Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 4 June 2026.#PM and Others v Minister van Asiel en Migratie.#Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank den Haag zittingsplaats Zwolle.#Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Asylum policy – Common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection – Directive 2013/32/EU – Article 46 – Right to an effective remedy – Full and ex nunc examination – Extent of the powers of the first-instance court or tribunal – Examination of the facts by the first-instance court or tribunal – Examination of the international protection needs by the first-instance court or tribunal – Refugee status or subsidiary protection status – Directive 2011/95/EU – Standards for the qualification of third-country nationals as beneficiaries of refugee status – Article 2(d) – ‘Well-founded fear of being persecuted’ – Assessment.#Case C-440/25.

Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Second Chamber)

4 June 2026 (*)

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Asylum policy – Common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection – Directive 2013/32/EU – Article 46 – Right to an effective remedy – Full and ex nunc examination – Extent of the powers of the first-instance court or tribunal – Examination of the facts by the first-instance court or tribunal – Examination of the international protection needs by the first-instance court or tribunal – Refugee status or subsidiary protection status – Directive 2011/95/EU – Standards for the qualification of third-country nationals as beneficiaries of refugee status – Article 2(d) – ‘Well-founded fear of being persecuted’ – Assessment )

In Case C‑440/25 [Ebilum], (i)

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle (District Court, The Hague, sitting in Zwolle, Netherlands), made by decision of 4 July 2025, received at the Court on 4 July 2025, in the proceedings

PM,

QN,

RM,

SM,

TM,

UM,

VM,

WM

v

Minister van Asiel en Migratie,

THE COURT (Second Chamber),

composed of K. Jürimäe, President of the Chamber, K. Lenaerts, President of the Court, acting as Judge of the Second Chamber, F. Schalin, M. Gavalec (Rapporteur) and Z. Csehi, Judges,

Advocate General: T. Ćapeta,

Registrar: A. Lamote, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 27 October 2025,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

–        PM, QN, RM, SM, TM, UM, VM and WM, by T. Neijzen, advocate, and by S. Rafi, expert,

–        the Netherlands Government, by A. Hanje and J. Langer, acting as Agents,

–        the Czech Government, by A. Edelmannová, L. Halajová and J. Vláčil, acting as Agents,

–        the German Government, by J. Möller and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents,

–        the European Commission, by F. Blanc, M. Debieuvre and F. van Schaik, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 4 December 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of (i) Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60), taken in isolation or read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and (ii) Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).

2        The request has been made in proceedings between PM, QN, RM, SM, TM, UM, VM and WM, Iraqi nationals and members of the same family, on the one hand, and the Minister van Asiel en Migratie (Minister for Asylum and Migration, Netherlands) (‘the Minister’), on the other, concerning the decisions of the Minister to reject those Iraqi nationals’ applications for international protection.

 Legal context

 European Union law

 Directive 2011/95

3        Recital 4 of Directive 2011/95 states:

‘The [Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 189, p. 150, No 2545 (1954)) (“the Geneva Convention”)] and the Protocol [relating to the Status of Refugees, concluded in New York on 31 January 1967] provide the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees.’

4        Article 2 of that directive, entitled ‘Definitions’, provides, in point (d) thereof:

‘“refugee” means a third-country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it, and to whom Article 12 does not apply’.

5        Article 4 of Directive 2011/95, entitled ‘Assessment of facts and circumstances’, provides:

‘1.      Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all the elements needed to substantiate the application for international protection. In cooperation with the applicant, it is the duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application.

2.      The elements referred to in paragraph 1 consist of the applicant’s statements and all the documentation at the applicant’s disposal regarding the applicant’s age, background, including that of relevant relatives, identity, nationality(ies), country(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, travel documents and the reasons for applying for international protection.

3.      The assessment of an application for international protection is to be carried out on an individual basis and includes taking into account:

(a)      all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on the application, including laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied;

(b)      the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant including information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm;

(c)      the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors such as background, gender and age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant’s personal circumstances, the acts to which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or serious harm;

(d)      whether the applicant’s activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international protection, so as to assess whether those activities would expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if returned to that country;

(e)      whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself or herself of the protection of another country where he or she could assert citizenship.

4.      The fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious indication of the applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.

5.      Where Member States apply the principle according to which it is the duty of the applicant to substantiate the application for international protection and where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation when the following conditions are met:

(a)      the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application;

(b)      all relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation has been given regarding any lack of other relevant elements;

(c)      the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant’s case;

(d)      the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and

(e)      the general credibility of the applicant has been established.’

