Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 18 June 2026.#Z.R. and Ś. v U. and Z.#Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 – Jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters – Article 5(3) – Special jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict – Place where the harmful event occurred or may occur – Natural and legal persons claiming breach of their personality rights as a result of the broadcast of audiovisual content on television and on the internet – International jurisdiction of the courts of a Member State other than the Member State where that content was produced – Place where the damage occurred – Centre of interests of those persons – Content containing elements making it possible indirectly to identify a person as an individual – Action seeking measures to eliminate and preclude the effects of such a breach and seeking compensation for non-material damage.#Case C-232/25.

Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Second Chamber)

18 June 2026 (*)

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 – Jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters – Article 5(3) – Special jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict – Place where the harmful event occurred or may occur – Natural and legal persons claiming breach of their personality rights as a result of the broadcast of audiovisual content on television and on the internet – International jurisdiction of the courts of a Member State other than the Member State where that content was produced – Place where the damage occurred – Centre of interests of those persons – Content containing elements making it possible indirectly to identify a person as an individual – Action seeking measures to eliminate and preclude the effects of such a breach and seeking compensation for non-material damage )

In Case C‑232/25 [Idziski], (i)

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland), made by decision of 21 February 2025, received at the Court on 27 March 2025, in the proceedings

Z.R.,

Ś.

v

U.,

Z.,

intervener:

Prokurator Regionalny w Krakowie,

THE COURT (Second Chamber),

composed of K. Jürimäe, President of the Chamber, K. Lenaerts, President of the Court, acting as Judge of the Second Chamber, F. Schalin (Rapporteur), M. Gavalec and Z. Csehi, Judges,

Advocate General: A. Rantos,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

–        Z.R. and Ś., by M. Brzozowska-Pasieka and J.A. Pasieka, radcowie prawni,

–        U. and Z., by P. Niezgódka, adwokat,

–        the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna, acting as Agent,

–        the European Commission, by B. Ernst and J. Hottiaux, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 5 February 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1; ‘the Brussels I Regulation’), read in the light of recitals 11 and 12 thereof.

2        The request has been made in proceedings between, of the one part, Z.R., a natural person domiciled in Poland, and Ś., a legal person established in Poland, and, of the other part, U. and Z., the co-producers of a television series established in Germany, concerning an alleged breach of the personality rights of Z.R. and Ś. following the broadcast of that series on television and on the internet.

 Legal context

 The Brussels I Regulation

3        Recitals 11 and 12 of the Brussels I Regulation state:

‘(11)      The rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile and jurisdiction must always be available on this ground save in a few well-defined situations in which the subject matter of the litigation or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different linking factor. …

(12)      In addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should be alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close link between the court and the action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice.’

4        Article 2(1) of that regulation provided:

‘Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.’

5        In Section 2 (‘Special jurisdiction’) of Chapter II of that regulation, Article 5(3) was worded as follows:

‘A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued:

…

3.      in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’.

 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012

6        Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1) repealed and replaced the Brussels I Regulation.

7        Article 66 of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides:

‘1.      This Regulation shall apply only to legal proceedings instituted, to authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settlements approved or concluded on or after 10 January 2015.

2.      Notwithstanding Article 80, [the Brussels I Regulation] shall continue to apply to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted, to authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settlements approved or concluded before 10 January 2015 which fall within the scope of that Regulation.’

 The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

8        Z.R., a Polish national, is a former soldier who, during the second World War, was a member of a clandestine Polish military organisation (‘unit X’). He is also a former prisoner of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp. He is involved in work to preserve the memory of the soldiers of unit X and to commemorate the contribution of Poles to rescuing the Jewish community during that war. Ś., established Poland, is an association with legal personality bringing together former members of that unit. The objects of the association are, inter alia, to defend the dignity, reputation and memory of unit X and its members.

9        U. and Z., who are established in Germany, co-produced a television series set against the backdrop of the events of the Second World War (‘the series at issue’). That series was broadcast on television, first in Germany in 2013 and subsequently in several other Member States, including Poland. It is also available online.

10      According to Z.R. and Ś., the series depicts the soldiers of unit X as anti-Semitic and nationalistic and as having collaborated with the Nazis in the Holocaust. That depiction thus breaches their personality rights, in particular the right to dignity, national identity and an undistorted historical account.

