ECLI:EU:C:2026:314

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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

ĆAPETA

delivered on 16 April 2026 (1)

Case C‑23/25 [Sutuska (i)]

Bank Millennium S.A.

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw, Poland))

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Unfair terms in consumer contracts – Directive 93/13/EEC – Article 6(1) – Article 7(1) – Effects of a finding that a contractual term is unfair – Void agreement – Insurance contracts concluded as collateral for an invalid loan agreement – Possibility of asserting claims that go beyond the reimbursement of the amounts agreed in the contract and the payment of default interest – Consumer’s right to reimbursement of insurance premiums – Insurance policies covering either the creditor’s risks or the borrower’s risks – Proportionality )

I. Introduction

1. The present case concerns the consequences of annulling a consumer contract that contained unfair terms within the meaning of the Unfair Terms Directive. (2)

2. The Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw, Poland), the referring court, ruled that a mortgage loan agreement concluded between a consumer and a bank was null and void because it found that the agreement contained unfair terms. That court must now decide whether the bank is liable to reimburse the consumer for the sums paid in relation to a number of insurance policies that the bank required the consumer to take out at the time that agreement was concluded.

II. The background to the proceedings, the question referred and the procedure before the Court

3. On 14 March 2007, AS, the borrower and the applicant in the main proceedings, concluded with Bank Millennium, the defendant in the main proceedings, a long-term mortgage loan agreement indexed to the Swiss franc.

4. The contract included a clause which provided that the loan instalments were to be paid in Polish zlotys (PLN) after conversion using the selling rate of the Swiss franc in accordance with the bank’s currency exchange rate table applicable on the date of payment. The referring court found that currency clause to be unfair and, therefore, by a partial judgment of 16 January 2025, declared the entire agreement null and void. Under national law, the invalidity of a contract requires the contracting parties to return whatever benefits they received under that contract.

5. In addition to the reimbursement of the loan instalments, AS seeks PLN 15 108.15 (approximately EUR 3 573), which represents the premiums paid for the four insurance policies taken out in connection with the loan agreement.

6. According to the order for reference, those policies were (i) high loan-to-value (LTV) insurance, (3) (ii) bridging insurance, (4) (iii) property insurance and (iv) life insurance.

7. The referring court indicates that it was not disputed in the proceedings pending before it that the bank must reimburse the borrower for the amount of the premiums paid for the insurance that covers its own risk, namely the high LTV and bridging insurance policies.

8. However, a dispute exists as to whether the borrower can recover the premiums paid for the insurance that protects his or her own risks, namely the property and life insurance policies.

9. As the referring court explains, the prevailing view in the domestic case-law is that the bank is not required to reimburse the borrower for the latter types of insurance premiums because those contracts are not intrinsically linked to the loan agreement, even if the bank is assigned the rights under those policies. The referring court reasons that it is the borrower (property insurance) and his or her heirs (life insurance) that remain the actual beneficiaries under those policies; if the sum insured exceeds the debt owed to the bank, the surplus is payable directly to the borrower in respect of the property insurance, or to the other beneficiaries in respect of the life insurance.

10. That interpretation is, as the referring court explains, based on the fact that a loan agreement only obliges the borrower to provide security; it does not impose a duty to pay the insurance premiums. That duty arises from the insurance contracts themselves and under the relevant provisions of the Ustawa – Kodeks cywilny (Law establishing the Civil Code), of 23 April 1964 (Dz. U. No 16, position 93), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, governing property and life insurance policies. Consequently, the loan agreement, the property insurance contract and the life insurance contract are independent legal relationships. Declaring the loan agreement null and void does not invalidate the insurance contracts; it merely renders ineffective the security mechanisms attached to them, namely, the assignment of the property insurance claim to the bank and the designation of the bank as the beneficiary of the sum insured under the life insurance policy. The borrower therefore remains entitled to compensation under the property insurance policy, and any heirs retain any benefit that may arise from the life insurance policy.

11. The referring court further states that, if the property were declared invalid, the borrower would have been uninsured from the date the loan was concluded, a factual scenario that courts are reluctant to bring about. Moreover, because the real beneficiaries of the premiums are the borrower or his or her heirs, any claim for reimbursement of those premiums should be directed against the insurance company, not the bank. In that context, the bank acts merely as an intermediary, collecting the premiums from the borrower and passing them on to the insurer, without receiving any benefit. This contrasts with the bank’s own risk insurance (the bridging and high LTV insurance policies), where the bank is the policyholder and the sole beneficiary, thereby making the reimbursement of those premiums a separate issue.