 Directive 2013/32

6        Recitals 10, 16, 18, 22 and 34 of Directive 2013/32 are worded as follows:

‘(10)      When implementing this Directive, Member States should take into account relevant guidelines developed by [the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which was replaced in 2022 by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)].

…

(16)      It is essential that decisions on all applications for international protection be taken on the basis of the facts and, in the first instance, by authorities whose personnel has the appropriate knowledge or has received the necessary training in the field of international protection.

…

(18)      It is in the interests of both Member States and applicants for international protection that a decision is made as soon as possible on applications for international protection, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination being carried out.

…

(22)      It is also in the interests of both Member States and applicants to ensure a correct recognition of international protection needs already at first instance. To that end, applicants should be provided at first instance, free of charge, with legal and procedural information, taking into account their particular circumstances. The provision of such information should, inter alia, enable the applicants to better understand the procedure, thus helping them to comply with the relevant obligations. It would be disproportionate to require Member States to provide such information only through the services of qualified lawyers. Member States should therefore have the possibility to use the most appropriate means to provide such information, such as through non-governmental organisations or professionals from government authorities or specialised services of the State.

…

(34)      Procedures for examining international protection needs should be such as to enable the competent authorities to conduct a rigorous examination of applications for international protection.’

7        Article 2 of that directive, entitled ‘Definitions’, provides, in point (f) thereof:

‘“determining authority” means any quasi-judicial or administrative body in a Member State responsible for examining applications for international protection competent to take decisions at first instance in such cases’.

8        Article 46 of Directive 2013/32, entitled ‘The right to an effective remedy’, provides, in paragraphs 1 and 3 thereof:

‘1.      Member States shall ensure that applicants have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against the following:

(a)      a decision taken on their application for international protection, including a decision:

(i)      considering an application to be unfounded in relation to refugee status and/or subsidiary protection status;

…

3.      In order to comply with paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to [Directive 2011/95], at least in appeals procedures before a court or tribunal of first instance.’

 Netherlands law

9        Article 3:3 of the wet houdende algemene regels van bestuursrecht (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) (Law laying down general rules of administrative law (General Law on Administrative Law)) of 4 June 1992 (Stb. 1992, n^o 315), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the Awb’), provides:

‘The administrative body shall not use the power to take a decision for any purpose other than that for which that power was granted.’

10      Article 6:19 of the Awb provides:

‘1.      The objection or appeal shall by operation of law also apply to a decision to withdraw, amend or substitute the contested decision, unless the parties concerned have an insufficient interest in that regard.

…

6.      Withdrawal or substitution of the contested decision shall not preclude the annulment of that decision if the person lodging the notice of objection or appeal has an interest in that regard.’

 The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

11      PM, QN, RM, SM, TM, UM, VM and WM (together, ‘the applicants in the main proceedings’) are Iraqi nationals and members of the same family, which consists of two parents and their six children, including several daughters (‘the daughters’).

12      The applicants in the main proceedings lodged applications for international protection in the Netherlands in 2017. Those applications were based on three sets of grounds, namely (i) issues with a neighbour, as well as fear of a vendetta and the daughters being forced into marriage; (ii) fear of the daughters being circumcised; and (iii) the daughters identifying with the fundamental value of equality between women and men, as well as the fear of being persecuted upon return to Iraq.

13      By decisions of 11 September 2023, the Minister rejected those applications for international protection as manifestly unfounded. The applicants in the main proceedings have brought an action against those decisions before the rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle (District Court, The Hague, sitting in Zwolle, Netherlands), which is the referring court.

14      The referring court examined the action at a hearing held on 26 March 2024, and then reopened the investigation in anticipation of the delivery of the judgment of 11 June 2024, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Women identifying with the value of gender equality) (C‑646/21, EU:C:2024:487), on the ground that that judgment could be relevant in the context of the examination of that action.

15      Following the delivery of that judgment, the Minister held an additional hearing for the applicants in the main proceedings, before issuing a new draft decision, and, by complementary decisions of 25 February 2025, confirmed the rejection of the applications for international protection. However, the Minister provided a complementary statement of reasons as regards both the alleged identification with the fundamental value of equality between men and women and the fear of the daughters being circumcised and forced into marriage.

16      The decisions of 11 September 2023 and the complementary decisions of 25 February 2025 (together, ‘the decisions at issue in the main proceedings’) have been challenged by the applicants in the main proceedings.

