ECLI:EU:C:2026:464

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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

SPIELMANN

delivered on 4 June 2026 (1)

Case C‑179/25 P

Marina Tauber

Council of the European Union

( Appeal – Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – Restrictive measures taken in view of actions destabilising Moldova – Freezing of funds – Restriction on admission to and transit through the territory of the European Union – Inclusion and maintenance of the appellant’s name on the list of persons concerned – Natural persons responsible for actions or policies which undermine or threaten the sovereignty and independence of and democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in Moldova – Criterion relating to planning, directing and engaging in violent demonstrations – Concept of ‘violent intentions’ – Probative value of press articles – Freedom to protest – Article 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms )

Introduction

1. By her appeal, Ms Marina Tauber (‘the appellant’) seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 18 December 2024, Tauber v Council (T‑493/23, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2024:913).

2. By its judgment, the General Court dismissed the appellant’s action, under Article 263 TFEU, for annulment of, first, Decision (CFSP) 2023/1047 (2) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1045 (3) (together, ‘the initial acts at issue’), and second, Decision (CFSP) 2024/1242 (4) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1243 (5) (together, ‘the maintaining acts at issue’), in so far as those acts (together, ‘the acts at issue’) concern her. Pursuant to those acts, the Council of the European Union prohibited the appellant from entering into, or transiting through, the territories of the Member States and froze all her funds and economic resources in those territories.

3. The General Court also dismissed the appellant’s action in so far as it sought to obtain, pursuant to Article 268 TFEU, compensation for non-material damage which the appellant claimed to have suffered by reason of the adoption of the initial acts at issue.

4. The present appeal, which has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures taken by the Council at the request of the Republic of Moldova, a candidate country for accession to the European Union, provides the Court of Justice with an opportunity to rule, inter alia, on the General Court’s interpretation of the listing criterion relating to planning, directing and engaging in violent demonstrations, set out in Article 1(1)(a)(ii) of Decision (CFSP) 2023/891 (6) (‘criterion (ii)’).

Legal context and background to the dispute

5. The factual and legal background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 13 of the judgment under appeal. For the purposes of the present Opinion, that background can be summarised by reference to the following facts.

6. The appellant is a female politician of Moldovan nationality. She has been a Member of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova since March 2019 and was the deputy leader of the Moldovan political party ȘOR until its dissolution on 19 June 2023.

7. On 28 April 2023, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, Decision 2023/891 and, on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU, Regulation (EU) 2023/888 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova. (7)

8. Article 1(1) of Decision 2023/891 provides as follows:

‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of:

(a) natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova, or democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Republic of Moldova through any of the following actions:

(i) obstructing or undermining the democratic political process, including by obstructing or seriously undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;

(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations or other acts of violence; or

(iii) serious financial misconduct concerning public funds and the unauthorised export of capital;

…’

9. Article 2(1)(a) of that decision provides that all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by natural persons, entities or bodies responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova, or democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Republic of Moldova through one of the three actions referred to in the preceding point of this Opinion are to be frozen.

10. By the initial acts at issue, the appellant’s name was included on the lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures set out in the annex to Decision 2023/891 and in Annex I to Regulation 2023/888, for the following reasons:

‘Marina Tauber is the deputy leader of the ŞOR Party and a Member of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. She was charged in the “Bank Fraud” case and she is subject to investigation in two criminal cases in the Republic of Moldova related to the illegal financing from an organised criminal group and the falsification of the report on the financial management of the ŞOR Party.

On 20 December 2022, prosecutors conducted several searches in connection with the case of the illegal financing of Ilan Shor’s party. The authorities of the Republic of Moldova then identified money which, according to the prosecutors, was to be used for organising anti-government protests and remunerating the participants in those demonstrations.

In 2023, knives, flammable substances and daggers were seized following protests organised by the People’s Movement, which the ŞOR Party is part of. Violence and altercations between the police and demonstrators were registered, where 54 people were detained, including minors. According to the General Police Inspectorate of the Republic of Moldova, Marina Tauber was among the main organisers of the protests of the ŞOR Party and the People’s Movement.

According to the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Moldova, she used special communication instruments in order to give direct instructions to the presidents and vice-presidents of the territorial offices of the ȘOR Party in the country on how to bring people to the demonstrations, organise transport and how to receive the money for the remuneration of the people.

By directing and planning violent demonstrations and through her serious financial misconduct concerning public funds and the unauthorised export of capital, Marina Tauber is responsible for actions which undermine and threaten the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova, and the democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Republic of Moldova.’

11. On 14 June 2023, the Council sent the appellant, at her request, document WK 6382/2023 REV 1, containing the evidence concerning her (‘document WK 6382/2023’).

12. The measures taken against the appellant in the initial acts at issue were extended by the maintaining acts at issue until 29 April 2025 on the basis of the same evidence as that contained in document WK 6382/2023.

The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

13. By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 9 August 2023, the appellant brought an action seeking, first, annulment of the initial acts at issue in so far as those acts concern her, and second, compensation for the non-material damage which she claims to have suffered as a result of the adoption of those acts. Furthermore, on 5 July 2024, the appellant lodged a statement of modification in order to amend the form of order sought in her application so as to include an application for annulment of the maintaining acts at issue. By decision of 11 December 2023, the European Commission was granted leave to intervene in support of the Council.

14. By the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed the action in its entirety.

15. As regards the claims for annulment, which alone are relevant in the context of the present appeal, the General Court noted that the criteria set out in Article 1(1)(a) and Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2023/891 were alternatives. It therefore examined only the pleas in law and arguments by which the appellant challenged the legality of the acts at issue in so far as they were based on the complaint that she had directed and planned violent demonstrations in the Republic of Moldova, within the meaning of the criterion laid down in point (ii) of those provisions. By contrast, it did not rule on the pleas in law and arguments which challenged the legality of those acts in so far as they were based on the complaint that the appellant was responsible for serious financial misconduct concerning public funds and the unauthorised export of capital, within the meaning of point (iii) of those provisions.