12. Despite the prevailing interpretation of national law in its domestic case-law, the referring court nevertheless harbours doubts as to whether depriving a consumer of the right to claim reimbursement of the premiums in question, following a decision that invalidates a loan agreement, is contrary to Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive.

13. The referring court notes that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, a contractual term held to be unfair must be regarded, in principle, as never having existed, so that it cannot have any effect on the consumer. (5)

14. Therefore, the referring court wonders whether the invalidity of the loan agreement must also lead to the reimbursement of the insurance premiums linked to that agreement. That court expresses doubts as to the proportionality of such a solution. A more appropriate reading, in its view, would be that the invalidity of a loan does not void the insurance contracts themselves, but merely renders ineffective the security mechanisms attached to them (the assignment of the property insurance claim and the designation of the bank as beneficiary of the life insurance sum).

15. Uncertain as to the correct interpretation of the aforementioned provisions of the Unfair Terms Directive, the referring court stayed the proceedings and referred the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘In the context of a loan agreement concluded between a consumer and a bank being found to be invalid in its entirety on the grounds that the agreement contains unfair terms without which it cannot continue in existence, must [Article] 6(1) and [Article] 7(1) of [the Unfair Terms Directive] and the principles of effectiveness and proportionality be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national law according to which:

– the bank is required to reimburse the consumer for the equivalent of the bank’s risk insurance costs incurred by the consumer, such as high [LTV] insurance and bridging insurance, which provided security for the repayment of the loan;

– the bank is not required to reimburse the consumer for the equivalent of the consumer’s risk insurance costs incurred by the consumer, such as property insurance and life insurance, which provided security for the repayment of the loan?’

16. Written observations were submitted to the Court by AS, Bank Millennium, the Polish and Portuguese Governments, and the European Commission.

17. A hearing was held on 22 January 2026, at which Bank Millennium, the Polish Government and the Commission presented oral argument.

III. Analysis

18. The present case follows a long line of rulings in which the Court has interpreted the effects of the declaration of invalidity of loan agreements indexed to the Swiss franc under the Unfair Terms Directive.

19. Nonetheless, the present reference for a preliminary ruling raises a novel question concerning the effects of the declaration of invalidity of a mortgage loan agreement on different insurance contracts linked to that agreement, an issue which has not yet been dealt with in the Court’s case-law.

20. The applicant in the main proceedings maintains that all insurance premiums paid by a consumer in performance of a loan agreement that is subsequently found to be null and void on the ground that it contained an unfair term should be reimbursed on the basis that they were paid in connection with an invalid loan agreement and were therefore undue.

21. Conversely, Bank Millennium, the Polish and Portuguese Governments, as well as the Commission argue that, unlike with high LTV and bridging insurance policies, the obligation on the borrower to pay property and life insurance premiums does not arise from the provisions of the loan agreement, but from the terms of the insurance contracts themselves. Consequently, the invalidity of the loan agreement would not result in the invalidity of the property and life insurance contracts, but would merely render the assignment of claims arising from those contracts to the bank ineffective.

22. In that regard, the referring court, in essence, asks the Court to confirm whether an interpretation of national law which entitles a borrower to claim reimbursement of premiums paid for high LTV and bridging insurance, but not for the premiums paid for property and life insurance, is permitted under the Unfair Terms Directive.

23. In order to answer that question, I will first shortly recall the relevant case-law (A) before presenting my view on this particular situation (B).

A. The relevant case-law of the Court

24. As expressly laid down in Article 6(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive and further explained in the Court’s case-law, when a court finds that a term used in a consumer contract is unfair, that term cannot be binding on the consumer. (6)

25. While the legal effects of a finding that a contractual clause is unfair are, in principle, for the Member States to define, (7) the Court has made it clear that national courts are obliged to remove that unfair clause from the contract, and cannot replace it with either an interpretation of the wishes of the parties in order to avoid the annulment of the contract or a supplementary provision of national law. (8) For that reason, in the event that a contract cannot continue to exist without the unfair term, national courts are obliged to annul the contract in its entirety. That is precisely what occurred in the present case, as the referring court held that the contract could not continue to exist without the unfair term and therefore declared the entire contract null and void. That finding of the national court has not been challenged.