17      Although the Minister has adopted decisions withdrawing the decisions at issue in the main proceedings, the referring court emphasises that, in accordance with Article 6:19 of the Awb, it has the power to annul those withdrawal decisions, because the applicants in the main proceedings have an interest in the annulment of those decisions. It indicates, in that regard, that the decisions withdrawing the decisions at issue in the main proceedings may be annulled on two different grounds. First, those withdrawal decisions were adopted in breach of Article 3:3 of the Awb and can thus be annulled on that ground. Second, the withdrawal decisions constitute an improper interference by the Minister in the proceedings before the referring court, with the result that they are contrary to Article 47 of the Charter, as well as Article 46 of Directive 2013/32, and can be annulled on that second ground. Lastly, the referring court notes that, because of the annulment of the withdrawal decisions, it is in a position to examine the merits of the decisions at issue in the main proceedings.

18      Regarding the rejection of the applications for international protection lodged by the applicants in the main proceedings, the referring court considers that it has sufficient information (i) to carry out, by itself, the assessment of the credibility of certain elements of the account given in support of the applications for asylum, namely the daughters identifying with the fundamental value of equality between women and men, and (ii) to carry out, by itself, an assessment of certain grounds relied on in support of the applications for international protection, namely the issues with the neighbour, the fear of a vendetta, and the fear of the daughters being forced into marriage.

19      However, the referring court explains that, according to the case-law of the Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, Netherlands), it cannot carry out such assessments. According to that national case-law, a court ruling on the legality of a decision rejecting an application for international protection which considers that the statement of reasons given in connection with the assessment of the credibility of the account provided in support of that application set out in such a decision is insufficient may not itself give a ruling either on the credibility of that account or on that application. Such a court must annul such a rejection decision and then refer the case back to the Minister in order that the latter may re-examine the application for international protection.

20      The referring court indicates that it has doubts as to whether that national case-law is in line with Directive 2013/32.

21      As regards the fear of the applicants in the main proceedings of being persecuted upon their return to Iraq, the referring court adds that the concept of ‘well-founded fear’ is not defined by Directive 2011/95 and that, at national level, no standard for assessing such a fear has been established. If such a fear fell to be assessed using a mathematical calculation of probability, the referring court considers that it would have to refer the case back to the Minister in that regard in order for the latter to carry out such a calculation in so far as, as the case file and the information regarding the country concerned currently stand, the referring court does not have before it the information necessary to do so.

22      In those circumstances, the rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle (District Court, The Hague, sitting in Zwolle) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)      Can the [rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle (District Court, The Hague, sitting in Zwolle)] derive from Article 46(3) of [Directive 2013/32], whether or not read in conjunction with Article 47 of [the Charter], or from any other provision or principle of EU law, the power to make its own ruling on the credibility of an asylum account, superseding the ruling made by the Minister?

(2)      Can the [rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle (District Court, The Hague, sitting in Zwolle)] derive from any of the abovementioned provisions the power to make a substantive and final ruling on the application for international protection on the basis of those parts of the asylum account which the Minister deems credible and, if the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, those parts of the asylum account which the court also deems credible? In that regard, may the court substitute its own [assessment of] the plausibility of the fear of persecution or the real risk of serious harm for that of the Minister, especially if, against the background of [the available and] publicly accessible country information, the court considers itself sufficiently informed to [carry out] such [an assessment]?

(3)      Can national case-law constrain the powers referred to in Questions 1 and 2, for example on the [ground] of procedural autonomy, to the effect that those powers are still vested exclusively in the Minister?

(4)      May the [rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle (District Court, The Hague, sitting in Zwolle)] take into account information which was put forward on appeal, but which was not yet available at the administrative stage, in the ruling on the question whether it has enough information to make a substantive ruling? Is it relevant in that regard whether the parties have been able to express their views fully on the facts in writing or at the hearing?

(5)      Should “well-founded fear” as referred to in Article 2(d) of [Directive 2011/95] be understood as meaning that there is a reasonable likelihood that the asylum seeker will be persecuted upon return? Should that reasonable likelihood be determined on the basis of the criterion of a “rational and reasonable person”, whereby the decisive factor is whether, from the perspective of a rational and reasonable person in the position of the asylum seeker, a return to the country of origin appears unreasonable after weighing up all the known circumstances? If not, what criteria should be applied?’

 Procedure before the Court

23      The referring court requested that the case be determined pursuant to the urgent preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 23a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and in Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.

24      On 22 July 2025, the Second Chamber of the Court, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decided not to grant that request.