11      On 19 November 2013, Z.R. and Ś. brought an action before the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Regional Court, Kraków, Poland) seeking, inter alia, an order requiring U. and Z. to issue an apology on the television channels in Poland and in the other Member States which had broadcast the series as well as on the internet. Z.R. also sought an award of 25 000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately EUR 5 750) as compensation for non-material damage.

12      U. and Z. raised a plea claiming that the Polish courts lacked jurisdiction, arguing that only the German courts had jurisdiction to hear that action. By order of 18 July 2016, the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Regional Court, Kraków) dismissed that plea. The appeal brought against that order was also dismissed by the Sąd Apelacyjny w Krakowie (Court of Appeal, Kraków, Poland).

13      Ruling on the substance, the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Regional Court, Kraków), by judgment of 28 December 2018, upheld Z.R. and Ś’s application in part and, in particular, ordered that an apology be issued on the relevant Polish and German television channels and on the internet. It also ordered that 20 000 zlotys (PLN) (approximately EUR 4 700) be awarded to Z.R. as compensation for non-material damage.

14      That decision was varied by judgment of the Sąd Apelacyjny w Krakowie (Court of Appeal, Kraków) of 23 March 2021, which upheld Ś.’s application in part but dismissed Z.R.’s application in its entirety. According to that court, no harm had been done to Z.R.’s honour because there was no link enabling him to be identified individually as the person depicted in the allegedly defamatory scenes of the series at issue.

15      All the parties challenged that decision of the Sąd Apelacyjny w Krakowie (Court of Appeal, Kraków) by means of appeals on a point of law brought before the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland), which is the referring court. In that context, U. and Z. plead, inter alia, that the proceedings are invalid because the case was examined on the merits even though the Polish courts lacked international jurisdiction to hear it.

16      The referring court raises the question of the interpretation of the concept of ‘place where the harmful event occurred’, within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation.

17      In the first place, the referring court enquires about the extent to which a court may have international jurisdiction to hear an action seeking compensation for the entirety of the damage caused by a breach of personality rights by broadcasting a series on television. In that regard, first, it seeks to ascertain whether the line of authority devolving from the judgment of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others (C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685), relating to breaches of personality rights committed by publishing information on the internet, is also relevant in the case of the broadcast of audiovisual content on television. If so, persons who consider that their rights have been breached by such a broadcast could bring an action for damages, in respect of the entirety of the alleged damage, before the courts of the Member State in which their centre of interests is located.

18      The referring court observes in particular that, given the current state of technological development, there are no longer significant differences between the various types of media in terms of the reach of their respective dissemination channels, since the same content is often published on their usual channels and on the internet at the same time. Thus, a series broadcast on television is also available on the internet, and the broadcast of a series on television is more often than not accompanied by an internet-based advertising and information campaign. Furthermore, as a result of technological developments in geo-blocking and geo-localisation, the dissemination of content on the internet may be restricted to a specific territory and that content may vary depending on where it is viewed. Consequently, the referring court harbours doubts as to whether or not a criterion based on the technical form taken by the dissemination of content on the internet should be applied in order to determine the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States. To accept that an action seeking compensation for the entirety of the damage caused could be brought in the Member State in which the applicant’s centre of interests is located only if the alleged damage results from dissemination on the internet would, where there is simultaneous online and offline dissemination, lead to fragmentation of the dispute. According to the referring court, that outcome would not be compatible with the requirements of the sound administration of justice.

19      Secondly, the referring court observes that the Court stated, in its judgment of 17 June 2021, Mittelbayerischer Verlag (C‑800/19, EU:C:2021:489), that the court of the centre of interests of an applicant can hear an action for damages, in respect of the entirety of the alleged damage, only where the content contains ‘objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, [the applicant] as an individual’. The referring court has doubts as to how those criteria should be interpreted in a situation such as that at issue in the case before it. More specifically, the series at issue does not make it possible to identify Z.R. individually, let alone Ś., since it is a work of fiction and does not refer directly or indirectly to persons who exist or who once existed. However, that series describes the conduct of a limited, defined group of persons which unquestionably refers to unit X, of which Z.R. was a member, and the defence of the dignity, reputation and memory of which are among Ś.’s objects. Thus, Z.R. and Ś. could be regarded as being indirectly identified.