26. In addition, although the legal consequences of finding that a contract is null and void are also, in principle, a matter of national law, those consequences must be compatible with EU law and, in particular, with the objectives pursued by the Unfair Terms Directive. (9)

27. In that respect, the Court has held that national law transposing that directive must, in particular, facilitate the achievement of two objectives.

28. First, the national law must allow for the restoration of the legal and factual situation that the consumer would have been in if the unfair term had not existed, by, inter alia, creating a right to restitution of advantages wrongly obtained, to the consumer’s detriment, by the seller or supplier on the basis of the unfair term. (10) A similar restitutory effect must be recognised where the unfairness of terms of a contract concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier results not only in the invalidity of those terms, but also in the invalidity of the contract in its entirety. (11)

29. Second, the national law must not undermine the deterrent effect sought by the Unfair Terms Directive. That objective is of a more general nature, and seeks to prevent sellers or suppliers from including unfair terms in consumer contracts. (12)

30. In Bank M, the judgment relied upon by the participants in the present proceedings, the Court summarised that case-law in the following way: ‘the compatibility with EU law of national rules governing the practical consequences of the invalidity of a mortgage loan agreement on account of the presence of unfair terms depends on whether those rules, first, make it possible to restore, in law and in fact, the situation which the consumer would have been in had that contract not existed and, second, do not undermine the deterrent effect sought by [the Unfair Terms Directive]’. (13)

31. With regard to the restoration in law and in fact of the situation which the consumer would have been in had the contract not contained an unfair clause, it follows clearly from the case-law that consumers must have the right, at the very least, to reimbursement of the monthly instalments and fees paid in respect of the performance of the agreement together with the payment of any default interest at the statutory rate from the date on which notice is served. (14) Additionally, in Bank M, the Court stated in general terms that claims that go beyond reimbursement of the monthly instalments and expenses paid in respect of the performance of that agreement do not appear to undermine the two objectives of the Unfair Terms Directive. (15) Nonetheless, the Court has not yet considered the right of consumers to claim reimbursement in respect of payments made in relation to insurance policies connected to the mortgage loan agreement.

32. To my mind, accepting claims for the reimbursement of payments in relation to all four types of insurance at issue in the present case would not undermine, but would rather contribute to, both the objective of restoring the borrower to a situation predating the conclusion of the nullified agreement, and the deterrent effect sought by the Unfair Terms Directive.

33. Nevertheless, the Court has also held that, when assessing its national law, national courts must take into consideration the principle of proportionality. That means that, even if it is true that the reimbursement of payments for all four types of insurance could contribute to the objectives of the Unfair Terms Directives, national law need not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives. (16)

34. In that light, the referring court explained in its order for reference that allowing consumers to claim reimbursement of the sums paid in relation to property and life insurance may be disproportionate. Such an argument would militate in favour of upholding the prevailing domestic case-law, which precludes a borrower from claiming reimbursement of premiums paid for property and life insurance policies, even where the taking of those policies was a condition of the loan agreement that was declared null and void because it contained an unfair clause. In the referring court’s view, the more appropriate reading might be that the invalidity of a loan agreement does not render void those insurance contracts themselves, but merely renders ineffective the security mechanisms attached to them, namely, the assignment of the property insurance claim and the designation of the bank as beneficiary of the life insurance sum. Under such an interpretation, the borrower would remain covered under both insurance policies and would be therefore unable to claim reimbursement of the premiums paid for those policies.

B. Assessment of the present case

35. The abovementioned case-law of the Court points to the conclusion that a bank is, in principle, required to reimburse all payments made by the borrower in relation to a contract that was later declared null and void because it contained unfair terms.

36. As noted above, the payments made by the borrower in relation to the first two types of insurance, namely high LTV and bridging insurance, appear inextricably linked to the loan agreement itself.

37. According to the order for reference, and in the referring court’s understanding, it seems to be undisputed that a bank must reimburse a consumer the premiums paid for the two policies that cover the bank’s own risks. Indeed, it can be said that those policies are inseparable from the agreement that has been declared invalid, as they would not exist without the mortgage loan agreement; the bank, not the borrower, is the policyholder, and it is the bank that is the sole beneficiary in respect of any pay out.

38. In that respect, there is no reason for the Court not to agree with the referring court, and should therefore answer the first part of the question referred to that effect.