25      By order of the President of the Court of 19 August 2025, it was decided that the case should be determined pursuant to the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105(1) of the Rules of Procedure.

 Regulations (EU) 2024/1347 and (EU) 2024/1348

26      Without having formally made reference, in its questions, to Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted, amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC and repealing Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L, 2024/1347, and corrigendum OJ L, 2025/90926), or Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU (OJ L, 2024/1348), the referring court has asked the Court of Justice to include those regulations in the answers given to those questions, given that it could be called upon to apply them in connection with the examination of the dispute in the main proceedings.

27      It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it. To that end, the Court may deem it necessary to consider provisions of EU law to which the national court has not referred in the text of its questions (see judgments of 20 March 1986, Tissier, 35/85, EU:C:1986:143, paragraph 9, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 44).

28      However, first, it should be noted that, pursuant to Article 42 of Regulation 2024/1347, that regulation is to apply from 12 June 2026.

29      Thus, it is not established that the interpretation of that regulation is necessary to enable the referring court to give a ruling in the case in the main proceedings.

30      In any event, it should be noted that Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95 and Article 3(5) of Regulation 2024/1347, which define the concept of ‘refugee’, are worded identically. Accordingly, the interpretation of the expression ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ set out in Article 2(d) of that directive is relevant for the purposes of a possible interpretation of the same expression as used in Article 3(5) of that regulation.

31      Second, it follows from Article 79(2) and (3) of Regulation 2024/1348 that (i) that regulation is to apply from 12 June 2026 and (ii) that regulation is to apply to the procedure for granting international protection in relation to applications lodged as from 12 June 2026.

32      It follows that applications for international protection, such as those lodged by the applicants in the main proceedings, lodged before that date, are governed by Directive 2013/32.

33      In those circumstances, there is no need to interpret Regulations 2024/1347 and 2024/1348.

 Consideration of the questions referred

 The first, second, third and fourth questions

34      By its first, second, third and fourth questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, (i) whether Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, is to be interpreted as conferring on a first-instance court or tribunal before which an action has been brought against a decision rejecting an application for international protection the power to give a binding ruling on the credibility of the account provided in support of that application, on the plausibility of the applicant’s fear of persecution or the real risk of that applicant suffering serious harm upon return to his or her country of origin, as well as on the merits of that application, taking into consideration evidence submitted in the course of the appeal procedure, and (ii) whether, where applicable, the Member States may place constraints on that power so that only the determining authority as defined in Article 2(f) of that directive (‘the determining authority’) has the power to assess applications for international protection and to decide on the merits of those applications.

35      In the first place, it should be noted that Directive 2013/32 distinguishes between the ‘determining authority’, which it defines in Article 2(f) thereof as ‘any quasi-judicial or administrative body in a Member State responsible for examining applications for international protection competent to take decisions at first instance in such cases’, and the ‘court or tribunal’ referred to in Article 46 of that directive. The procedure before a determining authority is governed by the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2013/32, entitled ‘Procedures at first instance’, while the procedure before a court or tribunal must comply with the rules laid down in Chapter V thereof, entitled ‘Appeals procedures’, which is made up of Article 46 of that directive (see judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 103, and of 16 July 2020, Addis, C‑517/17, EU:C:2020:579, paragraph 61).

36      As can be seen from recital 34 of Directive 2013/32, procedures for examining international protection needs should be such as to enable the competent authorities to conduct a rigorous examination of applications for international protection.

37      It should also be emphasised that it follows from recitals 16 and 22, from Article 4, and from the general scheme of that directive that the examination of the application for international protection by an administrative or quasi-judicial body with specific resources and specialised staff in this area is a vital stage of the common procedures established by the directive (see judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 116, and of 16 July 2020, Addis, C‑517/17, EU:C:2020:579, paragraph 61).

38      In addition, it should be borne in mind that the assessment governed by Article 4 of Directive 2011/95, pursuant to which the determining authority must adopt a decision on an application for international protection, takes place in two separate stages. In the course of the first stage, the determining authority must establish the factual circumstances which may constitute evidence that supports that application. In the course of the second stage, it must carry out a legal appraisal of that evidence, which entails deciding whether, in the light of the specific facts of a given case, the substantive conditions for the grant of international protection are satisfied (see, by analogy, judgment of 22 November 2012, M., C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraph 64).

39      It is, admittedly, true that the assessment of the credibility of an account provided in support of an application for international protection and the assessment of the plausibility of the fear of persecution or of the real risk of suffering serious harm form part of that first stage and the assessment of the facts. However, that factual assessment does not fall outside the remit of a first-instance court or tribunal before which an action has been brought against a decision rejecting an application for international protection.