The procedure before the Court of Justice and the forms of order sought

16. By document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 3 March 2025, the appellant lodged an appeal against the judgment under appeal. She claims that the Court should:

– set aside the judgment under appeal;

– give final judgment in the matter itself and annul the acts at issue in so far as those acts concern her;

– in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for a fresh ruling on her application brought pursuant to Article 263 TFEU;

– in any event, refer the case back to the General Court for it to rule on her application under Article 268 TFEU, and

– order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings before the Court of Justice and before the General Court.

17. The Council and the Commission contend that the Court should dismiss the appeal and order the appellant to pay the costs.

18. The appellant, the Council and the Commission presented oral argument and replied to the questions put by the Court at the hearing held on 11 March 2026.

Analysis

19. In support of her appeal, the appellant relies on three grounds of appeal. The first alleges, in essence, errors of law in the examination of the plea of illegality directed against Decision 2023/891 and Regulation 2023/888, as well as an absence of a legal basis and misuse of powers. The second concerns the assessment of the evidence for the purpose of applying criterion (ii). The third relates to the General Court’s examination of the plea alleging infringement of fundamental rights.

The first ground of appeal, alleging errors of law in the examination of the plea of illegality in respect of Decision 2023/891 and Regulation 2023/888

20. The first ground of appeal consists of two parts. By those parts of the ground of appeal, the appellant essentially and principally criticises the General Court for not having sought to establish the genuine purpose of the restrictive measures at issue, which, in her view, was not that stated by the Council, but rather that of supporting the Moldovan Government against certain internal opposition forces. She submits that the General Court failed to carry out the requisite review of the choice of legal basis, which requires ascertaining the actual objectives of the acts in question, and that the restrictive measures regime at issue is, in fact, targeted at leaders of opposition parties, thereby constituting a direct interference with the internal democratic political process of a third State. From that perspective, the appellant criticises the General Court, first, for recognising undue discretion on the part of the Council to determine for itself whether its actions comply with Articles 2, 8 and 21 TEU, and second, for incorrectly ruling out the existence of a misuse of powers.

21. The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes that line of argument.

22. Before examining the errors of law which that ground of appeal alleges that the General Court committed, it is necessary to examine two complaints, raised in the context of the first ground of appeal, which do not, in themselves, relate to those errors. In particular, first, the appellant complains that the General Court distorted the ‘factual context’. I would point out that, according to settled case-law, such distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence. Moreover, the appellant must indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in that person’s view, led to that distortion. (8) In the present case, the appellant has not indicated precisely the facts alleged to have been distorted. I therefore consider that that complaint must be rejected as inadmissible.

23. Second, the appellant alleges a ‘procedural error’ on the part of the General Court, in that it refused, in paragraph 175 of the judgment under appeal, to rule on the applications for measures of organisation of procedure made by the appellant before it. However, it follows from settled case-law that the General Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it in respect of the cases before it. The sufficiency of the evidence before it is a matter to be appraised by it alone and is not subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, except where that evidence has been distorted or the inaccuracy of the findings of the General Court is apparent from the documents in the case file, (9) which does not appear to be the case here. I therefore consider that that complaint must also be rejected as inadmissible.

24. I shall now turn to the errors of law alleged against the General Court in the first ground of appeal. As a preliminary point, I consider it necessary to clarify their exact scope. The appellant does not dispute that the objective of consolidating and supporting democracy and the rule of law in an EU candidate country falls within the objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), for the purposes of Article 21(2)(b) TEU, or that the Council may, in principle, adopt restrictive measures intended to prevent the planning of violent demonstrations in order to pursue that objective. Her line of argument therefore does not call into question either the Council’s competence to adopt the acts at issue or the legality of criterion (ii) as such. It concerns, more specifically, the objective that was actually pursued by the application of the measures at issue in the circumstances of the present case.

25. It follows from that that the two parts of the first ground of appeal are based on the same criticism. According to the appellant, the Council made use of the mechanism provided for in Decision 2023/891 in order to weaken certain opposition forces in favour of the Moldovan Government, and the General Court failed to censure that use. Viewed in that light, the argument alleging infringement of Articles 2, 8 and 21 TEU relates, in the circumstances of the present case, to the complaint of misuse of powers. Therefore, from that perspective, the two parts of the first ground of appeal should be examined together.

26. In that regard, I would point out, as the General Court did in paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal, that it follows from settled case-law that a measure is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to have been taken solely, or at the very least chiefly, for ends other than those for which the power in question was conferred or with the aim of evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaties for dealing with the circumstances of the case. (10)

27. In the present case, the General Court examined, in paragraphs 50 to 57 of the judgment under appeal, in accordance with the requirements of the case-law relating to restrictive measures, whether the objective pursued by the Council, as was apparent from the content and purpose of the acts at issue, fell within the scope of the CFSP and, in particular, one of the objectives set out in Article 21(2) TEU. (11) To that end, it noted that Decision 2023/891 concerned persons responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the sovereignty and independence of, and democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Republic of Moldova. It also placed those measures in the context of EU support for an EU candidate country, facing, in the Council’s assessment, destabilisation actions calling for immediate reaction. Therefore, the General Court was entitled to find, without erring in law, that, in the light of their purpose and content, the acts at issue were directly linked to the objective of consolidating and supporting democracy and the rule of law, within the meaning of Article 21(2)(b) TEU.

28. Moreover, in paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found, in its assessment of the facts, which is not subject to appeal, that the appellant had not adduced any evidence capable of establishing that the Council had pursued a hidden objective, distinct from that resulting from Decision 2023/891.