39. Therefore, the only two payments that require additional assessment are the premiums paid for the property and life insurance policies, for which the prevailing national case-law appears to deprive borrowers of the right to claim reimbursement.

40. It is first necessary to recall that the Unfair Terms Directive, which is a minimum harmonisation instrument, (17) leaves it to the Member States to adopt the detailed rules for the protection of consumers from unfair terms in consumer contracts. In that sense, Member States have discretion and may apply different legal solutions to ensure the restoration of the borrower to the position in which he or she would have been in had the unfair term not existed, and which serve to deter sellers or suppliers from including unfair terms in consumer contracts. The Unfair Terms Directive merely requires that, as a minimum, those two objectives are satisfied.

41. In that sense, the national court, and not the Court of Justice, is in the best position to conclude whether the rules of national law, assessed in the context of its entire national legal order, are suitable and necessary to fulfil the objectives of the Unfair Terms Directive.

42. Accordingly, the Court may only provide guidance to the national court as to what to take into account when making such an assessment.

43. Thus, for the purposes of the present case, I will propose some elements that may be relevant for the referring court to consider when deciding whether it is necessary to reverse the prevailing interpretation of national law, according to which the applicant in the main proceedings would not have the right to claim reimbursement of the premiums paid for the property and life insurance policies, even where the taking of those policies was a condition of the mortgage loan agreement that was declared null and void because it contained an unfair clause.

44. Those two insurance policies, on the one hand, cover certain risks for the bank that arise if the mortgaged property is damaged or if the borrower dies, but, on the other hand, they also cover certain risks the borrower bears independently of the loan. All participants at the hearing, as well as the referring court, (18) agreed that those insurance policies have that dual function.

45. On account of the dual function of those two insurance policies, the payments performed in relation to them could be understood either as being inextricably linked to the mortgage loan agreement, or as being independent of that agreement.

46. On the one hand, it could be said that the borrower took those insurance policies only because they were conditions for receiving the loan. (19) In such an understanding, the reimbursement of payments made in relation to those policies could be viewed as necessary to restoring the borrower to the situation in which she was in before the contract was concluded, as she had no obligation to make such payments prior to the existence of the loan agreement.

47. Furthermore, requiring the reimbursement of payments for those insurance policies, which were connected to the loan agreement found to contain unfair terms, may well enhance the deterring effect sought by the Unfair Terms Directive.

48. Those arguments favour a finding that consumers have the right to claim reimbursement of premiums paid for those policies.

49. On the other hand, the case-law of the Court requires, in principle, the ‘restitution of advantages wrongly obtained, to the consumer’s detriment, by the seller or supplier on the basis of [the] unfair term’. (20)

50. In the present case, because the premiums at issue relate to life and property insurance policies, both of which benefit the consumer, they are not, per se, to the consumer’s detriment. First, as confirmed during the hearing, AS was free to choose the insurance company from which she took out the policies. Second, it was not disputed in the main proceedings that the insurance policies were duly performed; the insurer provided an effective guarantee over the consumer’s property and person, covering risks such as fire, flood, death, disability, etc. Those benefits were not merely hypothetical. Even in the absence of a claimable event, the insurer bore the risk on its balance sheet, maintained the necessary reserves, and incurred actual costs in obtaining reinsurance to cover its potential exposure. Throughout the duration of those policies, the insurer remained ‘on-risk’, providing the consumer with continuous protection and immediate financial security. Since the premiums constituted legitimate consideration for the risks assumed, their payment represents a service that was effectively rendered and economically priced.

51. Therefore, any claim for reimbursement of those premiums is not only post festum, but also proves difficult to evaluate in the context of such an undisputable provision of services. Indeed, it could be said that reimbursement in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, in relation to property and life insurance policies, would go beyond merely restoring the consumer to the situation that he or she would have been in had the unfair term not existed; it would, in effect, give the consumer free insurance cover without any personal expense.