20      The referring court wonders whether, in the absence of any identification of the applicant as an individual, consideration could nevertheless be given to account being taken of the significance of the content of the message liable to breach the applicant’s personality rights in the Member State in which that person’s centre of interests is located. In that respect, the referring court is of the view that, where that content is of objectively considerable significance in a Member State, the content issuer may reasonably expect an action to be brought before the courts of that Member State. Thus, having regard to the objective pursued by Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation, read in the light of recitals 11 and 12 thereof, those courts could have jurisdiction in respect of the entirety of the alleged damage.

21      In the second place, in the event that the jurisdiction of the Polish courts is limited solely to the extent of the alleged damage which occurred on Polish territory, the referring court also enquires whether some of Z.R. and Ś.’s non-pecuniary claims could fall within that jurisdiction. In its judgment of 17 October 2017, Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan (C‑194/16, EU:C:2017:766), the Court circumscribed that type of jurisdiction, holding that an action for the rectification or removal of content published on the internet is indivisible, with the result that it can be brought only before the courts of the State with international jurisdiction to assess the entirety of the damage caused by the potential breach of personality rights. However, the referring court states that Z.R. and Ś. are not seeking to have the series at issue removed from the internet or to prevent it from being broadcast again on television. What they seek is, first, to have specific information displayed prior to each broadcast of that series and, secondly, an injunction requiring an appropriate statement to be made on the Polish and German television channels and on the websites on which that series was broadcast.

22      In those circumstances, the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)      Must Article 5(3) in conjunction with recitals 11 and 12 of [the Brussels I Regulation] be interpreted as meaning that in a case concerning the infringement of personality rights on the grounds of the content of a cinematographic work, the courts in a Member State in which the film was broadcast, which is different to the Member State in which the film was produced, have international jurisdiction to decide an action seeking:

(a)      non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of the infringement of personality rights, including an order for a statement containing an apology to be issued by the television channels that broadcast the film, regardless of the location from which it was broadcast, and also to be displayed on websites, as well as an order to display a similar statement prior to any broadcast of the film, regardless of the location from which it is broadcast, or

(b)      pecuniary performance (compensation) aimed at making good the entirety of the damage suffered in connection with the infringement of personality rights, inter alia in connection with the dissemination (broadcasting) of the film in other Member States,

having regard to the fact that:

–        the applicants have their centre of interests and place of residence (head office) in that Member State [in which the film was broadcast],

–        the applicants assert that their personality rights have been infringed as a result of the way in which the film depicts the soldiers belonging to a military unit from that Member State ([…]), whereby one of the applicants is a former soldier of that military unit, and the other is an association of former soldiers of that military unit, the particular aim of which, according to its articles of association, is to defend the memory, historical truth and dignity of that unit;

–        given the historical, cultural and social context, the content of the film, including the way in which the soldiers of the abovementioned military unit ([…]) are depicted is objectively of considerable importance for the territory of that Member State?

(2)      In the event that the first question is answered in the negative, should Article 5(3) in conjunction with recitals 11 and [12] of [the Brussels I Regulation] be interpreted as meaning that in a case concerning the infringement of personality rights on the grounds of the content of a cinematographic work, the courts in a Member State in which the film was broadcast that is different to the Member State in which the film was produced have international jurisdiction to decide an action seeking:

(a)      non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of the infringement of personality rights that occurred in connection with the broadcasting of the film in the Member State where the action was brought, including an order for an apology to be issued in this Member State, and also an order to display a corresponding statement prior to any broadcast of the film in that Member State, or

(b)      pecuniary performance (compensation) aimed at making good the damage suffered in connection with the infringement of personality rights as a result of the dissemination (broadcasting) of the film in the Member State where the action was brought,

having regard, where necessary, to the circumstances referred to in [the first, second and third indents of the first question]?’

 Procedure before the Court

23      The referring court requested that this case be dealt with under the expedited procedure, pursuant to Article 105(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, or the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, provided for in Article 107 thereof.

24      By decision of 10 April 2025, the Second Chamber of the Court decided, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, not to grant the request to have the case dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.

25      By order of 22 May 2025, Idziski (C‑232/25, EU:C:2025:389), the President of the Court decided to refuse the referring court’s request to have the case dealt with under the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure. By the same order, in the light of the nature of the case and of the significance of the questions which it raises, the President of the Court nevertheless decided that the case should be heard as a matter of priority, pursuant to Article 53(3) of the Rules of Procedure.