29. The General Court then held, in the same paragraph, that the mere fact that the Council had acceded to a request for support made by the Moldovan Government against actions threatening to destabilise the Republic of Moldova could not, in itself, constitute evidence of a misuse of powers. It also noted that criterion (ii) is formulated in general terms and may apply to categories of persons other than opposition politicians alone. In that regard, I note that the wording of that criterion refers to actions, namely the act of directing or planning, directly or indirectly, violent demonstrations, and not to membership of an opposition political party.

30. In those circumstances, and in the absence of objective, relevant and consistent evidence of a misuse of powers, I consider that the General Court was entitled to find, without committing an error of law, that the acts at issue had a relevant legal basis under the CFSP and pursued an objective in the public interest, consisting in consolidating and supporting democracy and the rule of law in a third State.

31. It is true that, in support of her line of argument, the appellant relies on the judgment in Commission v United Kingdom (12) and the distinction which it draws between the apparent purpose of an act and the objective actually pursued by it. However, in my view, that case-law cannot be applied to the present dispute. In the case referred to above, the Court was seised of a national measure restricting trade, the alleged health justification for which was directly contradicted by the circumstances of its adoption, its economic context and its effects. The present case concerns CFSP measures imposing restrictive measures, the legal basis for which must be assessed in the light of objective factors amenable to judicial review, including the purpose and content of those measures. (13)

32. Review of the legal basis thus enables the powers of the author of the act and the regularity of the procedure followed for its adoption to be ascertained. It does not involve seeking, from that perspective, the existence of a hidden political agenda. That latter issue fell within the scope of the complaint alleging misuse of powers, which was examined by the General Court. As stated in points 27 and 30 of this Opinion, the General Court did not, in my view, err in law in finding that such a misuse had not been established.

33. In the light of the foregoing, and since the appellant does not dispute that the Council could adopt restrictive measures in order to support democracy and the rule of law in the Republic of Moldova, I consider that the General Court did not err in law in rejecting, in the absence of misuse of powers, the argument alleging infringement of Articles 2 and 8 TEU and of Article 21(1) TEU. Consequently, I propose that the Court should reject the first ground of appeal.

The second ground of appeal, alleging errors of law in the consideration of the evidence and in the application of criterion (ii)

34. By her second ground of appeal, which is divided into four parts, the appellant complains that the General Court vitiated its assessment of the evidence relied on to justify her inclusion on the list at issue under criterion (ii), relating, in essence, to the planning of violent demonstrations, by several errors of law and distortions.

35. By the first part, she criticises the mode of proof adopted, on the ground that the General Court, by relying on press articles, did not use the most reliable method of proof. By the second part, she disputes the assessment of that evidence for the purpose of establishing that criterion (ii) was satisfied, in particular as regards the violent intention of the demonstrations in question. By the third part, she complains that the General Court incorrectly assessed the link between her conduct and the objective of the restrictive measures, by holding that she was responsible for actions which threatened, in the interests of the Russian Federation, to undermine the sovereignty of and the rule of law in the Republic of Moldova. Lastly, by the fourth part, she submits that the General Court did not draw the appropriate conclusions from the dissolution of her party, whereas that circumstance, in her view, ruled out the possibility that she could still satisfy criterion (ii).

36. The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes those arguments. In particular, as regards the second part of the second ground of appeal, the Council claims that the General Court did not err in law in classifying the facts relied on against the appellant as establishing that she plans, directs, engages in, supports or facilitates ‘violent demonstrations’ or ‘other acts of violence’, within the meaning of criterion (ii). The Council further states that the General Court’s analysis of the evidence demonstrated to the requisite legal standard that the appellant was guided by violent intentions or had incited violence or otherwise rejected the foundations of a democratic society.

The first part of the second ground of appeal

37. As regards the first part of the second ground of appeal, concerning paragraphs 103 to 109 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant raises, in essence, two complaints. First, she submits that the General Court should have criticised the fact that the Council had not relied on official sources even though, in her view, such sources could have been obtained in the Republic of Moldova. Second, she claims that the General Court disregarded the principle that, where multiple methods of proof are available, the EU institutions are required to use the most reliable one.

38. I would point out at the outset that it is settled case-law that, in appeal proceedings, the assessment of the facts and evidence falls, in principle, within the jurisdiction of the General Court, save where the facts or evidence have been distorted. However, that rule applies only in so far as the appeal seeks, in reality, a reassessment of the factual record. By contrast, a complaint is admissible where it does not call into question the findings of fact as such, but criticises the legal characterisation adopted by the General Court on the basis of facts deemed to be established. (14)

39. Thus, in the context of the first part of the second ground of appeal, in so far as the appellant asks the Court of Justice to challenge the General Court’s specific assessment of the probative value of the documents in the case file, her line of argument comes up against the limit of the appeal. By contrast, that part remains admissible in so far as she criticises the General Court for having validated the Council’s application of an incorrect legal test to assess the probative value of the evidence submitted.

40. As regards the substance, the Court has already noted that the principle which prevails in EU law is that of the unfettered evaluation of evidence, from which it results, first, that, where evidence has been obtained lawfully, its admissibility cannot be contested before the General Court, and second, that the only relevant criterion for the purpose of assessing the probative value of evidence lawfully adduced relates to its credibility. (15)

41. Moreover, as regards, more specifically, the review of restrictive measures, the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to include the name of a person on the list of persons subject to such measures, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. To that end, the EU Courts must determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of the information or evidence provided and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case. (16)

42. In the light of that case-law, the two complaints comprising that part, referred to in point 37 of this Opinion, are, in my view, based on the same erroneous premiss. The relevant question was not whether the Council had sought the most reliable evidence in absolute terms, or whether it could have obtained additional official evidence. The General Court was called upon solely to determine whether the evidence actually adduced was sufficiently precise, reliable and consistent to support the reasons for listing.

43. It follows that the argument in paragraph 35 of the appeal, to the effect that the relevant question was whether the Council could obtain official evidence in the Republic of Moldova that was ‘more reliable’ than press articles, cannot succeed. That argument amounts, in reality, to transforming a requirement of sufficient reliability of the evidence in the file into a requirement of optimal proof, which is not clear from the Court’s case-law.