52. It is true that, in EU policies, Article 169 TFEU and Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union require a high level of protection to be afforded to consumers, who are in a weaker position in relation to sellers or suppliers, inasmuch as they must be deemed to be less informed, economically weaker and legally less experienced than the other party. (21) However, it is equally true that the case-law of the Court recognises that consumer protection is not absolute. (22)

53. In that respect, even if the property and life insurance policies at issue are also beneficial for the bank, (23) those benefits do not result from the unfair term itself. In that respect, it is important to stress that the objective of the Unfair Terms Directive is not to annul all contractual arrangements containing unfair terms, but to achieve a balance between the rights and obligations of the contracting parties, restoring equality between them. (24)

54. Thus, national rules, whose objective is to restore the consumer to his or her initial situation had the unfair term not existed, need not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that primary aim of the Unfair Terms Directive by placing a disproportionate burden on banks. Tilting the balance too much to the opposite side might endanger the stability of the financial market, an outcome that would be contrary to the objectives of the Unfair Terms Directive.

55. On that account, the Court has acknowledged that the objectives of ensuring the stability of the banking and financial system and preventing a systemic risk are of public interest pursued by the European Union. (25)

56. Those objectives are of general interest and are constitutionally anchored in the mission for stability of the financial system entrusted to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) by Article 127(5) TFEU, as well as in the need to preserve stability of the Economic and Monetary Union provided for in Article 3(4) TEU.

57. It is worth highlighting that prudential requirements have been established at EU level on the basis of Article 114 TFEU (internal market), under the Capital Requirements Regulation, (26) and of Article 63(1) TFEU (free movement of capital), under the Capital Requirements Directive. (27) Those requirements apply to all Member States and transcend the boundaries of the euro area.

58. Those requirements are reinforced in various acts of EU secondary law on consumer protection, such as Directive 2014/17/EU concerning mortgage loans. (28)

59. Even though life and property insurance policies are not required under the applicable EU law in relation to granting mortgage loans, they do serve to ensure the bank’s compliance with essential prudential requirements and regulatory standards. It is not disputed in the main proceedings that the requirement imposed on borrowers by banks to take such insurance policies is not, in itself, unfair or legally invalid.

60. Ultimately, the implementation of such safeguards serves both the private interests of the bank and the borrower, and the broader public interest. By protecting the borrower against unforeseen circumstances and the bank against default, those measures uphold the stability of the banking and financial system – a general interest objective of EU law.

61. There are countless expenses that a borrower may incur in relation to the conclusion of a contract that is subsequently declared invalid. (29) In that regard, national law is entitled to draw a line between the expenses that must be returned to the consumer and those for which reimbursement does not automatically follow from the fact that a mortgage loan agreement has been declared invalid because it contained an unfair term. (30)

62. In conclusion, the matter of the reimbursement of the two types of insurance premiums is not a question of favouring one principle over another, but one of balancing the various interests.

63. Provided that the borrower is reimbursed for all the payments made to the bank’s advantage as a result of the unfair term in the mortgage loan agreement, I do not consider that EU law precludes an interpretation of national law according to which the borrower does not have the right to claim reimbursement of the premiums paid for property and life insurance policies, even where taking out those policies was a condition of the loan agreement that was declared null and void because it contained an unfair term.

IV. Conclusion

64. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw, Poland) as follows:

In the event of the complete annulment of a consumer contract, Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, read in the light of the principles of effectiveness and proportionality,

must be interpreted as not precluding a judicial interpretation of national law according to which:

– the bank is required to reimburse the consumer for the equivalent of the bank’s risk insurance costs incurred by the consumer, such as high loan-to-value insurance and bridging insurance, which provided security for the repayment of the loan;

1 Original language: English.

i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.

2 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29; ‘the Unfair Terms Directive’).

3 High LTV insurance offsets a lender’s risk in situations where the value of the loan amount corresponds to a substantial proportion (more than 80%) of the value of the mortgaged property. The higher the LTV ratio, the higher the risk of the loan for the lender, which is why the borrower may be requested to take out additional insurance.

4 Bridging insurance is a short-term security that covers a bank’s risk during the transitionary period between the disbursement of the loan and the formal legal registration of the mortgage in the land and mortgage register.

5 See, in that respect, judgment of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others (C‑154/15, C‑307/15 and C‑308/15, EU:C:2016:980, paragraph 61).

6 See, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others (C‑154/15, C‑307/15 and C‑308/15, EU:C:2016:980, paragraphs 53 to 57 and the case-law cited).

7 See, to that regard, judgments of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others (C‑154/15, C‑307/15 and C‑308/15, EU:C:2016:980, paragraph 66), and of 15 June 2023, Bank M. (Consequences of the annulment of the contract) (C‑520/21, ‘Bank M’, EU:C:2023:478, paragraph 61).