40      Indeed, Article 46(1) of Directive 2013/32 recognises that applicants for international protection have a right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal against decisions taken on such applications. Article 46(3) of that directive defines the scope of that right, specifying that the Member States bound by that directive must ensure that the court or tribunal before which a decision relating to an application for international protection is contested carries out ‘a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to [Directive 2011/95]’ (see judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 106, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 76).

41      As regards the scope of that right, the Court has held that the words ‘shall ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law’ must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States are required, by virtue of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, to order their national law in such a way that the processing of the appeals referred to includes an examination, by the court or tribunal, of all the facts and points of law necessary in order to make an up-to-date assessment of the case at hand (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 110, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 81).

42      In that regard, the Court has specified that the expression ‘ex nunc’ points to the court or tribunal’s obligation to make an assessment that takes into account, should the need arise, new evidence which has come to light after the adoption of the decision under appeal (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 111, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 82).

43      Such an assessment makes it possible to deal with the application for international protection exhaustively without there being any need to refer the case back to the determining authority (judgment of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 112).

44      In addition, the Court has indicated that the adjective ‘full’ used in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 confirms that the court or tribunal is required to examine both the evidence which the determining authority took into account or should have taken into account and that which has arisen following the adoption of the decision by that authority (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 113, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 83).

45      Accordingly, first, in accordance with the case-law of the Court referred to in paragraphs 41 to 43 of the present judgment, a first-instance court or tribunal before which an action has been brought against a decision rejecting an application for international protection has the power to assess the facts and to carry out its own exhaustive and up-to-date assessment of the facts being disputed before it.

46      Only the examination of the facts enables the credibility of an account provided in support of an application for international protection to be assessed, as well as the plausibility of the fear of persecution or of the real risk of suffering serious harm, which are essential components of the examination of the need for such protection.

47      Second, a first-instance court or tribunal before which an action has been brought against a decision rejecting an application for international protection is required, as can be seen from paragraphs 42 and 44 of the present judgment, to examine both the evidence which the determining authority took into account or should have taken into account and that which has arisen following the adoption of the decision by that authority.

48      This means that such a court or tribunal may take into account evidence which has been submitted in the course of the appeal procedure but which was not yet available at the administrative stage.

49      In addition, the processing of an application for international protection would be considerably delayed if a first-instance court or tribunal before which an action has been brought against a decision rejecting such an application were required to refer the case back to the determining authority in order for such evidence to be taken into consideration by that authority for the purpose of taking a decision on the applicant’s need for international protection.

50      The power of such a court or tribunal to take into consideration new evidence on which that authority has not taken a decision is thus consistent with the purpose of Directive 2013/32, which seeks in particular, as is apparent inter alia from recital 18 thereof, to ensure that applications for international protection are dealt with ‘as soon as possible …, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination being carried out’ (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraphs 111 and 112, and of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraphs 78 and 88).

51      As regards the question whether the applicant for international protection and the determining authority must have the possibility of expressing their views regarding that new evidence, the Court has indicated that the court or tribunal is required, as follows from Article 47 of the Charter, to offer the applicant the opportunity to express his or her views when that evidence could affect him or her negatively (judgment of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 114).

52      That court or tribunal must also, in accordance with the principle audi alteram partem, provide the determining authority with the opportunity to submit its observations regarding such new evidence.

53      Such an interpretation is all the more appropriate given that that court or tribunal must take into account that new evidence in order to be able to give an exhaustive ruling on the application for international protection.

54      It follows that, in order to meet the requirement, laid down in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, that there be a full and ex nunc examination, a national first-instance court or tribunal before which an action has been brought against a decision of the determining authority rejecting an application for international protection must (i) have the power to carry out its own assessment of the facts and (ii) take into account new evidence which has come to light following the adoption of the decision under appeal, while ensuring that the parties have the opportunity to submit their observations regarding that evidence.

55      In the second place, it follows from the case-law of the Court that, by providing that the court or tribunal with jurisdiction to rule on an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection is required to examine, where applicable, the ‘international protection needs’ of the applicant, the EU legislature, through the adoption of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, intended to confer on such a court or tribunal, where it considers that it has available to it all the elements of fact and law necessary in that regard, the power to give a binding ruling following a full and ex nunc – that is to say exhaustive and up-to-date – examination of those elements, as to whether the applicant concerned satisfies the conditions laid down in Directive 2011/95 to be granted international protection (judgment of 29 July 2019, Torubarov, C‑556/17, EU:C:2019:626, paragraph 65).