44. The analogy which the appellant seeks to draw from the judgments in Netherlands and Others v Commission, (17)China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, (18)PAN Europe (Closer) (19) and HSBC Holdings and Others v Commission (20) must, in my view, be rejected. Those judgments form part of separate disputes and do not allow the inference, in relation to restrictive measures, that there is an obligation on the part of the Council to seek, as a matter of priority, official evidence or evidence that, theoretically, would be the most reliable.

45. Such a requirement would, moreover, be difficult to apply. The reliability of a piece of evidence cannot be assessed on the basis of a predetermined hierarchy between categories of sources. It depends on its origin, its content, the context in which it occurs and whether it is consistent with the other evidence in the file.

46. With specific regard to the judgment in PAN Europe (Closer), (21) the reference to the most reliable scientific and technical data available is inseparable from the framework specific to the scientific risk assessment in relation to plant protection products and the precautionary principle. Such a formula cannot be transposed as such to the judicial review of the reasons for listing in the present case. As already noted in the preceding point, what matters in that context is not the hypothetical identification of the best possible source, as the appellant submits, but the existence of a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to support the findings made. (22)

47. Nor do I see any error of law in the General Court’s assessment that it was for the appellant to identify precisely the evidence capable of giving rise to doubts as to the reliability of the press articles used. Since the Council had produced detailed evidence, it was not sufficient for the appellant to claim, generally, that official or more reliable evidence could have been obtained. On the contrary, it was for her specifically to highlight the inaccuracies, contradictions or omissions likely to affect the credibility of the documents produced.

48. I therefore consider that the first part of the second ground of appeal must be declared inadmissible in so far as it seeks, in reality, to call into question the General Court’s specific assessment of the probative value of the evidence in the file. By contrast, it must be rejected as unfounded in so far as the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law by confirming the Council’s consideration of evidence from unofficial sources and by not penalising the failure to use the method of proof which the appellant presents as ‘the most reliable’.

The second part of the second ground of appeal

49. With regard to the second part of the second ground of appeal, concerning paragraphs 114 to 131 of the judgment under appeal, I consider it useful, given the diversity of the appellant’s complaints, to clarify its scope from the outset. I shall first examine the admissibility of that part. I shall then set out the extent to which the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’) concerning ‘violent intentions’ may shed light on the analysis. Lastly, I shall explain why, in my view, even assuming that the General Court could have inferred from the evidence in the file the existence of violent intentions, such a finding would not, in itself, satisfy criterion (ii).

50. In the first place, in the light of the case-law cited in point 38 of this Opinion, I consider that it is necessary to distinguish more clearly, within the appellant’s line of argument, what constitutes a real criticism that there was distortion and what is, in reality, a challenge to the legal classification adopted by the General Court.

51. As regards the complaints by which the appellant challenges the reasoning in the judgment under appeal relating to exhibits 5, 6, 18, 20, 21 and 22, (23) I do not consider that the complaints alleging distortion can succeed. The appellant complains, in essence, that the General Court made, on the basis of those exhibits, findings which she disputes, or attributed to those findings a scope which she considers overly broad. Such an argument does not, however, demonstrate a manifestly incorrect assessment of those exhibits. Rather, it seeks to challenge the scope which the General Court attributed to those exhibits and, more broadly, the conclusion that it drew from it in relation to the relevant listing criterion.

52. The same applies to the complaints made against exhibits 13, 14 and 17. (24) Again, the appellant has not established that the General Court altered the clear content of those documents. Under the guise of that complaint, she is in fact challenging the weight the General Court attached to them and the legal classification which it inferred from them. It follows that, also on that issue, the criticism thus raised does not in fact relate to any distortion, but is rather a challenge to the assessment and classification adopted by the General Court.

53. By contrast, although the complaints alleging distortion must be rejected as such, the second part of the second ground of appeal is still admissible in so far as it calls into question the legal classification adopted by the General Court, both with regard to the facts it considered to be established and with regard to the scope it attributed to the concept of ‘violent intentions’ in the light of criterion (ii).

54. In the second place, it is necessary to clarify to what extent the case-law of the ECtHR relating to Article 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (25) which enshrines the freedom of assembly and association, may be taken into consideration for the purpose of examining the second part of the second ground of appeal. Of particular relevance is the concept of ‘violent intentions’ when exercising the freedom to protest, to which the General Court referred in the judgment under appeal and on which the appellant relies in support of the second part of the second ground of appeal.

55. I consider that that case-law is of certain interest in clarifying the concept of ‘violent intentions’ in the context of demonstrations and in preventing it from being confused with the mere desire to cause disruption, stir up unrest or fuel dissatisfaction. As the General Court stated in paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal, the ECtHR has held that Article 11 ECHR does not protect a demonstration where the organisers and participants have violent intentions, incite violence or otherwise reject the foundations of a democratic society. (26) Similarly, I note that the ECtHR has specified that neither the mere risk of disorder nor the mere possibility that persons with violent intentions might join a demonstration is, in itself, sufficient for the protection of that demonstration to be forfeited. (27)

56. However, I am of the opinion that that case-law cannot be transposed as such to the present case. In the abovementioned judgments, the question was whether the acts at issue still fell within the scope of the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly protected by Article 11 ECHR. The present case concerns a different issue. It is a matter of determining whether the conditions of criterion (ii) are satisfied. It is true that that case-law may usefully shed light on the concept of ‘violent intentions’ in the context of demonstrations. Nevertheless, it cannot, on its own, determine the application of the listing criterion in question. That criterion forms part of a separate legal framework, which may, admittedly, share certain commonalities with the freedom to protest, but the specific conditions of the criterion must be assessed independently in the light of the particular requirements of disputes concerning restrictive measures.