8 See judgment of 8 September 2022, D.B.P. and Others (Mortgage loans denominated in foreign currency) (C‑80/21 to C‑82/21, EU:C:2022:646, paragraph 68). Indeed, as Advocate General Trstenjak explains in points 86 to 88 of her Opinion in Banco Español de Crédito (C‑618/10, EU:C:2012:74), the prospect of national courts ‘curing’ a contract that contains an unfair term, either by modifying or replacing that term, ‘would not only neutralise the deterrent effect of Article 6 of [the Unfair Terms Directive], but [would] also have the reverse effect’ by incentivising a supplier or seller to ‘“try his luck” and to include as many unfair terms as possible in the agreement in the hope that most of them will be overlooked by the national court’.

9 See, to that effect, Bank M, paragraph 64.

10 See judgments of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others (C‑154/15, C‑307/15 and C‑308/15, EU:C:2016:980, paragraph 66), and of 31 March 2022, Lombard Lízing (C‑472/20, EU:C:2022:242, paragraphs 50 to 55 and the case-law cited).

11 See, in that respect, Bank M, paragraph 66.

12 See, for example, Bank M, paragraphs 67 and 68. That objective follows from Article 7 of the Unfair Terms Directive.

13 Bank M, paragraph 68.

14 See judgment of 30 April 2025, AxFina Hungary (Continued existence of the contract) (C‑630/23, EU:C:2025:302, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited). The Court has also recognised the right of consumers to claim reimbursement of expenses such as notarial and management costs, where those expenses arise as a result of an unfair term. See, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2020, Caixabank and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (C‑224/19 and C‑259/19, EU:C:2020:578).

15 Bank M, paragraphs 69 and 74.

16 See, to that effect, Bank M, paragraph 73.

17 That means that Member States may also adopt rules that provide a higher level of protection to consumers than what is required by that directive. See the twelfth recital thereof and judgments of 3 June 2010, Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid (C‑484/08, EU:C:2010:309, paragraph 28), and of 18 January 2024, Getin Noble Bank and Others (Review by a national court of its own motion of unfair contractual terms) (C‑531/22, EU:C:2024:58, paragraph 68).

18 Point 5 of the response from the referring court to the questions from the Court.

19 However, it is also possible that the borrower already had property insurance for the property offered as mortgage, or life insurance, and merely cedes her claims under those policies to the bank up to the amount of the value of the loan.

20 Judgment of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others (C‑154/15, C‑307/15 and C‑308/15, EU:C:2016:980, paragraph 66), emphasis added. See also point 28 of the present Opinion.

21 Judgment of 7 November 2019, Profi Credit Polska (C‑419/18 and C‑483/18, EU:C:2019:930, paragraph 46).

22 Judgments of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others (C‑154/15, C‑307/15 and C‑308/15, EU:C:2016:980, paragraph 68), and of 13 March 2025, Banco Santander (C‑230/24, EU:C:2025:177, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

23 For example, if the mortgaged property is not insured by the borrower, the bank may have to take out such insurance policies at its own expense, which could lead to it offering a higher price for the loan.

24 See, to that effect, judgment of 23 November 2023, Provident Polska (C‑321/22, EU:C:2023:911, paragraphs 81 and 87 and the case-law cited).

25 See judgment of 16 July 2020, Adusbef and Others (C‑686/18, EU:C:2020:567, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited). In particular, in the context of interpreting the Unfair Terms Directive, see judgment of 8 May 2025, Myszak (C‑324/23, EU:C:2025:324, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).

26 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1), as amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1496 of 12 June 2025 amending Regulation No 575/2013 with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk (OJ L, 2025/1496).

27 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338), as amended by Directive (EU) 2024/1619 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive 2013/36 as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619).

28 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36 and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 60, p. 34). See, in particular, Article 12(4) thereof.

29 Those may include mundane expenses such as the price of a taxi service driving the consumer to the bank in order to sign the contract, or the costs of translating documents that must be provided in the language of the State in which the bank is situated in order to apply for the loan.

30 Even if such additional costs could be excluded from the scope of the right to claim reimbursement following a declaration of invalidity of a loan agreement on the ground that it contained an unfair term, it cannot be excluded that such costs may be recoverable in an action for damages, provided that the conditions for receiving such compensation are fulfilled.

Opinion of Advocate General Ćapeta delivered on 16 April 2026.###

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