56      First, it follows from that case-law, as well as from paragraphs 41 to 44 of the present judgment, that the legislature has defined, in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, the scope and the rigorousness of the examination, by a national first-instance court or tribunal before which an action has been brought against a decision of the determining authority rejecting an application for international protection, of the applicant’s international protection needs. Accordingly, the definition of the scope and rigorousness of that examination does not fall within the procedural autonomy of the Member States. Therefore, the Member States may not place constraints on the power of such a court or tribunal to rule on those international protection needs.

57      It is not possible to argue otherwise on the ground that the determining authority would be best placed and equipped to examine the merits of applications for international protection. It is true that the examination of such an application by that authority is, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 37 of the present judgment, an essential stage of the common procedures introduced by Directive 2013/32. However, in the context of the system put in place by that directive, that authority is not the only one with the power to assess applications for international protection and to decide on the merits of those applications, as can be seen from, inter alia, the case-law cited in paragraph 55 of the present judgment.

58      Similarly, it follows from the foregoing considerations that, contrary to the assertions made by the Netherlands Government in its observations, the power conferred on a national first-instance court or tribunal before which an action has been brought against a decision of the determining authority rejecting an application for international protection goes beyond ‘review with an appropriate degree of restraint’ of the determining authority’s decision. Consequently, such a court or tribunal cannot be required to exercise that power ‘with restraint’, but must carry out a full and ex nunc examination, that is to say, an exhaustive and up-to-date examination, of the matters of fact and of law, as well as the international protection needs of the applicant.

59      Second, it is true that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 only concerns the examination of the appeal brought and does not therefore govern what happens after any annulment of the decision under appeal (judgment of 29 July 2019, Torubarov, C‑556/17, EU:C:2019:626, paragraph 54).

60      However, it also follows from case-law that the recognition of such a court or tribunal as having the power to give a binding ruling on the question whether an applicant satisfies the conditions laid down in Directive 2011/95 to be granted international protection means that, where that court or tribunal annuls a decision of an administrative authority following an exhaustive and up-to-date examination of the international protection needs of an applicant in the light of all the relevant elements of fact and law and finds that that applicant must be granted international protection, and then refers the case back to that administrative authority in order that that authority may adopt a new decision, the administrative authority is required to grant the international protection sought, subject to matters of fact or law arising that objectively require a new up-to-date assessment. Similarly, if the same administrative authority subsequently adopts a decision to the contrary, without establishing in that regard that new matters have arisen justifying a new assessment of the international protection needs of the applicant, that court or tribunal must vary that decision which does not comply with its previous judgment and substitute its own decision as regards the application for international protection, disapplying, as required, any national legislation prohibiting it from doing so (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2019, Torubarov, C‑556/17, EU:C:2019:626, paragraphs 66, 73, 75, 77 and 78).

61      In the present case, it can be seen from the explanations provided by the referring court that that court considers that it has sufficient information to carry out itself an assessment of the credibility of certain elements of the account provided by the applicants for international protection, as well as certain grounds relied on in support of their applications for international protection. However, it explains that, according to the case-law of the Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State), it does not have the power to carry out such assessments and must confine itself to annulling the decisions at issue in the main proceedings and then referring the case back to the Minister in order that the latter may re-examine the applications for international protection.

62      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, when national courts apply domestic law, they are bound to interpret it, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive, and consequently comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU (judgment of 6 November 2018, Bauer and Willmeroth, C‑569/16 and C‑570/16, EU:C:2018:871, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

63      The principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by it, with a view to ensuring that the directive in question is fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (judgment of 6 November 2018, Bauer and Willmeroth, C‑569/16 and C‑570/16, EU:C:2018:871, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

64      As has been held by the Court, the requirement to interpret national law in conformity with EU law includes, in particular, the obligation for national courts to change their established case-law, where necessary, if it is based on an interpretation of national law that is incompatible with the objectives of a directive. Consequently, a national court cannot, inter alia, validly consider that it is impossible for it to interpret a provision of national law in conformity with EU law merely because that provision has consistently been interpreted in a manner that is incompatible with EU law (judgment of 17 April 2018, Egenberger, C‑414/16, EU:C:2018:257, paragraphs 72 and 73 and the case-law cited).

