordered, in addition to bearing his own costs, to pay those incurred by the Commission both in the proceedings at first instance and in the appeal proceedings.

On those grounds, the Court (Eighth Chamber) hereby:

1. Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of 10 July 2024, UJ and Others v Commission (T‑120/23, EU:T:2024:464) in so far as it concerns UJ, UL, UN, UP, US, UU and UV;

2. Dismisses the appeal in so far as it concerns UT;

3. Annuls the decisions of 5 May 2022 by which the selection board of the open competition EPSO/AD/380/19 decided not to include the names of UJ, UL, UN, UP, US, UU and UV on the reserve list for the recruitment of administrators at grade AD 7 in the field of international cooperation and managing aid to non-EU countries, as well as the decisions of 15 July 2022 by which that same selection board rejected the requests of UJ and UL to review the decisions of 5 May 2022 not to include their names on that reserve list;

4. Orders the European Commission, in addition to bearing its own costs, to pay all of the costs incurred by UJ, UL, UN, UP, US, UU and UV both in the proceedings at first instance and in the appeal proceedings;

5. Orders UT, in addition to bearing his own costs, to pay those incurred by the European Commission both in the proceedings at first instance and in the appeal proceedings.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: Italian.

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