57. In that regard, and in the third place, the complaint alleging misapplication of criterion (ii) must, in my view, be examined as such. It is on that point that the General Court appears to me to have erred in law. I note that the appellant has raised that complaint explicitly in the heading preceding paragraph 46 of the appeal, alleging errors of law relating to the violent nature of demonstrations. It is also apparent from paragraph 8 of the reply, and from the exchanges at the hearing, that she criticises the General Court for having misapplied that criterion, on account of failing to establish the existence of violent demonstrations.

58. Criterion (ii), as set out in Decision 2023/891, refers to conduct objectively linked to violent demonstrations or other acts of violence. It is not limited to a subjective element relating to the intention of the person concerned. In fact, it makes no mention of that whatsoever. The criterion – and, I emphasise, the entire criterion and nothing more than the criterion (‘no less, but certainly not more’) – requires a material element, consisting in planning, directing, engaging in, supporting or facilitating such demonstrations or such acts. (28) That material element must be proved.

59. It is true that, as is apparent from the case-law of the ECtHR referred to in point 55 of this Opinion, violent intentions may have significant probative value in the assessment of whether a demonstration is peaceful or violent in nature. They may thus constitute a useful indicator for assessing the nature of the demonstrations in question or the role of the person subject to the restrictive measures. However, they cannot replace the material element required by criterion (ii).

60. In the present case, as is apparent from paragraphs 114 and 115 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court focused its reasoning on whether it was established that the appellant was guided by ‘violent intentions’. It is true, in that regard, that, contrary to what is claimed by the appellant, the General Court correctly held that certain evidence in the file, cited in particular in paragraphs 117 to 122 of the judgment under appeal, revealed violent intentions. That evidence, taken together, could be seen as indicating a strategy of confrontation. (29) However, it is precisely on that point that the General Court erred in law, in my view, by regarding that finding as sufficient to conclude that that criterion (ii) was satisfied. In other words, it is the General Court’s approach of rendering the subjective element autonomous vis-à-vis the material element that poses a problem.

61. The General Court appears to have confused two distinct aspects. The first, derived from the case-law relating to Article 11 ECHR, is that concerning the determination of the scope of peaceful demonstrations. In that regard, as I have stated in point 55 of this Opinion, the concept of ‘violent intentions’ is relevant and may play a decisive role in determining whether the acts in question still fall within the scope of the protection afforded by the freedom of peaceful assembly. The second is the application of criterion (ii), which is specific to EU restrictive measures. In that regard, it was for the General Court to ascertain whether the demonstrations in which the appellant is said to have engaged or which she is said to have planned, supported or facilitated, were themselves of a violent nature within the meaning of the applicable criterion, which it failed to do.

62. Accordingly, the conclusion reached by the General Court in paragraph 128 of the judgment under appeal appears to me to be vitiated by an error in the legal classification of the facts. In particular, the General Court considers that ‘the statement in the grounds of the [acts at issue] that the [appellant] gave instructions to recruit … persons to take part in demonstrations during which acts of violence were committed is not vitiated by an error of assessment’. (30) That conclusion is not supported by the assessment of the evidence set out in paragraphs 116 to 127 of that judgment. It does not follow from that assessment that acts of violence were actually committed during the demonstrations concerned. (31)

63. In those circumstances, I consider that the second part of the second ground of appeal is well founded in so far as it alleges, in essence, that the General Court disregarded the exact scope of criterion (ii).

The third part of the second ground of appeal

64. By the third part of the second ground of appeal, directed against paragraphs 132 to 141 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant disputes, in essence, the assessment by which the General Court found that the demonstrations in question had been organised in the interest and with the assistance of the Russian Federation, formed part of the destabilisation actions to which the restrictive measures were intended to respond, and thus allowed the Council to find, without making any error of assessment, that the appellant was responsible for actions which undermine or threaten democracy and the rule of law in the Republic of Moldova.

65. As a preliminary point, I consider that the complaints alleging a distortion of the evidence cannot succeed. It is apparent from paragraph 70 of the appeal that the appellant does not in fact dispute the substantive content of the evidence examined by the General Court, in particular exhibits 21 and 22 in document WK 6382/2023, but the conclusion it drew from that evidence in paragraph 140 of the judgment under appeal, to the effect that the demonstrations in question were organised in the interest and with the assistance of the Russian Federation. Her line of argument therefore relates, in reality, to the legal classification of the facts relied on by the General Court in the light of the conditions for the application of the restrictive measures at issue. In accordance with the case-law referred to in point 38 of this Opinion, such a question falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on appeal.

66. As to the substance, I take the view that the appellant’s complaints cannot be accepted. She complains, in essence, that the General Court placed excessive importance on the classification of her party as pro-Russian or favouring Russia, whereas such a classification cannot, in her view, establish either a desire for the Republic of Moldova to be associated with the Russian Federation or support its illegal actions. She maintains also that the mere existence of links with the Russian Federation was not sufficient to satisfy the listing criterion.

67. I consider that such an argument cannot be accepted. As the Council submitted in its rejoinder, the classification of the appellant’s party as pro-Russian is not the only factor taken into consideration by the General Court. It forms part of a body of specific and consistent evidence on which the General Court relied to assess whether the demonstrations in question undermined or threatened the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova or, more broadly, democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in that State.

68. Moreover, that classification cannot be viewed in isolation from the legislative and factual context referred to in Decision 2023/891. It is clear in particular from recitals 4 and 7 of that decision that the actions in question, in the Council’s view, formed part of destabilisation attempts linked to the Russian Federation, aimed at exploiting the Republic of Moldova’s energy dependence in order to stir up unrest among the population and exert pressure on the Moldovan Government.

69. It follows that the appellant is not justified in claiming that the General Court relied on mere abstract links between herself and the Russian Federation. In paragraphs 134 to 139 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found specific links, set against the political and economic context arising from the Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as a body of evidence intended to establish that the Russian Federation sought, in particular by training certain individuals to use violence, to exploit the demonstrations organised by the appellant in order to destabilise the Republic of Moldova. It was in the light of that body of evidence that the General Court found that those demonstrations could be regarded as forming part of such destabilisation actions.