65      However, if such a consistent interpretation were to prove impossible, the Court has emphasised the imperative of the court with jurisdiction to set aside, with a view to applying EU law, national legislative provisions that might prevent EU rules which have direct effect, such as Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, from having full force and effect (judgment of 3 April 2025, Barouk, C‑283/24, EU:C:2025:236, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

66      Lastly, the possibility of bringing an appeal against the decision of a national first-instance court or tribunal before which an action has been brought against a decision of the determining authority rejecting an application for international protection is not capable of calling the foregoing considerations into question.

67      According to the wording of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, the effective remedy for which provision must be made by the Member States is to concern ‘at least … appeals procedures before a court or tribunal of first instance’. That provision thus requires the Member States to make provision for such a remedy while leaving them the possibility of introducing an appeal or cassation procedure, without however having the characteristics of the examination provided for by that provision differ depending on whether the Member States make use of that possibility.

68      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first, second, third and fourth questions is that Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, first, it confers on a first-instance court or tribunal before which an action has been brought against a decision rejecting an application for international protection the power to give a binding ruling on the credibility of the account provided in support of that application, on the plausibility of the applicant’s fear of persecution or the real risk of that applicant suffering serious harm upon return to his or her country of origin, as well as on the merits of that application, taking into consideration evidence submitted in the course of the appeal procedure, and, second, the Member States may not place constraints on that power.

 The fifth question

69      By its fifth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95 is to be interpreted as meaning that the expression ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ refers to a situation where there is a reasonable likelihood that an applicant for international protection will be persecuted upon return to his or her country of origin, and, where applicable, what are the criteria according to which the existence of such a reasonable likelihood is to be established.

70      In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court has two standards in mind for assessing the well-founded fear of being persecuted. On the one hand, that fear could be assessed by means of a mathematical calculation of probability. On the other hand, that fear could be defined as ‘a reasonable likelihood’ or ‘a reasonable chance’ of being persecuted. In that scenario, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether the relevant criterion consists in determining whether, from the perspective of a rational and reasonable person in the position of the applicant for international protection, a return to the country of origin appears unreasonable after weighing up all the known circumstances.

71      In that regard, in the first place, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95, which reproduces Article 1(A)(2) of the Geneva Convention, a ‘refugee’ means, inter alia, a third-country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.

72      Regarding the assessment of the question whether an applicant for international protection has a well-founded fear of being persecuted, the Court has emphasised that such an assessment must be carried out with vigilance and care, as what are at issue are questions relating to the integrity of the person and to individual liberties, questions which relate to the fundamental values of the Union (see, by analogy, judgment of 2 March 2010, Salahadin Abdulla and Others, C‑175/08, C‑176/08, C‑178/08 and C‑179/08, EU:C:2010:105, paragraphs 88 to 90).

73      It can also be seen from the case-law of the Court that, in the scheme of Directive 2011/95, the assessment of the well-foundedness of an applicant’s fear of being persecuted must, in accordance with Article 4(3) thereof, be individual in character and be carried out on a case-by-case basis. When the competent national authorities carry out such an assessment, they must determine whether the circumstances established constitute such a threat that the person concerned may reasonably fear, in the light of his or her individual situation, that he or she will in fact be subject to acts of persecution. That determination must be based solely on a specific evaluation of the facts and circumstances, in accordance with the rules laid down in particular by Article 4(3) to (5) of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 September 2023, Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (Political opinions in the host Member State), C‑151/22, EU:C:2023:688, paragraph 42).

74      Article 4(3) of Directive 2011/95 lists, in points (a) to (e) thereof, the elements that must be taken into account for that purpose, which include, in particular, all relevant facts as they relate to the applicant’s country of origin at the time of taking a decision on his or her application, statements and documentation on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution, as well as his or her individual position and personal circumstances. Article 4(4) of that directive specifies that the fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution, or to direct threats of such persecution, is a serious indication of the applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution will not be repeated.

75      Thus, the competent authorities of the Member States must carry out an exhaustive and thorough examination of all the relevant circumstances, relating to the specific personal situation of that applicant and of the more general context of his or her country of origin, from, inter alia, a political, legal, judicial, historical and sociocultural perspective, in order to determine whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of being personally persecuted (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 September 2023, Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (Political opinions in the host Member State), C‑151/22, EU:C:2023:688, paragraph 45).

76      It thus follows from the case-law of the Court that, in order to determine whether an applicant for international protection has a well-founded fear of being persecuted, it is necessary to carry out, with vigilance and care, an individual, specific and objective assessment of that applicant’s personal situation, of the facts and circumstances relating to his or her application, and of the facts and circumstances relating to the situation in his or her country of origin.