 Consideration of the questions referred

 Preliminary observations

26      As a preliminary point, in the first place, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the first sentence of Article 80 of Regulation No 1215/2012, that regulation repeals and replaces the Brussels I Regulation, which itself replaced the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by the successive conventions on the accession of new Member States to that convention. Consequently, the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of one of those legal instruments also applies to the provisions of the others, whenever those provisions may be regarded as ‘equivalent’. There is such equivalence between, on the one hand, Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation and, on the other, Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 2025, Stichting Right to Consumer Justice and Stichting App Stores Claims, C‑34/24, EU:C:2025:936, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

27      It follows that the Court’s interpretation of the latter provision also applies to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation.

28      In the second place, as regards the determination of the legislation applicable ratione temporis to the dispute in the main proceedings, it should be pointed out that Article 66(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides that the Brussels I Regulation is to continue to apply to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted before 10 January 2015 which fall within the scope of that regulation.

29      In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the applicants in the main proceedings brought their action before the Polish courts on 19 November 2013. It follows – as, moreover, the referring court has stated – that the Brussels I Regulation is applicable ratione temporis to the dispute in the main proceedings.

 The first question

30      By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the Member State in which a natural or legal person’s centre of interests is located have jurisdiction to hear an action brought by that person seeking compensation for the entirety of the damage allegedly suffered by him, her or it as a result of a breach of personality rights following the broadcast of audiovisual content on television in several Member States.

31      In addition, the referring court asks whether the same also applies to a situation in which the content was disseminated on the internet but does not make it possible to identify, even indirectly, that person, even though it unequivocally identifies a limited group whose members constitute a closed category of persons to which the person concerned may be linked.

32      Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation provides that a person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.

33      It should be recalled that, as a derogation from the jurisdiction provided for in Article 2(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, namely that the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled are to have jurisdiction, which constitutes the general rule, the rule of special jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict laid down in Article 5(3) thereof must be interpreted restrictively (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 January 1993, Shearson Lehman Hutton, C‑89/91, EU:C:1993:15, paragraphs 14 to 16, and of 17 June 2021, Mittelbayerischer Verlag, C‑800/19, EU:C:2021:489, paragraph 26).

34      That rule of special jurisdiction is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur, which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings (judgments of 16 July 2009, Zuid-Chemie, C‑189/08, EU:C:2009:475, paragraph 24, and of 21 December 2021, Gtflix Tv, C‑251/20, EU:C:2021:1036, paragraph 24).

35      It follows from the case-law of the Court that the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’, contained in Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation, is intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it. Thus, the defendant may be sued, at the option of the applicant, in the courts for either of those places. Those two places could constitute a significant connecting factor from the point of view of jurisdiction, since each of them could, depending on the circumstances, be particularly helpful in relation to the evidence and the conduct of the proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 November 1976, Bier, 21/76, EU:C:1976:166, paragraphs 15, 17, 24 and 25, and of 2 December 2025, Stichting Right to Consumer Justice and Stichting App Stores Claims, C‑34/24, EU:C:2025:936, paragraph 47).

36      In the present case, the referring court is uncertain whether the Polish courts may assume jurisdiction on the basis of the place where the alleged damage occurred, in circumstances such as those of the dispute in the main proceedings.

37      In that regard, it is settled case-law that, in relation to actions seeking compensation for non-material damage allegedly caused by a defamatory article published in the printed press, the victim may bring an action for damages against the publisher before the courts of each Member State in which the publication was distributed and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to reputation. However, each of those courts has jurisdiction to rule only in respect of the damage caused in its own Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 March 1995, Shevill and Others, C‑68/93, EU:C:1995:61, paragraph 33, and of 21 December 2021, Gtflix Tv, C‑251/20, EU:C:2021:1036, paragraph 29).

38      In the specific context of the internet, the Court has nonetheless ruled, in a case involving an alleged breach of personality rights, that persons who consider that their rights have been breached must also have the option of bringing an action for damages, seeking compensation for all the harm caused, before the courts of the Member State in which their centre of interests is located (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others, C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 52, and of 17 October 2017, Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan, C‑194/16, EU:C:2017:766, paragraph 32).

39      The Court has made clear that, since the option open to persons who consider that their rights have been breached of bringing an action before the courts of the Member State in which their centre of interests is located, in respect of the entirety of the alleged damage, is justified in the interests of the sound administration of justice and not specifically for the purpose of protecting the applicant, whether the person is a natural or legal person is not conclusive (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 October 2017, Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan, C‑194/16, EU:C:2017:766, paragraph 38).