70. In those circumstances, I consider that it was open to the Council, and subsequently to the General Court, to place the conduct complained of in the general context necessary to clarify its scope. I therefore propose that the Court reject the third part of the second ground of appeal as unfounded.

The fourth part of the second ground of appeal

71. By the fourth part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant criticises paragraphs 142 to 154 of the judgment under appeal, by which the General Court held, in particular in paragraphs 149 and 150 of that judgment, that the dissolution of her political party had not rendered the restrictive measures at issue obsolete, including in the absence of any violent demonstrations having been planned after her initial inclusion on the lists at issue.

72. As a preliminary point, the complaint alleging distortion of the facts, raised in paragraph 76 of the appeal, must, in my view, be rejected as inadmissible. It is worded in vague terms and does not refer to any specific evidence, contrary to the requirements set out in point 22 of this Opinion. In reality, the appellant is not disputing any manifest distortion of the facts or the evidence, but challenging the legal inferences that the General Court drew from the dissolution of the political party ȘOR and, more broadly, the alleged change in the factual situation.

73. In that regard, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the maintenance of a person on a list of restrictive measures requires an assessment of whether, since the initial listing or the last review, the factual situation has changed in such a way that it is no longer possible to draw the same conclusion regarding the person’s involvement in the activities concerned. (32)

74. In the present case, the dissolution of the ȘOR party did not, in itself, render the maintenance of the measures at issue unlawful. The wording of criterion (ii) does not mention membership of a particular political group, but refers to the act of planning, directing, engaging in, supporting or facilitating violent demonstrations or other acts of violence. Thus, even though the conduct complained of was, in fact, within a party-political framework, it was not, in law, necessarily dependent on it. The disappearance of that framework was therefore not sufficient, in itself, to rule out the possibility that the appellant could still be covered by the criterion in question.

75. Moreover, the General Court did not merely dismiss the relevance of the dissolution of the appellant’s political party in June 2023, which had been declared unconstitutional. It also took into consideration, in paragraph 146 of the judgment under appeal, the recent personal conduct of the person concerned, in particular her involvement in the planning of the demonstrations in question, her statements likely to provoke disorder at those demonstrations and her activities on social media. It was on the basis of that body of evidence that the General Court took the correct view that the Council was entitled to consider that the appellant remained likely to be covered by criterion (ii).

76. The argument based on the absence of further violent demonstrations in the period immediately following the initial listing is also unconvincing in my view. The case-law referred to in point 73 of this Opinion does not require the Council to produce, at each review, new facts of the same nature as those on which the initial listing was based. It requires an updated review to ascertain whether the initial reasons are still relevant to the situation existing at the date of maintenance.

77. In that regard, the General Court noted, in essence, in paragraphs 149 to 152 of the judgment under appeal, that the demonstrations in question had taken place very recently, that they had had serious effects on the situation in the Republic of Moldova and that those effects had not lost their relevance, since the geopolitical context had not changed and the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures had not been achieved. It thus assessed the dissolution of the ȘOR party and the absence of further demonstrations in the context of an updated review of the situation, without considering that those circumstances were sufficient, in themselves, to render the initial reasons irrelevant.

78. I infer from that that the fourth part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible in so far as it concerns a distortion of the facts. As to the remainder, in so far as it alleges an error of law, I consider that the General Court was entitled to find, without erring in law, that the situation had not changed in such a way that it was no longer possible to maintain the same conclusion as to the appellant’s involvement in the activities covered by criterion (ii). The fourth part of the present ground of appeal therefore does not seem to me to be well founded.

79. In the light of the foregoing, I consider that the second ground of appeal must be upheld in so far as it alleges that the General Court erred in law in the application of criterion (ii), by holding that the existence of ‘violent intentions’ was sufficient to conclude that the condition relating to planning, directing, supporting, facilitating or engaging in violent demonstrations was satisfied. It must be rejected as to the remainder.

The third ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in the assessment of the infringement of fundamental rights

80. By the third ground of appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, that the General Court erred in law in finding, in paragraphs 164 to 167 of the judgment under appeal, that the restrictive measures at issue did not constitute a disproportionate interference, first, with the rule of law and her freedom to engage in political activity, and second, with her right to property and her freedom to conduct a business.

81. The Council and the Commission dispute that line of argument.

82. Before examining the merits of that ground of appeal, it is necessary to assess its admissibility. According to settled case-law, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or the ground of appeal in question will be dismissed as inadmissible. It is for the Court, if necessary of its own motion, to determine whether that requirement is satisfied. (33)

83. In the present case, that requirement appears to me to be satisfied. The appellant clearly refers to paragraphs 164 to 167 of the judgment under appeal and submits, in essence, that the General Court erred in law in holding that the restrictive measures at issue did not impose on her disadvantages which were disproportionate to the objectives pursued. In that regard, she relies in particular on the case-law of the ECtHR concerning violent intentions in the context of Article 11 ECHR and complains that the General Court failed to take account of the dissolution of the ȘOR party.

84. It follows that the third ground of appeal identifies with sufficient clarity both the contested paragraphs of the judgment under appeal and the legal arguments relied on in support of them. It is therefore, in my view, admissible.

85. As regards the substance, it should be borne in mind that the review of the proportionality of restrictive measures takes account of the broad discretion enjoyed by the Council in CFSP matters. It involves ascertaining, first, whether the measures at issue pursue an objective of general interest recognised by the European Union; second, whether they are not manifestly inappropriate having regard to that objective; and, third, whether they manifestly exceed what is necessary to achieve that objective, by imposing on the person concerned a burden which is excessive in relation to the objective pursued. (34) It is in the light of that framework that it is necessary to examine whether the General Court erred in law in its assessment of the proportionality of the acts at issue.