77      In the second place, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, Directive 2011/95 must be interpreted not only in the light of its general scheme and purpose, but also in a manner consistent with the Geneva Convention – which, as set out in recital 4 of that directive, constitutes ‘the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees’ (judgment of 4 October 2024, Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl and Others (Afghan women), C‑608/22 and C‑609/22, EU:C:2024:828, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

78      In that context, in the light of the role conferred on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) by the Geneva Convention, the documents issued by the HCR are particularly relevant (judgment of 16 January 2024, Intervyuirasht organ na DAB pri MS (Women victims of domestic violence), C‑621/21, EU:C:2024:47, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

79      The expression ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ set out in Article 1(A)(2) of the Geneva Convention is interpreted in paragraphs 37 to 50 of the HCR’s document HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.2 issued in February 2019 and entitled ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’.

80      According to that document, a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ has a subjective dimension and an objective dimension. Having regard to the subjective nature of the fear, the assessment of the situation of an applicant for international protection consists more in an evaluation of the applicant’s statements than in a judgement on the situation prevailing in his or her country of origin. However, in so far as that subjective element is qualified by the words ‘well-founded’, refugee status must not be determined only by that applicant’s frame of mind, but must be based on an objective situation and an individual assessment. Thus, in order to assess whether there is a well-founded fear, both elements must be taken into consideration.

81      First, it follows from those indications that the assessment of whether there is a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ cannot be carried out solely from the subjective perspective of the applicant for international protection, but must be based on an objective assessment of the situation.

82      Second, the standard required is that of a reasonable fear or a fear that can be established to a reasonable degree.

83      In the third place, it should be borne in mind that, according to recital 10 of Directive 2013/32, the Member States should take into account relevant guidelines developed by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which was replaced in 2022 by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), when implementing that directive.

84      First, the EUAA indicates, on pages 20 and 21 of its practical guide, entitled ‘Qualification for international protection’, that, in order to be considered well founded, the subjective fear of an applicant for international protection must be objectively substantiated. In addition, in order to assess that applicant’s position, it is necessary to examine his or her individual situation in the light of information regarding the general situation in his or her country of origin.

85      Second, on pages 109 and 110 of its ‘Practical Guide on Evidence and Risk Assessment’, the EUAA specifies that a fear of persecution is to be regarded as well founded where the likelihood of the risk of persecution occurring meets a certain threshold. According to that practical guide, it is appropriate to require a reasonable degree of likelihood, so that, even if a mere possibility of persecution is not sufficient to establish that the fear relied on is well founded, it nevertheless should not be required that that likelihood be a certainty.

86      It follows from those three sets of considerations that, in order to establish that there is a well-founded fear of persecution, the competent national authorities cannot view the situation solely from the subjective perspective of the applicant for international protection, but must carry out an individual, specific and objective assessment of that applicant’s personal situation, of the facts and circumstances relating to his or her application, and of the facts and circumstances relating to the situation in his or her country of origin.

87      In addition, it follows from those sets of considerations that the fear of being persecuted must be considered to be established where there is a reasonable likelihood that the risk of persecution relied on by the applicant will occur upon return to his or her country of origin.

88      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the fifth question is that Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95 must be interpreted as meaning that the expression ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ refers to a situation where there is a reasonable likelihood that an applicant for international protection will be persecuted upon return to his or her country of origin, and that, in order to establish the existence of such a fear, the competent national authorities must carry out an individual, specific and objective assessment of that applicant’s personal situation, of the facts and circumstances relating to his or her application, and of the facts and circumstances relating to the situation in his or her country of origin.

 Costs

89      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby rules:

1.      Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as meaning that first, it confers on a first-instance court or tribunal before which an action has been brought against a decision rejecting an application for international protection the power to give a binding ruling on the credibility of the account provided in support of that application, on the plausibility of the applicant’s fear of persecution or the real risk of that applicant suffering serious harm upon return to his or her country of origin, as well as on the merits of that application, taking into consideration evidence submitted in the course of the appeal procedure, and, second, the Member States may not place constraints on that power.

2.      Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted,

must be interpreted as meaning that the expression ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ refers to a situation where there is a reasonable likelihood that an applicant for international protection will be persecuted upon return to his or her country of origin, and that, in order to establish the existence of such a fear, the competent national authorities must carry out an individual, specific and objective assessment of that applicant’s personal situation, of the facts and circumstances relating to his or her application, and of the facts and circumstances relating to the situation in his or her country of origin.

[Signatures]

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*      Language of the case: Dutch.

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i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.