40      In the light of that summary of the case-law, the referring court enquires, in the first place, whether the findings made in the judgment of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others (C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685), recalled in paragraph 38 above, are also relevant in the case of a breach of personality rights following the broadcast of audiovisual content on television in several Member States.

41      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the place where the damage occurred is the place where the event giving rise to the damage, entailing tortious, delictual or quasi-delictual liability, produced its harmful effects upon the victim (judgment of 7 March 1995, Shevill and Others, C‑68/93, EU:C:1995:61, paragraph 28).

42      In the case of an international breach of the personality rights of a natural or legal person relating to the broadcast of audiovisual content on television, the breach occurs in the places where that content is broadcast and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to reputation (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 March 1995, Shevill and Others, C‑68/93, EU:C:1995:61, paragraph 29).

43      In those circumstances, a natural or legal person must be able to bring an action for damages against the producer of that audiovisual content before the courts of each Member State in which that content was broadcast and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to reputation, each of those courts having jurisdiction only to hear an action seeking compensation for the damage caused in its own Member State.

44      That said, the television broadcast of audiovisual content in several Member States must be distinguished from the dissemination of such content on the internet. The placing online of content on a website is to be distinguished, generally, from the regionalised distribution of media in that it is intended, in principle, to ensure the ubiquity of that content. That content may be consulted instantly by an unlimited number of users throughout the world, irrespective of any intention on the part of the person who placed it as regards its consultation beyond that person’s Member State of establishment and outside of that person’s control (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others, C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 45).

45      Those considerations do not apply to the broadcasting of audiovisual content on television. Such broadcasting is not, in principle, available instantly and worldwide, but is regionalised, limited to the geographical area in which the television signal is received.

46      The fact, mentioned by the referring court, that the dissemination and accessibility of a work on the internet could also be restricted to a particular region as a result of technological developments in geo-blocking and geo-localisation does not call the foregoing considerations into question. Even assuming that those or other technological developments might prove to be relevant for determining whether the requirement of ubiquity of the audiovisual content broadcast on the internet is satisfied, such developments have no bearing on the finding that the broadcasting of audiovisual content on television does not satisfy that condition.

47      Those considerations are also not called into question in the situation, also referred to in the request for a preliminary ruling, where audiovisual content is broadcast simultaneously on television and on the internet, on the ground that that would lead to fragmentation of the dispute. Although there are disadvantages to having different courts ruling on various aspects of the same dispute, the applicant always has the option of bringing an action for damages, seeking compensation for all the harm caused, before the courts of the Member State either of the defendant or of the place of the causal event giving rise to the damage, namely the registered office of the producers of the series at issue (see, by analogy, judgments of 7 March 1995, Shevill and Others, C‑68/93, EU:C:1995:61, paragraph 32, and of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others, C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 43).

48      Consequently, in accordance with the linking factor relating to the occurrence of the damage, in the event of an alleged breach of the personality rights of a natural or legal person as a result of content broadcast on television in several Member States, the courts of the Member State in which the applicant’s centre of interests is located do not have jurisdiction to hear an action directed at the entirety of the alleged damage. By contrast, the courts of each Member State in which that content was broadcast on television and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to reputation has jurisdiction to hear an action for compensation brought by that person. The jurisdiction of each of those courts is, however, circumscribed to actions seeking compensation solely for the damage caused in the Member State of the court concerned.

49      In the second place, the referring court enquires whether, in the event of a breach of personality rights because of audiovisual content broadcast on the internet, the courts of the Member State in which the applicant’s centre of interests is located have jurisdiction to hear an action seeking compensation for that breach where that content does not make it possible to identify, even indirectly, that applicant, even though the content unequivocally identifies a limited group whose members constitute a closed category of persons to which the applicant may be linked.

50      In that regard, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the courts of the place in which the centre of interests of a person claiming that his or her personality rights have been breached by content published on a website is located have jurisdiction to hear, in respect of the entirety of the alleged damage, an action for damages brought by that person only if that content contains objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, that person as an individual (judgment of 17 June 2021, Mittelbayerischer Verlag, C‑800/19, EU:C:2021:489, paragraph 46).