86. In the present case, the General Court held, in paragraphs 163 to 165 of the judgment under appeal, that the restrictive measures at issue pursued an objective of general interest consisting in supporting the Moldovan authorities against destabilisation actions capable of hindering the process of accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union. It also considered that those measures were appropriate, since they targeted, inter alia, persons who, by directing or planning violent demonstrations, represented a threat to democracy and the rule of law in that State.

87. As regards the allegedly excessive nature of those measures, the General Court noted, in paragraph 167 of the judgment under appeal, that they did not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the appellant engaging in opposition political activity in the Republic of Moldova. They did not, as such, prohibit her from planning demonstrations against the government, provided that those demonstrations remained peaceful and were not part of the destabilisation actions by external actors, such as the Russian Federation.

88. I do not consider that that assessment is vitiated by an error of law. As already stated in the context of the analysis of the fourth part of the second ground of appeal, the measures at issue were adopted not because the appellant was a member of an opposition political party, but because of conduct considered to be covered by criterion (ii). They do not therefore, by their very nature, deprive her of the possibility of continuing to engage in lawful political activity. Nor do they infringe the essence of her fundamental rights, in particular her right to property and her freedom to conduct a business, since they are limited, reversible and accompanied by safeguards specific to the restrictive measures regime. (35)

89. Lastly, the argument that the General Court failed to take into account the change of context resulting from the dissolution of the ȘOR party cannot succeed. The General Court expressly examined that factor in paragraphs 142 to 150 of the judgment under appeal. As noted in point 77 of this Opinion, the General Court was entitled to find that that dissolution was not sufficient to render obsolete the measures adopted against the appellant, given their objective, their context and the personal conduct of the person concerned.

90. On the basis of those considerations, I propose that the Court should reject the third ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in the assessment of the proportionality of the restrictive measures and the alleged infringement of the appellant’s fundamental rights.

Summary

91. On account of the error of law committed by the General Court in the interpretation of criterion (ii), I propose that the Court should uphold the second part of the second ground of appeal and, consequently, set aside the judgment under appeal. As is clear from paragraphs 99 and 100 of the judgment under appeal, the violent nature of the demonstrations was disputed before the General Court. Nonetheless, the General Court did not ascertain whether the demonstrations in question had actually given rise to acts that could be classified as ‘violent’ within the meaning of criterion (ii). In order to dismiss the action, the General Court focused, in its examination, on the appellant’s subjective intention, whereas such an element is not part of the conditions specific to that criterion.

The action before the General Court

92. In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Court of Justice may, where it sets aside the decision of the General Court, either itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits, or refer the case back to the General Court for judgment.

93. I consider that the state of the proceedings does not permit final judgment to be given. As shown in the examination of the second part of the second ground of appeal, the General Court did not apply the correct legal test to determine whether criterion (ii) was met. The application of the relevant test presupposes an examination of the facts relating to the existence of ‘violent demonstrations or other acts of violence’ within the meaning of that criterion. In my view, that information does not appear to be sufficiently evident from the file submitted to the Court of Justice.

94. In that regard, and as has been recalled in point 91 of this Opinion, the appellant specifically disputed that the demonstrations to which the Council refers could be classified as ‘violent’ within the meaning of criterion (ii). In those circumstances, I propose that the Court of Justice refer the case back to the General Court.

Costs

95. Since, according to my analysis, the case must be referred back to the General Court, the costs should be reserved.

Conclusion

96. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court of Justice should:

(1) set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 18 December 2024, Tauber v Council (T‑493/23, EU:T:2024:904);

(2) refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union.

(3) order that the costs be reserved.

1 Original language: French.

2 Council Decision of 30 May 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2023/891 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova (OJ 2023 L 140 I, p. 9).

3 Council Implementing Regulation of 30 May 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/888 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova (OJ 2023 L 140 I, p. 1).

4 Council Decision of 26 April 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2023/891 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova (OJ L, 2024/1242).

5 Council Implementing Regulation of 26 April 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/888 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova (OJ L, 2024/1243).

6 Council Decision of 28 April 2023 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova (OJ 2023 L 114, p. 15).

7 Council Regulation of 28 April 2023 (OJ 2023 L 114, p. 1).

8 See, inter alia, judgments of 15 May 2025, Kiene and Others v Parliament and Council (C‑487/24 P, EU:C:2025:357, paragraph 21), and of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P; ‘the judgment in Pumpyanskiy’, EU:C:2026:245, paragraph 157).

9 See judgment of 26 January 2017, Mamoli Robinetteria v Commission (C‑619/13 P, EU:C:2017:50, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited).

10 See judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 135), and of 29 November 2018, Bank Tejarat v Council (C‑248/17 P, EU:C:2018:967, paragraph 86).

11 See, to that effect, judgment of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council (C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

12 Judgment of 15 July 1982 (40/82, EU:C:1982:285). I note that, in that case, the Court, in order to find that the national measure contained a disguised restriction, relied on ‘certain established facts’ which led to the conclusion that the United Kingdom legislation concealed a protectionist objective and was not genuinely aimed at health (paragraph 37). In particular, the United Kingdom had prohibited imports of Christmas turkeys from France, relying on the protection of animal health against Newcastle disease. However, the Court considered that that restriction did not genuinely pursue a health objective, but constituted a disguised restriction for protectionist purposes. It took particular account of the fact that the measure had been adopted in the run-up to Christmas in order to hinder French imports, as a result of pressure from the United Kingdom producers.

13 See, to that effect, judgments of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council (C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited), and of 28 July 2016, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission (C‑330/15 P, EU:C:2016:601, paragraph 37).

14 See, to that effect, judgment in Pumpyanskiy (paragraphs 162 and 324). See also the judgment of 26 September 2018, Infineon Technologies v Commission (C‑99/17 P, EU:C:2018:773, paragraph 103), in which the Court notes that ‘there is distortion where, without recourse to new evidence, the assessment of the existing evidence is manifestly incorrect. It is for appellants to indicate precisely the evidence which has been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which have allegedly been made’.

15 See judgment of 26 September 2018, Infineon Technologies v Commission (C‑99/17 P, EU:C:2018:773, paragraph 65).

16 See, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 119 and 124), and of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 38).

17 Judgment of 24 September 2019 (T‑760/15 and T‑636/16, EU:T:2019:669, paragraph 194).

18 Judgment of 21 September 2023 (C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraph 143).

19 Judgment of 25 April 2024 (C‑308/22, EU:C:2024:350, paragraphs 90, 92 and 94).

20 Judgment of 27 November 2024 (T‑561/21, EU:T:2024:869, paragraphs 132 and 137).

21 Judgment of 25 April 2024 (C‑308/22, EU:C:2024:350).

22 See, inter alia, judgment of 26 March 2026, UC v Council (C‑455/24 P, EU:C:2026:253, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited).

23 See paragraphs 117 to 124 of the judgment under appeal.

24 See paragraph 130 of the judgment under appeal.

25 Signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’).

26 See ECtHR, 15 October 2015, Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC] (CE:ECHR:2015:1015JUD003755305, § 92). See, more generally, with regard to Article 11 ECHR, Keller, H., ‘Artikel 11. Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit’, in Frowein, J.O. and Peukert, W., Europäische MenschenRechtsKonvention. EMRK-Kommentar, N.P. Engel Verlag, Kehl, 2024, 4th edition, pp. 723 to 759.

27 See ECtHR, 12 June 2014, Primov and Others v. Russia (CE:ECHR:2014:0612JUD001739106, § 155 and 157). Reference should also be made, inter alia, to the decision of the ECtHR of 11 October 2001, Osmani and Others v. ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (CE:ECHR:2001:1011DEC005084199). In that case, the applicants had organised demonstrations while being aware of the risk that they might degenerate into riots, serious disorder and clashes with the police. Those demonstrations did give rise to an attack on law enforcement officers by a group armed with metal sticks and throwing stones, rocks, Molotov cocktails and teargas projectiles. The applicants had also drawn attention to themselves by their radical stances against the government, by organising groups of demonstrators, by assigning roles and by issuing instructions to participants. In that context, the ECtHR dismissed the actions brought before it as inadmissible.

28 Whilst being aware that the restrictive measures are precautionary in nature (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 358)), and therefore do not constitute criminal penalties, it may be useful, for purely analytical purposes, to consider criterion (ii) by analogy with the structure of a criminal offence. Whilst not itself of a criminal nature, that criterion, in its wording, has a structure reminiscent of that of a criminal offence, which may shed light on the approach taken by the General Court in applying, in my view erroneously, that criterion to the present case. According to the prevailing view in comparative criminal law, an ‘offence’ is a complex concept, comprising both conduct, that is to say, the material element of the offence, and a state of mind, that is to say, the intellectual or mental element thereof (see Pradel, J., Droit pénal comparé, Dalloz, Paris, 2008, 3rd edition, pp. 62 and 63, and p. 90 et seq., for an analysis of the ways in which the various national laws approach the existence of the psychological element of the offence. See also Tulkens, F. and van de Kerchove, M., Introduction au droit pénal. Aspects juridiques et criminologiques, Wolters Kluwer, Waterloo, 2007, 8th edition, pp. 358 to 359). As regards crimes and offences, the mental element consists of two elements, namely knowing (sciens) and willing (volens), thus forming criminal intent (see Hennau, C. and Verhaegen, J., in collaboration with Spielmann, D. and Bruyndonckx, A., Droit pénal général, Bruylant, Brussels, 2003, 3rd edition, p. 320; see, also, Spielmann, D. and Spielmann, A., Droit pénal général luxembourgeois, Bruylant, Brussels, 2004, 2nd edition, p. 325).

However, unlike a criminal offence, criterion (ii) does not contain any reference, even implicit, to state of mind, and is limited to the material element. Thus, and by drawing a strictly theoretical parallel between criterion (ii) and the criminal theory of the constituent elements of the offence, it seems to me that, in the present case, the General Court focused its review on the search for a form of mens rea, whereas that criterion required, first, the characterisation of an actus reus, namely, in particular, planning, directing or engaging in demonstrations or other acts, which themselves had to be of a violent nature.

29 The General Court thus noted, in paragraphs 117 to 121 of the judgment under appeal, on the basis in particular of exhibits 5, 6 and 18, the existence of a practice whereby the appellant’s party selected and remunerated individuals to participate in demonstrations organised by that party. It also noted the appellant’s specific role in organising those rallies, and the existence of techniques used to conceal payments and the transportation of the participants to Chișinău (Moldova). In addition to that evidence it noted, first, exhibit 22, cited in paragraph 122 of the judgment under appeal, concerning the arrest of 24 persons and the seizure of funds intended to finance the demonstrations, and second, exhibits 20 and 21, cited in paragraph 123 of that judgment, according to which members of paramilitary groups and former soldiers and police officers were selected to provoke social unrest during those rallies.

30 Emphasis added.

31 For the sake of completeness, I note that, in paragraph 45 of her appeal, the appellant states that some of the demonstrations she had organised in her capacity as the deputy leader of a large opposition party ‘gave rise to acts of violence’. In response to a question put by the Court at the hearing, the appellant specified that that statement related to acts which she described as ‘isolated, unplanned and sporadic’.

32 See, to that effect, judgments of 26 July 2017, Council v LTTE (C‑599/14 P, EU:C:2017:583, paragraph 46), and of 13 March 2025, PKK v Council (C‑72/23 P, EU:C:2025:182, paragraph 106).

33 See judgment in Pumpyanskiy (paragraph 157 and the case-law cited).

34 See judgment in Pumpyanskiy (paragraphs 229 to 233).

35 I note in that regard that, in paragraph 164 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found, without that being contested by the appellant, that she had not identified any less restrictive measures capable of achieving the objective pursued with the same effectiveness.

Opinion of Advocate General Spielmann delivered on 4 June 2026.###

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