51      Such a requirement is necessary in order to ensure the predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down in the Brussels I Regulation and the legal certainty which that regulation seeks to guarantee, particularly with regard to the issuer of the content concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 June 2021, Mittelbayerischer Verlag, C‑800/19, EU:C:2021:489, paragraph 37).

52      In the present case, the series at issue, published on the internet, recounts the conduct of a limited, defined group of persons which, according to the referring court, is unequivocally the group made up of the members of unit X, one of whom was Z.R. The objects of Ś. are, inter alia, to defend the dignity, reputation and memory of that unit and its members.

53      However, it should be observed that the fact that that content refers to a limited, defined group of persons to which Z.R. could be linked is not sufficient to enable him to be identified indirectly as an individual.

54      Subject to verification by the referring court, it is apparent from the documents in the case that the series at issue does not make it possible to identify individually the applicants in the main proceedings inasmuch as it is a work of fiction which recounts the conduct of a group of soldiers – members of unit X – without it being possible to ascertain the true identity of the members depicted in the series.

55      In the light of the objective of predictability of the rules of jurisdiction and the objective of legal certainty, recalled in paragraph 51 above, the criterion relating to the indirect identification of persons claiming that their personality rights have been breached by content published on the internet requires that it be possible to identify those persons with certainty by reason of attributes which are specific to them and which distinguish them from all other individuals.

56      To hold otherwise would mean that the issuer of a message that interferes with personality rights would be unable to ascertain the centre of interests of the persons forming the subject matter of that message and would thus be unable to predict before which court he or she might be sued. Even if the content of such a message was directed only at a limited, defined group of persons to which an applicant could be indirectly linked, the respective centres of interests of the various persons making up that group could be located in different Member States.

57      By contrast, as a limited group whose members constitute a closed category of persons, unit X is, unequivocally, directly identified by the series at issue broadcast on the internet. Thus, the content of that series contains objective and verifiable elements making it possible to identify that group directly by distinguishing it from any other.

58      It follows that the court of the place of the centre of interests of a legal person, whose principal purpose is to defend the interests of a limited group whose members constitute a closed category of persons, has jurisdiction to hear, in respect of the entirety of the alleged damage, an action for damages brought by that legal person, where the audiovisual content broadcast on the internet contains objective and verifiable elements making it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, that group by distinguishing it from any other.

59      That conclusion satisfies the requirement of predictability, in that it enables both the applicant and the defendant to identify the courts having jurisdiction. As regards, in the present case, U. and Z., who are the producers of the series at issue, in so far as that series specifically targets unit X, it is predictable that an action for damages, seeking compensation for all the harm caused, would be brought before the court of the centre of interests of the legal person whose principal purpose is to defend the interests of that unit.

60      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the Member State in which a natural or legal person’s centre of interests is located do not have jurisdiction to hear an action brought by that person seeking compensation for the entirety of the damage allegedly suffered by him, her or it as a result of a breach of personality rights following the broadcast of audiovisual content on television in several Member States. The same is true of the courts of the Member State in which the centre of interests of a natural person is located, where that content was broadcast on the internet but does not make it possible to identify, even indirectly, that person, even though it unequivocally identifies a limited group whose members constitute a closed category of persons to which the person concerned may be linked. By contrast, the courts of the Member State of the centre of interests of a legal person, whose principal purpose is to defend the interests of that group, have jurisdiction to hear its action seeking compensation for the entirety of the damage allegedly suffered by it as a result of a breach of personality rights following the broadcast of that content on the internet.

 The second question

61      By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of a Member State which have jurisdiction to rule solely on the damage caused in their own Member State, resulting from an alleged breach of personality rights relating to the broadcast of a series on the internet and on television, may hear an action against the producer of that series seeking, first, a non-pecuniary remedy aimed at eliminating and precluding the effects of such a breach and, secondly, a pecuniary remedy aimed at securing compensation for the non-material damage resulting from the broadcast of that series.

62      In the present case, the referring court states that the applicants in the main proceedings seek, first, to have specific information displayed prior to each broadcast of that series, whether on the internet or on television. Secondly, they seek an injunction requiring an appropriate statement to be made on Polish and German television channels and on the internet. In addition, they also seek an award of compensation in favour of Z.R. to make good the non-material damage suffered as a result of the broadcast of that series.

63      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in the light of the ubiquitous nature of the information and content placed online on a website and the fact that the scope of their distribution is, in principle, universal, the Court has previously held that an application for the rectification of the former and the removal of the latter is a single and indivisible application. Consequently, such an application can only be made before a court with jurisdiction to rule on the entirety of an application for compensation for damage, and not before a court that does not have jurisdiction to do so (judgments of 17 October 2017, Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan, C‑194/16, EU:C:2017:766, paragraph 48, and of 21 December 2021, Gtflix Tv, C‑251/20, EU:C:2021:1036, paragraph 32).

64      By contrast, the Court has found that, to the extent that an application for compensation is not a single and indivisible application, an applicant may bring proceedings before the courts of each Member State having jurisdiction to rule on a part of the damage caused in the territory of their own Member State, in order to obtain partial compensation which is limited solely to the damage caused in that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2021, Gtflix Tv, C‑251/20, EU:C:2021:1036, paragraphs 35 and 43).

65      It follows from the foregoing that the courts of each Member State having jurisdiction to rule solely on the damage caused in the territory of their own Member State may hear only divisible applications for compensation. Such applications may thus seek to make good or prevent only the damage caused in the Member State of the court seised and must, in their effects, be limited to the territory of that Member State.

66      Therefore, in the present case, as regards solely the damage resulting from an alleged breach of personality rights relating to the broadcast of a series on television, the action brought by the applicants in the main proceedings before the Polish courts would be in line with the rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation, provided that their action is confined to seeking compensation for the damage they consider to have suffered on Polish territory alone or to preventing such damage from occurring.

67      As regards solely the damage resulting from an alleged breach of personality rights relating to the broadcast of a series on the internet, in the light of the answer to the first question, the second question is relevant only for natural persons such as Z.R. The action brought by Z.R. before the Polish courts seeking a pecuniary remedy would be in line with the rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation, provided that the subject matter of that action respects the limits mentioned in the preceding paragraph. By contrast, those courts do not have jurisdiction to hear an action brought by a natural person such as Z.R. seeking a non-pecuniary remedy aimed at securing the rectification of the information in that series placed online.

68      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second question is that Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of a Member State which have jurisdiction to rule solely on the damage caused in their own Member State, resulting from an alleged breach of personality rights relating to the broadcast of a series on television, may hear an action against the producer of that series seeking, first, a non-pecuniary remedy aimed at eliminating and precluding the effects of such a breach and, secondly, a pecuniary remedy aimed at securing compensation for the non-material damage resulting from the broadcast of that series. The same is true of an action brought against that producer seeking a pecuniary remedy aimed at securing compensation for the non-material damage resulting from the broadcast of that series on the internet. By contrast, those courts do not have jurisdiction to hear an action brought against that producer seeking a non-pecuniary remedy aimed at securing the rectification of the information in that series placed online.

 Costs

69      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby rules:

1.      Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters

must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the Member State in which a natural or legal person’s centre of interests is located do not have jurisdiction to hear an action brought by that person seeking compensation for the entirety of the damage allegedly suffered by him, her or it as a result of a breach of personality rights following the broadcast of audiovisual content on television in several Member States. The same is true of the courts of the Member State in which the centre of interests of a natural person is located, where that content was broadcast on the internet but does not make it possible to identify, even indirectly, that person, even though it unequivocally identifies a limited group whose members constitute a closed category of persons to which the person concerned may be linked. By contrast, the courts of the Member State of the centre of interests of a legal person, whose principal purpose is to defend the interests of that group, have jurisdiction to hear its action seeking compensation for the entirety of the damage allegedly suffered by it as a result of a breach of personality rights following the broadcast of that content on the internet.

2.      Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001

must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of a Member State which have jurisdiction to rule solely on the damage caused in their own Member State, resulting from an alleged breach of personality rights relating to the broadcast of a series on television, may hear an action against the producer of that series seeking, first, a non-pecuniary remedy aimed at eliminating and precluding the effects of such a breach and, secondly, a pecuniary remedy aimed at securing compensation for the non-material damage resulting from the broadcast of that series. The same is true of an action brought against that producer seeking a pecuniary remedy aimed at securing compensation for the non-material damage resulting from the broadcast of that series on the internet. By contrast, those courts do not have jurisdiction to hear an action brought against that producer seeking a non-pecuniary remedy aimed at securing the rectification of the information in that series placed online.

[Signatures]

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*      Language of the case: Polish.

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i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.